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RECOVERING HYPERBOLE:  RE-IMAGINING THE LIMITS OF RHETORIC FOR 
AN AGE OF EXCESS 
 
by 
 
JOSHUA R. RITTER 
 
Under the Direction of James Darsey 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Hyperbole has a varied and contentious history, and its forms and functions are largely 
ignored and dismissed today.  Often misunderstood, hyperbole nevertheless offers critical 
insights into our understandings of epistemology and ontology that cannot go unexplored.  
In order to recover and reinvigorate a theory of hyperbole within the field of rhetorical 
theory and criticism, I explore the history of this critical trope from ancient to modern 
times.  I then offer two functions and one meta-function of hyperbole based on this 
historical survey:  moving through impossibility towards possibility, asserting a lie on the 
side of truth(s), and re-orienting one’s perspective through disorientation.  Derived from a 
historical survey of hyperbole, these two functions and one meta-function are vital for 
understanding and constructing a theory of hyperbole that is productive and useful for 
current theoretical discussion.  Using these functions, I offer a variety of examples under 
the purview of the epideictic and grotesque genres and show how hyperbole might be 
employed within rhetorical theory and criticism.  Overall, this project seeks to respond to 
the gap that exists within current rhetorical theory regarding hyperbole, to explore why 
hyperbole is often dismissed as a tropological expression of excess and exaggeration, and 
to revitalize interest in hyperbole for critical use in areas such as rhetoric, theology, and 
philosophy. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
And, now, I will show you a more hyperbolic [υπερβολήν] way. 
1 Corinthians 12:311 
 
In Linnaean terms, excess is the order, bombast and hyperbole the genera, and within the 
genus hyperbole, one finds various species:  metaphoric hyperbole, discursive hyperbole, 
hyperbole ruled by allegory, hyperbole as litote, and hyperbole that verges on irony, 
catachresis, or paradox. 
Christopher D. Johnson 
INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE 
 A HYPERBOLIC PROBLEM 
 
 Hyperbole (Lat:  superlatio, Gk:  υπερβολή) is an exaggeration, an excess, 
literally meaning to “throw beyond.”2  It is a familiar and often used trope, e.g., “America 
is a giant among nations” or “Capitalism is a colossus,” but its specific functions are 
largely unexplored or even forgotten by current rhetorical theorists, which is surprising 
considering the fact that hyperbole has a rich, though contentious, rhetorical history.  
Moving through impossibility towards possibility and offering a deceit in order to push 
beyond given interpretations of reality and meaning, the functions of hyperbole are 
contradictory, complex, and often disorienting, but these functions have particular 
importance for the current age of excess because of the epistemological and ontological 
insights they can provide, e.g., disrupting notions of absolute truth in order to radically 
                                                
1 1 Corinthians 12:31, my translation.  This passage could also be rendered, “And yet, a way is 
revealed to you according to hyperbole (or extravagance).” 
 
2 Hyperbole (noun):  1) obvious and intentional exaggeration, excess, throwing over or beyond; 2) 
an extravagant statement or figure of speech not intended to be taken literally; 3) a figure of speech in 
which exaggeration is used for emphasis or effect 
 
From the Latin:  superlatio 
From the Greek:  υπερ-βολή 
υπερ – meaning over and above, beyond, more than 
βολή – from βαλλω, meaning to throw 
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alter perspectives about that “truth.”  As the most effective trope for expressing the 
inexpressible and describing what is beyond description, hyperbole risks being mis-
apprehended, and it stretches and strains facts and language so it might transcend the 
“ordinary” and communicate as yet unimagined possibilities.  
 Unlike other tropes, hyperbole is exceedingly and intentionally epistemologically 
and ontologically disruptive.  It is paradoxical in the extreme.  It repetitively shocks and 
de-stabilizes with audacious claims that are meant to force one beyond the literal and into 
the figural realm.  It does not insinuate or offer subtle insights, though its path to these 
insights might be sly and deceitful, and it offers no synthesis of thought.  It offers 
dissonance rather than resonance, and the resonance it does offer might be dissonance 
itself.  It brings blunt force trauma, it is brazenly deceptive, and its intent is brutality. 
It is true that all tropes are types of conceits intended to bring one to a new and 
perhaps surprising insight.  The difference of hyperbole from other tropes is that it 
amplifies this fact so it is more than apparent that what is being said is a falsehood.  It 
heightens the suspicion that more is being communicated than what is stated.  Unlike 
other tropes, hyperbole must be recognized as a hyperbole for it to be effective, and it 
does not even attempt to go unnoticed.  It privileges emotion over reason, and it often 
verges on the edge of madness.  Hyperbole blatantly, disorientingly, and traumatically 
batters its audience and pushes it towards alternative ways of perceiving meaning and 
being through extreme contradiction.  It undermines at every tropological turn, and it 
exorbitantly creates intense pathos that is often unsettling and disturbing.  Confounding 
in the extreme, hyperbole is used and mis-used, recognized and mis-recognized, and its 
pervasiveness within discourse can make its importance hidden in plain sight. 
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Exaggeration and excess are common and familiar enough on the one hand.  As 
Quintilian writes, “[Hyperbole] is in common use, as much among the unlearned as 
among the learned, because there is in all men a natural propensity to magnify or 
extenuate what comes before them, and no one is contented with the exact truth.”3  On 
the other hand, hyperbole becomes complicated when we are called to explain what the 
use of exaggeration or excess or the definite forms and functions of hyperbole within 
language mean or signify.  What are the benefits of using an exaggerated or excessive 
form of communication?  Why suggest it is “a million degrees outside” when one could 
simply note the numerical degree?  What else is being indicated by this exaggerated and 
excessive form of communication?  I suggest that the excessiveness of hyperbole elicits a 
constructive, transformative ambiguity for alternative possibilities of meaning and being.  
However, as the contentious history of hyperbole indicates, fear and suspicion of excess 
and exaggeration hinders its exploration leaving a significant gap in current rhetorical 
theory regarding hyperbole.   
As I will show, an unsure relation to excess exists from Plato to Augustine to the 
current rhetorical context.  Both necessary and denigrated, the excess and exaggeration 
that are represented and displayed by hyperbole are negotiated along the margins of 
moderation throughout hyperbole’s controversial history.  The rhetorical and 
psychological disruptiveness of hyperbole is indeed a significant concern of rhetorical 
theorists, and it is paradoxically praised but also resisted.  An uncertain understanding of 
excess and exaggeration is a thread running through hyperbole’s history, but, as discussed 
below, the epistemological and ontological benefits of hyperbole are considerable. 
                                                
3 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.6.75, trans. Lee Honeycutt, 
<http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/quintilian/8/chapter6.html#68> (8 November 2009) 
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Familiar genres such as parody, caricature, satire, the burlesque, and the grotesque 
make use of hyperbole, and the four master tropes – metaphor, metonymy, irony, and 
synecdoche – seek to extend and expand meaning, which is the main function of 
hyperbole.  Yet, hyperbole’s role is significantly unexplored in these varied genres and 
tropological expressions, and its forms and functions remain largely obscure in the 
current theoretical and critical context.  Beyond academic theoretical discussions, 
common parlance further masks the (mis)use of hyperbole.  For example, referring to 
President Obama as Hitler or to his health care plan as including “death panels” are 
exaggerations.4  This assertion pushes the boundaries of reason towards impossibility and 
expresses more than the “truth” warrants in order to constitute and to communicate 
alternate realities.   
One may consider these expressions and comparisons absurd, ridiculous, 
irrational, or fanatical, but these references are not simple statements of description.  
They are hyperbolic assertions of impossible possibilities and falsehoods on the side of 
pushing truth(s) beyond conventional boundaries, i.e., an “elegant surpassing of the 
truth.”5  More than descriptors of one’s given reality, these expressions tropologically 
signify complex worldviews, perspectives, ideologies, and institutional frameworks.  
Through the force of their exaggeration, these assertions attempt to indicate what is 
                                                
4 For examples, see <http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2009/may/08/chain-
email/money-humanitarian-aid-not-emmigration-assistance> and <http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/statements/2009/aug/10/sarah-palin/sarah-palin-barack-obama-death-panel>.  
 
5 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.6.67, trans. Lee Honeycutt, 
<http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/quintilian/8/chapter6.html#68> (8 November 2009). 
 
  5       
beyond reality rather than what is beyond belief.6  One is indicating more than a literal 
statement when describing Obama as Hitler. 
Suggesting that Obama is Hitler is blatantly false, and this assertion immediately 
shows the obviousness that Obama is not Hitler.  When faced with this radical 
contradiction that Obama is not literally Hitler while unabashedly referring to him as 
such, one’s attention is arrested, and one is forced to consider alternate ways of 
interpreting this statement.  As the author of Rhetorica ad Herennium asserts, emphasis is 
used to reveal and foster the suspicion that something more is being communicated than 
what is stated, and the emphasis of hyperbole offers more than the given truth of a 
situation warrants in order to increase this suspicion.7  While other tropes attempt to 
avoid suspicion of being a trope, hyperbole flagrantly displays itself as such to 
intentionally create suspicion and render itself suspect in order to force one to see beyond 
a statement of “truth” or fact and discover alternative, re-interpreted truth(s) within the 
statement itself. 
An obvious and deceitful exaggeration, the lie of a statement such as Obama is 
Hitler is not intended to deceive but to create a momentary suspension of reality and 
reason, to disrupt typical synthesizing thought processes, in order to force one to 
(re)consider other truth(s) a hyperbolic statement might indicate.  Offering a range of 
interpretations, the perspectival truth(s) revealed by a hyperbolic lie can vary widely 
based on the hearer’s context because the intent of hyperbole is not to present one with 
definitive “truth.”  Through the disrupting, disorienting lie, a re-orientation of one’s 
                                                
6 Ibid., 8.6.73, 8.6.76. 
 
7 [Cicero], Rhetorica ad Herennium, trans. Harry Caplan (London:  Harvard University Press, 
2004), 4.53.67. 
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views and assumptions can occur.  When employed effectively by the hyperbolist, 
hyperbole as a transitional principle of contradiction imbues a disorienting perspectival 
ambiguity and a paradoxicality upon its subject(s), but the intent is always transition or 
re-orientation of one’s perspective.   
It is the reception of the exaggeration upon which hyperbole succeeds or fails.  
The positive or negative reception of hyperbole depends upon one’s predisposition 
towards hyperbole.  That is, based on how it is implemented, how it is received, and what 
context it is used within, a failed hyperbole for one may be an effective hyperbole for 
another.  When the figural expression is viewed only as literal or too outrageous, then the 
hyperbolist and the (re)interpretive work hyperbole can provide fail.  Without viewing 
the assertion as a tropological representation of excess that arrives at possibility through 
impossibility and other truth(s) through falsehoods, the (il)logic of hyperbole’s assertion 
is overshadowed, and even defeated, by the literal.   
The promise of hyperbole is transition from one perspective to another, and its 
risk is misapprehension as it communicates through contradiction and signifies 
ambiguous and paradoxical assertions beyond the purview of logical argumentation.  In 
making a hyperbolic assertion, one does not rely on logical argumentation.  Depending 
upon affectus more than ratio and justified by the magnitude of its exigence, hyperbole 
pushes the bounds of logic whereby logical thought forms are opened up to radical 
perspectival expressions that evoke emotions, enthusiasm, and experiences.  However, 
this complexity of meaning and ambiguity is often overlooked, neglected, or 
misunderstood in current theoretical discourse. 
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The contentious history of hyperbole, which I will explore in chapter two, is 
complex and variable because the attitudes about hyperbole and excess differ 
significantly throughout its history.  Sometimes, in Renaissance rhetorical theory, for 
example, it is celebrated, though often tentatively.  At other times, hyperbolic excess is 
regarded with outright fear, suspicion, e.g., by Plato and Aristotle.  Hyperbole is 
discussed primarily within Romanticism as the vehicle for the “sublime.”  Hyperbole is 
also theoretically silenced and glossed by the privileging of irony in postmodern 
discourse, often dismissed as a signal of religious fanaticism, and consistently ignored as 
one of the master tropes. 
I offer a history of hyperbole for two reasons.  First, current rhetorical theory and 
criticism is disconnected from hyperbole’s history because hyperbole is largely neglected 
today.  An exploration of how hyperbole is defined and viewed throughout its history will 
thereby provide a foundation upon which to build a theory of hyperbole for current 
discussion.  Hyperbole does not need rescuing, but it does need to be re-presented and 
recast for the current context as the forms and functions of hyperbole are all but 
forgotten.  Second, and closely related to the first, a historical survey will provide a basic 
context from which to view and explicate hyperbole today.  Without understanding the 
ways this trope is historically defined and interpreted would make it difficult to offer a 
fully developed theory of hyperbole.   
What I offer, then, is a history intended to increase an understanding of how 
hyperbole has been defined and perceived.  Re-exploring hyperbole’s rich history reveals 
the complexities and subtleties about this trope that may have escaped us today.  Given 
significant technical tropological attention at various times in its history, these 
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discussions offer fertile ground for re-constructing a detailed theory of hyperbole for the 
current context.  Hyperbole’s history also clarifies the observation that an uncertain 
relation to excess and exaggeration does exist and does affect our views regarding 
hyperbole.  Revealing this uncertainty is important because it offers insight not just into 
the functions of hyperbole and how it operates effectively or ineffectively but also into 
our indecisive fear and suspicion of excess itself. 
Considering hyperbole is often used to describe events, thoughts, perspectives, or 
experiences, it is striking that there is a significant lack of scholarship regarding 
hyperbole in contemporary rhetorical theory as well as contemporary theory in general.  
Indeed, the pithy and dismissive discussion of hyperbole in contemporary rhetorical 
theory is an interesting occurrence since hyperbolic excess and the perspectival 
ambiguity and paradoxicality it exerts upon the subject is such a complex and prevalent 
force within discourse.  For example, in contemporary rhetorical theory hyperbole is 
often subordinated to an extension of metaphor and/or irony. 
In the Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, Hienrich F. Plett defines hyperbole:  “It is 
mostly a kind of metaphor or allegory that raises the referential object beyond 
probability.”8  In Plett’s essay, rather than describing the complex tropological relation 
among hyperbole, metaphor, and allegory, hyperbole does not receive any extended 
consideration.  In like manner, although the authors of The New Rhetoric do not describe 
hyperbole as subordinate to metaphor, they do not offer an extended reflection on 
                                                
8 Hienrich F. Plett, “Hyperbole,” in Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, ed. Thomas O. Sloane (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2001), 364. 
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hyperbole.9  Their brief explication of hyperbole does link hyperbole to an argument of 
unlimited development that is always an argument of direction thereby assigning 
hyperbole an argumentative form rather than simply dismissing it as an irrational 
assertion.  Yet, their analysis of this observation is insufficient for developing a 
conceptualization of hyperbole that fully elaborates the implications of its role within 
contemporary discourse.  In addition, Katrin Ettenhuber10 and Goran V. Stanivukovic11 
do offer several keen insights into the nature of hyperbole, but their scope is rather 
limited since they are studying hyperbole only within the purview of Renaissance 
rhetorical theory. 
Outside of the realm of rhetorical theory, Mikhail Bakhtin notes the positive role 
of hyperbole within grotesque realism and laughter during the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance, but he never offers any analysis regarding the specific functions of 
hyperbole.12  Georges Bataille celebrates excess in his scatological philosophy of 
heterogeneous expenditure without reserve, but the role of hyperbole is never 
mentioned.13  Friedrich Nietzsche also often emphasizes excess and exaggeration in his 
                                                
9 Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric:  A Treatise on Argumentation, 
trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame:  University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), esp. 287-
292. 
 
10 Katrin Ettenhuber, “Hyperbole:  Exceeding Similitude,” in Renaissance Figures of Speech, eds. 
Sylvia Adamson, Gavin Alexander, and Katrin Ettenhuber (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 
 
11 Goran V. Stanivukovic, “’Mounting above the Truthe’:  On Hyperbole in English Renaissance 
Literature,” Forum for Modern Language Studies, 43, no. 1 (2007) :  9-33. 
 
12 See Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington:  Indiana 
University Press, 1984). 
 
13 For example, see Georges Bataille, Inner Experience, trans. Leslie Anne Boldt (Albany:  SUNY 
Press, 1988); Georges Bataille, Guilty, trans. Bruce Boone (Venice:  Lapis Press, 1988); and Georges 
Bataille, Theory of Religion, trans. Robert Hurley (New York:  Zone Books, 1989). 
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philosophy, though the role of excess in Nietzsche’s thought is uncertain since he 
sometimes praises moderation as well,14 and Jean-Luc Marion relies heavily on excess 
for his post-metaphysical phenomenological project.15  Yet, neither of these thinkers 
addresses the role of hyperbole within their systems of thought.  Jean-Pierre Mileur,16 
Suzanne Guerlac,17 and Jacques Derrida18 all address the notion of hyperbole but do not 
explore the functions historically ascribed to it, which often leads to assertions about 
hyperbole that are inaccurate.  Slavoj Zizek is another contemporary theorist who 
frequently uses excess and exaggeration, not just in the content of his writing, but as a 
form or style of thought.  That is, his argumentative form regularly operates through 
hyperbolic assertions rather than logical suppositions, but again, a thoroughgoing 
discussion or examination of hyperbole is absent from his writing.19 
The neglect of hyperbole by these theorists notwithstanding, hyperbole offers a 
particular force of language that is not as obvious within other tropological formations.  
For example, when Washington Irving describes Ichabod Crane as “tall, but exceedingly 
                                                
14 For example, see Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, trans. Marion Faber and 
Stephen Lehmann (Lincoln:  University of Nebraska Press, 1984); Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak, trans. R. 
J. Hollingdale (Cambridge:  University of Cambridge Press, 1982); and Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York:  Penguin Books, 1966). 
 
15 See Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess:  Studies of Saturated Phenomena, trans. Robyn Horner and 
Vincent Berraud (New York:  Fordham University Press, 2002). 
 
16 Jean-Pierre Mileur, The Critical Romance:  The Critic as Reader, Writer, Hero (Madison:  The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1990). 
 
17 Suzanne Guerlac, The Impersonal Sublime:  Hugo, Baudelaire, Lautreamont (Stanford:  
Stanford University Press, 1990). 
 
18 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago:  University of Chicago 
Press, 1978). 
 
19 For example, see Slavoj Zizek, On Belief (London:  Routledge, 2001); Slavoj Zizek, The 
Fragile Absolute:  Or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? (London:  Verso, 2000); and 
Slavoj Zizek, The Plague of Fantasies (London:  Verso, 1997). 
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lank, with narrow shoulders, long arms and legs, hands that dangled a mile out of his 
sleeves,”20 Irving is describing Crane through the force of hyperbole.  In a similar 
example, when Garrison Keillor says in the voice of Guy Noir, Private Eye, “She [Miss 
Moffett] was rather beautiful, tall, with raven hair and a red wrap dress that hugged her 
hips so tight I could read the lettering on her underwear,”21 Keillor is also using 
hyperbole.  It is not that Miss Moffett’s dress was literally that tight, and Crane’s hands 
did not literally dangle a mile out of his sleeves.  These are falsehoods and impossibilities 
on the side of truth(s) and possibilities.  It is the exaggeration and excessiveness, which 
moves the literal into figural descriptions of Moffett and Crane, that offers one a way of 
viewing them that would be less forceful or imaginative if hyperbole were not employed. 
In addition to these examples of hyperbole, religious rhetoric and theological 
discourse tend to use hyperbole quite often.  Various models of “God,” especially 
classical Christian theistic models of “God,” are often premised upon Platonic ideals such 
as the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, which are buttressed by hyperbole in their 
attempt to express the impossible while still remaining bound to specific contexts of 
possibilities.  Neo-Platonic Christian writers, such as Plotinus, also ground their 
arguments upon certain ideals assuming that the force of their hyperbolic assertions will 
carry their argument along a clear and logical line of thinking, but it is the paradox of 
hyperbole that offers a meandering path towards insight.  Contemporary theological 
scholars like Karl Barth (a neo-orthodox theologian) and Hans Urs von Balthasar (a 
sacramental, aesthetic theologian) also rely upon these same idealist assertions and use 
                                                
20 Washington Irving, The Legend of Sleepy Hollow (Filiquarian Publishing, 2006), 10. 
 
21 Garrison Keillor, “Guy Noir,” A Prairie Home Companion, 
<http://prairiehome.publicradio.org/programs/2007/06/23/scripts/noir.shtml> (10 September 2009). 
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hyperbole to structure their arguments, and Mark C. Taylor’s postmodern a/theology of 
“nots” is premised entirely upon the forms and functions of hyperbole.   
Although hyperbole is a pervasive and significant force within thought and 
language, the evidence suggests it is often overlooked, distrusted, and neglected, 
especially in the current context.  As one theologian theorizing about hyperbole argues, 
“At best, when we hear hyperbole at all today it sounds ridiculous, foolish, absurd, even 
fanatical.  We are in danger of losing a dimension to language which stretches the 
imagination, challenges ready-made assumptions, and forces unusual perspectives,”22 and 
he further suggests, “Hyperbole is more than an occasional eruption or a useful tool.  It is 
a basic fact of language and action that commands attention and warrants understanding 
on its own terms.”23  These statements each support my argument, and what they 
highlight is twofold.   
First, they assert that hyperbole’s forms and functions are misunderstood and 
underappreciated.  Second, these comments contend that hyperbole is a significant force 
within thought and language.  Implicitly, Erasmus offers a similar assertion, “By this lie 
[of hyperbole], as Seneca says, we come to truth; for hyperbole says more than reality 
warrants, yet what is true is understood from the false,”24 and Quintilian’s Institutes of 
Oratory extensively, though indecisively, argues for the importance of hyperbole.  
Examining hyperbole can shed new light on the ways scholars approach the study of 
discourse in general because hyperbole pushes interpretation and thought beyond its 
                                                
22 Stephen H. Webb, Blessed Excess:  Religion and the Hyperbolic Imagination (Albany:  State 
University of New York Press, 1993), xii. 
 
23 Ibid., 150. 
 
24 Desiderius Erasmus, On Copia of Words and Ideas, trans. Donald B. King and H. David Rix 
(Milwaukee:  Marquette University Press, 2007), 35. 
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normative limits through its uses of exaggeration and excessiveness.  Yet, if we do not 
seek to understand hyperbole, then its insights will go unnoticed.   
Because the material of theology takes us beyond pedestrian experience, it should 
not be surprising that hyperbole, an obvious vehicle for expressing the sacred, has been 
given its most sustained attention in contemporary time by a theologian, Stephen H. 
Webb.  Thinking about the uses and meaning of hyperbole, Webb defines hyperbole as “a 
trope that beckons but also warns; it accomplishes an intensification that does not result 
in a metaphorical synthesis but brazenly both invites and distances the audience from the 
height of an apparently unreasonable position.”25  Webb’s definition is certainly 
ambitious in his positioning of hyperbole into such a vital rhetorical position; yet, he 
often falls short in connecting his conclusions to the broader rhetorical implications of 
hyperbole in relation to thought and language, meaning and being.   
Webb’s aim is to connect hyperbole to theological discourse, e.g., terms such as 
“grace” and “love,” but even here, his illuminating insights into hyperbole and theology 
have broader rhetorical implications than his findings admit.26  For example, Webb does 
note the rhetorical aspect of his analysis, but he does not significantly explore current 
discussions regarding rhetorical theory or criticism.  He offers no suggestion as to how a 
hyperbolic perspective might aid in rhetorical criticism, or, how a hyperbolic style may 
                                                
25 Stephen H. Webb, “The Rhetoric of Ethics as Excess:  A Christian Theological Response to 
Emmanuel Levinas,” Modern Theology 15, no. 1 (1999) :  3. 
  
26 See Stephen H. Webb, Blessed Excess:  Religion and the Hyperbolic Imagination (Albany:  
State University of New York Press, 1993); Stephen H. Webb, Re-Figuring Theology:  The Rhetoric of 
Karl Barth (Albany:  State University of New York Press, 1991); Stephen H. Webb, The Gifting God:  A 
Trinitarian Ethics of Excess (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1996); Stephen H. Webb, “The Rhetoric 
of Ethics as Excess:  A Christian Theological Response to Emmanuel Levinas,” Modern Theology 15, no. 1 
(1999) : 1-16; Stephen H. Webb, “The Rhetoric of and about Excess in William James’ The Variety of 
Religious Experience,” Religion and Literature 27 (1995) : 27-45; and Stephen H. Webb, “A Hyperbolic 
Imagination:  Theology and the Rhetoric of Excess,” Theology Today 50 (1993) : 56-67. 
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be constructed by rhetorical theorists as a useful theoretical framework.  Yet, changing 
the way rhetorical scholars view hyperbole can alter the way they understand concepts 
such as style, decorum, discourse, and subjectivity. 
Webb also does not delve enough into the specific functions of hyperbole based 
on an extended historical exploration of the term, and he often assigns functions to 
hyperbole that are simply not accurate.  He gives us a theological perspective about a 
rhetorical term, but he does not necessarily give us a rhetorical perspective regarding 
theological/philosophical concepts and ideas.  In sum, Webb falls short of his own desire 
to understand hyperbole completely on its own terms as a significant tropological 
expression.  However, his observations offer many points on which to build, and his work 
clearly indicates the complexity one finds when exploring the forms and functions of 
hyperbole.  This complexity highlights the fact that the de-stabilizing nature of hyperbole 
poses a significant problem, even a threat, to the way we relate to thought and language 
because its force is so disruptive in regard to meaning and being. 
 Christopher D. Johnson is one scholar of comparative literature who does offer 
extensive and clear insights into hyperbole’s forms and functions, but he limits himself 
largely to Baroque literature.27  He also does not offer implications regarding his analysis 
of the Baroque texts he examines.  He simply moves from one author to the next without 
offering any summary insights.  He does present a thoroughgoing analysis of Quintilian’s 
theory of hyperbole, but his significant observations frequently go unused in his actual 
analyses of the authors he explores.  His project reveals contemporary scholars’ 
                                                
27 Christopher D. Johnson, Hyperboles:  The Rhetoric of Excess in Baroque Literature and 
Thought (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 2010). 
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ignorance towards hyperbole as well as the importance of hyperbole for critical use, but 
his conclusions leave much to be desired. 
Despite these few authors’ attempts at explicating hyperbole and showing the 
importance of hyperbole’s role within thought and language, their analyses are 
insufficient in parsing out the intricacies of hyperbole.  Although “excess” (the core of 
hyperbole’s function) is explored in contemporary philosophical and psychoanalytic 
discourse, and the “sublime” (closely linked but distinct from hyperbole) is analyzed as 
an important rhetorical aspect/tactic, hyperbole is absent from these discussions.  Thus, 
its role and function are in need of re-exploration because hyperbole is such a pervasive 
and uncertain force within thought and language itself, and hyperbole can shed new light 
on the ways scholars approach texts and discourse.28  That is, our relation to hyperbole is 
obscured by its excessively ambiguous role within thought and language because of its 
ignored functions.  Its meaning, its form and content, its role and function, all constitute a 
vagueness with our relation to hyperbole itself. 
THE SUBJECT OF HYPERBOLE 
 EPISTEMOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY 
 
 Examination of as significant and overlooked a trope as hyperbole is a 
complicated endeavor because of the questions it raises as well as the various ways it 
expresses itself through discourse and subjectivity.  Among the important questions that 
our troubled relationship with the use of hyperbole puts into play are those related to 
                                                
28 For example, Harry Clor argues that moderation is what suffers in today’s society because we 
live in a culture of excess.  See Harry Clor, On Moderation:  Defending an Ancient Virtue in a Modern 
World (Waco:  Baylor University Press, 2008).  The pervasiveness of excess is thus acknowledged by 
many, but the rhetorical function of hyperbole is ignored.  Hyperbole is not thoroughly examined in order 
to determine our relation to it. 
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epistemology and ontology.  Our relation to excess and exaggeration – and to their 
epistemological and ontological implications – is indefinite and often frightening.  
Paradoxically, the disorienting heights that distorts our relation to this trope is one of its 
main functions.  The confusion that frustrates our relation to hyperbole can also offer one 
a re-orientation to thought and language, to meaning and being, because ambiguity can 
open up new ways of seeing and perceiving the world, but misapprehension is a 
significant risk of this movement through vagary.  
The ambiguity of excess is always a threat to the order, decorum, convention, 
propriety, proportion, and hierarchy of being, which is why the excessiveness and 
exaggeration of hyperbole is often resisted for its seeming irrationality.  One reason for 
restraining hyperbole in the ancient world (as well as later historical periods) is its 
ontological disruptiveness.  A fear of embodied hyperbole was directly connected to a 
fear of rhetorical excess, and stylistic vices were synecdochally connected to excessive 
forms of living.  Plato and Aristotle, for example, are particularly harsh in their 
condemnation of hyperbolic excess.   
In Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates launches an attack on all that is excessive about 
rhetoric, i.e., sophistic rhetoric.  At a linguistic level, he equates these excesses to flattery 
and cookery, and he considers these not to be arts but excessive ploys intended to 
deceive.29  Cookery only appears to be an art, but it is not.  It is a device of appearance 
                                                
29 For example, Socrates says, “It [cookery] seems to be an art, but…is not an art but experience 
and routine.”  See  Plato, Gorgias, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr., (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1998), 
463b.  Of flattery he writes, “It [flattery] pretends to be this that it has slipped in under, and gives no heed 
to the best but hunts after folly with what is ever most pleasant, and deceives, so as to seem to be worth 
very much” (464c-464d). 
However, this does not stop Plato from using rhetorical devices such as hyperbole.  Matthew Fox 
writes of Plato’s observation of Daedalus, “Plato credits him with having constructed a mechanical statue 
of the gods that was so lifelike that the statues perspired under the hot Aegean sun and had to be restrained 
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that deceives the hearer and lacks substantive knowledge.  For Plato, the excesses of 
cookery, flattery, and folly are “shameful,” and Plato is typically perceived as privileging 
dialectic over rhetoric.30  Rhetorical excess only offers one the appearance of truth, but in 
fact, appearance is not truth but deceit.   
At an ethical level, Socrates compares the “intemperate man,” the vice of 
embodied excess, to a leaky jar, and he argues that the orderly life, the virtue of 
moderation, is better than the intemperate life.31  Linguistic and embodied excess are both 
denigrated, even feared, while the ideal of Greek moderation is lauded.  Excess 
destabilizes the balance of moderation.  More than a rhetorical flourish, Plato argues that 
excessiveness is a vice, an ontological dissonance, to be avoided so that one may live 
well.  Excessiveness and moderation are thus linked to how one might live, how one 
might “be” in the world, and this ontological duality is clearly established – the moderate, 
moral life is good while the intemperate, immoral life is bad. 
The same duality of moderation/excess can be seen in Plato’s philosophy of 
rhetoric outlined in Phaedrus.  Socrates argues that there are two ruling natures within 
                                                                                                                                            
lest they run away.”  See Matthew Fox, The Hidden Spirituality of Men:  Ten Metaphors to Awaken the 
Sacred Masculine (Novato:  New World Library, 2008), 33. 
 
30 For example, see G. L. Hendrickson, “The Origin and Meaning of the Ancient Characters of 
Style,” The American Journal of Philology 26, no. 3 (1905) :  249-290; Richard A. Lanham, The Motives 
of Eloquence:  Literary Rhetoric in the Renaissance (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1976); and 
Stanley E. Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts:  The Experience of Seventeenth-Century Literature (Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 1972).  For an opposite view of Plato’s dialectic/rhetoric dichotomy, see 
Richard M. Weaver, Language is Sermonic:  Richard M. Weaver on the Nature of Rhetoric, eds. Richard L. 
Johannesen, Rennard Strickland, and Ralph T. Eubanks (Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press, 
1970). 
 
31 Plato, Gorgias, 493d-494a.  He further posits, “The moderate soul is therefore good” (507a).  He 
then suggests, “If the moderate soul is good, the one that suffers the opposite to the moderate is bad; and 
this would be the foolish and intemperate soul,” and he argues, “He who wishes to be happy must, it would 
seem, pursue and practice moderation, and each of us must flee intemperance as fast as his feet will carry 
him” (507a, 507d). 
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humans:  the desire of pleasures and that which aims at the best.  He states, “Now then, 
when opinion leads with reason toward the best and wins mastery, the name of the 
mastery is moderation; but when desire without reason drags us toward pleasures and 
rules in us, the name wanton outrage is applied to the rule.”32  The moderate, “good” and 
reasonable soul is privileged over the excessive desirous soul that lacks reason and 
pursues only pleasure.   
Linking excess to wanton outrage also suggests that excess is equated with a lack 
of emotional control and a disruption of order, which are two things hyperbole is almost 
always associated with or accused of doing.  Hyperbole is also typically described as 
lacking reason, as irrational, and as excessive desire leading to pleasures.  Thus, Plato 
implicitly argues against hyperbole and its embodiment as irrational desire.  He 
establishes an ontological duality between moderation and excess, and moderation 
implies a virtuous mastery over one’s life while excess implies a significant ethical lack 
in one’s life.  For Plato, the very nature and being of what it means to be human is at 
stake in the moderation/excess dualism, and excess, as embodied hyperbole, is rejected as 
something that must be avoided.  This same concern carries over to Plato’s student, 
Aristotle.  
Ancient rhetorical theorists were not simply concerned with hyperbole’s 
ontological disruptiveness, however.  For example, there is an interesting epistemological 
connection to hyperbole in Rhetorica ad Herennium:  “Emphasis [significatio] is the 
figure which leaves more to be suspected than has been actually asserted…The emphasis 
is produced through Hyperbole [per exsuperationem] when more is said than the truth 
                                                
32 Plato, Phaedrus, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1998), 237d-
238a. 
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warrants [patitur veritas], so as to give greater force to the suspicion.”33  Similarly, the 
author of On the Sublime states, “Hyperbole may tend to belittle as well as to magnify; 
the common element in both is a strain on the facts.”34  Or, Quintilian says, “[Hyperbole] 
is an elegant surpassing of the truth.”35  These are stimulating and complex passages not 
simply because of the re-iteration of hyperbole’s link to a “surpassing of the truth” or “a 
strain on the facts,” but because these passages suggest an interesting epistemological 
relationship between hyperbole and “truth.”  
Hyperbole is not a simple form of distortion because hyperbole works by being 
recognized as a figural exaggeration.  Hyperbole pushes one to think beyond given 
“truths” and assumed versions of reality.  The hyperbolist offers hyperbole to be 
recognized as an exaggeration (either immediately or eventually), and this can become a 
constructive, transformative ambiguity for alternative possibilities of meaning and being.  
Or, it can fail in/as literality when it is mis-apprehended.  Hyperbole can serve to 
heighten a suspicion of “truth” in order to reveal a concealment and point to something 
more, more than the truth warrants, and constitute alternative ways of perceiving a given 
“reality.”  In short, hyperbole is an important trope not simply for its exaggeration but for 
its epistemological participation in the (re)constitution of meaning and its questioning of 
given “truths” or “realities.”   
                                                
33 [Cicero], Rhetorica ad Herennium, trans. Harry Caplan (London:  Harvard University Press, 
2004), 4.53.67. 
 
34 [Longinus], On the Sublime, Loeb Classical Library, trans. W. H. Fyfe (Cambridge:  Harvard 
University Press, 1995), 285. 
 
35 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.6.67, trans. Lee Honeycutt, 
<http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/quintilian/8/chapter6.html#68> (8 November 2009). 
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A more contemporary perspective of hyperbole’s epistemological contingency 
reveals that the realm of postmodern and poststructuralist discourse, where moderation 
itself is condemned and excessive transgression and disruption of epistemological and 
ontological limits is celebrated,36 may have prepared the way for a shift to a more 
positive conception of hyperbole.  Hyperbole is seemingly the trope par excellence for 
current discussion since hyperbole is such a de-stabilizing epistemological and 
ontological force.  For example, in his Prophets of Extremity:  Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Foucault, Derrida,37 Allan Megill unintentionally argues that each of these figures is 
engaged in the (epideictic) rhetorical strategy of hyperbole to “fiction” (pseudologia) the 
past in order to “throw beyond” the present and the future (logos politikos).   
Although Megill offers no discussion of hyperbole, his argument leads one to 
conclude that attempting to say too much in order to say what can never be fully 
articulated, which is one function of hyperbole, is precisely what Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Foucault, and Derrida were pushing the exploration of “truth” towards.  Each figure 
                                                
36 For example, Derrida writes, “That which gives us to think beyond the closure cannot be simply 
absent.  Absent, either it would give us nothing to think or it still would be a negative mode of presence.  
Therefore the sign of this excess must be absolutely excessive as concerns all possible presence – absence, 
all possible production or disappearance of beings in general, and yet, in some manner, it must still signify, 
in a way unthinkable by metaphysics as such.  In order to exceed metaphysics it is necessary that a trace be 
inscribed within the text of metaphysics, a trace that continues to signal not in the direction of another 
presence, or another form of presence, but in the direction of an entirely other text….The mode of 
inscription of such a trace in the text of metaphysics is so unthinkable that it must be described as an 
erasure of the trace itself.  The trace is produced as its own erasure.”  See Jacques Derrida, Margins of 
Philosophy, trans. Allan Bass (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1982), 75-76; quoted in Mark C. 
Taylor, Altarity (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1987), 268.  This trace that is its own erasure 
within the text of metaphysics itself that signals, or transgresses, in the direction of an entirely other text 
might thus be thought of as hyperbole or a hyperbolic style.  See also Derrida’s discussion of the 
“prodigious” in Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod 
(Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1987) and his discussion of “chora” in Jacques Derrida, “Faith and 
Knowledge:  The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of Reason Alone,” in Acts of Religion, trans. Gil 
Anidjar (New York:  Routledge, 2002) and Jacques Derrida, “Khora,” in On the Name, trans. Peggy Kamuf 
(New York:  Routledge, 1994). 
 
37 Allan Megill, Prophets of Extremity:  Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida (Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 1985). 
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employs the strategy of extremity in order to portray a certain position, and the 
excessiveness of their claims is necessary to exert the full force of their argument that is 
epistemologically and ontologically disruptive and de-stabilizing. 
Hyperbole is ostensibly infinite in its intensification, and it is dangerously without 
limit.  As Derrida notes, hyperbole “cannot be enclosed in a factual and determined 
historical structure, for it is the project of exceeding every finite and determined 
totality.”38  Hyperbole’s excessive disruptiveness de-stabilizes epistemological and 
ontological presuppositions.  By throwing beyond every finite and determined totality, 
hyperbole offers one a perspectival shift/mobility, which heightens one’s awareness of 
how limits, norms, decorum, order, hierarchies, and conventions are constituted through 
thought and language.  Yet, as I will show, hyperbole is not without limit.  It does throw 
beyond given perceptions of reality, but it is not excess beyond all measure.  Rather, it is 
a purposeful measure of excess used for transition through contradiction. 
Through ambiguity, hyperbole allows for a perspectival shift/mobility, and it 
positions one’s interpretive lens in such a way, almost as looking awry, as to reveal what 
one might miss without the perspective of hyperbole.  As Katrin Ettenhuber, drawing 
from her work on Renaissance writers, suggests, “By highlighting the limits of figuration 
and productively destabilising the reader’s views of linguistic norms and conventions, it 
[hyperbole] encourages active reflection on the different ways in which meaning is 
constructed and communicated.”39  The problematic role of hyperbole, then, is also one 
of its most important aspects for determining our relation to hyperbole.  The nebulous 
                                                
38 Derrida, Writing and Difference, 60. 
 
39 Ettenhuber, “Hyperbole,” 210. 
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role of hyperbole lends itself to constituting an excessive ambiguity, and it is this 
ambiguity that allows hyperbole to work in relation to meaning, i.e., the disruption of 
meaning as “givenness.”   
One’s relation to that excessive ambiguity is problematic because ambiguity is 
mysterious, uncertain, seemingly irrational, and frightening through its de-stabilizing 
effects on our modes of existence and our systems of thought.  A hyperbolic perspective 
pushes the boundaries of decorum towards a style that is disruptive and often grotesque, 
which is precisely the reason hyperbole is frequently mistrusted.  Yet, it is this de-
stabilizing and contradictory nature of hyperbole that makes it such an intriguing 
tropological expression in need of re-exploration and re-consideration. 
THREE FUNCTIONS OF HYPERBOLE 
 
 In order to make my argument that hyperbole is a contentious trope in need of re-
exploration because of the gap within current tropological theory and that hyperbole can 
offer critical contributions to contemporary rhetorical theory and criticism, I offer two 
consistent historical functions of hyperbole and one meta-function.  After offering a 
history of hyperbole, these functions will guide and structure my argument:  impossibility 
leading towards possibility, a lie on the side of truth(s), and a re-orientation out of 
disorientation.  The two functions and one meta-function also highlight the movement of 
hyperbole to transition out of contradiction, to shift perspectives through the contrariety 
of hyperbole’s paradoxical transformation(s).   
The first two functions are historically ascribed to hyperbole, and the last one is a 
meta-function of hyperbole that I derive from two one-sentence glosses made by Paul 
Ricoeur upon which I will significantly expand.  I discuss the meta-function last because 
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explicating the first two functions will make it more apparent that re-orienting through 
disorientation is hyperbole’s comprehensive, global purpose.  That is, after exploring the 
first two functions of hyperbole, I will then offer the final meta-function of 
disorientation/re-orientation as an overall culminating function because the purpose of 
each function of hyperbole is to disorient and disrupt in order to re-orient one towards 
another perspective.  Thus, after a discussion of hyperbole’s controversial history in 
chapter two, I will offer an explication of these functions in chapters three and four. 
IMPOSSIBILITY/POSSIBILITY AND TRUTH/LIE 
 
In chapter three, I will explore the impossibility/possibility and truth/lie functions 
of hyperbole, which also lead to questions of hyperbole’s justification, use of decorum, 
and reliance upon kairos.  It is Quintilian who offers a thoroughgoing examination of 
these two functions of hyperbole, though Longinus, Demetrius, and the author of Ad 
Herennium address these functions to a lesser degree.  Seneca’s insights do highlight well 
the impossibility/possibility function, but Quintilian’s theory of hyperbole is so profound 
that it will influence the attitudes and uses of hyperbole throughout the history of 
rhetorical theory.  In the Renaissance, for example, when those like Erasmus view 
hyperbole particularly positively, it is Quintilian’s theory of hyperbole they rely upon.  
Even in current theorists’ hesitant and pithy statements about hyperbole, e.g., Derrida, I 
will show that Quintilian’s theory of hyperbole continues to be operative.   
As noted above, Quintilian writes, for example, that hyperbole is an “elegant [i.e., 
decorous] surpassing of the truth,”40 and he suggests, “It is sufficient to remark that the 
                                                
40 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.6.67, trans. Lee Honeycutt, 
<http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/quintilian/8/chapter6.html#68> (2 November 2009). 
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hyperbole lies, but not so as to intend to deceive by lying.”41  In complete contradiction to 
normative ways of defining a lie, Quintilian’s epistemological assertion about hyperbole 
is a confounding one.  Ascribing this function to hyperbole, Quintilian alters typical 
perceptions of epistemological inquiry and suggests that hyperbole operates within its 
own type of (il)logic where given notions of truth can be expanded or exploded.  He also 
posits that lying hyperbolically on the side of truth(s) can be an “elegant,” even decorous, 
tropological expression. 
Regarding the impossibility/possibility function while also implying the truth/lie 
function, Seneca writes, “Exaggeration never hopes all its daring flights to be believed, 
but affirms what is incredible, that thereby it may convey what is credible.”42  Through 
exaggeration one asserts “what could not possibly be in order that they might be thought 
to be as much so as possible.”43  Expressing the possible through the impossible is 
hyperbole’s forte in Seneca’s mind and is an important insight into hyperbole.  Pushing 
the bounds of belief and straining epistemological and ontological boundaries to a 
breaking point for the purpose of transition holds a vast array of implications and uses for 
hyperbole.  Indeed, at a time when the impossibility of possibility and the possibility of 
impossibility are common phrases within poststructuralist discourse, it seems that this 
function of hyperbole is particularly hospitable to the current theoretical context.   
Noted above, hyperbole is purposefully epistemologically and ontologically 
disruptive and transformative, and these two functions particularly highlight this 
                                                
41 Ibid., 8.6.74. 
 
42 Seneca, On Benefits, trans. Aubrey Stewart (London:  George Bell and Sons, 1905), 7.23. 
 
43 Ibid. 
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characteristic of hyperbole.  Out of the contradiction of moving through impossibility 
towards possibility and offering a linguistic lie on the side of hermeneutical truth(s), a 
transition occurs from one perspective to others.  This transition, and whether one 
participates in it or not, is the crux upon which hyperbole will succeed or fail.  If 
hyperbole is not received well and a transition does not occur through hyperbole’s figural 
force, then it is because hyperbole has become impaled upon the spear of the literal.  
Despite hyperbole’s forceful push into the figural, it may still be accused of absurdity and 
dismissed as a violator of decorum, insincerity, pretense, and faulty judgment, i.e., 
kakozelia.44 
In order to parse out these two functions, I will examine the epideictic and 
grotesque genres.  Though completely absent from current rhetorical theory,45 epideictic 
is historically connected to hyperbole, and grotesque theorists connect hyperbole to their 
discussions but often unwittingly.  These two genres exemplify the uses of hyperbole, 
and I will use them to explore these two functions of hyperbole.  I will also use these 
genres to explicate the disorientation/re-orientation meta-function of hyperbole in chapter 
four.  I will mainly use epideictic in chapter three, and I will mainly use the grotesque in 
chapter four, though there is definite overlap between the two in each chapter. 
                                                
44 Johnson, Hyperboles, 34. 
 
45 For example, see Richard Chase, “The Classical Conception of Epideictic,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 47 (1961) :  293-300; Perelman, The New Rhetoric; Walter H. Beale, “Rhetorical Performative 
Discourse:  A New Theory of Epideictic,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 11 (1978) :  221-246; Bernard K. 
Duffy, “The Platonic Functions of Epideictic Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 16 (1983) :  70-93; 
Celeste Michelle Condit, “The Functions of Epideictic:  The Boston Massacre Orations as Exemplar,” 
Communication Quarterly 33 (1985) :  284-299; Michael K. Carter, “The Ritual Functions of Epideictic 
Rhetoric:  The Case of Socrates’ Funeral Oration,” Rhetorica 9 (1991) :  209-232; Dale L. Sullivan, “The 
Ethos of Epideictic Encounter,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 26 (1993) :  113-133; Bradford Vivian, 
“Neoliberal Epideictic:  Rhetorical Form and Commemorative Politics on September 11, 2002,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 92 (2006) :  1-26; and Theodore C. Burgess, Epideictic Literature (Whitefish:  Kessinger 
Publishing, 2007). 
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In epideictic, where exaggeration and amplification (υπερβολή and αυχέσις)46 are 
used either to praise excessively or to blame excessively, hyperbole is a formative and 
crucial tool.  Auxesis (αυχέ-σις:  the process, state, or condition of increasing; 
amplification), for example, is “magnifying the importance or gravity of something by 
referring to it with a disproportionate name.”  As we will see from Quintilian’s view, all 
the types of amplification are species of hyperbole:  incrementum, comparatio, 
ratiocinatio, and congeries.  Viewed from a hyperbolic perspective, the epideictic genre 
engages hyperbole, especially through incrementum, to render an evaluation from one 
perspective (pistis), or “given,” towards another perspective or thought, a transformation 
of perspective.47 
Affirming and critiquing a “given” perspective in order to transform thought 
occurs through the use of hyperbole as it points towards an “invented great:”  “[Epideictic 
promotes] identification with a new or different vision of community through the 
veneration of an ‘invented great.’”48  This invented great aids in emphasizing a critique of 
a current context and points the audience towards an alternate view of the present and 
future.  It is an impossibility that points towards other possibilities of meaning and being; 
a deceit on the side of truth(s).  That is, hyperbole is used in order to alter one’s “given” 
perception of reality and point towards another (contingent) ideal that is ambiguous 
                                                
46 Edward P. J. Corbett and Robert J. Connors, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student (Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 403.  Or, as Erasmus states, “Speech is varied by auxesis, i.e., by amplification, 
when in order to render something more effectively we put in place of an appropriate word a stronger one.”  
See Desiderius Erasmus, On Copia of Words and Ideas, trans. Donald B. King and H. David Rix 
(Milwaukee:  Marquette University Press, 2005), 35.   
 
47 For a discussion of epideictic discourse in a more aesthetic view based on a constellation of 
purposes see Dale L. Sullivan, “The Ethos of Epideictic Encounter,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 26, no. 2 
(1993) :  113-133. 
 
48 Richards, “Inventing Sacagawea,” 3. 
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“truth” as the free play of interpretation and signification, which may be deceptive in its 
ateleology and transformative vision of what might yet come to pass.  Thus, a rhetor’s 
use of hyperbole allows for a celebration as well as a disruption of “givenness,” a moving 
from one thing to something else through excessive contradiction.  By exploring aspects 
of the epideictic genre in this manner, the forms and functions of hyperbole will be 
illuminated. 
Out of this brief discussion of the epideictic genre an interesting relationship 
among hyperbole, decorum,49 and kairos50 is discovered.  I will discuss the issue of a 
decorum of excess in chapter three, but I will significantly expand upon it in chapter four.  
For example, I suggest that decorum and kairos together constitute a more fluid decorum 
of excess where hyperbole functions both forcefully and appropriately.  The contextual 
aspect of hyperbole is governed by kairos,51 and the kairotic moment marks the excessive 
                                                
49 For example, see Michael Leff, “The Habitation of Rhetoric,” in Argument & Critical Practices 
Proceeding from the Fifth SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation, ed. Joseph Wenzel (Annandale:  SCA, 
1987); Robert Hariman, “Decorum, Power, and the Courtly Style,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 78, no. 2 
(1992) :  149-172; Joy Connolly, The State of Speech:  Rhetoric and Political Thought in Ancient Rome 
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2007); Stephen J. McKenna, Adam Smith:  The Rhetoric of 
Propriety (Carbondale:  Southern Illinois University Press, 2005); Craig R. Smith, “Roman Decorum as a 
New Praxis for Existential Communication,” Western Journal of Communication 56, no. 1 (1992) : 68-89; 
and Robert Hariman, “Decorum,” in Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, ed. Thomas O. Sloane (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2001). 
 
50 For example, see Dale L. Sullivan, “Kairos and the Rhetoric of Belief,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 78 (1992) :  317-332.  For an interesting argument that is often contradictory to Sullivan’s 
presentation of kairos regarding Plato and Aristotle see James L. Kinneavy, “Kairos in Classical and 
Modern Rhetorical Theory,” in Rhetoric and Kairos:  Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis, eds. Phillip 
Sipriora and James S. Baumlin (Albany:  State University of New York Press, 2002) and James L. 
Kinneavy and Catherine R. Eskin, “Kairos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” Written Communication 2 (1994) :  
131-142.  Isocrates also emphasized kairic thought and action within his system of rhetorical paideia.  See 
Phillip Sipiora, “Introduction:  The Ancient Concept of Kairos,” in Rhetoric and Kairos:  Essays in History, 
Theory, and Praxis, eds. Phillip Sipriora and James S. Baumlin (Albany:  State University of New York 
Press, 2002); John Poulakos, “Kairos in Gorgias’ Rhetorical Compositions,” in Rhetoric and Karios:  
Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis, eds. Phillip Sipriora and James S. Baumlin (Albany:  State 
University of New York Press, 2002); and Scott Consigny, “Gorgias’s Use of the Epideictic,” Philosophy 
and Rhetoric 25, no. 3 (1992) : 281-297. 
 
51 See James L. Kinneavy, “Kairos:  A Neglected Concept in Classical Rhetoric,” in 
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and disorienting path of hyperbole.  Within these situations (kairois), the excessive 
response of hyperbole can be perceived as the right measure or appropriate 
proportionality (to prepon) – an adherence to decorum, i.e., a decorum of excess where 
all is exaggerated and disproportionality is the proportionate and appropriate response.  
The magnitude of a particular exigence or subject matter demands a timely response 
equal to the task.  The trajectory of hyperbole both exceeds and is dependent upon kairos 
and decorum within a decorum of excess. 
The epistemological and ontological disruptiveness of hyperbole functions as a 
response to an exigence at a kairotic moment by throwing beyond a “given” rational 
economy and highlighting the force of circumstantial contingency.  For example, a 
statement by William Falk highlights hyperbole’s relation to kairos and contingency: 
Perhaps Abraham Lincoln made a mistake.  When some Americans believe the 
current president is a communist cult leader trying to brainwash the nation’s 
schoolchildren, and other Americans want the last president to be dragged off his 
ranch in handcuffs, it is time to reassess the state of our union.  So may I make a 
modest proposal.  There is a way to end the bitter bickering over health care, 
abortion, affirmative action, religion in the public square, taxation, torture, and the 
proper role of government.  It is called secession.  Yes, I know:  Splitting the 
United States into two nations is a bit extreme.  But extremism in the defense of 
America’s sanity is no vice.  And since we’re already segregating ourselves by 
what we watch, listen to, and read, why not go all the way?52 
 
As Falk’s statements and his reference to Jonathan Swift’s “A Modest Proposal” suggest, 
he is being obviously hyperbolic, e.g., as hyperbolic satire, even going as far as actually 
identifying his ideas with extremity.  He offers a lie on the side of truth(s).  His response 
is both governed by the exigence of political and social unrest and exceeds the 
                                                                                                                                            
Rhetoric and Praxis:  The Contributions of Classical Rhetoric to Practical Reasoning, ed. Jean Dietz Moss 
(Washington, D.C.:  The Catholic University of America Press, 1986). 
 
52 William Falk, “Untitled,” The Week, 18 September 2009, 7. 
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decorousness of logical argumentation.  At the “right moment,” he goes beyond the 
accepted rationality of political rhetoric, highlights the contingency of the situation, 
pushes the boundaries of decorum, and makes a hyperbolic assertion of secession that is 
forceful and disruptive to one’s national identity.  The political exigence is his 
justification for the use of hyperbole and guards against accusations of misuse and 
absurdity.  In sum, the hyperbolic rhetoric Falk employs is ontologically disruptive, 
excessive, and still bound to its contextual exigence within a decorum of excess. 
The contextual aspect of hyperbole is indeed an important one:  “Hyperbole is 
always located in a situation, a context, an economy [in order to disrupt that situation or 
economy].  It is always of something and toward something else.”53  The excessive 
trajectory of hyperbole operates within a decorum of excess, which includes kairos as a 
guide because outside of the “opportune moment,” hyperbole is ridiculous.  Hyperbole’s 
excess loses its power and meaning when it is disconnected from its context.  It is 
unwarranted and unjustified.  Not only does a weak connection to context hinder the 
hyperbolist’s justification of hyperbole’s use, but it renders hyperbole almost 
meaningless. 
Relying on a decorum of excess in a particular context, hyperbole functions 
effectively in all of its excessive ambiguity and irrationality.  The pre-Socratic ethic, 
especially in the Pythagorean school and Gorgias’s thought, of “Know the opportunity” 
(kairon gnothi) is vital for the functioning of hyperbole.54  In response to a particular 
exigence, “Extraordinary circumstances and unprecedented conditions compel one to 
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resort to kairotic speech, that is, speech that risks violating established norms of propriety 
and decorum.”55  Hyperbolic speech is a certain kairotic speech that seemingly violates 
norms and decorum in order to respond appropriately to a particular exigence, and its 
justification is the extraordinary, which is particularly evident in hyperbole’s 
disorientation/re-orientation function. 
DISORIENTATION/RE-ORIENTATION  
 
The disorientation/re-orientation meta-function I will explore in chapter four is 
not one that is historically associated with hyperbole, and it is a new contribution to the 
theory of hyperbole.  As I said above, the inspiration for this function comes from two 
one-sentence glosses made by Ricoeur, and I will significantly expand upon his 
assertions.  The main statement from Ricoeur I will explicate is the assertion, 
“[Hyperbole] reorients by first disorienting [the law of paradox and hyperbole]…[and] 
makes the extraordinary break forth in the ordinary [the law of extravagance].”56  
Ascribing both paradox and the extraordinary to hyperbole, Ricoeur states what I 
suspected all along about hyperbole.  Namely, that hyperbole is a trope specifically 
designed to disorient the audience long enough in order to produce a re-orienting shift to 
other as yet unrealized perspectives and realities.  This is the meta-function, or “law,” of 
hyperbole because each function of hyperbole is subsumed under this impetus to re-orient 
through disorientation, and this is particularly evident in the grotesque genre. 
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Typified in both the epideictic and grotesque genres, I will mainly use the 
grotesque because it specifically highlights the disorientation/re-orientation of hyperbole.  
Also, some theorists of the grotesque already tangentially associate the grotesque with 
hyperbole.  Suzanne Guerlac’s notion of the “impersonal sublime,” for example, relies on 
both hyperbole and the grotesque.  She suggests that the logic of excess, a 
“hyperbologic,”57 is what guides the grotesque and that the grotesque’s rhetorical figure 
is “accumulation, exaggeration, or hyperbole.”58  Within the grotesque, “The same and 
the other are held together, ‘complicated,’ by hyperbole.”59  It is this complication that is 
the uneasy pathos created through hyperbole within the grotesque, and it is what must be 
traversed in order to arrive at new resonant, re-oriented possibilities.   
In his illuminating work on the grotesque, Geoffrey Galt Harpham describes 
grotesqueries as standing “at a margin of consciousness between the known and the 
unknown, the perceived and the unperceived, calling into question the adequacy of our 
ways of organizing the world, of dividing the continuum of experience into knowable 
particles.”60  Although Harpham does not explicitly discuss hyperbole in his work, the 
language here is similar to what I have identified as hyperbole’s role in thought and 
language, i.e., standing disorientingly at the margin of consciousness between the known 
and the unknown and calling into question the adequacy of our ways of organizing the 
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60 Geoffrey Galt Harpham, On the Grotesque:  Strategies of Contradiction in Art and Literature 
(Aurora:  The Davies Group, Publishers, 2006), 3. 
 
  32       
world.  In Harpham’s understanding, the grotesque serves a positive function that 
expands and re-orients our imagination rather than hindering imagination.  
Bakhtin explicitly notes the positive role of hyperbole regarding the grotesque 
image of the body in Rabelais’s writing.  He writes, “The grotesque body…is a body in 
the act of becoming.  It is never finished, never completed; it is continually built, created, 
and builds and creates another body.”61  He then argues that the outgrowing of the self 
and the transgressing of one’s own body each play a leading role in the grotesque image, 
which are both subject to “positive exaggeration, to hyperbolization.”62  In Harpham’s 
and Bakhtin’s depictions, the grotesque serves a positive function of transformation, 
which errantly transitions from one understanding of reality to another.  
The grotesque offers fertile ground for explicating this meta-function of hyperbole 
despite the varying interpretations of the grotesque by numerous theorists.  No matter the 
differing characteristics enumerated across the literature of the grotesque, the one 
unifying concept is that of disorienting contradiction, paradox, or incongruity,63 e.g., 
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Kenneth Burke offers the grotesque as a perspective by incongruity.64  The main 
hyperbolic function represented by the grotesque, then, is its disorienting contradictory 
nature, which always (mis)leads towards some transition of thought, emotion, experience, 
insight, or psychological state.  
Viewing hyperbole through the lens of the grotesque also reveals its paradoxical 
and transgressive characteristics that move one from dissonance to a newly created sense 
of resonance in the audience.  It is this resonance, this re-orientation, which carries the 
audience through contradictions towards a transition.  The dissonant force of hyperbole’s 
aggressiveness is justified by its figural resonance.  The attitudes about hyperbole and our 
difficult relation with excess and exaggeration often stifle this transformative movement, 
but hyperbole repeatedly offers a way to batter the literal into the figural and moves one 
through paradox into partial apprehension. 
Examining the contentious history of hyperbole as well as its three functions that 
move within a decorum of excess, which are exemplified in the epideictic and grotesque 
genres, leads to the conclusion that hyperbole is an important, though often 
misunderstood, trope deserving of further attention and exploration.  A gaping hole 
within current rhetorical theory, this tropological representation of excess is in need of 
critical re-exploration. 
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CHAPTER 2:  THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF HYPERBOLE 
 
There are two things upon which every treatment of the Scriptures depends:  the means of 
discovering what the thought may be, and the means of expressing what the thought is. 
St. Augustine 
 
God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived. 
Anselm 
 
The special goal of theologians is to expound Scripture wisely; to render its doctrine 
according to faith, not frivolous questions; to discourse about piety gravely and 
efficaciously; to wring out tears, to inflame spirits to heavenly things. 
Erasmus 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Hyperbole has a rich and contentious rhetorical history.  It is misunderstood, 
celebrated, denigrated, treated with suspicion, extolled, disparaged as a “lowd lyer,” an 
“overreacher,” and described as a vice that leads one away from the virtue of moderation.  
“Some writers…argue that hyperbole can become a stylistic vice, and advise the orator to 
dispense with its services altogether.”1  The main reason for this contentiousness is 
because of the fear of rhetorical theorists, philosophers, and rhetorical theologians that 
hyperbole will go too far – disrupting decorum and/or leading one to a life of vice, e.g., 
“sin,” vehemence, intemperance, or licentiousness.   
The central assumption buttressing this fear is that the excessive ornamentation of 
language, the overuse of rhetorical tropes and figures as a violation of decorum, will 
enliven passions and desires and lead one to excessive forms of living, mistakes, and 
error.  Tropes are all forms of lies that attempt to magnify or expand meaning, but 
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hyperbole is more blatant in this function.  This is why some call hyperbole the “trope-
producing trope,”2 and it is why theorists link it to decorum.  In fact, one’s view of 
hyperbole is often contingent upon one’s understanding of decorum.  In addition, for 
most rhetoricians throughout history, stylistic and moral excess is considered to be a 
transgression of virtue, decorum, and moderation, but for those like the sophists or the 
Romantics, excess is preferred and celebrated within a certain decorum of excess.  As the 
tropological representation of excess, the explicit or implicit discussion of hyperbolic 
excess and its protean forms is at the center of this controversy.   
It is not that the excessive function of hyperbole changes throughout history, 
though how it is (re)interpreted for epistemological purposes may change.  Rather, it is 
the form and attitudes about hyperbole that change at various times in history as well as 
how excess can effect ontological conceptions.  As the tropological representation of 
excess, hyperbole’s epistemological implications and its relation to ontology within this 
historical framework are explored but only insofar as they prove my thesis for this 
chapter, which is the contentious history of hyperbole.  Hyperbole’s definition, form, and 
functions are all ambiguous and protean in divergent, conflicting ways, e.g., its 
paradoxical nature, its violation/adherence to decorum, its stylistic vices/virtues, and its 
contextual contingency.  As such, hyperbole’s de-stabilizing rhetorical function as it is 
related to stylistic and moral decorum is significantly interrelated with epistemological 
and ontological concerns about excess.3  The epistemological function of hyperbole is 
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related to its embodied ontological (ethical) form as a way living, and the characterization 
of hyperbole reveals important aspects of the ways one’s relationship to hyperbole 
interacts with meaning and being; thereby, revealing its debated place in thought and 
language. 
Many philosophers, rhetoricians, and theologians refer to the dangers and vices of 
excessive living as well as stylistic vices and superfluous eloquence without mentioning 
hyperbole.  Although hyperbole is not always specifically referenced, the attitudes and 
expressions about excess, ornament, appearance, desire, and superfluity can be linked to 
“embodied hyperboles.”  That is, hyperbole is a trope as well as a figure of thought.4  As 
the tropological representation of excess expressed as a figure of thought, hyperbole can 
be interpreted and portrayed in an embodied form as a type of hyperbolic praxis.5  Quite 
simply, embodied hyperboles are those ways of living that re-present excessive behavior 
or transgress conventional limits, either in abundance or in paucity.  Throughout history, 
embodied hyperboles are referred to in various ways, e.g., sin, intemperance, impiety, 
vice, adolescence.  
It is true that hyperbole is technically a trope, but today, rhetorical theorists 
recognize tropes as being generators of meaning and being.  In this sense, hyperbole 
represents:  1) the tendency of all tropes towards excess, i.e., “the trope-producing 
                                                
4 Christopher D. Johnson, Hyperboles:  The Rhetoric of Excess in Baroque Literature and Thought 
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trope,”6 2) the tropological and figural representation of rhetorical excess, and 3) the 
bodily expression of excess, i.e., embodied hyperbole.  As generators of meaning and 
being, tropological language and being are intimately tied together.  As such, hyperbolic 
excess is either denounced as a stylistic vice that always violates decorum and results in 
“sin” or a derivative thereof; or, hyperbolic excess is viewed as an epistemological virtue, 
a “beauty,” and “elegant” when it adheres to a decorum of excess.  Excess is often 
viewed in terms of a moralistic good/bad (and even evil) binary, and this binary tension is 
continually (re)negotiated.  These views of hyperbole lead to the conclusion that 
hyperbole has a controversial history, both in rhetorical theory as well as rhetorical 
theology and philosophy. 
A history of rhetoric often overlaps with a history of theology since many 
theologians are also rhetoricians and vice versa, and I will make theological observations 
about hyperbolic excess along the way, though the main focus will remain on hyperbole 
and its history.  Furthermore, theological discourse fairly consistently privileges 
metaphor and analogy explicitly, but implicitly, theology relies heavily upon hyperbole 
for its assertions about theological terms and doctrines, e.g., grace, love, Christology, 
eschatology, theories of atonement, and the incarnation, as well as within many of its 
argumentation strategies. 
In the present project, I offer a survey of hyperbole’s significant and controversial 
history to provide a more thorough understanding of hyperbole for current discussion.  
Except for the four master tropes, particularly metaphor, current rhetorical theorists are 
not as inclined to think in serious theoretical terms about figures and tropes, as rhetorical 
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theorists were in other times.  That is, we currently do not often consider the range of 
figures and tropes about which previous theorists explored, and we do not typically 
examine the precise, nuanced distinctions they maintained.  Thus, this history will 
recover some of this discussion regarding hyperbole.   
I limit this historical survey to show how hyperbole is defined and to show how 
the attitudes about hyperbole change.  An analysis of why these attitudes shift based on 
political, religious, or socio-economic contexts is not explored in depth because my 
purpose is simply to offer a backdrop from which to better understand this trope and its 
functions for contemporary rhetorical theory rather than to present the contextual 
dynamics from which the attitudes toward hyperbole emerge, though this is another much 
needed work to foster a greater understanding of hyperbole.   
I also limit this historical overview of hyperbole to the Western rhetorical 
tradition while incorporating Western theological and homiletic observations about 
hyperbole as examples when appropriate.  I will not examine every text or thinker who 
mentions hyperbole, exaggeration, or amplification, but I will engage those rhetoricians 
and rhetorical theologians who have contributed to the development of hyperbole, 
positively or negatively.  I will offer a more detailed analysis of hyperbole in Greco-
Roman rhetorical theory, including the “Church Fathers,” than at other times because all 
other discussions and definitions of hyperbole are premised upon the writings of these 
theorists, especially Quintilian.  Some contemporary philosophers also offer insights into 
hyperbole, but I will save a detailed analysis of those philosophers for later chapters since 
they have less to do with the history of hyperbole and more to do with parsing out 
hyperbole’s functions. 
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 I will first examine the views of hyperbole by Greco-Roman rhetorical theorists, 
including the Latin “Church Fathers,” and I will then explore the Middle Ages, the 
Renaissance, the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and contemporary rhetorical theory.  I 
will proceed, then, along a rhetorical trajectory through a history of hyperbole that will at 
times be influenced by and influence theology.  Thus, this history is a history of 
hyperbole’s prescriptions and proscriptions within rhetorical theory, rhetorical theology, 
and the preaching traditions within Western Christian discourse, and what I will find is 
that hyperbole’s excessively disruptive force is sometimes scorned, sometimes 
celebrated, often misunderstood, and always treated with suspicion. 
ANCIENT WESTERN RHETORICAL THEORY 
 “PAGAN” RHETORIC 
 
The contentious history of hyperbole can be perceived as a significant ontological 
threat, and this fear is expressed through the dualities of intemperance/temperance, 
excess/moderation, vice/virtue, deceit/truth, and irrationality/rationality.  Hence, one 
reason for restraining hyperbole in the ancient world is its ontological disruptiveness. 
From Plato, to Aristotle, to Demetrius and Cicero, the forces of excess are resisted, even 
vilified, in favor of a more stable, moderate order founded upon unarguable “first 
principles” and logos.7  David Bentley Hart, an Eastern Orthodox theologian, writes, 
“The cosmos and the city, the city and the soul:  this is the golden thread of analogy 
running through ancient Greek metaphysics; the serene lineaments of rational form are 
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always engaged in a struggle with the tragic depths they comprise with the turmoil that 
surrounds them as fate and as the infinite.”8  The Greek cosmos for many of its 
philosophers is viewed as fragile, and its analogous ontological assumptions require a 
constant synecdochal striving for equilibrium that only the virtue of moderation can 
guarantee.9  Hyperbole, through its excessiveness, disrupts that equilibrium and 
moderation through paradox and contradiction and threatens the presumed balance of 
order, unity, and beauty.  Expressions of hyperbolic excess like grotesqueries, 
monstrosities, chimaeras, amalgams, and duplicitous combinations are often resisted as 
imperfections of appearance and mysteries of ambiguity.  A certain harmony is attempted 
through philosophical, theological, and mythological systems of thought, but hyperbolic 
assertions are not entirely concerned with harmony.  Thus, it is not a simple distrust of 
hyperbole as flagrant, deceitful, or distasteful that one encounters but an aversion to its 
extreme disruptive metaphysical, specifically ontological (in its analogical 
differentiations), implications. 
A common theme of Greek rhetors, as well as Roman orators, is to condemn the 
excessive eloquence, vices, intemperance, ornate speech, and mere appearance of the 
sophists because sophistic excess diverged from the ideal of moderation they sought to 
uphold.  James J. Murphy asserts that the entire Greco-Roman world often attacked the 
sophists of the “Second Sophistic” for their rhetorical excess.10  The contempt for the 
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sophists and their employment of hyperbole is reflected in Thomas E. Ameringer’s 
statement that oxymoron and hyperbole “form one of the most objectionable and 
unartistic traits of sophistic rhetoric.”11  The connection of hyperbole to sophistic rhetoric 
is made more explicit when he writes, “The hyperbole is another trope much in vogue 
with the sophists…The sophist orators often employed it to give to topics which were 
trivial or commonplace an air of grandeur and importance.”12  Sophistic excess is 
explicitly linked to hyperbole.  Even before the second sophistic, the sophists were 
chastised for their excess, and this condemnation of sophistic excess is twofold.  It is a 
denunciation of rhetorical excess as a stylistic vice tropologically and figurally 
represented as hyperbole as well as embodied excess, i.e., embodied hyperbole, as a 
moral vice.  Rhetorical excess is synecdochally connected to embodied excess.  Hence, 
allegations against rhetorical excess in sophistic discourse are also ethical allegations 
against the sophists in terms of intemperate living.  Hyperbole as the tropological 
representation of excess is thereby also condemned.  The avoidance of stylistic vices, 
therefore, is a significant concern for ancient rhetoricians because it synecdochally 
represents the embodiment of excess.  
Isocrates, for example, condemns the sophists in Against the Sophists and in his 
Encomium of Helen.  In Against the Sophists, Isocrates argues that the sophists are 
deceivers who live a life of careless indolence instead of devoting themselves to serious 
study.  He calls them liars, and he asserts, “Oratory is good only if it has the qualities of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
11 Thomas E. Ameringer, A Study in Greek Rhetoric:  The Stylistic Influence of the Second 
Sophistic on the Panegyrical Sermons of St. John Chrysostom (Kessinger Publishing, 2006), 40-41. 
 
12 Ibid., 18.   
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fitness for the occasion, propriety of style, and originality of treatment.”13  In contrast to a 
good orator, he views the sophists as speaking about absurdities and violating the rules of 
decorum through their excessive speech as well as their excessive living.  His 
condemnation of the sophists occurs as a stylistic rebuke that is also a renunciation of 
their lives as expressions of figural excess.  One’s oratory is considered a reflection of 
one’s life, and because hyperbole is the tropological representation of excess, hyperbolic 
speech is rejected for its destabilizing epistemological and ontological effects.  Although 
Isocrates himself is often characterized as a sophist for his use of an ornate or grand 
style,14 he attempts to distance himself from the excessive style of sophistic discourse 
and, mutatis mutandi, the lives they lead.  What Isocrates rejects is hyperbole the trope 
and figure of thought that leads to embodied hyperbole.  The rhetorical and ethical 
allegations Isocrates brings against the sophists for their excess are also particularly 
evident in Plato’s writing where he vehemently critiques the sophist’s excessive style as 
well as intemperate living.  The same is true of Aristotle. 
Although Plato clearly establishes a moderation/excess duality in Gorgias and 
Phaedrus, it is Aristotle who is often referenced by other rhetorical theorists when 
discussing hyperbole.  I will, then, forego an explication of Plato, and move directly to 
Aristotle.  In Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, he lays out his proposition for the virtues 
of moderation over and against the excesses of appetites, pleasures, intemperance 
                                                
13 Isocrates, Against the Sophists, 1.14-1.15, Ohio State University at Mansfield, 
<http://english.mansfield.ohio-state.edu/writing/276files/IsocratesAgainst.htm> (5 November 2009). 
 
14 Morris Croll argues that the true and original grand style is developed by Isocrates.  Although 
Thucydides and Demosthenes are typically equated with the grand style, Croll argues that they belong to 
the plain style, and that Isocrates and Cicero are the main proponents of the grand style.  See Morris Croll, 
“Attic” and Baroque Prose Style:  Essays by Morris Croll, eds. J. Max Patrick and R. O. Evans (Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1966). 
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(akolasia), and desires.  He equates intemperance, either in excess or deficiency, with the 
irrationality of children’s desires and things that are shameful,15 which explicitly equates 
the vice of excess with irrationality, shame, and unreasonableness.  Just as for Plato, 
excess is an ontological deficiency, a lack, that necessitates a corrective ethical and moral 
obligation to moderation.  Indeed, Aristotle argues that the intemperate person, i.e., one 
who embodies excess, exhibits irresponsibility for others.16   
Not only does Aristotle consider excess to be irrational and contrary to reason, he 
also suggests that it lacks any ethical dimension.  He believes that the intemperate person 
is one who disobeys and lacks the “right nature.”17  Anything intemperate or immoderate 
is to be rejected and “expelled” because it is contrary to the “right nature,” the “right” 
way of being in the world.  Many theorists, as will be shown, also characterize hyperbole 
as irrational, shameful, unethical, and lacking the right nature for expressing ideas within 
language.  In this sense, Aristotle is describing embodied hyperbole, and he is arguing 
against the ways moral and bodily excesses lead one away from the ethical position of 
moderation and virtue.  Though only implied here, this connection to hyperbole is overt 
in On Rhetoric. 
                                                
15 He states, “For the things that need to be tempered are those that desire shameful things and 
tend to grow large.  Appetites and children are most like this; for children also live by appetite, and desire 
for the pleasant is found more in them than in anyone else,” and he posits that “if the appetites are large and 
intense, they actually expel rational calculation.  That is why appetites must be moderate and few, and 
never contrary to reason.”  See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis:  
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1999), 3.12.30. 
 
16 He writes, “One person pursues excesses of pleasant things because they are excesses and 
because he decides on it, for themselves and not for some further result.  He is intemperate; for he is bound 
to have no regrets, and so is incurable…The one who is deficient is his opposite, while the intermediate one 
is temperate.”  Ibid., 7.7.20. 
 
17 He writes that “the decent person…will attend to reason because his life aims at the fine,” and 
he considers the intemperate person to be a “base person.”  Ibid., 10.9.5b, 10.9.10b. 
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In On Rhetoric, Aristotle equates hyperbole with metaphor, and he explicitly 
dismisses hyperbole as “adolescent” and “vehement.”18  He links hyperbole to 
adolescence because “All the mistakes they [adolescents] make are in the direction of 
excess and vehemence…for they do ‘everything too much.’”19  For Aristotle, hyperbole 
is an (overly) exaggerated metaphor and is equated with the mistakes and passions of 
youth suggesting that the young are easily angered, disregard limits, and are given to 
excessive expression – a psychological intensity of feeling expressed through language – 
which is certainly not in accord with Greek notions of moderation.  In his terms, “It is 
inappropriate for an older [wiser] man to speak [in hyperbole].”20  What was only implied 
in Ethics is now made explicit.  Hyperbole is the tropological and figural representation 
of excess, and using the irrational and shameful trope in language violates decorum and 
reflects one’s deficient character.  The “adolescent” embodies hyperbole while the “older 
man” embodies a decorum of moderation, which is violated by excess.  Hyperbole is 
simply too risky because it risks doing “everything too much.”  It is intemperate and 
uncontrollable, which leads to rhetorical as well as ethical mistakes in the direction of 
excess-as-lack.  What hyperbole lacks, however, moderation is able to manage and 
contain, and these mistakes and excessive vices in one’s life and within discourse are 
regulated.21  Thus, Aristotle’s view of hyperbole becomes clearer.  It is too excessive, too 
                                                
18 Aristotle, On Rhetoric:  A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George A. Kennedy (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 1991), 3.11.15. 
 
19 Ibid., 2.12.14. 
 
20 Ibid., 3.11.15.  
 
21 Michael Harrawood writes, “The thing hyperbole exhibits or exposes, what Aristotle calls 
vehemence, is the speaker’s will to dominate the imaginative content of the verbal exchange by imposing 
upon the listeners a hyperextended figure as an element of argument enclosed by logos and thus both 
obvious and containable within shared discourse.”  See Michael Harrawood, “Overreachers:  Hyperbole, 
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irrational, and ethically inept, and using hyperbole reflects a lack of appropriate, 
moderate character because it is used primarily by those who cannot control their 
passions and desires, which paradoxically suggests that excess reveals a lack rather than 
abundance.  
Pseudo-Longinus, henceforth referred to as Longinus, offers a more amenable 
description of hyperbole than Aristotle, and he discusses it primarily as a trope of 
language used in the elevated style thereby emphasizing its rhetorical function rather than 
its embodied form.  Largely abandoning logos and ethos, Longinus’s elevated style 
appeals exclusively to pathos to move his audience, to “transport them.”   To achieve this 
goal, Longinus employs the use of hyperbole, but Longinus’s main concern is that 
hyperbole might blend with the “true Sublime.”22  He writes of hyperbole, “The 
hyperbole is sometimes ruined by overshooting the mark.  Overdo the strain and the thing 
sags, and often produces the opposite effect to that intended.”23  Distinct from the 
sublime, Longinus contends that hyperbole may be ruined by its precise function to 
enlarge and exaggerate, which is the primary fear of all rhetorical theorists regarding 
hyperbole.  For Longinus, as for others, this fear is a stylistic concern because the risk of 
hyperbole is that it might be amplified beyond the elevated, or sublime, style thereby 
disrupting the decorum of this style.  Hyperbole is necessary and appropriate when 
                                                                                                                                            
the ‘circle in the water,’ and Force in I Henry 6,” English Literary Renaissance 33, no. 3 (2003) :  321; 
quoted in, Goran V. Stanivukovic, “’Mounting Above the Truthe’:  On Hyperbole in English Renaissance 
Literature,” Forum for Modern Language Studies 43, no. 1 (2007) :  11. 
 
22 [Longinus], On the Sublime, The Loeb Classical Library, trans. W. H. Fyfe, ed. G. P. Goold 
(Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1995), 177. 
 
23 Ibid., 281. 
 
  46       
discussing sublime topics because it is a breaker of boundaries, but it must be inhibited so 
as not to violate the decorum of the elevated style or blend into the Sublime. 
To further aid in regulating the excess of hyperbole, Longinus argues, “The best 
hyperbole is the one which conceals the very fact of its being a hyperbole.  And this 
happens when it is uttered under stress of emotion to suit the circumstances of a great 
crisis.”24  Hyperbolic excess must be concealed as well as limited to certain situations, 
e.g., those of psychological duress, in order for it to be effective and justified.  Overall, 
then, hyperbole is appropriate when discussing sublime topics as well as during moments 
of extreme duress.  Hyperbole must adhere to a certain decorum because the incident (or 
the content of one’s argument) does not exist for the sake of hyperbole, but “the 
hyperbole for the sake of the incident”25 – “The intensity of feeling justifies the excess in 
language.”26  The use of hyperbolic excess, the force of its phenomenological and 
psychological power, must be appropriate to the situation or the content being discussed.  
As almost all rhetorical theorists will reiterate, using hyperbole effectively is contingent 
upon its adherence to a certain decorum of excess.  Longinus is clearly favorably inclined 
towards hyperbole as long as decorum is maintained so it will not be too disruptive or be 
confused with the sublime.  Hyperbole must not “overdo” its intended purpose.  Thus, 
Longinus utilizes hyperbole as a breaker of boundaries to “throw beyond” the limits of 
                                                
24 [Longinus], On the Sublime, 283. 
 
25 Ibid. 
 
26 Brian Vickers, “The ‘Songs and Sonnets’ and the Rhetoric of Hyperbole,” in John Donne:  
Essays in Celebration, ed. A. J. Smith (London:  Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1972), 140.  Vickers makes this 
statement in reference to Longinus and Aristotle. 
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language and knowledge, but he also struggles with establishing a type of decorum in 
which hyperbole does not go too far.27   
Demetrius offers a less favorable definition of hyperbole, which is also discussed 
primarily in stylistic terms.28  For Demetrius, all forms of hyperbole are characteristically 
impossibilities and are “frigid,” i.e., “that which exceeds its appropriate form of 
expression.”29  Although impossibility is the specific function of an adynaton, which is 
one form of hyperbole, he conflates the two terms rather than parsing out the distinctions.  
In so doing, he dismisses the “frigidity” of hyperbole as a stylistic vice, and he relegates 
it to being used only in comic poetry and to evoke laughter.  This is not an uncommon 
tactic used to discredit and demean hyperbole, but it is also not a wholly negative 
association.  Because Demetrius rejects the use of hyperbole, he makes a distinction 
between force (hyperbole) and grandeur (the eloquence of the grand style).30  Here, a 
simplistic binary of excess is established.  Hyperboles, as brute force, are considered 
distasteful and result only in laughter and jest because they signify nothing of importance 
and produce a “frigid” style, but grandeur is considered eloquent.  Hyperbole is 
denigrated through impossibility, and its “frigid” style is separated from the eloquence of 
the grander style.  Whereas Longinus appropriates hyperbole’s excessive and disruptive 
                                                
27 Ettenhuber, “Hyperbole,” 205. 
 
28 “The most frigid of all figures is hyperbole, which is of three kinds.  It is expressed either in the 
form of a likeness, for example ‘like the winds in speed’; or of superiority, for example ‘whiter than snow’; 
or of impossibility, for example ‘with her head she reached the sky.’  Admittedly every hyperbole is an 
impossibility.  There could be nothing ‘whiter than snow,’ nothing ‘like the winds in speed.’  But this last 
kind is especially called impossible.  And so the reason why every hyperbole seems particularly frigid is 
that it suggests something impossible.”  See Demetrius, On Style, The Loeb Classical Library, trans. 
Doreen C. Innes (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1995), 427. 
 
29 Demetrius, On Style, 114; quoted in, Ettenhuber, “Hyperbole,” 199.  
 
30 Debora K. Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric:  The Christian Grand Style in the English Renaissance 
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1988), 32. 
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functions for certain contexts and subjects, Demetrius seemingly rejects it outright, 
though this picture of Demetrius’s interpretation is somewhat complicated in the next 
chapter. 
The contentious and controversial history of hyperbole is already evident, and this 
trend continues within Roman rhetorical theory where hyperbole is viewed more 
favorably.  Cicero, however, takes a rather ambiguous stance on hyperbole.  On the one 
hand, Cicero offers his ontological position on the subject of excess.  In Cicero’s early 
work, De Inventione, the ontological concerns regarding moderation persist,31 and his 
stance against excess is abundantly apparent.  He repeatedly extols the four major virtues 
– wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance – that are to be nurtured while their opposites 
should be avoided.  There is no mention of hyperbole specifically, but like Aristotle, the 
vices of excess can be viewed as embodied hyperboles that are to be avoided for their 
disruption of moderation.  In like manner, in De Oratore the virtue of moderation as civic 
virtue is consistently privileged over excess and vice, and how knowledge is ethically 
communicated in practical and civic matters becomes more important.  The form of 
embodied hyperbole as intemperate, unethical, excessive living stands in direct 
opposition to the moderate virtues of Cicero’s ideal orator.   
On the other hand, Cicero offers his epistemological position on the subject of 
excess.  In De Oratore, he defines hyperbole as “exaggeration and overstatement of the 
truth for the sake of amplification or diminution.”32  This is a telling statement because 
                                                
31 For example, “Temperance is a firm and moderate control exercised by calculation over lust and 
other impulses of the spirit that are not right [not straight].”  See Cicero, De Inventione, 2.54.164, trans. 
John F. Tinker, Rhetoric and Composition, <http://rhetoric.eserver.org/categories/history/classical/genres-
of-rhetoric.html#delib-part> (23 October 2009). 
 
32 Cicero, De Oratore, trans. James M. May and Jakob Wisse (New York:  Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 3.203. 
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hyperbole is shown to operate so the truth might be amplified, elaborated, or expanded 
upon in either vertical direction.  Far from a negative view of hyperbole, Cicero appears 
to regard this trope as fostering epistemological inquiry, a playfulness with meaning, and 
the pursuit of knowledge by exaggerating or overstating the truth for a particular effect – 
the effect of elaborating and expounding upon the truth and meaning.  Thus, Cicero’s 
view of excess is ambiguous.  Embodied hyperbole is denigrated while hyperbole the 
trope is productive for engaging epistemological concerns.  This latter view of hyperbole 
is more explicitly outlined in Ad Herennium. 
In Ad Herennium (thought to be authored by Cicero for centuries), the 
epistemological connection to hyperbole is evident.  The author, like Cicero, defines 
hyperbole as “a manner of speech exaggerating the truth, whether for the sake of 
magnifying or minifying something.”33  Later, the author writes, “Emphasis [significatio] 
is the figure which leaves more to be suspected than has been actually asserted…The 
emphasis is produced through Hyperbole [per exsuperationem] when more is said than 
the truth warrants [patitur veritas], so as to give greater force to the suspicion.”34  Neither 
observation condemns excess or intemperance.  In the latter one, hyperbole’s 
epistemological playfulness with and (re)constitution of meaning is highlighted.  
Hyperbole is portrayed here as emphasizing a truth that is already known35 thereby giving 
                                                                                                                                            
 
33 [Cicero], Rhetorica ad Herennium, trans. Harry Caplan (London:  Harvard University Press, 
2004), 4.44. 
 
34 Ibid., 4.67. 
 
35 Stephen H. Webb writes of Ad Herennium, “Hyperbole does not create a truth, but rather 
magnifies something that is already true,” and he suggests that hyperbole is portrayed more like simile than 
metaphor, since metaphor creates new meaning.  See Stephen H. Webb, Blessed Excess:  Religion and the 
Hyperbolic Imagination (Albany:  State University of New York Press, 1993), 8. 
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greater force to the suspicion that something more may still be revealed than what is 
explicitly stated.  Hyperbole does not conceal in deceit but reveals through truth, and 
exaggerating the truth to reveal more than the truth warrants suggests that a plasticity of 
meaning is present in this discussion of hyperbole.36  Hyperbole does not simply 
emphasize a truth that is already known in order to confirm one’s already held beliefs, it 
surpasses the truth and states more than the truth warrants to highlight the complexity of 
meaning.  Hyperbole reveals the malleability of truth, and this playfulness with meaning 
is precisely what Seneca observes in his discussion of hyperbole. 
In On Benefits, Seneca offers a similar epistemological position regarding 
hyperbole when he posits, “The purpose of all exaggeration is to arrive at the truth by 
falsehood,” and he suggests that through exaggeration one asserts “what could not 
possibly be in order that they might be thought to be as much so as possible.”37  In this 
commonly (re)interpreted passage by rhetorical theorists, Seneca states that the 
paradoxical function of hyperbole is to arrive at truth through a lie – to suggest 
impossibility as possibility and possibility as impossibility.  The paradox of all language 
is that it lies while attempting to signify or accurately represent the truth, and hyperbole 
exploits this paradox productively.  Hyperbole must point towards the impossible, the lie, 
in order to arrive tentatively at the possible, an assertion of truth:  “Exaggeration never 
hopes all its daring flights to be believed, but affirms what is incredible, that thereby it 
                                                
36 Similarly, Longinus states, “Hyperbole may tend to belittle as well as to magnify; the common 
element in both is a strain on the facts.”  See [Longinus], On the Sublime, 285.  Or, as Quintilian will later 
argue, “It [hyperbole] is an elegant surpassing of the truth.”  See Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.6.67, 
trans. Lee Honeycutt, <http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/quintilian/8/chapter6.html#68> (28 October 
2009). 
 
37 Seneca, On Benefits, trans. Aubrey Stewart (London:  George Bell and Sons, 1905), 7.23. 
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may convey what is credible.”38  The lie of hyperbole is not a falsehood intended to 
deceive but a concerted effort to destabilize perceptions of meaning in order to reveal 
alternative conceptions of truth and knowledge.  Hyperbole is not simply a lie, but an 
excessive figural distortion on the side of truth.  It is an exaggerated mis-recognition that 
leads to recognition and a theoretical method of epistemological inquiry that highlights 
the fragility of meaning through excess.  In this theory of excess, affirming the incredible 
through exaggeration in the pursuit of knowledge is necessary because the known is not 
capable of expressing the as yet unknown, the as yet unrealized within knowledge itself.  
Thus, contrary to Aristotle and Demetrius, Seneca implies that a deficiency in our 
perceptions of reality and knowledge requires the disruption of excess, and hyperbole is 
the vehicle of this disruption.  Quintilian explores these same views about hyperbole in 
Institutes of Oratory. 
Only implied in Cicero, the author of Ad Herennium, and even Seneca, Quintilian 
offers several interesting explicit descriptions of hyperbole that carry stylistic and 
epistemological implications, and his more developed descriptions offer the most 
complex theory of hyperbole thus far.  Indeed, Quintilian’s theory is the most influential 
theory of hyperbole in the history of rhetorical theory, and I will explicate his theory in 
more detail in the next chapter.  On a stylistic level, he views hyperbole as a “bolder sort 
of ornamen [sic],” and he says, “It is an elegant surpassing of the truth and is used 
equally for exaggerating and extenuating.”39  Rather than a vice or a lack, hyperbole is 
considered elegant, but this elegance can go awry if, at least the appearance of, 
                                                
38 Ibid. 
 
39 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, trans. Lee Honeycutt, 8.6.67, 
http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/quintilian/8/chapter6.html#68, last accessed 2 November 2009. 
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moderation, i.e., decorum, is not maintained.  For example, he states, “But even in the use 
of hyperbole, some moderation must be observed, for though every hyperbole is beyond 
belief, it ought not to be extravagant, since in no other way do writers more readily fall 
into…’exorbitant affection.’”40  Here again, decorum is used to regulate hyperbole’s 
excesses that can move “beyond belief.”  For Quintilian, elegant hyperboles are decorous 
while extravagant hyperboles push the boundaries too far, and when they move beyond 
moderation into “exorbitant affectation,” he considers them “absurdities.”41  Again, a 
binary of excess is posited, but Quintilian’s binary is more complex than Demetrius’s. 
On the one hand, Quintilian argues that hyperbole is an elegant ornament and 
excess is viewed as a good, but on the other hand, he also suggests that it should not 
become an extravagant ornamentation, which can be viewed as sophistic artifice.  This is 
a stylistic distinction that hinges on decorum.  Hyperbole is “a beauty” when the subject 
it is describing is appropriate and “extraordinary in nature.”  There is a certain 
justification for hyperbole wherein hyperbole is effective when the form matches the 
subject matter discussed.  When decorum is maintained, literal departure from the truth is 
“pardoned” because the figural falsehood is not affirmed but recognized.42  Thus, an 
inhibitory caution is placed upon hyperbole because of its excessive disruptiveness, but 
its epistemological function remains a significant force in his theory. 
                                                
40 Ibid., 8.6.73. 
 
41 Ibid., 8.6.74. 
 
42 “It very often raises a laugh, and if the laugh be on the side of the speaker, the hyperbole gains 
the praise of wit, but if otherwise, the stigma of folly.  It is in common use, as much among the unlearned 
as among the learned, because there is in all men a natural propensity to magnify or extenuate what comes 
before them, and no one is contented with the exact truth.  But such departure from the truth is pardoned 
because we do not affirm what is false.  In a word, the hyperbole is a beauty when the thing of which we 
speak is extraordinary in nature.  For we are then allowed to say a little more than the truth, because the 
exact truth cannot be said, and language is more efficient when it goes beyond reality than when it stops 
short of it.”  See Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.6.74-8.6.76. 
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On an epistemological level, Quintilian defines hyperbole stating, “It is sufficient 
to remark that the hyperbole lies, but not so as to intend to deceive by lying, and we 
therefore ought to consider more carefully how far it becomes us to exaggerate that which 
is not believed.”43  Like Seneca’s definition, hyperbole is paradoxically not a lie intended 
to deceive but to reveal.44  “A lie, expressed in linguistic terms, becomes truth on a 
hermeneutical level.  Hyperbole thus acts a generator of meaning.”45  Quintilian’s theory 
of language suggests that hyperbole is a redeeming figure that leads to an abundance of 
meaning rather than a lack.  Peter William Shoemaker posits, “Implicit in this theory is 
an assumption that ordinary language is flat and banal, and therefore inadequate to 
describe the abnormal, the unusual, and the marvelous.”46  Hyperbole breaks the bounds 
of language and attempts to describe the unbelievable and incomprehensible.  It 
tropologically articulates what cannot be articulated through “ordinary language.”  
Quintilian’s definition of hyperbole gives it an epistemological playfulness that allows 
for a (re)constitution of meaning and being through a transcendence of language.  By 
exaggerating meaning, one comes to the truth, but Quintilian also suggests something 
more than Cicero and Seneca.  He contends that excess and exaggeration are inherent and 
productive forces within “human nature,” language, and one’s conception of these given 
realities. 
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44 Stephen H. Webb calls this a “baffling statement” that reveals “hyperbole’s ambiguous relation 
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Quintilian asserts that the excessiveness of reality itself requires the use of 
hyperboles on a regular basis and that humans have a “natural propensity” to 
exaggerate.47  He notes that when one speaks of something that transcends the normal 
limits of nature, it is better to go too far than not far enough since “no one is contented 
with the exact truth.”48  Language, in fact, is more effective when it goes beyond its 
limits and the “exact truth” because the orator can then offer “a rich terrain for stylistic 
invention and play.”49  Thus, the utilization of hyperbole is more than tropological or 
stylistic.  It is a figure of thought.  It is an epistemological theory of excess that 
acknowledges the propensity for excess and deceit in language as well as being, and it 
harnesses this excess to explore truth claims that may lie outside the bounds of ordinary 
language, “exact truth,” and accepted knowledge.  Overall, the daring heights and risks of 
“elegant hyperbole,” i.e., good hyperbole, lead to an abundance of meaning rather than a 
lack of moral character, and the lie of hyperbole leads paradoxically to an assertion of 
truth.  In this sense, hyperbole is a redemptive figure of virtue, stylistically and 
epistemologically, rather than a vice.  However, the “extravagant hyperbole,” i.e., bad 
hyperbole, leads to a violation of moderate living as well as decorous speaking.  
Quintilian advises caution, but he also offers a justification for hyperbole that might 
operate within a decorum of excess where ordinary language is not enough to express the 
extraordinary nature of a particular situation or subject matter and epistemological 
inquiry is furthered by exceeding the truth it seeks to discover.   
                                                
47 “There is in all men a natural propensity to magnify or extenuate what comes before them, and 
no one is contented with the exact truth.”  Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.6.74. 
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 From these descriptions and characterizations of hyperbole by various theorists, 
we see that hyperbole is a contentious term from the beginning.  It is described as an 
impossibility evoking a “frigid” style, adolescent, a vehicle for the sublime, and a lie on 
the side of truth.  It is mistrusted and rejected by some for its lack of value, violation of 
decorum, shamefulness, and proclivity towards excessive desires.  It is explored by others 
as a useful trope, a productive mode of inquiry, and an elegant ornament that enhances 
one’s style.50  These observations indicate that hyperbole can be viewed on three different 
levels:  1) an excessive trope of language, 2) the tropological representation of rhetorical 
and embodied excess, and 3) a “trope-producing trope”51 that pushes all tropes and 
figures toward excess and a possible violation of decorum.  As such, hyperbole is often 
associated with sophistic discourse for its excess and artifice,52 and even when hyperbole 
                                                
50 Important to note is that hyperbole is considered by all of these theorists as an external, 
rhetorical tool.  Excess is an internal vice, but the trope of hyperbole is an external expression.  Even 
through excess, however, the concern for these theorists is still the projection of a certain way of living.  
The external is not a reflection of the inner life but a projection of perception.  The way others perceive 
one’s life is of utmost importance.  In this sense, outward perception is also a tool to be utilized, and the 
body is viewed as a utilitarian device to project virtue.  Although Quintilian considered rhetoric to be an art 
of living, it is not until Tertullian, and then the Augustinian psychology of the self, that the inner life and 
emotions will be connected to rhetoric itself, i.e., an outward reflection of an inward devotion (a 
sacramental view of language), rather than viewing rhetoric largely as a means to an end, i.e., a tool of 
expression to persuade.  Philosophically, these “pagan” rhetorical theorists are concerned with ethics and 
one’s moral life, but rhetorically, language is a device to be utilized in order to persuade.  They largely 
reject the excessive artistry of sophistic discourse, but their view of rhetoric as a tool, a system of 
persuasion, is still aligned with the sophistic, utilitarian view of language.  Thus, these rhetorical theorists’ 
rejection of excess is, generally, a rejection of what might be perceived as pursuing pleasure for its own 
sake or self-aggrandizement – a perception of excess. 
 
51 Mileur, The Critical Romance, 12. 
 
52 For example, Debora K. Shuger writes, “When, therefore, ancient…rhetorics criticize 
periodicity, ornament, and symmetry, they should not be perceived as rejecting oratory in favor of the plain 
style, but as defending the power and passion of genus grande from the encroachments of sophistic 
overrefinement.”  See Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric, 25.  In contrast to the aesthetic pleasure or the affective 
display of one’s skill advocated by the sophists, these ancient rhetorics regard ornaments of language, i.e., 
tropes, figures, periodicity, and rhythm, as acquiring value by creating a desired and appropriate emotional 
response instead of leading to stylistic vice.  These ornaments were to be used in moderation so as to 
portray a particular moral, virtuous self to those with whom one lived.  Ibid., 51. 
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is celebrated, moderation is still privileged over excess.53  A typical way to inhibit this 
excess is by suggesting it must always adhere to decorum in order to be effective.  This 
inhibition by decorum is not necessarily a negative position to take because it responds to 
those who attack hyperbole as a stylistic vice, which I will discuss below as well as in the 
following chapters.   
Christian rhetoricians are heavily influenced by these contentious conceptions of 
hyperbole as well as its association with sophistic discourse, and this is evident in the 
writings of the “Church Fathers” like Tertullian, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Augustine.  
These rhetorical theologians rarely, if at all, reference hyperbole specifically as a trope, 
but their overall attitudes about excessive vices, excessive eloquence, excessive living, 
ornament, and appearance suggest an adamant resistance to all things hyperbolic.  Their 
treatises explicitly denounce excess as “sin,” i.e., embodied hyperbole, and ornate speech, 
but the rhetorical arguments they construct, as well as their advice about the uses and 
misuses of rhetoric, suggest a more ambiguous relationship with excess. 
HYPERBOLE AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC:  TERTULLIAN TO AUGUSTINE 
 
When Christianity began to spread throughout the Roman Empire, many 
rhetoricians converted to Christianity but did not leave their rhetorical training behind.  
                                                
53 There were also other philosophical schools of thought that held varying views about excess.  
These philosophies included Cynicism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism.  Over-generalizing to an extreme 
degree, the Cynics utilized excess to defy convention.  The Stoics favored moderation over excess, and the 
Epicureans lived life to its fullest, sometimes to excess and sometimes not.  These philosophies and pagan 
rhetorical theories were significantly influential for Christianity and Christian rhetoricians, especially 
Stoicism.  For example, Paul Tillich states that Stoicism “is the only real alternative to Christianity.”  See 
Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, 2nd ed. (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 2000), 9.  He further writes, 
“The Stoics were more important than Plato and Aristotle together for the life of the late ancient world.  
The life of the educated man in the ancient world at this time was shaped mostly by the Stoic tradition,” 
which is also true of Christians at this time and into the Roman period.  See Paul Tillich, A History of 
Christian Thought, ed. Carl E Braaten (New York:  Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968), 7. 
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Some Christian converts did reject their rhetorical training altogether, but other Christian 
rhetoricians began blending Christianity with rhetoric even as they attempted to distance 
themselves from their rhetorical training.  George A. Kennedy writes, “It is a remarkable 
fact that of the eight greatest Latin Fathers of the Church, five (Tertullian, Cyprian, 
Arnobius, Lactantius, and Augustine) were professional teachers of rhetoric before they 
became Christians, while the other three (Ambrose, Hilary, and Jerome) had been 
thoroughly trained in the rhetorical schools.”54  He further argues, “What dialectic is to 
rhetoric in Aristotelian rhetoric, hermeneutics is to homiletics in Christian rhetoric.”55  
What Kennedy is highlighting in these statements is the conversion of rhetoric to 
Christianity.  Rhetorical issues became transposed theological and homiletic issues.  The 
task, then, is to baptize rhetoric into Christianity.   
It is important to note that Christian rhetoricians at this time (loosely conceived 
here as the second through fourth centuries) are largely influenced by Cicero’s writings.  
Christian rhetoricians lauded the ideal of “Ciceronian moderation” over and against the 
excessive ornamentations, pleasures, values, and vices of the sophists as well as pagan 
culture.  Murphy states that Ambrose of Milan “recognizes the need for training of 
preachers and condemns not rhetoric itself but its sophistic abuses,”56 and he continues, 
“Although attacks upon rhetoric had an ancient tradition, the Christian writer often saw in 
the rhetoric of his time that taint of a worldly, pagan culture which could lead men away 
                                                
54 George A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to 
Modern Times, 2nd ed. (Chapel Hill:  The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 167. 
 
55 Ibid., 157. 
 
56 Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages, 52. 
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from God.”57  Christians viewed the excesses of pagan culture and their values to be anti-
Christian, and the rhetorical expression of this attitude resonated through the excessive, 
artificial eloquence of the sophists.  In contrast, many Christian rhetoricians equated 
Ciceronian rhetoric with the moderate teachings and values of Christianity through his 
blending of eloquence with wisdom, i.e., form with substance.  The baptism of rhetoric 
into Christianity was thus largely a conversion of Ciceronian rhetoric to Christianity.   
It is not surprising that rhetorical theologians would reject excess.  The influence 
of Ciceronian moderation coupled with the Christian conception of “sin” made a rejection 
of excess and hyperbole a foregone conclusion because hamartia (“sin”) in the New 
Testament literally means “a missing of the mark,” as an arrow might miss its mark.  
Theologically, sin is viewed as an excessive moral divergence from the truth.  In like 
manner, hyperbole literally means “overshooting the mark” or “throwing beyond” it.  
Thus, a rhetorical device such as hyperbole that intentionally seeks to miss the mark and 
diverge from given truths is easily equated with the sins and vices of pagan culture.   
Although hyperbole is rarely explicitly mentioned, the attitudes of the “Church 
Fathers” toward excess are unequivocally negative.  As the tropological and figural 
representation of excess as well as an excessive “trope-producing trope,”58 hyperbole is 
thereby also rejected.  Additionally, excessive language is intimately tied to excessive 
living, and as Alexandre Leupin writes, “The troping of values creates an anti-Christian 
excess,”59 i.e., sin.  The stylistic and embodied excess of the sophists as well as pagan 
                                                
57 Ibid., 51. 
 
58 Mileur, The Critical Romance, 12. 
 
59 Alexandre Leupin, Fiction and Incarnation:  Rhetoric, Theology, and Literature in the Middle 
Ages, trans. David Laatsch (Minneapolis:  University of Minneapolis Press, 2003), 185. 
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culture becomes a theological issue through sin, and the soteriological troping of pagan 
values is viewed as anti-Christian because of its penchant for excess.  Hence, it is a small 
step to move from viewing sin as excess to viewing sin in one’s life as the very 
embodiment of hyperbole.  It is the excessive aspect of hyperbole that does too much, 
says too much, embellishes too much, and exaggerates the use of eloquence that these 
rhetoricians denounced because the “too much” led to vice and away from the “right 
amount” of Christian truth and virtue. 
Paradoxically, some rhetorical theologians like Tertullian denounce as well as 
embrace excess, and they argue for a type of divine excess as distinct from sophistic 
excess.  What occurs in rhetorical theology at this time is a theological (re)interpretation 
of the hyperbolic excess binary.  Soteriologically, if sin and/as pagan excess is the 
embodiment of hyperbole, then only the lie of hyperbole is emphasized without its 
redeeming quality of lying on the side of truth.  Hyperbole as sin, i.e., pagan excess, is 
viewed negatively as “evil” while hyperbole as divine excess, i.e., redemptive excess, is 
viewed positively as “good.”60  The redemptive hyperbolic circuit of a lie on the side of 
truth must be completed so it does not result in sin.  Christologically, Christ is often 
viewed as the excessive expression of God’s divine grace.  This divine logos of excess is 
the very embodiment or incarnation of God that is the expenditure without reserve of 
God’s love for creation.  Christ is the figural representation of ideal excess that is always 
pointing beyond himself to the ideal of God, and thus, a hyperbolic figure.61  Hence, 
                                                
60 One could argue that the docetic schism actually hinges figurally on a bad hyperbole where 
Christ only appears to be human without being the incarnated embodiment of God.  In this sense, the lie is 
not on the side of truth but an actual deceit rather than the revelation of a larger truth. 
 
61 For example, see the argument of unlimited development (discussed at the end of the chapter) 
explicated by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric:  
A Treatise on Argumentation, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame:  University of 
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Christ is the figural representation/embodiment of God’s love as “good,” i.e., an elegant 
hyperbolic figure of thought, while sin is the figurative expression/embodiment of “evil,” 
i.e., extravagant hyperbole.  Rhetorical theologians of this time struggle with this 
rhetorico-theological binary of excess, and this paradox highlights again the contentious 
historical development of hyperbole, especially when converting rhetoric to Christianity. 
For example, the founder of Latin Christianity, Tertullian, is one of the first 
rhetorical theologians to attempt this conversion.  What is interesting for my project is his 
implied attitude towards hyperbole, which culminates in a theological condemnation of 
the sins of pagan culture through a rejection of the empty eloquence and the excessive 
artifice of sophistic discourse.  However, his use of the ornate, “Asiatic” style as well as 
his argument for “Christian ornament” – a Christian decorum of excess – often relies 
upon the very excess he condemns.  These excesses also aid in establishing a Christian 
rhetoric through the conversion of tropes and figures for Christian purposes, which is 
often paradoxical and ambiguous.  
SECOND CENTURY:  TERTULLIAN 
 
 Septimius Tertullianus, the founder of Latin Christianity, is a rather obscure 
figure who writes during the time of the “second sophistic,” and his influence is quite far 
reaching.62  Although Tertullian was not the first Christian to write in Latin, he was one 
                                                                                                                                            
Notre Dame Press, 2003), 290-292.  However, I will significantly critique and augment these authors’ 
argument in the following chapters. 
 
62  Those influenced by Tertullian include:  Minucius Felix, Cyprian, pseudo-Cyprian, Novatian, 
Hippolytus, Dionysius of Rome, pseudo-Tertullian, Eusebius of Ceasarea, the anonymous Altercatio 
Heracliani, Optatus of Milevi, Zeno of Verona, Lucifer of Cagliari, Hilarius of Poitiers, Pactatus, Pacian of 
Barcelona, Anon, Didymus of Alexandria (Didymus the Blind), Phoebadius, Gregorius Illiberitanus, 
Potamius of Lisbon, the anonymous Collatio Alexandri et Dindimi, Philastrius, Ambrosiaster, Chromatius, 
Salvianus, Pelagius, Rufinus (of Aquileia), Augustine, Petilianus, Vincentius Victor, Evagrius, Vincent of 
Lerins, Gregory of Elvira, Priscillian, Prudentius, Leo the Great, Claudianus Mamertus, the anonymous 
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of the first Christian theologians to write extensively in Latin,63 and his Latin terms 
played a considerable role in changing the writings of Western theological scholarship 
dramatically.64  In addition, Robert Dick Sider suggests that Tertullian's extensive 
theological works largely address the rhetorical debates of his time.65  It is, in fact, only 
recently that scholars laud Tertullian as one of the greatest Christian rhetoricians of his 
time.   
Like the other “Latin Fathers,” Tertullian’s view towards moral excess resided 
closely to his view of rhetorical eloquence and style – the synecdochal connection 
between excessive speaking and excessive living, between hyperbole as trope and as 
figure of thought.  Sider argues that Tertullian's style was similar to that of Asiatic 
rhetoric,66 an excessive style of rhetoric, and Leupin posits that tradition actually 
attributes the Asiatic, or “African,” style to Tertullian.67  Rhetorical style was a major 
concern for Tertullian, as it was for Cicero and Quintilian,68 and Tertullian struggled with 
                                                                                                                                            
Praedestinatus, Arnobius the Younger, Gennadius, Fulgentius of Ruspe, Fabius Planciades Fulgentius 
(Fulgentius the mythographer), Gelasius, Cassiodorus, Venantius Fortunatus, Isidore of Seville, the 
anonymous Antiphonale Compendiense, Venerable Bede, and Peter the Venerable.  For a complete list with 
all references to Tertullian's texts see “Witnesses to the Influence of Tertullian (or, Who had read what?),” 
The Tertullian Project, <http://www.tertullian.org/witnesses/witnesses.htm> (28 October 2009). 
 
63 Walter H. Wagner, After the Apostles:  Christianity in the Second Century (Minneapolis:  
Fortress Press, 1994), 188.  See also Timothy David Barnes, Tertullian:  A Historical and Literary Study, 
(Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1971). 
 
64 Wagner, After the Apostles, xii. 
 
65 Robert Dick Sider, Ancient Rhetoric and the Art of Tertullian (Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 1971), xi-xvii. 
 
66 Ibid., 3. 
 
67 Leupin, Fiction and Incarnation, 37. 
 
68 Debora K. Shuger argues, “In Roman rhetoric, the distinction between the grand and plain styles 
forms the core of the controversy between Cicero, Quintilian, and the ‘Atticists.’”  See Shuger, Sacred 
Rhetoric, 7-8. 
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the proper place and delineation of style.69  Tertullian emphasized the need for rhetorical 
style, but only in moderation.  Like others before him, his concern with eloquence and 
style was tied to the excesses of the sophists, and it is his critiques of the style of the 
second sophistic that offer insight into his view of hyperbolic excess, artifice, and 
appearance.   
Perhaps his most extended critique of sophistic excess is found in On the Apparel 
of Women.  While this treatise is typically interpreted theologically to argue for Christian 
moderation in adorning oneself (men are also included in this argument), it can also be 
interpreted rhetorically as a response to the declamations of the sophists.  Leupin argues, 
“Rhetoric’s conversion to Christianity is nowhere more clear than in On the Apparel of 
Women,” and he posits, “On the Apparel of Women becomes a point-by-point counter-
text to the pagan vision of ornament.”70  And he continues, “On the Apparel of Women is 
more than a simple denunciation of the feminine body and its adornment.  It also attacks 
the pagan art of appearances along with the entire civilization conceived of as perverted 
by the false, by artifice, and by the obfuscation of nature.”71  For Tertullian, sophistic 
ornament, excess, and pagan culture are false, perverse, and empty in contradistinction to 
what he calls “Christian ornament,” which can be viewed as “true eloquence” maintained 
                                                
69 In On the Soul (De Anima), “The fault, I suppose, in the divine doctrine lies in its springing 
from Judea rather than from Greece.  Christ made a mistake, too, in sending forth fisherman to preach, 
rather than the sophist [or, learned rhetorician].”  See Tertullian, On the Soul (De Anima), 1.3, Christian 
Classics Electronic Library at Wheaton College, <http://www.tertullian.org/anf/anf03/anf03-
22.htm#P2588_854958> (26 October 2009).  Other translations write “learned rhetorician” rather than 
“sophists.”  For example, see Ernest G. Sihler, From Augustus to Augustine:  Essays & Studies Dealing 
with the Contact and Conflict of Classic Paganism and Christianity (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 1923), 117. 
 
 
70 Leupin, Fiction and Incarnation, 34. 
 
71 Ibid., 36.  Furthermore, On the Apparel of Women uses the cosmetics of women to “spell out 
the perverse artifices of the oratory art and of rhetorical culture” (35). 
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within a Christian decorum, and he uses the apparel of women to make his argument and 
his critique of pagan culture as well as sophistic rhetoric.  Thus, his theological position 
on ornamental apparel and Christian modesty is also a rhetorical position regarding 
sophistic excess and the troping of pagan values, which becomes translated and viewed as 
“anti-Christian excess,”72 i.e., hyperbole as a figure of thought. 
Tertullian contends that perverse pagan values as well as sophistic ornament and 
artifice are to be avoided.  Against the sophists, he argues that self-aggrandizement and 
eliciting applause from the audience through ornate language and stylistic devices are not 
enough.  A Christian ornamentation for effect must arise from being itself – an 
individual’s “modest” Christian life.  Tertullian argues that Christian excess and 
ornamentation must differ significantly from pagan excess and sophistic eloquence.  
Appearance must appropriately reflect interiority, not simply project one’s desired 
perception of the self.73  In a turn Augustine will also make, the use of rhetorical devices 
must re-present one’s inner, moral self and God’s truth.  Christian ornament, for 
Tertullian, concerns excess as figure of thought more than a tropological re-presentation 
of excess, and this Christian ornamnetation is grounded ontologically in Christian 
modesty and morality, which results in rhetorical abundance.  “To Christian modesty it is 
                                                
72 Ibid., 185. 
 
73 For example, “To Christian modesty it is not enough to be so, but to seem so too.  For so great 
ought its plenitude to be, that it may flow out from the mind to the garb, and burst out from the conscience 
to the outward appearance; so that even from the outside it may gaze, as it were, upon its own furniture, (a 
furniture) such as to be suited to retain faith as its inmate perpetually.  For such delicacies as tend by their 
softness and effeminacy to unman the manliness of faith are to be discarded…Clothe yourselves with the 
silk of uprightness, the fine linen of holiness, the purple of modesty. Thus painted, you will have God as 
your Lover!”  See Tertullian, On the Apparel of Women, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 4, ed. Philip Schaff, 
Christian Classics Ethereal Library, <http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf04.iii.iii.ii.xiii.html> (26 October 
2009). 
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not enough to be so, but to seem so too.”74  Interiority “flows out” and “bursts out” into 
exteriority.75  Similar to Isocrates and Aristotle, Christian ornament is a reflection of 
one’s inner life expressed appropriately through language, which establishes a Christian 
decorum where excess is entirely appropriate – a Christian decorum of excess moderates 
and inhibits sophistic excess.  Thus, sophistic ornament as excessive rhetorical artifice as 
well as pagan excesses are rejected, but Christian ornament (“true eloquence”) as the 
appropriate rhetorical expression of embodied divine excess and God’s truth nurtured in 
one’s modest inner life is encouraged.76   
Paradoxically, Christian ornament as rhetorical excess, as trope and figure of 
thought, is derived from Christian moderation.  Theologically, moderation regulates 
excessive living and the sins of pagan culture, i.e., embodied hyperbole.  Rhetorically, on 
the other hand, moderation results in a decorous, Christian, ornamented style as well as 
an expression of one’s inner life that is presented and used for communicating the truth of 
Christianity.  Embodied sophistic excess is avoided, but an ornate style, with its tropes 
and figures, is good when it is distinct from sophistic style and adheres to a Christian 
decorum of excess.  Thus, Tertullian, in like manner to Quintilian, offers a binary of 
excess and thereby a binary of hyperbole as the tropological and figural representation of 
excess.  On the one hand, he argues against the vices/sins of pagan culture and excessive 
ornamentation as empty eloquence and a stylistic vice – hyperbole as the “trope-
                                                
74 Ibid. 
 
75 Ibid. 
 
76 Catherine M. Chin argues that Christianity actually takes shape in the form of linguistic excess 
through the mulitiplicity of interpretations.  There is a clear division between Christian and pagan writing, 
and the excess of paganism is displaced with the divine excess of Christianity that comes from revelation 
rather than invention and empty eloquence.  See Catherine M. Chin, Grammar and Christianity in the Late 
Roman World (Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007). 
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producing trope” – as well as embodied hyperbole as sin that leads one astray from the 
Christian life.  On the other hand, he highlights the necessity of tropological excess and 
ornamentation in order to communicate the truth of Christianity, and he does this by re-
interpreting excess for a Christian context and developing a Christian decorum of excess.   
Tertullian’s re-interpretation suggests that rhetorical excess is appropriate when it 
reflects an inner, modest life devoted to God, which establishes a Christian decorum of 
excess, and this implies a positive view of hyperbole in Tertullian’s writing.  If pagan 
culture and sophistic ornamentation are excessive and deceitful both tropologically and as 
figure of thought, i.e., extravagant hyperboles that lie, then Christian ornaments are 
falsehoods on the side of truth, i.e., elegant hyperboles, which appropriately reflect inner 
devotion to God as divine excess and then exaggerate the truth in an attempt to reach the 
impossibility of this divine truth.  Thus, his rhetorical concerns regarding style and the 
appropriate expression of excess are also theological concerns regarding one’s inner 
devotion to God and Christian modesty.  These theological concerns can be interpreted 
and resolved rhetorically through hyperbole as trope and figure of thought as well as 
through a Christian decorum of excess; a complex and paradoxical position indeed. 
THIRD AND FOURTH CENTURY CHRISTIAN RHETORIC 
 
 After Tertullian, the tone of a Christian rhetoric and its response to the decadence 
of pagan culture as well as the excess of sophistic discourse becomes fairly well 
established, but Christians remain skeptical and even fearful of rhetoric overall, 
especially eloquence (the “seductress”).  The power of rhetoric and its tropological and 
figural devices are very real threats to early Christians because of the persuasive power 
through eloquence these devices provide an orator to move as well deceive the 
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audience.77  Christian rhetoricians want to harness the power of eloquence to move their 
audiences to conversion, but they are afraid the excess and deceit of eloquence will taint 
their message of Christian truth.  They know that eloquence can lead one to deceit and sin 
just as easily as it can move one to truth because eloquence contains no moral certitude.  
As a result, some Christian rhetoricians at this time will completely reject eloquence, and 
others will tentatively court it for Christian purposes. 
As a way to accept parts of rhetoric, e.g., eloquence, and reject others, all that is 
feared about rhetorical excess is equated with the artificial deceit of sophistic eloquence 
as well as pagan values, which is perceived to stand in direct opposition to the substantive 
truth of Christianity.  Noted previously, almost any critique of the sophists is also a 
critique of hyperbole, and vice versa, since tropological and discursive excess is 
inherently structured by hyperbole as the “trope-producing trope” as well as the 
representative tropological representation of excess itself.  Ergo, the condemnation of 
sophistic eloquence is the implicit condemnation of hyperbole, but it is also a necessary 
reclamation of eloquence, “true eloquence,” for Christian purposes, which will not reach 
fruition until Augustine.  Thus, the development of a Christian eloquence begins with a 
rejection of the excessive trickery and deceit of sophistic eloquence, i.e., a rejection of the 
hyperbolic function of/within sophistic discourse.  
Tertullian begins this conversion of pagan eloquence to Christian eloquence by 
displacing the excessive form of sophistic eloquence and replacing it with an excessive 
                                                
77 Wayne A. Meeks writes, “Early Christianity was a movement of converts.  That is, the 
Christians thought of themselves as people who had turned their lives around, from one state to another 
profoundly better.  Turning around (Greek epistrophe, Latin conversio) is a metaphor that could have broad 
and multiple consequences for the way the early Christians perceived their moral possibilities and 
obligations.”  See Wayne A. Meeks, The Origins of Christian Morality:  The First Two Centuries (New 
Haven:  Yale University Press, 1993), 18. 
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form of Christian eloquence through appropriate ornamentation – a binary of hyperbolic 
excess.  However, Christian writers beginning in the third century either reject all 
eloquence for simplicity, or significantly restrain its uses.  In both instances, it is 
simplicity and not excess, even “Christian excess,” that is considered to be appropriate 
for Christian discourse and preaching.  A simple style and an undiluted form of language 
with few or no embellishments are preferred over an excessive style because the 
substance of Christian truth alone is believed to be sufficient to persuade, i.e., convert, 
one’s audience.  As shown below, there is a hyper-vigilance against the stylistic excesses 
of eloquence as well as excessive living for its obfuscation and/or dilution of the truth.  
Stylistic embellishments are equated with sinful excess, and the rhetorical issue of 
eloquence is again shown to be a soteriological issue for rhetorical theologians. 
Christian rhetoricians know the power of eloquence to persuade, desire to harness 
that power but also fear it, often reject it as deceitful and sinful, and summarily view 
sophistic eloquence – as the unnecessary, deceitful, and excessive over-embellishment of 
language, i.e., sinful – to be an obfuscation of truth.  Christian rhetoricians, then, must 
negotiate the tension between rhetorical, Ciceronian eloquence (“true eloquence”) 
utilized to communicate Christian truth for the purpose of conversion and sophistic 
artifice that only deceives.  This negotiation occurs through decorum – substance and 
form, truth and its appropriate expression.  Through decorum, rhetorical theologians 
moderate the excessive, i.e., hyperbolic, tendency of all tropes and figures in order to 
regulate sophistic excess as well as the hyperbole of embodied excess they view as sin.  
In opposition to sophistic and/or pagan excess that is deceitful and sinful stands the 
substantive, moderate nature of Christian truth.   
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Third century “Church Fathers” reject sophistic style in favor of a simple style 
that highlights Christian “continence” and “virtue.”  Cyprian’s treatise, for example, “On 
the Dress of Virgins,” is an argument against ornamental excess as well as pagan culture 
that connects one’s use of language to one’s moral life.  Similar to Tertullian, though 
harsher in his treatment of eloquence, Cyprian engages in a rhetorical critique of sophistic 
ornament through theological arguments for Christian modesty and purity as opposed to 
the flagrance of pagan culture.  He argues for a Christian discipline that includes fleshly 
purity and a “seemliness of dress and ornament”78 – a rejection of embodied as well as 
rhetorical excess.  More explicitly, Cyprian writes in Ad Donatum, “A full eloquence may 
be the pride of vocal ambition, but in speaking of the Lord God, a pure simplicity of 
expression…which is convincing depends upon the substance of the argument rather than 
upon the forcefulness of eloquences.”79  The “forcefulness of eloquences” as the troping 
of pagan values represented through sophistic excess and hyperbole, as the representative 
trope of this excess, is replaced with a simple style that is “convincing.”  A simple 
decorum that privileges substance, i.e., scripture, over form is preferred out of a fear that 
all rhetorical embellishment may deceive and lead to a “pride of vocal ambition.”  For 
Cyprian, excessive eloquence and excessive living are replaced by a simple “convincing” 
style and Christian discipline.  This rejection of excess on two levels implies again the 
                                                
78 For example, he writes, “Discipline, the safeguard of hope, the bond of faith, the guide of the 
way of salvation, the stimulus and nourishment of good dispositions, the teacher of virtue, causes us to 
abide always in Christ, and to live continually for God, and to attain to the heavenly promises and to the 
divine rewards.  To follow her is wholesome, and to turn away from her and neglect her is deadly.”  See 
Cyprian, “On the Dress of Virgins,” in Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 5, ed. Philip Schaff, Christian Classics 
Ethereal Library, <http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf05.iv.v.ii.html> (26 October 2009). 
 
79 Cyprian, Ad Donatum, 2; quoted in, James J. Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages:  A History 
of Rhetorical Theory from St. Augustine to the Renaissance (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 
1974), 51. 
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connection of language to being, and excess must be rejected for its disruptiveness and its 
deceit.   
In the fourth century, the same basic attitude towards the excesses of eloquence is 
maintained, and the need for establishing a more Christian society by abolishing 
paganism of all types is more pressing.  To accomplish this goal, an intellectual 
foundation for Christianity is a necessity.80  Integral for developing this intellectual 
system is rhetoric, but it must be a Christian rhetoric that is distinct from the sophists.  
Hence, in the fourth century, with a turn towards the education of Christians that was 
only beginning in Tertullian’s time, epistemological inquiry and its appropriate 
expression are brought to the forefront of the discussion about rhetorical eloquence.  
Certainly, ontological concerns about Christian piety are still important, but 
hermeneutical issues about the interpretation of scripture within third and fourth century 
Christian treatises begin to focus more on movere in preaching and the use of “sacred 
eloquence” to elicit conversion-as-persuasion.  Inherent in this rhetorical concern is the 
continued tension between rejecting artificial sophistic eloquence and utilizing “true 
eloquence” and a Christian decorum of speaking and living to encourage virtuous living.   
The debate about eloquence is a complex rhetorical and theological issue that 
hinges on a perception of hyperbolic excess.  Lactantius, for example, is considered the 
                                                
80 James J. Murphy writes, “It was a matter of the greatest moment, for upon its success depended 
the training of future apologists to defend doctrine against heresy, the formation of future poets to carry the 
Word of God to the people through literature, and the very education of the people themselves.”  See 
Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages, 48.  For further discussion of the political transformation from pagan 
to Christian society, see Peter Brown, The Rise of Western Christendom:  Triumph and Diversity, A.D. 
200-1000, 2nd ed. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2003); Peter Brown, The Making of Late Antiquity (Oxford:  Harvard 
University Press, 1993); Averil Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire:  The Development of 
Christian Discourse (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1991); Catherine M. Chin, Grammar and 
Christianity in the Late Roman World (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007); and Helmut Koester, 
History, Culture, and Religion of the Hellenistic Age, 2nd ed. (New York:  Walter de Gruyter, 1995). 
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“Christian Cicero” for his eloquence, but he vehemently rejects the use of eloquence in 
his writings.  In Divine Institutes, “Of Religion, Wisdom, and the Chief Good” and “Of 
Restraining the Pleasures of the Senses,” Lactantius suggests that virtue is a “beauty” 
while pleasure, a well known vice of excess as sin, is “not even a good,” is dangerous, 
and is not honorable.81  Pleasure, as a hyperbolic figure of thought leading to embodied 
hyperbole, is to be despised for bringing the very feeling of excess, of “satiety,” and 
when the excessiveness of pleasure is itself in excess, it is “injurious” and a “deformity” 
– “Nothing is so hateful to God as an unchaste mind and an impure soul.”82  He then 
equates pleasure with eloquence, which reinterprets pleasure tropologically and figurally 
thereby linking embodied excess itself to eloquence, and rejects excess/eloquence as 
dishonorable, injurious, and a deformity.  He suggests those who are eloquent do not seek 
truth but pleasure and the appearance of truth, “which soothe[s] the ears” and captivates 
“by the sweetness of discourse.”83  Thus, the issue of excess as pleasure/eloquence is a 
                                                
81 In “Of Religion, Wisdom, and the Chief Good, he writes, “There is pleasure, which is desired by 
all; but this is common also to man with the beasts, and has not the force of the honourable, and brings a 
feeling of satiety, and when it is in excess is injurious, and it is lessened by advance of age, and does not 
fall to the lot of many…Therefore pleasure is not the chief good; but it is not even a good.”  Lactantius, “Of 
Religion, Wisdom, and the Chief Good,” in Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 7, ed. Philip Schaff, Christian 
Classics Ethereal Library, <http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf07.iii.ii.iii.xi.html> (2 November 2009). 
In “Of Restraining the Pleasures of the Senses,” he also writes, “For a too great eagerness for 
pleasure both produces danger and generates disgrace, and that which is especially to be avoided, leads to 
eternal death.  Nothing is so hateful to God as an unchaste mind and an impure soul.  Nor let any one think 
that he must abstain from this pleasure only…but also from the other pleasures which arise from the rest of 
the senses, because they also are of themselves vicious, and it is the part of the same virtue to despise 
them.”  See Lactantius, “Of Restraining the Pleasures of the Senses,” in Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 7, ed. 
Philip Schaff, Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 
<http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf07.iii.ii.viii.lviii.html> (2 November 2009). 
 
82 In response to pleasure, Lactantius argues, “But nothing can be found more beautiful than 
virtue, nothing more worthy of a wise man.  For if vices are to be avoided on account of their deformity, 
virtue is therefore to be desired on account of its beauty.”  See Lactantius, “Of Religion, Wisdom, and the 
Chief Good,” in Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 7, ed. Philip Schaff, Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 
<http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf07.iii.ii.iii.xi.html> (2 November 2009). 
 
83 For example, he writes, “But he who is carried away by hearing (to say nothing respecting 
songs, which often so charm the inmost senses that they even disturb with madness a settled state of the 
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rhetorical as well as theological concern, and rejecting excess on both levels of thought 
can be viewed as a stylistic resistance to figural depravity reflecting a concern regarding 
embodied hyperbole as sin in one’s Christian life.  The danger Lactantius highlights is 
that rhetorical excess, i.e., “an unchaste mind,” might lead one to be “carried away by 
hearing” and “led aside to impious worship,”84 i.e., “an impure soul.”  As the tropological 
representation of excess, hyperbole at the rhetorical or embodied level is rejected as 
sinful, and to escape the sin of excess, Lactantius denigrates eloquent artifice and pagan 
pleasure for substantive truth and virtue.   
Unlike Tertullian’s view of divine excess leading to the rhetorical abundance of 
“Christian ornament,” Lactantius follows the more common view that all excess leads to 
a moral lack and vice, and he rejects eloquence-as-excess as sinful depravity outright.  
Gregory of Nazianzus, however, takes a different stance regarding eloquence, though not 
excess.  He writes several encomia that show the structure and topics of the sophists, and 
Kennedy asserts that his encomium of Basil is “probably the masterpiece of sophistic 
Christian oratory.”85  Within the encomium, however, he (excessively) praises Basil for 
his restraint when utilizing eloquence, and he asserts the importance of eloquence when 
                                                                                                                                            
mind by certain elaborately composed speeches and harmonious poems, or skilful disputations) is easily led 
aside to impious worship.  Hence it is that they who are either themselves eloquent, or prefer to read 
eloquent writings, do not readily believe the sacred writings, because they appear unpolished; they do not 
seek things that are true, but things that are pleasant; nay, to them those things appear to be most true which 
soothe the ears.  Thus they reject the truth, while they are captivated by the sweetness of the discourse.”  
See Lactantius, “Of Restraining the Pleasures of the Senses,” in Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 7, ed. Philip 
Schaff, Christian Classics Ethereal Library, <http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf07.iii.ii.viii.lviii.html> (2 
November 2009). 
 
84 Ibid. 
 
85 Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, 164.   
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communicating ideas.86  In a letter to Younger Nicobulus, Gregory again extols the 
importance of eloquence, a certain “grace,” that is to be restrained by moderation.87  In 
the letter, Gregory is solely concerned with the ways Christian truth is communicated.  
He suggests that writings and orations should not be unadorned, but language must be 
“sweetened” through figures of speech that are “few and modest” and not “abused,” 
which “shews [sic] insatiability” and association with the sophists.88  Gregory does not 
reject eloquence or its rhetorical devices, but he suggests that it must be used moderately 
and appropriately.  Thus, decorum is shown again to be the vehicle for regulating 
rhetorical excess, and a Christian eloquence that relies only on a simple style further 
emerges.   
Unlike the pagan rhetoricians who utilized various styles, only a simple style can 
enhance the substance of Christian truth because rhetorical excess reveals “insatiability” 
in one’s life.  The fear, as with those before Gregory, is that figures and tropes in/of 
excess, the deceits of eloquence, may disrupt the moderation and balance one should 
                                                
86 In the encomium, Basil writes of eloquence, “Eloquence was his by-work, from which he culled 
enough to make it an assistance to him in Christian philosophy, since power of this kind is needed to set 
forth the objects of our contemplation.  For a mind which cannot express itself is like the motion of a man 
in a lethargy.”  See Gregory of Nazianzus, “Funeral Oration on the Great S. Basil, Bishop of Caesarea in 
Cappadocia,” Christian Classics Ethereal Library, <http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf207.toc.html> (3 
November 2009). 
 
87 He writes, “The third point about a letter is grace:  and this we shall safeguard if we do not write 
in any way that is dry and unpleasing or unadorned and badly arranged and untrimmed, as they call it; as 
for instance a style destitute of maxims and proverbs and pithy sayings, or even jokes and enigmas, by 
which language is sweetened.  Yet we must not seem to abuse these things by an excessive employment of 
them.  Their entire omission shews rusticity, but the abuse of them shews insatiability.  We may use them 
about as much as purple is used in woven stuffs.  Figures of speech we shall admit, but few and modest.  
Antitheses and balanced clauses and nicely divided sentences, we shall leave to the sophists, or if we do 
sometimes admit them, we shall do so rather in play than in earnest.”  See Gregory of Nazianzus, “Letter LI 
to Nicobulus,” Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 
<http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf207.iv.iv.viii.ii.html> (3 November 2009). 
 
88 Ibid. 
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hope to achieve through one’s way of being in the world.  This concern with eloquence is 
also observed in John Chrysostom’s writing (“John the Golden-Tongued”). 
 Like Gregory, Chrysostom understands the need for eloquence within Christian 
rhetoric.  In On the Statutes, Chrysostom posits that an eloquence of style is helpful for 
avoiding tedium and creating variety, and he asserts, “The sermons must be varied and 
embellished; it must contain comparison, proofs, paraphrases, and the like, so that we 
may select what will profit our soul.”89  In this revealing passage, the importance of 
eloquence and figural embellishment is evident, and he states that “sermons must be 
varied and embellished” in order to “profit our soul.”90  There is a certain desperation in 
this passage that shows how important Chrysostom believes eloquence is for 
communicating the Christian message.  The form and force of one’s epistemological 
assertions must move one to a profitable way of being in the world, i.e., the Christian life, 
a particular ontological position.  Thus, eloquence is not viewed as an excessive stylistic 
device but as a necessity, which is also revealed in Ambrose of Milan’s distinction 
between secular eloquence (sapientia saeculi) and sacred eloquence (sapientia 
spiritualis).  As is evident, the debate over eloquence is a controversial one, and the 
hyperbolic nature of language and ornamentation is feared for its de-stabilizing 
epistemological and ontological effects. 
In reaction to sophistic eloquence and its excesses, rhetorical theologians reject 
excess in fear of rhetorical excesses leading to excesses of living.  This threat of 
eloquence and its tropes and figures of excess, and thus hyperbole as the representative 
                                                
89 John Chrysostom, On the Statutes; quoted in, Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, 166, my emphasis. 
 
90 Ibid., my emphasis. 
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tropological and figural representation of this excess, is equated with excessive pagan 
values that are disdained as sins, which results in the necessity of a Christian decorum of 
moderation when using eloquence at all.  The troping of pagan values results in an anti-
Christian excess that leads to a rejection of embodied excess as well as sophistic excess 
and, mutatis mutandi, hyperbole.  In rhetorico-theological terms, the form of expression 
(the lie) is denigrated for the substance of the argument (the truth), and the fear of sin as 
an embodied hyperbole collapses the redemptive function of hyperbole into a 
soteriological misapprehension of ornamentation and eloquence, which makes the 
acceptance of eloquence in preaching a tenuous theological position that must be 
moderated through decorum.  For many, the only “proper” manner to communicate the 
truth of God is through a simplicity of language that is viewed as undiluted by vice, 
untainted by sin, and free of obfuscation.  Thus, the simple style of preaching known as 
the homily developed. 
The homily became a popular style of sermon during the fourth century because it 
often lacked any figural expressions or attempt at a pleasing arrangement of ideas 
whatsoever.91  Augustine, however, disparages the homily, and although he also shows a 
concern about eloquence and/as excess, he argues that eloquence is necessary when 
preaching in order to teach, to please, and move the audience.  Thus, he does not connect 
eloquence to deceit or vice but to virtue.  Eloquence and its rhetorical devices are not 
deceptions leading one to excessive living.  Rather, eloquence and its tropes and figures 
are tools to be utilized in service to expounding upon and communicating Christian 
                                                
91 Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages, 55. 
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virtue, but eloquence is much more than just a tool for Augustine.  It is a psycho-
hermeneutical and spiritual necessity. 
AUGUSTINE 
 
Although these previous Christian rhetoricians all contributed to the blending of 
rhetoric and Christianity, the most well known figure for his melding of Christianity and 
rhetoric is Augustine, and his complex contributions to rhetoric and Christianity merit an 
extended discussion.  Much has been written of Augustine from a rhetorical perspective, 
and I will not recount those studies here.92  For my argument, Augustine’s stance 
regarding excess significantly differs from the other Christian rhetoricians of his time, but 
                                                
92 For example, see Jeffrey Bullock, “Augustinian Innovation:  A Spokesperson in a Post-Classical 
Age,” Journal of Communication and Religion 20, no. 1 (1997) :  5-13; Tim Detwiler, “Viewing 
Robertson’s Rhetoric in an Augustinian Mirror,” Journal of Communication and Religion 11, no. 1 (1988) :  
22-31; Richard Leo Enos and Roger Thompson et al., eds., The Rhetoric of St. Augustine of Hippo:  De 
Doctrina and the Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric (Waco:  Baylor University Press, 2008); Keith 
V. Erickson, “The Significance of ‘Doctrina’ in Augustine’s ‘De Doctrina Christiana,’” Rhetoric Society 
Quarterly 15 (1985) :  105-107; Gerald Fulkerson, “Augustine’s Attitude toward Rhetoric in De Doctrina 
Christiana:  The Significance of 2.37.55,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 15 (1985) :  108-111; W. R. Johnson, 
“Isocrates’ Flowering:  The Rhetoric of Augustine,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 9, no. 4 (1976) :  217-231; 
Michael C. Leff, “St. Augustine and Martianus Capella:  Continuity and Change in Fifth-Century Latin 
Rhetorical Theory,” Communication Quarterly 24, no. 4 (1976) :  2-9; Alexandre Leupin, Fiction and 
Incarnation:  Rhetoric, Theology, and Literature in the Middle Ages, trans. David Laatsch (Minneapolis:  
University of Minneapolis Press, 2003); James J. Murphy, “Saint Augustine and the Christianization of 
Rhetoric,” Western Speech (1958) :  24-29; James J. Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages:  A History of 
Rhetoric Theory from St. Augustine to the Renaissance (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1974); 
James J. Murphy, “Saint Augustine and Rabanus Maurus:  The Genesis of Medieval Rhetoric,” Western 
Speech 31, no. 2 (1967) :  88-96; James J. Murphy, “Saint Augustine and the Debate about a Christian 
Rhetoric,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 46, no. 4 (1960) :  400-411; Gerald A. Press, “Doctrina in 
Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 17, no. 2 (1984) :  98-120; Glenn H. Settle, 
“Faith, Hope, and Charity:  Rhetoric as Aletheiac Act in On Christian Doctrine,” Journal of 
Communication and Religion 17, no. 2 (1994) :  46-60; Christine Mason Sutherland, “Reforms of Style:  
St. Augustine and the Seventeenth Century,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 21, no. 1 (1991) :  26-37; Dave 
Tell, “Augustinian Political Theory and Religious Discourse in Public Life,” Journal of Communication 
and Religion 30, no. 2 (2007) :  213-235; Calvin L. Troop, “Augustine for Communication Scholars,” 
Journal of Communication and Religion 28, no. 1 (2005) :  131-146; Calvin L. Troop, Temporality, 
Eternity, and Wisdom:  The Rhetoric of Augustine’s Confessions (University of South Carolina Press, 
1999); and Stephen R. Yarbrough, “The Love of Invention:  Augustine, Davidson, and the Discourse of 
Unifying Belief,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 30, no. 1 (2000) :  29-46. 
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not from Tertullian.  This is not surprising since, as I noted earlier, Tertullian was a major 
influence on Augustine.   
On the one hand, like Tertullian and other Christian rhetoricians, Book IV of De 
Doctrina Christiana is a response to and an attack on sophistic excess – clarity is 
preferred to ornate, excessive speech.  Augustine is also largely influenced by Cicero,93 
especially Cicero’s Hortensius,94 and Calvin L. Troop suggests that Augustine attempted 
to become Cicero’s “ideal orator,”95 which includes Cicero’s stance against the sophists.  
On the other hand, like Tertullian and in contrast to other Christian rhetoricians, 
Augustine fully accepts the use of eloquence and rhetorical devices, as he re-interprets 
them for a Christian context.  Augustine also incorporates the three different styles of 
speaking – plain, moderate, and grand – into his homiletic theory, and he suggests that 
rhetorical excess and the grand style, where hyperbole may be employed, may be used 
with clarity when speaking about the extravagant things of God and in order to be 
                                                
93 John D. Schaeffer writes, “If book 4 of the De Doctrina is read as advice on how to deliver an 
extemporaneous sermon, Augustine’s recommendations suggest that he is not simply opposing classical 
rhetoric:  he is disavowing the rhetoric of the Second Sophistic movement and returning to the orally based 
rhetoric of republican Rome, which he is adapting to a textually based religion attended by an emerging 
sense of interiority.”  See John D. Schaeffer, “The Dialectic of Orality and Literacy:  The Case of Book 4 
of Augustine’s De Doctriana Christiana,” in The Rhetoric of St. Augustine of Hippo:  De Doctrina and the 
Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric, eds. Richard Leo Enos and Roger Thompson et al. (Waco:  
Baylor University Press, 2008), 291. 
 
94 Wendy Olmsted argues that in Augustine’s Confessions, he “rejects both the sophistic version 
of rhetoric as mere eloquence and the notion that argument should depend on subject matter alone – what 
James J. Murphy calls the ‘Platonic rhetorical heresy.’”  See Wendy Olmsted, “Invention, Emotion, and 
Conversion in Augustine’s Confessions,” in Rhetorical Invention and Religious Inquiry:  New 
Perspectives, eds. Walter Jost and Wendy Olmsted (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 2000), 65. 
 
95 Troop writes, “In his own time, reacting as Cicero did to Sophistic excesses, and conscientiously 
practicing a rhetoric that attempted to integrate style and substance, based on a love of wisdom and the end 
of achieving a happy life, Augustine attempts to become an ideal orator.”  Troop, Temporality, Eternity, 
and Wisdom, 28. 
 
  77       
persuasive, i.e., a Christian decorum of excess.96  His integration of eloquence into 
preaching is, if not a replica, certainly an updated version of Tertullian’s project.  
Augustine does develop a more complex Christian decorum of language, self, and 
preaching where rhetorical excess can be used effectively that is more influential than 
Tertullian’s theory, but Augustine’s view of excess is fairly identical to Tertullian’s. 
For Augustine, as for Tertullian, excess is both accepted/justified and rejected 
based on the context and the way it is used, and re-interpreting excess for a Christian 
context is a significant concern.  For example, Augustine’s interpretation of Ambrose’s 
“sacred eloquence,” a taming of sophistic (excessive) eloquence, has a prominent place in 
Augustine’s rhetorical theory97 and can be viewed as similar to Tertullian’s argument for 
“Christian ornament.”  In both instances, sophistic excess is rejected, but a Christian 
rhetorical excess is accepted, which establishes a binary of hyperbolic excess and thereby 
a Christian decorum of excess.98  Analogously, Augustine’s sacred eloquence, 
                                                
96 For example, he writes, “But when it is necessary to move and convince a listener by the grand 
style – as it is when one’s opponent grants the truth and attractiveness of what is said, but is unwilling to 
act upon it – one must without doubt express himself grandly.  But who is moved if he does not understand 
what is said, or whose attention is held if he is not pleased?  Wherefore, in this style also, when an obdurate 
heart has to be bent by the grand manner of speech, unless the speaker makes himself both understood and 
enjoyed, he cannot make himself persuasive.”  See Saint Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, trans. D. W. 
Robertson, Jr. (Upper Saddle River:  Prentice Hall, 1997), 4.26.58. 
 
97 See Amy K. Hermanson, “Religion’s Rhetoric:  Saint Augustine’s Union of Christian Wisdom 
and Sophistic Eloquence,” in The Rhetoric of St. Augustine of Hippo:  De Doctrina and the Search for a 
Distinctly Christian Rhetoric, eds. Richard Leo Enos and Roger Thompson et al. (Waco:  Baylor University 
Press, 2008), 311-314. 
 
98 “Augustine described temperance not as restraining all impulses but as restraining all competing 
impulses except one, so that love might give itself entirely and without restraint to that which is loved.  On 
this view, the Greek ideal of moderation is set aside.  Jesus’ ‘ethic of the extreme’ gains supremacy over 
Aristotle’s ‘doctrine of the mean’ and over the curbing of all passions in the Stoic ideal.  According to 
Augustine, temperance and the other virtues are, so to speak, forms of intemperate love for God.  There can 
never be too much love for God, nor too little of the impulses which impede it.”  See Paul Ramsey, Basic 
Christian Ethics (Westminster John Knox Press, 1950), 226. 
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Tertullian’s Christian ornament, and Quintilian’s elegant hyperbole stand in opposition to 
sophistic excess and/as extravagant hyperbole that violates decorum.   
Augustine and Tertullian both argue that sophistic ornament is a “deceitful 
cosmetic,” and they propose a Christian ornamental/sacred eloquent form constituted 
from and influenced by the substance of Christian truth as well as inward devotion to 
God – a unity of substance and form, eloquence and wisdom.99  A telling passage 
regarding Augustine’s view of excess occurs when he, like Tertullian and Cyprian, 
parallels sophistic eloquence with the ornamentation of women.  Tertullian and 
Augustine engage in a troping of pagan values in order to discredit those values.  
Augustine cites Cyprian’s “On the Dress of Virgins,” and he says that those who have 
“discolored their faces with paint” are worse than adulterers.100  He does not go so far as 
Cyprian who calls the vagina a “devil’s gate,” but he does write vehemently against the 
ornamentation of women’s faces.   
Augustine’s concern is to establish a rhetorical Christian decorum while also 
psychologically connecting it to an embodied moral Christian decorum.  For example, 
Augustine writes, “That you consider yourself adorned and beautiful, this is an insult to 
the divine work, a violation of truth,” and he continues, “But can sincerity and truth 
remain when what is sincere is polluted, and when what is true is turned into a lie by 
                                                
99 Augustine argues, “There are two things upon which every treatment of the Scriptures depends:  
the means of discovering what the thought may be, and the means of expressing what the thought is.”  See 
Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, trans. Sister Therese Sullivan, 4.1.1, in The Rhetoric of St. Augustine 
of Hippo:  De Doctrina and the Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric, eds. Richard Leo Enos and 
Roger Thompson et al. (Waco:  Baylor University Press, 2008), 35.  Echoing Cicero, Augustine posits that 
the way an idea is expressed (homiletics) is just as important as discovering the idea through the 
interpretation of scripture (hermeneutics). 
 
100 Ibid., 4.21.48-49. 
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immodest coloring and deceitful cosmetics?”101  This statement is certainly reminiscent 
of Tertullian’s treatise On the Apparel of Women, and it is also a now familiar view of 
sophistic excess polluting the truth and distorting one’s moral life – truth comes from 
God, and the adornment of humans is superfluous.  Immodest and excessive cosmetics, as 
a violation of decorum, are deceitful and distort truth into a lie – the typical view of 
Christian rhetoricians regarding hyperbolic excess – hyperbole as figure of thought, e.g., 
pleasure, pollution, desire, moves towards a hyperbolic praxis as embodied hyperbole.102  
Just as for Tertullian, Augustine’s view of sophistic excess is entirely negative; however, 
associating truth with sincerity (an ethical expression of interiority emerging from the 
divine excess (desire) of charity and grace)103 is an interesting psychological move that 
distinguishes Augustine’s position from Tertullian’s.104  This move also establishes a 
Christian decorum of excess as distinct from sophistic excess. 
Augustine’s connection of truth and sincerity to its rhetorical expression suggests 
that what one discovers hermeneutically is psychologically connected to the very 
expression of one’s spiritual interpretation.  In this view, and in contrast to Tertullian, 
sophistic ornamentation does not just hinder or obfuscate communication, but it pollutes 
                                                
101 Ibid., 4.21.49. 
 
102 In now familiar rhetorico-theological terms, embodied excess is connected to rhetorical excess, 
and eloquence remains a soteriological issue in terms of deceit, pollution, and lies, which is the problem of 
sophistic eloquence as well as human desires.  
 
103 See Olmsted, “Invention, Emotion, and Conversion,” 66-67; Marjorie O’Rourke Boyle, 
“Rhetorical Theology:  Charity Seeking Charity,” in Rhetorical Invention and Religious Inquiry:  New 
Perspectives, eds. Walter Jost and Wendy Olmsted (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 2000), 90; and 
Webb, “Hyperbolic Imagination,” 279-300. 
 
104 See Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric; Leupin, Fiction and Incarnation; and Sarah Spence, Rhetorics of 
Reason and Desire:  Vergil, Augustine, and the Troubadours (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1988).  
Spence, for example, writes, “The Confessions is not only the story of one life; it is the story of the 
conversion of an entire culture from one that set as its model the Isocratean orator to one that recognized 
the necessity of desire to rhetoric and tried to valorize its role” (56). 
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and alters the very substance of one’s argument as well as one’s inner self.  Truth is 
actually “turned into a lie” through immodest ornamental deceit, and sincerity ceases to 
be sincere when “polluted.”105  Different from his predecessors who argued that sophistic 
eloquence, i.e., overblown and excessive speech, only deceives and hinders the 
communication of truth, the subtle argument Augustine makes is that sophistic excess 
actually alters one’s inner life.  Form is not simply a reflection of substance and one’s 
life, but it can be a substantive distortion of truth and one’s inner being.  As a response to 
sophistic excess, and a critical redemptive turn for Christian excess, Augustine argues 
that maintaining decorum through sacred eloquence, i.e., “Christian ornament,” is vital 
for one’s preaching as well as one’s Christian life since the hermeneutical process 
(substance) and its delivery (form) will generate the epistemological/ontological path to 
truth or ruin.  
Augustine comes to this position on sacred eloquence, i.e., Christian excess, from 
two levels of thought/justification:  decorum and an inner moral ethos.  Michael C. Leff 
notes the first level in Augustine’s thought when he writes, “The use of eloquence is 
justifiable, but only on the condition that it supports respectable ideas.  Truly eloquent 
style has its origin in the message itself.”106  Eloquence, even with its excesses, is 
justified by substance, and the only eloquence that is worthy of a Christian orator comes 
from the message of truth itself, i.e., scripture.  Establishing this sacred decorum is 
important for Augustine because, like Tertullian, it allows him to establish a sacred 
                                                
105 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, 4.21.49. 
 
106 Michael C. Leff, “Saint Augustine and Martianus Capella:  Continuity and Change in Fifth-
Century Latin Rhetorical Theory,” in The Rhetoric of St. Augustine of Hippo:  De Doctrina Christiana and 
the Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric, eds. Richard Leo Enos and Roger Thompson et al. (Waco:  
Baylor University Press, 2008), 240. 
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eloquence that utilizes rhetorical excess without falling into sophistic vice.  Murphy 
writes, “Augustine postulates the existence of a new type of eloquence, ‘fitting for men 
most worthy of the highest authority and clearly inspired by God.’”107  This new type of 
eloquence, with its tropes and figures, is the direct opposite of sophistic eloquence, and 
the same as Tertullian’s argument for a “Christian ornament.”  Additionally, Augustine’s 
sacred eloquence posits the view of interpretation as “inspired by God” – a 
moral/psychological conception of invention as revelation – which suggests that form is 
not only derived from the substance of one’s argument but from an interior spiritual life, 
an inner moral ethos.  
Augustine’s second level of thought regarding sacred eloquence – an inner moral 
ethos – is highlighted by Schaeffer.  Contra Leff, and others like Christine M. Sutherland, 
Thomas O. Sloane, and Stanley Fish, Schaeffer argues that eloquence and style also come 
from the interiority of the speaker.  Like Tertullian, Augustine contends that the interior 
life, a certain moral ethos, of the speaker is essential for developing the style of 
sermons.108  Tertullian argues that a moderate inner life will lead to an exterior 
expression of Christian ornamentation (a Christian decorum of excess), and Augustine 
makes a similar argument.109  It is the interior life, suggests Schaeffer, that is essential in 
Book IV.  He writes, “Style may be adapted to the audience, to the subject, or to the 
                                                
107 Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages, 59. 
 
108 For example, Shuger argues, “Augustine, and subsequent Christian rhetoricians, therefore insist 
that true passion and eloquence flow from the interior motions of the Holy Spirit stirring the speaker’s heart 
and inflaming his words.”  They do not abandon the trope of hyperbole or amplification, but attempt to 
establish a balance between art and grace, the exterior and interior.  See Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric, 48. 
 
109 Augustine states, “Such a teacher [one of integrity] to render himself persuasive, may without 
presumption express himself not only in the subdued and in the moderate style, but also in the grand style, 
because his life is beyond reproach.”  See Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, 4.28.61. 
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effect desired, but it is always an authentic reflection of the preacher’s interior state, 
which is achieved through a life of meditative reading and prayer.”110  The excesses of 
style, eloquence, and the passions are all to be governed by a moderate inner life (a 
psychological foundation for style) formed through reading and prayer.111  The inner 
“noetic quest” of the spiritual life leads to knowledge, as faith, through the desired object 
that is God (logos), which results in a cultivation of the emotions (pathos or affectus), 
e.g., love.112  Not only does substance affect form and vice versa, form is also governed 
by one’s psychological spiritual life, which must be communicated appropriately (and 
passionately).  Through sacred eloquence, form and substance are governed ontologically 
through an interior emotional life that leads to revelation of the excessive mysteries of 
God.   
Augustine, like Aristotle, connects rhetoric to the emotions,113 and these emotions 
must govern one’s (excessive) speech through divine inspiration – language is a 
reflection of interiority.  Because of the importance Augustine gives to emotions in 
general and hyperbolic emotions like charity or love in particular,114 he must prove that 
the emotional aspect of rhetoric will aid in (re)orienting one’s self towards the desired 
                                                
110 Schaeffer, “The Dialectic of Orality and Literacy,” 307. 
 
111 Ibid., 306-307. 
 
112 Shuger, “Philosophical Foundations,” 55, 149. 
 
113 Debora K. Shuger, “The Philosophical Foundations of Sacred Rhetoric,” in Rhetorical 
Invention and Religious Inquiry:  New Perspectives, eds. Walter Jost and Wendy Olmsted (New Haven:  
Yale University Press, 2000), 53.  In contrast, “The influence of Boethius after Augustine would privilege 
the dispassionate nature of dialectic over rhetoric, but Augustinian Christianity, especially in the 
Renaissance, would “set affective inwardness over dispassionate intellection…in a way that links rather 
than opposes emotion and reason” (54). 
 
114 These terms are hyperbolic because they attempt to express the divine excess of God.  The 
excess of God is the incomprehensible ideal, and thus, hyperboles are the most appropriate tropological 
expressions to attempt a description of this incomprehensibility. 
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object, i.e., God.115  The linking of emotion and reason occurs because, for Augustine, 
passions (pathos) are derived from truth (logos) and the divine logos of excess (Christ).116  
Shuger writes (regarding the influence of Augustine on Renaissance rhetoric), 
“Affectivity, instead of being an irrational perturbation, thus moves into the center of 
spiritual experience.”117  Thus, excess is appropriate when it is a divine excess 
communicated through language, but excess is inappropriate when it substantively 
distorts the revealed truth of God.  In this sense, excess is not just a stylistic vice or an 
ornamental tool, but excessive emotion/passion can be redemptive or it can become a sin 
against the truth of God if one does not adhere to decorous expression. 
Sacred eloquence is fostered and excess is inhibited by decorum and one’s inner 
spiritual life, i.e., one’s emotional state, and this interiority is connected to excessive 
passions like love and charity (hyperbolic terms), which all must come from God as well 
as substantive invention as a type of revelation derived from scripture.118  For Augustine, 
excess can only come from God.  This excess must be communicated effectively, and the 
most appropriate tropological expression of this excess is hyperbole, within a Christian 
                                                
115 Shuger, “Philosophical Foundations,” 52. 
 
116 Noted at the beginning of this section, Christ himself is often viewed as the excessive 
expression of God’s divine grace.  This divine logos of excess is the very embodiment of God that is the 
expenditure without reserve, i.e., uninhibited excess, of God’s love for creation.  Christ is the figure of 
excess itself, and thereby, the very representation of hyperbole.  In short, Christ is the hyperbolic 
representation of God’s love.   
 
117 Shuger, “Philosophical Foundations,” 53.  The styles of rhetoric share a fairly contentious 
history, and it is not uncommon for Isocratean style to be compared to a Demosthenean style.  The former 
is equated with an athlete and gymnastics of the mind while the latter is compared to the soldier, the 
warrior, and the battlefield.  Isocratean style is contrasted with the Demosthenean grand style, its emotive 
force and passionate grandeur.  For the Christian orator, this becomes a battle against sin.  See Shuger, 
Sacred Rhetoric, 22, 124-126. 
 
118 The inhibition placed on excess (and style), then, is not wholly based on the substance of one’s 
argument, but it is largely due to one’s moderate inner life.  One’s entire life of moderation, “clearly 
inspired by God,” will insure that sacred eloquence, including the grand style, is an authentic expression of 
substance, which is the truth of Christianity.   
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decorum of excess.  God, the divine logos of excess as redemptive, is the excess that 
erupts into one’s eloquence from interior devotion and prayer that inspires revelation.  
This divine excess is internalized and embodied in order to communicate one’s revelation 
persuasively and appropriately.  Interiority influences one’s style, or form, and form 
alters substance while also being derived from substance.  From this complexity, sacred 
eloquence emerges in contradistinction to sophistic eloquence.  The embodiment of 
divine excess and its expression must be communicated appropriately and eloquently in 
one’s sermonic oration, and the tropological representation of this excess is hyperbole. 
All of the “Church Fathers” affect the attitudes of Christian preachers toward 
excess and thereby hyperbolic tendencies of thought and language in the centuries to 
come, but none as much as Augustine.  In the Middle Ages, however, theological views 
of excess related to style and eloquence are replaced with the rational discourse of 
dialectic.  Those like Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, for example, take dialectic to 
new depths leading up to the Scholasticism of Anselm of Canterbury.  Inventio, not 
eloquentia, becomes the only path of theology.  Through Boethius, an abyssal opposition 
arises between eloquence as deceit and invention as certitude,119 and eloquence is given 
over to dialectical inquiry and logic.  The divine excess and sacred eloquence of 
Tertullian and Augustine is replaced with the calculated reason of logic.  The tension 
between inventio and eloquentia is significant for hyperbole because tropes of excess like 
hyperbole and figures of excess like embodied hyperboles are largely abandoned for the 
definitive logic of dialectical truth.  There is simply no room for hyperbolic excess in the 
realm of dialectic. 
                                                
119 Thomas M. Conley, Rhetoric in the European Tradition (Chicago:  The University of Chicago 
Press, 1990), 100. 
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HYPERBOLE BEYOND AUGUSTINE:  THE PREACHING TRADITION OF THE 
MIDDLE AGES 
 
 Beyond Augustine into the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, preaching using a 
simple or plain style becomes rigorously instantiated, though preaching still maintained a 
certain pathos in order to persuade.  A preacher’s purpose is to convert and inflame 
passion in the audience, i.e., a conversion of emotions, but only through a plain style that 
jettisons artistic language and relies on psychological (Augustinian psychology) and 
theological argumentation guided by the Holy Spirit.  Emotion and the effects of 
language come only from God,120 which must not be contaminated by rhetorical excess.  
As with Augustine, excess erupted from a divine excess (a divine logos of excess), but it 
was contained, or controlled, within a plain, unadorned style.121  Paradoxically, the use of 
emotions to persuade results in what some would call a grand plain style, but here, 
argument and dialectic are still privileged over eloquence and style.  Rhetoric is 
denigrated, and dialectic is celebrated for its argumentative certitude.  Eloquence and 
tropes are certainly considered to be useless since truth needs no adornment.   
Despite the belittlement of rhetoric, the distrust of eloquence as deceitful, the 
disdain of rhetorical excess in preaching and more technical rhetorics, and the fear of 
excess in one’s moral life, hyperbole is not altogether absent from the conversation.  
Ernst Robert Curtius asserts that a discussion of the link between hyperbole and 
epideictic, which is also noted by Greco-Roman rhetors, occurs in the Middle Ages 
regarding the ethical implications of “hyperbolical panegyric,” or “panegyric ‘outdoing,’” 
which leads to an “outdoing” topos.  Curtius concludes that during the Middle Ages, 
                                                
120 Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric, 51-53. 
 
121 The former from Tertullian, and the latter from Augustine.  
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especially in Christian rhetoric, “[The panegyric’s] chief trope is the hyperbole.  The 
hyperbolic style is authorized not only by the pagan writers but also by the entire 
Bible.”122  Again, there seems to be a binary of excess where “pagan” excess, i.e., secular 
eloquence, is rejected but Christian excess is accepted, i.e., sacred eloquence.   
Mystical and apophatic theologians certainly employ the use of hyperbole within 
their discourse.  Other medieval rhetorical theologians offer excessive arguments for the 
praise of God, panegyric sermons and poetry about the divine, and a defense of 
scripture’s rough rather than eloquent style.  It is true that many theologians of Latin as 
well as medieval Christianity, e.g., Origen and Augustine, view scripture figuratively 
rather than literally and argue for a certain scriptural eloquence that reveals the mysteries 
of God, but their preferred figure is overwhelmingly metaphor rather than hyperbole.  
Perhaps the most overt link to hyperbole in medieval rhetoric is the use of amplificatio, 
but it remains disconnected from elocutio,123 which serves to underscore again the 
distrust of deceitful eloquence as the lie of hyperbole.   
Cassiodorus, Boethius, Priscian, Pope Gregory the Great, Isidore, Saint Bede, 
Alcuin, Hrabanus Maurus, Gerbert of Reims, Notker Labeo, and Alain de Lille all 
privilege argument over eloquence to prevent embellishment from distorting the 
substance of one’s argument.  In fact, the Church’s attitude towards rhetoric at this time 
is that it should not be used in preaching at all.124  Although rhetoric is still a subject of 
                                                
122 Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard R. Trask 
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1991), 164. 
 
123 Walter J. Ong, S. J., Ramus:  Method, and the Decay of Dialogue from the Art of Discourse to 
the Art of Reason (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 213. 
 
124 Preaching in the Middle Ages became less and less important.  Stephen H. Webb writes that the 
liturgical calendar became more important during the period preceding the Middle Ages, and the festal 
sermon became popular.  He states, “By the fifth century, more and more worship services had a reading of 
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study at his time, it is only one of seven arts:  the trivium (grammar, rhetoric, and 
dialectic) and the quadrivium (geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music).  The trivium 
is particularly for younger students.125  It is not until the ars praedicandi of the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries, leading into the Renaissance, that preaching begins to change 
from the homily to the “thematic” sermon and eloquence regains some importance.126  
The Dominican and Franciscan monastic preaching orders of the thirteenth century begin 
to develop more fully the treatises devoted to the arts of preaching, which are decisively 
more Ciceronian than Boethian.127  The Cistercians also revive preaching somewhat by 
developing a more simplified liturgy.128  Scholastic commentators beginning with 
Abelard remain loyal to Boethius through their construction of unadorned university 
                                                                                                                                            
the Scripture without a preaching of the Word.”  See Stephen H. Webb, The Divine Voice:  Christian 
Proclamation and the Theology of Sound (Grand Rapids:  Brazos Press, 2004), 113.  At this time 
hagiography became prominent even over scripture.  Lectionary preaching also became popular since most 
priests could not compose a well-organized sermon.  In the eighth century catechetical preaching became 
important to establish cultural uniformity, and the same sermons were preached year after year.  
“Homilaries” were sample sermons that priests could give verbatim (114).  There seems to be “a direct 
correlation between the systemization of the liturgy and the decline of preaching” (115). 
 
125 Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Rhetoric:  The Quest for Effective Communication (Wiley-
Blackwell, 2004), 26.  See also Walter J. Ong, S. J., Ramus:  Method, and the Decay of Dialogue from the 
Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 198. 
 
126 See Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, eds., The Rhetorical Tradition:  Readings from 
Classical Times to the Present, 2nd ed. (Boston:  Beford/St. Martin’s, 2001), esp. 525-528; Harry Caplan, Of 
Eloquence:  Studies in Ancient and Mediaeval Rhetoric (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1970), esp. 105-
134; Thomas M. Conley, Rhetoric in the European Tradition (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 
1990); Edward P. J. Corbett, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, 3rd ed. (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 1990), esp. 548-550; George A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric 
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1994); George A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian 
and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times, 2nd ed. (Chapel Hill:  The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1999); and James J. Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages:  A History of Rhetoric Theory 
from St. Augustine to the Renaissance (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1974);  
 
127 Conley, Rhetoric in the European Tradition, 96.  William of Auvergne, Robert of Basevorn, 
Raymond Llull, and Richard of Thetford all concentrated on a strong Ciceronian eloquence, an abundance 
of eloquence (copia), amplification, and are anti-Boethian (96-97).  The Dominicans were even known as 
the “Order of Preachers.”  See Webb, Divine Voice, 115. 
 
128 Webb, Divine Voice, 115.  For example, Bernard of Clairvaux began a golden age of preaching 
that lasted from 1125-1274. 
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sermons, but these more practical monastic preachers and teachers promote the eloquence 
of the Ciceronian ideal. 
 Medieval rhetorics continue to struggle between excessive passions and 
eloquence, but discussions of elocutio largely disappear from more technical discussions 
of rhetoric and are replaced by a concern for the ethical behavior of the orator, which is 
tied more to dialectical argumentation than rhetoric.129  Passions do not move but 
contribute to intellectual argumentation.  It is not eloquence that persuades but a 
psychological mindset driven by simple, passionate expression within the substance of 
argument itself.130  The excess of passions is thus suppressed through the intellectual 
dialectic of Scholasticism, and elocutio is separated from inventio.  This position changes 
in the Renaissance where tropes and figures like hyperbole and amplification are not 
largely viewed as stylistic vices but as generators of imagination, inspiration, and the path 
to God,131 and the Augustinian psychology of the will and emotion is dominant.   
Outside of the purview of the preaching tradition, there are interesting theological 
and social developments regarding excess.  First, a fascination with martyrdom, 
asceticism, mysticism, and saintliness becomes more extreme during the Middle Ages as 
well as fantastical descriptions of hell and divine retribution, e.g., Dante’s hyperbolic 
poetry (part of the “outdoing” topos described by Curtius) and Dionysus the Areopagite’s 
                                                
129 Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric, 51. 
 
130 Peter T. King describes this mental architecture as “sub-personal functional mechanisms [that] 
are identified and organized into faculties; these faculties causally interact such that one reduces another 
from potency to act, perhaps through the intermediary of a mental representation (called a species), thereby 
giving rise to psychological phenomena.”  See Peter T. King, “The Inner Cathedral:  Mental Architecture in 
High Scholasticism,” Vivarium 46, no. 3 (2008) :  254. 
 
131 For example, see John Prideaux’s Sacred Eloquence as highlighted in Ettenhuber’s essay.  
Prideaux argues that hyperboles, and particularly “Sublime Hyperboles,” allow one to make contact with 
God.  Ettenhuber, “Hyperbole,” 205-206. 
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use of the “hyper-negative” to describe and argue theologically for the 
incomprehensibility of God.132  Paradoxically, while rhetorical excess is frequently 
rejected in discourse, its embodiment is often praised through rhetorical excess, e.g., the 
“hyperbolical panegyric.”  To be sure, martyrdom was also praised by those like 
Tertullian and Cyprian, and it was a significant concern while Christians were sought out 
and persecuted.  Yet, the writings of the Middle Ages transition from martyrdom to 
Christian asceticism (askesis), i.e., embodied hyperbole as the extreme training of the 
body and the soul.  A significant interest in prophecy and apocalyptic discourse 
contribute to this development and call for those obedient to Christianity to prepare, or 
train (askesis), themselves for the coming apocalypse.  Through asceticism and 
apocalyptic discourse, excess is given a positive teleology that was previously only 
reserved for moderation. 
 Second, a fascination with the grotesque (discussed in chapter four) leads to 
hyperbolic actions such as the carnival and the carnivalesque described by Mikhail 
Bakhtin133 as well as hyperbolic literary forms such as the exaggerated grotesque of 
burlesque literature.  These hyperbolic forms occur in the Middle Ages but gain 
                                                
132 All mystical rhetoric is premised on a certain amount of hyperbole since its purpose is to 
describe the incomprehensible and unintelligible.  Boyle writes, “This exaggeration of language is evident 
in the mystical predilection for hyperbole and exclamation and for the imagery of eroticism and 
intoxication.”  See Boyle, “Rhetorical Theology,” 92.  In terms of Dionysian theology, his hyper-negative 
(mystical) apophatic theology aspires to reach what it cannot reach, which is the precise function of 
hyperbole.  Carlson writes of Dionysus’s language, “Literally hyperbolic, such language throws the subject 
of language beyond both its language and its subjectivity, into a ‘nowhere’ or ‘nothing’ of experience.”  
See Thomas A. Carlson, “Apophatic Analogy:  On the Language of Mystical Unknowing and Being-
Toward-Death,” in Rhetorical Invention and Religious Inquiry:  New Perspectives, eds. Walter Jost and 
Wendy Olmsted (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 2000), 202.  Again noting its hyperbolic element, 
Carlson writes, “The rhetoric of apophasis, by attempting to transcend language through language, serves 
as the indispensable vehicle for a spiritual practice that seeks a knowledge of the unknowable” (198). 
 
133 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington:  Indiana 
University Press, 1984).  See also David K. Danow, The Spirit of Carnival:  Magical Realism and the 
Grotesque (Lexington:  The University Press of Kentucky, 1995). 
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momentum in the Renaissance, the Baroque, and Romanticism.  Geoffrey Galt Harpham 
describes grotesqueries as standing “at a margin of consciousness between the known and 
the unknown, the perceived and the unperceived, calling into question the adequacy of 
our ways of organizing the world, of dividing the continuum of experience into knowable 
particles.”134  In Harpham’s understanding, the grotesque (a type of hyperbolic form) 
serves a positive function that expands one’s imagination rather than leading to vice.  In 
like manner, Bakhtin argues that the carnival inverts social hierarchies when grotesque 
bodies are positively exaggerated, “hyperbolized,” to assert the impossibility that the 
poor are royalty in order to reveal the truth (the possible) that all hierarchies are based on 
social fictions.  Embodied hyperboles and exaggerated concepts, e.g., the gargantuan, the 
colossal, the titanic, serve a positive role to reveal truths typically unacknowledged.135 
 Third, more complex theological arguments on the doctrine of God begin to 
develop, and they all must address God’s place or role in the universe and creation, 
especially in regard to other theological doctrines such as Christology, atonement, and 
eschatology.  This ontological emphasis on transcendence and immanence as well as 
incarnation and telos leads inexorably to the question of excess in theology, e.g., God as 
excess in and/or through Creation, Christ’s sacrifice as excessive atonement for excessive 
sin, God as beyond description.  A significant concern of theologians at this time is to 
attempt to prove the existence of God through logical argumentation.  For example, 
                                                
134 Geoffrey Galt Harpham, On the Grotesque:  Strategies of Contradiction in Art and Literature 
(Aurora:  The Davies Group, Publishers, 2006), 3.  See also Virginia E. Swain, Grotesque Figures:  
Baudelaire, Rousseau, and the Aesthetics of Modernity (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2004). 
 
135 Parody, caricature, melodrama, and satire are also styles that can be construed as hyperbolic, 
but the grotesque is a wholly hyperbolic form while these other styles are often more ironic than 
hyperbolic. 
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Anselm of Canterbury in the eleventh century offers the ontological proof of God’s 
existence suggesting, and parroting Quintilian, that God is that than which nothing 
greater can be conceived.136  This is an interesting argument of incrementum that is a 
species of auxesis, which is a species of hyperbole (discussed in detail in the following 
chapters).137  Yet, those like the Scholastic theologian Thomas Aquinas refute Anselm’s 
argument.138  Influenced by the rhetorical writings of Aristotle, Cicero, Ambrose, and 
Augustine, Aquinas offers an interesting view of excess, and as an example, I will briefly 
note Aquinas’s view of excess towards sin and worship – a Christian binary of hyperbolic 
excess.   
 In “Whether Ambition is a Sin” of Aquinas’s Summa Theologica, he asserts, “The 
desire for good should be regulated according to reason, and if it exceed this rule it will 
be sinful.  In this way it is sinful to desire honor in disaccord with the order of reason.”139  
Reason is the mean, and any deviation from the mean is excessive, i.e., sinful.  Even the 
virtue of honor may become sinful through excess.  As stated previously, equating sin 
with excess is not surprising since sin “misses the mark,” and hyperbole “overshoots the 
                                                
136 Quintilian writes that incrementum can “proceed at once to something than which nothing 
greater can be named.”  See Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.4.7. 
 
137 One might also conceive of this argument as an argument of unlimited development that 
terminates at the ideal term.  Only hyperbole, and litotes, can rescue the development from infinite 
expansion according to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca.  See Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New 
Rhetoric, 290-292. 
 
138 Anselm’s argument holds sway for some time, but those like the Benedictine monk Guanilo in 
the late eleventh century argue against Anselm’s argument.  In Guanilo’s “The Reply on behalf of the 
Fool,” he asserts that if Anselm’s argument were applied to any other topic, then it would seem ridiculous.  
Thomas Aquinas also refutes Anselm’s argument, though somewhat more eloquently, by offering five 
“proofs” in which the existence of God might be demonstrated.  One could argue that the refutation of 
Anselm’s argument actually occurs because it ends the project of theology itself by terminating at the ideal 
term and dispensing with superfluous hyperbolic expressions about the ideal term. 
 
139 Aquinas, “Whether Ambition is a Sin,” in Summa Theologica, Christian Classics Ethereal 
Library, <http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.SS_Q131_A1.html> (14 November 2009). 
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mark.”  Viewed rhetorico-theologically, sin is a hyperbolic figure of thought that 
becomes an embodied hyperbole.  More precisely, sin is the lie of hyperbole and a 
negative excess.  Reason is the truth, and embodied hyperbole-as-sin is a lie intended to 
deceive.  If hyperbole is a lie on the side of truth, as Seneca and Quintilian assert, then 
the function of hyperbole is to assert what is incredible to arrive at the credible, but for 
Aquinas, this redemptive hyperbolic function is denied.  However, when speaking about 
God rather than human desires, Aquinas has a very different view of hyperbole’s 
excessive function. 
 In “Whether there can be any Excess in the Worship of God,” Aquinas offers a 
brief explication of excess – dividing it between absolute quantity and quantity of 
proportion – and he concludes by stating that there is no excess in worship.140  What 
Aquinas reveals in this statement is the inverse supposition that there is actually nothing 
but excess in worship.  Worship is completely hyperbolic thereby establishing a decorum 
of excess for worship.  Excess is appropriate for worship because worship (form) is 
contingent upon the object being worshipped (subject matter, substance)141 and the 
internal state of one’s soul, or mind.  Not surprisingly, Augustine’s theological argument 
about rhetorical eloquence is almost exactly like Aquinas’s theological argument about 
                                                
140 Aquinas writes, “A thing is said to be in excess in two ways.  First, with regard to absolute 
quantity, and in this way there cannot be excess in the worship of God, because whatever man does is less 
than he owes God.  Secondly, a thing is in excess with regard to quantity of proportion, through not being 
proportionate to its end.  Now the end of divine worship is that man may give glory to God, and submit to 
Him in mind and body.  Consequently, whatever a man may do conducing to God's glory, and subjecting 
his mind to God, and his body, too, by a moderate curbing of the concupiscences, is not excessive in the 
divine worship, provided it be in accordance with the commandments of God and of the Church, and in 
keeping with the customs of those among whom he lives.”  See Aquinas, “Whether there can be any Excess 
in the Worship of God,” in Summa Theologica, Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 
<http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.SS.ii.SS_Q93.SS_Q93_A2.html?highlight=excess#highlight> 
(14 November 2009). 
 
141 “Substance” is used here in a rhetorical, not a theological, sense. 
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God and worship, which indicates that eloquent speech for Augustine is a type of worship 
as praise to/of God through speaking.  For Augustine and Aquinas, a certain decorum as 
well as an inner spiritual state must be present for proper worship, or sacred eloquence.  
Aquinas argues that “a moderate curbing of the concupiscences” is a prerequisite for the 
worship of God, but nothing offered to God is enough since one can never exceed the 
quantity or proportionality of the object being worshipped.  Yet, as I have noted, 
hyperbole is not intended to throw beyond all reason and knowledge, which is more the 
function of the sublime or adynaton.   
Hyperbole asserts the incredible to arrive at the credible; it lies on the side of 
truth.  In Aquinas’s argument, God (the truth) is the impossible, and worship (the 
unrecognized falsehood) is the possible.  He argues, within a classical theistic paradigm, 
that there is no excessive form of worship because excess itself is the appropriate and 
proportional response to the ideal concept of God, i.e., only hyperbolic assertions about 
God are possible.  The lies of hyperbole are attempts to describe God, which is 
impossible, but these falsehoods are not intended to deceive.  The lie of hyperbole 
functions here to reveal truths about God through language, which makes worship 
hyperbolic.  Just as Anselm makes God the amplified term, i.e., through incrementum, in 
his ontological argument for God’s existence, Aquinas makes the same move.  God is the 
extraordinary subject matter requiring excessive amplification in Aquinas’s decorum of 
excess.  Hyperbole is a bridge between transcendence and immanence, infinity and finite 
assertions.  Thus, Aquinas’s argument hinges on the function of hyperbole to assert the 
impossible in order to arrive at the possible. 
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 As asserted earlier, these are subtle arguments regarding the excess of hyperbole.  
From the Church Fathers through the Middle Ages, hyperbole is rarely specifically 
referenced.  Implicitly, either the error of sin and vice – embodied hyperboles – is 
discussed; or, divine excess as hyperbolic excess that must be appropriately expressed is 
posited – worship, martyrdom, and asceticism, and a paradoxical binary of excess is 
revealed.  It is the misapprehending of hyperbole’s function that causes hyperbole to be 
equated with sin.  If the lie of hyperbole is taken on its own, then it is viewed as sin, but 
when hyperbole is allowed to function at its full potential, it is viewed as sacred excess 
for purposefully revealing truths and correcting moral ineptitudes.  The misapprehension 
of hyperbole distorts its purpose, and it is viewed only as a lie.   
A renewed interest in hyperbole as a trope does not occur until the Renaissance 
when the trope is explicitly discussed by numerous writers.  In the Renaissance, much 
from the Middle Ages is overturned and reversed, including a renewed importance of 
rhetoric.142  In rhetorical theory, tropes and figures regain prominence, and style and 
eloquence are again preferred over the cold logic of dialectic in order to impassion one’s 
audience and move them to conversion.  A Christian grand style is developed, and 
hyperbole is elevated to a status that is second only to metaphor.  In fact, Christian 
rhetors argue that it is only through hyperbole that one can glimpse the beauty of God.  It 
is to the Renaissance that I now turn. 
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HYPERBOLE IN RENAISSANCE RHETORICAL THEORY (AND THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT) 
 
 The Renaissance is an important era for rhetorical theory as well as Christian 
theology and preaching through a renewed interest in Classical texts and rhetoric, “true 
eloquence,” that defined the humanism of the time.143  Christian rhetoricians contribute 
significantly to theology, rhetorical theory, and the overall culture and aesthetic of the 
Renaissance.  This “sacred rhetoric,” argues Debora K. Shuger, “is not a narrowly 
specialized compartment of the history of Renaissance rhetoric but its most vital and 
reflective branch.”144  Rather than simply Ciceronianizing religious discourse like the 
Church Fathers, sacred rhetorics exhibit “a theoretical concern for language, making 
them articulate witnesses to the sacred aesthetics of the Renaissance.”145  By linking style 
to passion, renewing an interest in sophistic discourse, and suggesting that “passion with 
its figures and tropes is also the language of divine disclosure,”146 sacred rhetorics offer 
fertile ground for hyperbole.  A significant influence for sacred rhetoricians’ view of 
excess is Augustine’s combination of divine wisdom and sacred eloquence as well as his 
concern for emotion and Christian inwardness.147 
 Most of Renaissance rhetorical theory, especially sacred rhetoric, is based upon 
Augustinian psychology that unites the passions and the will thereby associating style 
with interiority rather than exteriority.  As noted previously, Greco-Roman pagan rhetoric 
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views style, generally speaking, as only external ornamentation to be added appropriately 
to one’s substantive argument, i.e., to be decorous, in order to teach, to please, and to 
move the audience.  The sophists exceed this stance and view ornamentation as useful to 
gain applause by bringing pleasure to the audience, and in the process, the sophists 
engage in self-aggrandizement for their own sake.  For Augustine, ornamentation is 
viewed as an external expression of internal passions that are nurtured through prayer and 
the Holy Spirit, which is a sacramental view of language:  “Passionate discourse thus 
imitates the movement of thought and feeling, the contours of the speaker’s inner life.”148  
The proof of the orator’s power is replaced with the power of the object of desire to 
inspire.  The human artist is diminished so that the glory of God may be revealed.  An 
orator in the service of God, Thomas Traherne writes, “Can never Exceed, nor be too 
high.”149  The use of rhetoric and its figures and tropes is not to be used for self-
aggrandizement but to teach, to please, and to move one towards an emotional, inner 
conversion inspired by God thereby providing a positive place for hyperbole in 
persuasive discourse.  As many Christian Renaissance rhetoricians iterate, the end of 
persuasion and preaching is conversion, i.e., persuasion is conversion and vice versa.150  
As Kenneth Burke might put it, identification is persuasion. 
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 The real boon for rhetorical theory at this time is the privileging of eloquence over 
the Scholasticism of the Middle Ages, who Erasmus allies with the animals.151  For 
Renaissance humanists, the abstract, speculative intellectualism of the Scholastics failed 
to engage the relevant, practical matters of life.152  The humanists view Scholasticism as 
an act of dialectical logic through the intellect, judgment, and comprehension, and its 
religious end is contemplation.153  In contrast, rhetoric seeks a movement of emotions 
(affectus) and the will to gain assent.154  Through rhetoric and decorum, an extravagance, 
sublimity, and tropological fecundity are expressed through the ideal of eloquence and 
the theological virtue of charity.155  Excessive tropes like hyperbole are given a pride of 
place, and metaphor, considered at times even by Aquinas to be “chaff,”156 is almost 
dethroned as the predominant trope in rhetorical theory.157   
 These developments offer a space for the re-interpretation of hyperbole in a more 
positive way.  Renaissance rhetorical theorists are still concerned with the view of 
hyperbole as a lie, but they re-shape this conception into a decorum of excess where 
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hyperbole becomes an appropriate literary virtue, a lie on the side of truth.  Stanivukovic 
writes, “Renaissance writers often turn the deception implied by hyperbole into a literary 
virtue.  Based on the manipulation of lie and truth within the very form of the trope, 
deception through hyperbole helped Renaissance writers explore the problem of 
appearance and reality, not only in large structures but in a compact stylistic form as 
well.”158  Rather than being equated with mere appearance and ornamentation, i.e., a 
linguistic lie, hyperbole actually helps Renaissance writers to explore the problem of 
appearance and reality, i.e., hermeneutical truth(s).159  Renaissance writers construct a 
theory of hyperbole that is more complex, and as with Quintilian, the deceit of hyperbole 
is epistemologically necessary.  The alleged vice of excess thus becomes a virtue, though 
still in moderation.   
In 1777, Joseph Priestley writes, “The reason why the hyperbole is, in appearance, 
a greater violation of truth than most other figures, is only this, that in the hyperbole the 
untruth lies in the affirmation itself.”160  In this sense, hyperbole is a tropological short 
circuit that carries the listener directly to the recognition that all tropes and figures carry 
an element of untruth within them since they are not literal but figurative statements.  
Other tropes and figures are eventually revealed as lies intended to reveal some truth, but 
hyperbole is a “lowd lyer” that shocks the audience into the untruth of the lie in order to 
take them to another alternative truth or version of reality.  Renaissance writers re-
explore the intricate functions of hyperbole; however, caution is still encouraged when 
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using hyperbole and excess in one’s style.  Hyperbole is celebrated, but it is also 
mistrusted.  The productive excessiveness Renaissance writers perceive in hyperbole can 
be too excessive even when exploring the transcendence of the divine, the sublime, the 
magnificent, and the wondrous through language.   
The key for these writers is the attempt to communicate the “beyond” of thought 
and language – to make the transcendent immanent and define the infinite in finite terms.  
To do this, a heightened style, eloquence, and rhetorical ornamentation must be 
proportionate to the excellence of the subject being discussed.  Decorum must be 
maintained.  Yet, more than adhering to a grand style, these writers re-contextualize the 
functions of hyperbole to develop a type of hyperbolic style or decorum of excess often 
expressed through the epideictic genre.161  Connecting hyperbole to epideictic is not an 
uncommon (discussed in the following chapter).  Greco-Roman theorists note this 
connection, Augustine views sacred eloquence as praise of God through language, and 
Aquinas realizes the necessity of excess for worship, but Renaissance writers make the 
link of hyperbole to epideictic explicit and more intricate theoretically. 
In this section, I will offer an explication of hyperbole during the Renaissance, 
and I will explore the views of excess held by the sacred and secular rhetorics of 
humanist writers.  What I will find is that hyperbole continues to be a contentious term as 
well as a trope that offers epistemological and ontological playfulness within rhetorical 
theory and rhetorical theology. 
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 “SECULAR” HUMANIST RHETORIC AND HYPERBOLE 
 
 Although Christian rhetoricians argue for the uses of amplification, magnitude, 
passionate speech, and hyperbole in the grand style, other rhetoricians discuss the 
function and form of hyperbole more explicitly.  George Puttenham, in his hugely 
influential Arte of English Poesie (1569), asserts of hyperbole: 
 
I for his [hyperbole] immoderate excesse cal him the ouer reacher right with his 
originall or [lowd lyer]…and this maner of speach is vsed, when either we would 
greatly aduance or greatly abase the reputation of any thing or person, and must 
be vsed very discreetly, or els it will seeme odious, for although a prayse or other 
report may be allowed beyond credit, it may not be beyond all measure.162 
 
Puttenham’s caution is to use hyperbole “discreetly.”  He also places it in the genre of 
epideictic oratory, which makes the use of hyperbole context specific thereby limiting 
hyperbole’s scope.  Classical manuals of rhetoric also note the use of panegyrical 
hyperbole, but Puttenham’s connection is overt.163  For Puttenham, hyperbole is to be 
used discretely when the appropriate situation arises, e.g., a situation that calls for 
epideictic oratory, but even when praising or blaming, Puttenham is not favorably 
inclined towards hyperbole.  The problem with hyperbole for him is not that it lies but 
that it is a “lowd lyer.”  For Puttneham, as for Longinus, the deceit of hyperbole should 
be concealed and used discretely.  Discretion and moderation must be used to temper the 
effect of hyperbole because praise may not be “beyond all measure;” or, as Quintilian 
says, beyond belief. 
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 In The Garden of Eloquence (1593), Henry Peacham also connects hyperbole to 
epideictic, but more subtly, and Peacham asserts that hyperbole must be employed when 
describing things that are beyond description.164  Not only does hyperbole succeed by 
drawing attention to itself, contra Puttenham, but it translates figurative language into 
emotional meaning – moving an audience through excessive praise.165  Hyperbole bridges 
the gap between what is spoken and what is meant, as Thomas Wilson also posits in Arte 
of Rhetorique (1553).166  Stanivukovic asserts that “an incredible, exaggerated utterance 
interrupts the language and logic of the existing argument,” by shifting “one level of 
meaning to another, re-invented meaning.”167  In this sense, hyperbole is abstract and 
ambiguous through its description of something that cannot be described, i.e., the 
attempted apprehension of something that is beyond thought and/or language.  Attaining 
the ideal is impossible.  Hyperbole attempts this feat, but it does not intend to reveal 
complete comprehension of the ideal, which would devalue the thought or feeling 
hyperbole evokes.  For Peacham, this attempt at comprehending the incomprehensible is 
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a strength of hyperbole because it furthers one’s imagination by asserting what is “almost 
incredible” through a type of “functional ignorance.”168 
 Puttenham and Peacham are representative examples of the positive and negative 
views regarding hyperbole in the secular rhetorics of the time.  Philip Sidney, in Defence 
of Poesy, argues that hyperbole can transform the audience.169  John Hoskyns, in 
Directions for Speech and Style (1599) and Gabriel Harvey, in Ciceronianus (1577), also 
discuss hyperbole and amplification,170 and they suggest that the use of tropes and figures 
must be appropriate to the substance of the argument.  As with most rhetorical theorists 
discussed thus far, arguing for a decorum of excess is one way theorists attempted to limit 
as well as to give hyperbole a proper place within discourse.171  Hoskyns echoes the 
definitions of hyperbole by Seneca and Quintilian by suggesting that hyperbole’s 
articulation “beyond the truth” (the incredible) will descend to the truth (the credible), or 
that the “flat impossibility” of hyperbole may highlight “the unspeakableness than the 
untruth of the relation.”172  Noel Malcolm writes of the use of hyperbole in “nonsense 
poetry” of the Renaissance:  “It makes reference to impossible things not because it is 
trying to describe an impossible world…but as a rhetorical figure, to emphasize and 
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dramatize impossibility itself.”173  For Renaissance writers, hyperbole does not assert 
impossibilities and absurdities for their own sake, but to reveal the function that 
impossibility may have for meaning itself.  The attempt by all of these theorists is to 
utilize the function of hyperbole to extend and play with meaning as well as to attempt to 
describe the impossible and create a sense of “wonder” by over-reaching the bounds of 
language.   
Others write of the uses of hyperbole in Elizabethan drama and poetry as well as 
Tudor poetics,174 which is beyond the scope of this project, but the overall attitude 
towards hyperbole in the Renaissance is that paradox, obscurity, and ambiguity all serve 
to avoid the trite and obvious in order to reveal life, force, wonder, and energeia.175  The 
same is true for Christian rhetoricians, and I will now focus on the sacred rhetorics of the 
Renaissance.  If the secular rhetorics of the Renaissance were concerned explicitly with 
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hyperbole as a figure of thought via amplification, then the sacred rhetorics can be 
characterized as exploring the form and function of amplification within the grand style 
of Christian preaching. 
SACRED RHETORIC:  CHRISTIAN HUMANISM AND HYPERBOLE 
 
 The primary concern of sacred rhetorics during the Renaissance is the use of 
emotion to move its audience to conversion – to teach and to move the audience from one 
set of values to another religious set of values through a heightening of emotion – which 
Shuger suggests establishes a Christian grand style.  Influenced heavily by Quintilian, 
Erasmus also “shifts the relationship of style and invention to promote the influential 
ideal of copia as eloquence, an ideal that effectively encourages Christian humanists to 
cultivate forms of hyperbolic excess.”176  The product of this style constitutes a Christian 
aesthetic (including a Christian view of the sublime) and a theory of language within the 
overall context of Renaissance rhetoric.177  In developing this Christian humanist style, 
the influence of Augustine can hardly be over emphasized, and through his psychology of 
the self, the tropes and figures of rhetoric are used not as decoration but as “the 
appropriate expression of the psyche in its attempt to apprehend and articulate 
transcendence.”178   
As noted above, this represents a significant shift from the Greco-Roman view of 
tropes and figures as external ornamentation, to a view of tropes and figures as outward 
expressions of inner emotions, devotion, and the will – a sacramental, incarnational view 
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of language.  “The program was the transformation of speech into act, of oratory into 
flesh, just as Speech had become incarnate.”179  John Donne, for example, views Christ as 
a rhetorical act, Erasmus considers “Christ as Speech” and Luther asserts that the Holy 
Spirit is a rhetorician.180  In this sense, God is viewed as a rhetorician who is:  1) moving 
one’s inward emotional state, i.e., persuading humanity, 2) communicating and being 
communicated figurally through language itself, and 3) the incarnated logos in the 
“figure” of Christ.  From the abstract intellectualism of the Scholastics, the Christian 
humanists emphasize an incarnational view of language and an Augustinian psychology 
that connects the emotions to rhetorical power.  The Christian grand style and its 
epideictic proclivity uses a sacramental theory of language that emphasizes the 
inner/moral life of the speaker, the excessiveness of tropological description as it is 
appropriate for its subject matter, and the inventional process of the speaker that is guided 
by the Holy Spirit. 
 Developing a theory of language that is sacramental is a significant contribution 
of Christian humanists.  Through magnitudo and praesentia, the purpose is to move the 
emotions (affectus) by making absent things present in order to combine the “excellent 
object with sensuous immediacy.”181  Those absent, divine things of grandeur must be 
communicated with equal grandeur and incarnated into language and eloquence, i.e., a 
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decorum of excess.  The excellent object inspires an inward passionate response, which is 
then translated into external figurative language, especially heightened tropes and figures, 
whereby words incarnationally signify supernatural truth,182 which includes hyperbole 
and sublime discourse.  The incredible is made credible through the incarnation of the 
imagination and the divine into language, and hyperbole is suited particularly well to 
achieve this goal.183  Attempting to communicate, to incarnate, what is incomprehensible 
is the main (paradoxical) function of hyperbole; thus, it is utilized in the sacred rhetorics 
to “shore up faith” and speak of those divine things that are beyond one’s ability to 
comprehend. 
 Perhaps the view of hyperbole Shoemaker derives from Balzac’s writings best 
summarizes hyperbole’s raison d’etre in the sacred rhetorics, though Balzac himself was 
unconcerned with sacred rhetoric.  Shoemaker writes, “Hyperbole expresses precisely 
that which we have difficulty believing.  By going beyond the truth, it attempts to 
reproduce in language the sense of marvel that one experiences before the divine, the 
spectacular, and the unbelievable.”184  Here again, one encounters the paradoxical and 
ambiguous nature of hyperbole that arrives at the truth by lying (in excess).  The deceit, 
however, is only meant to be believed up to the limits of its own unbelievability.  
Because of the limits of language, impossible heights must be asserted in order to attempt 
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to describe the experiences of transcendence.  The overall goal of using hyperbole is not 
to lie, but to, paradoxically, speak/praise the truth through that which is unbelievable.  In 
epideictic and sublime discourse, even the grotesque discourse of the Renaissance, 
hyperbole functions particularly well because affect (affectus) replaces argumentation 
(ratio),185 and the audience loses itself in the emotive language of the orator.186  In the 
context of sublime discourse, the unbelievable becomes believable with little difficulty. 
 The Protestant rhetorician John Prideaux, in Sacred Eloquence (1659), argues for 
“Sublime Hyperboles” in his Christian rhetoric and seeks to establish a decorum of 
excess.  Ettenhuber suggests of Prideaux’s writing and Christian rhetorics in general, 
“But for Christian theories of eloquence, hyperbole shores up faith and points the way to 
God precisely because it defies the laws of probability.”187  Traherne demonstrates a 
similar feeling when he writes, “All Tropes are Clouds; Truth doth itself excel. / 
Whatever Heights Hyperboles can tell,”188 and again, he writes of excess related to God: 
 What bound may we assign,  
 O God, to any work of thine!  
 Their endlessness discovers thee  
 In all to be Divine ;  
 A Deity  
 That will for evermore exceed the end  
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 Of all that creature's wit can comprehend.189 
 
The excess of hyperbole points to incomprehensibility, which is celebrated in the 
Renaissance rather than avoided or displaced by certitude.  As for Anselm and Aquinas, 
God is the ideal, elusive term implicitly buttressed by the amplification (auxesis) of 
hyperbole, but for Renaissance writers, hyperbole is explicitly recognized to be the 
vehicle for communicating this divine ideal.  When speaking of God, language is inept 
and limited, but hyperbole as trope and figure of thought defies the laws of probability, 
replaces argumentation with affect, pushes the bounds of language, strains human 
knowledge to the point of shattering, and offers one the closest utterance of transcendent 
experience.  In line with Quintilian and Seneca, most Renaissance writers understand that 
hyperbole is a “special kind of language, which goes beyond normal speech…in order to 
express a supra-normal idea or experience.”190  The implication of this statement is that, 
like religious discourse in general, hyperbole is a special kind of language that attempts 
to express supra-normal, supra-rational, or super-natural ideas or experiences.  The 
heights of hyperbole take the listener beyond normal experience.  The abjected orator or 
writer must simply speak of the divine to communicate the improbable. 
 In sum, Christian humanist rhetoric of the Renaissance seeks to transcend the 
boundaries of thought and language through the use of hyperbole within a decorum of 
                                                
189 Thomas Traherne, The Poetical Works of Thomas Traherne, American Libraries, 
<http://www.archive.org/stream/poeticalworksoft00trah/poeticalworksoft00trah_djvu.txt> (18 November 
2009).  This is a statement that is reminiscent of Anselm’s argument that God is that than which nothing 
greater can be conceived as well as Aquinas’s views on worship. 
 
190 Vickers, “The Rhetoric of Hyperbole,” 143.  Vickers recounts Priestley writing of hyperbole, 
“As we are led into no mistake by such terms, they are, in fact, to us who enter into this situation and 
feelings, more true and just expressions of those feelings than any plainer terms could have been” (146).  
For Priestley, hyperboles draw the hearers into discourse more than other tropes because they are more 
adept at expressing feelings that are often beyond description:  “The state of mind produced by an attempt 
to realize hyperbolical expressions, may not be more than barely adequate to the ideas intended to be 
conveyed” (147). 
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excess, heightened speech, and epideictic discourse, and they replace the view of 
ornamentation as a vice by emphasizing passionate and redemptive discourse that is 
sincere.  The purpose is to move the hearer to conversion through a conjunction of power 
and luminosity emanating from one’s passions.191  In Erasmus’s last work, Ecclesiastes 
sive concionator evangelicus (1535), he explicitly connects psychology and religious 
expression to elocutio to highlight the theological and artistic aspects of sacred 
eloquence.192  It is this spiritualized view of emotions and a sacramental view of language 
coupled with an intense awareness of decorum that inhibits hyperbole’s use but also 
fosters a grand style and the productive use of hyperbole within sacred rhetorics.  The 
subject matter discussed (divine discourse) must be proportionately elevated through 
language in order to create a suitable emotional response.193   
From Aurelio Brandolini, Rudolph Agricola, Nicholas Hemmingsen, Melachthan, 
William Perkins, and Tridentine Rhetoric to Sturm, Vossius, Keckermann, Caussin, and 
Alsted, the Christian grand style uses incarnational theology, Augustinian psychology, a 
sacramental theory of language, and a decorum of excess in order to move the hearer to 
conversion through emotion.  Christian epideictic preaching, noted earlier to be explicitly 
connected to hyperbole, reaches its greatest eloquence in the seventeenth century through 
those like Francois Fenelon, Robert South, James Arderne, Rene Rapin, and Robert 
                                                
191 Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric, 122, 138-139. 
 
192 Ibid., 64. 
 
193 Ibid., 90.  See especially Francois Fenelon, Dialogues on Eloquence (approx. 1679) and 
Bernard Lamy, Art of Speaking. 
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Ferguson.  Yet, even within these traditions, extremism is viewed as absoluteness,194 
which those like Erasmus and Lamy try to avoid by calling for moderation and a 
cautionary use of hyperbole.195  Thus, figures and tropes like hyperbole are viewed 
positively within the secular and sacred humanist rhetorics of the Renaissance, but 
moderation is still encouraged to inhibit its excesses.  Hyperbole is still distrusted for its 
de-stabilizing, paradoxical, and ambiguous rhetorical power, and it remains a contentious 
term. 
 Beyond the Renaissance, a distrust of hyperbole is particularly present through the 
development of Ramism, which has a significant effect on Continental philosophers and 
rhetoricians of the Enlightenment.  Influenced by Agricola, Ramus separates rhetoric 
from dialectic by absorbing decorum and style, including amplificatio, into a dialectical 
structure thereby viewing rhetoric as only the ornamentation of tropes and figures.196  
Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes share a similar distrust of excessive ornamentation,197 
though Descartes utilizes the function of hyperbole through “hyperbolic doubt” for his 
system of thought.198  Bacon views rhetoric positively and as a great art, but he separates 
                                                
194 Religious extremism was a significant concern, and those like the “metaphysical” preachers 
were often accused of “vain showmanship for their extravagant use of figures of speech.”  See Webb, 
Divine Voice, 123. 
 
195 For example, Lamy writes of hyperbole, “We say more than we intend, for fear we should say 
less.  But these kind of Expressions are to be used with great caution and decorum:  We must have a care 
that there be always a proportion betwixt the natural Idea of the Trope, and the thing we would explain; 
otherwise the Hearer may misunderstand, and take one thing for another.”  Lamy, Art of Speaking, 87-88. 
 
196 Ong, Ramus, 212. 
 
197 Conley, Rhetoric in the European Tradition, 162-176. 
 
198 “Hyperbolic Doubt is doubt taken-to-the limit, doubt in excess of everyday uncertainty and 
anxiety about what to believe.”  See Catherine Wilson, Descartes’s Meditions:  An Introduction 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2003), 51.  Arriving at what is true requires hyperbolic doubt as 
excessive doubt about all that is known or believed.  It requires an extreme distrust.  Hyperbole itself is not 
distrusted, but it is a tool used to heighten distrust. 
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invention from rhetoric, though he is not a Ramist.199  Bacon also opposes the excessive 
ornamentation utilized by Ciceronians of his day,200 and he favors using hyperbole only 
when speaking about love.201  In favor of reason, scientific Skepticism, the Cartesian 
method, and ideal scientific discourse, those like the “enthusiasts,” for example, are 
critiqued for their ‘unclear and overblown language.”202   
In addition, the sacramental view of language is rejected by those philosophers 
like Locke and Hume (an admirer of Demosthenes)203 because words are viewed as signs 
of things and not the things themselves embodied in language.  Language is seen as 
imprecise and cannot convey knowledge accurately.204  In fact, Locke’s and Hume’s 
epistemology is derived from sense perceptions (not testimony or revelation) as 
independent of language, which is the opposite view of a sacramental theory of language 
                                                
199 Bizzell, The Rhetorical Tradition, 737.  For example, Bacon’s The Advancement of Learning 
(1605) is a critique of Ramism.  See Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, 255. 
 
200 Ibid., 738. 
 
201 He writes, “It is a strange thing to note the excess of this passion, and how it braves the nature 
and value of things, by this; that the speaking in a perpetual hyperbole is comely in nothing but in love.”  
See Francis Bacon, “Of Love,” in Essays, Civil and Moral, The Harvard Classics, 
<http://www.bartleby.com/3/1/10.html> (25 November 2009), my emphasis. 
 
202 Conley, Rhetoric in the European Tradition, 168, my emphasis.  Critiquing “enthusiasts” was a 
way to contain religious extremism and exuberance that many believed resulted in irrationality and passion.  
In England, silencing enthusiasts was a way to “stifle the extremes of both Protestantism and Catholicism 
in favor of the rule of reason and temperance.  This preference for temperance and a renewed interest in 
science created an overall climate of resisting anything excessive – in the words of Bacon, anything “high 
flown and forward fancy.”  Enthusiasm, which was a caricature of the prophetic and occasional form of 
Protestant preaching, was thus attacked by Enlightenment philosophers for its religious exuberance.  See 
Webb, Divine Voice, 120-2. 
 
203 In Of Eloquence (1743), Hume would bemoan the lack of eloquence in his time.  Adam Potkay 
also notes Hume’s regret and his desire to salvage the power of Demosthenes.  He suggests that Hume’s 
fascination with Demosthenes was his utilization of eloquence “to bind people through a virtuous – and 
secular – appeal to their collective passions.”  See Adam Potkay, The Fate of Eloquence in the Age of 
Hume (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1994), 160. 
 
204 Bizzell, The Rhetorical Tradition, 814-815. 
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that considers knowledge and faith to be an outward expression of an inward experience 
and knowledge derived from God.   
In response, Giambattista Vico argues against Cartesian philosophy and in favor 
of rhetoric as a superior philosophy of knowledge.205  However, he is the first to create 
the concept of the “four master tropes,” later echoed by Hayden White and Kenneth 
Burke, and he excludes hyperbole from this conception thereby implying that it is a trope 
of lesser importance; 206 even linking hyperbole at one point to the thoughts of children as 
did Aristotle.207  Interestingly, it is Kantian philosophy that offers the most productive 
use for hyperbole in the Enlightenment, but it is only implied since he has little regard for 
rhetoric.208   
Those in the Scottish Enlightenment did reflect rhetorically on hyperbole briefly, 
though they simply took the negative rather than the positive Greco-Roman view 
regarding hyperbole, i.e., they distrust its excessive force and/or equate it with vice.  
Hugh Blair, for example, dismisses hyperbole suggesting that only young people and 
those with lively imaginations use it profusely – by lively imagination, Blair means 
“Orientals” and those he perceives as belonging to lesser developed cultures than 
Europeans.209  He states that hyperboles are difficult to manage, a resource of an author 
                                                
205 Ibid., 862 and Conley, Rhetoric in the European Tradition, 199. 
 
206 Brian Vickers, “The Atrophy of Modern Rhetoric, Vico to De Man,” Rhetorica 6, no. 1 (1988), 
28. 
 
207 See Benedetto Croce, The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico (Piscataway:  Transaction 
Publishers, 2002), 223. 
 
208 Conley, Rhetoric in the European Tradition, 244-5.  Hyperbole is implied in Kant’s theory of 
beauty and the sublime as well as his explication of excess as either magnitude (the mathematical sublime) 
or power (the dynamic sublime). 
 
209 Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (BiblioLife, 2009), 170. 
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of a feeble mind, and must be used with caution.210  Although he has a negative view of 
hyperbole, he does note its frequency of use, and he observes that “our common forms of 
compliment are almost all of them extravagant Hyperboles.”211  In addition, Blair often 
conflates the sublime with hyperbole, George Campbell discusses hyperbole only in 
passing,212 Richard Whately does not discuss hyperbole explicitly but refers to excesses 
and vices,213 and John Henry Newman equates an excess of emotions with sin.214   
 Overall, Renaissance writers are positively inclined to use hyperbole in their 
writing, and they find it a productive trope in epistemological terms.  They are concerned 
with the transcendent and the supra-rational, and they use hyperbole to explore the 
“beyond” of language and the plasticity of meaning.  Unlike the rhetorical theological 
theories of Latin and medieval rhetorics, hyperbole in the Renaissance is explicitly 
referenced, defined, and its function is extensively examined.  It is not denigrated or 
misused, but it is inhibited for its unbridled excessiveness.  In the Enlightenment, rhetoric 
and hyperbole are viewed negatively, and these concepts are often equated with religion, 
irrationality, and the “fairer sex.”  A revolution in thinking about language and 
knowledge occurs, and there is little place for excess in the new scientific paradigm.  A 
very different view of hyperbole occurs within Romanticism via the sublime. 
                                                
210 Ibid., 170-1. 
 
211 Ibid., 170. 
 
212 George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (Forgotten Books, 2009). 
 
213 Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric (Central European University Press, 2009). 
 
214 John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (Adamant Media Corporation, 
2004), 415. 
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HYPERBOLE IN ROMANTICISM AND CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC 
 
What is important to note about Romanticism is that the overall tone of 
Romanticism leading into post-Romantic and contemporary theoretical discourse lends 
itself to a constructive development of a theory of hyperbole because of the tendency to 
exaggerate or offer extreme assertions, e.g., about the sublime.  The penchant for excess 
in Romanticism heavily influences the thought of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  
Rudolf Otto’s mysterium tremendum et fascinans as well as the ethical positions of 
Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas are often hyperbolic, and much postmodern and 
poststructuralist discourse is also hyperbolic.  For example, such concepts as différance, 
the trace, dissemination, the more, alterity, aporia, heterology, expenditure without 
reserve, and Dasein215 all exhibit hyperbolic characteristics.   
A “present absence” or an “absent presence” are equally hyperbolic because these 
assertions break the bounds of language and reasoning proper, they throw beyond thought 
and language in order to arrive at an alternate version of “reality” or “truth.”  In this 
sense, hyperbole is similar to the “double death” of Maurice Blanchot, “death as 
possibility and as impossibility.”216  Indeed, the “possibility of impossibility” and the 
“impossibility of possibility” are common hyperboles in postmodern as well as pre-
modern discourse, e.g., Seneca and Quintilian, though the epistemological 
presuppositions in each are often significantly different.  Hyperbole’s very function is to 
                                                
215 Heidegger discusses “Dasein” as something that has been thrown, an existing that is a 
thrownness.  In Heidegger’s precise sense, then, hyperbole could be construed as the excessive “not,” or 
“negativity,” which is constitutive of Dasein’s thrownness – the “care,” the “Being-the-basis of a 
negativity).  Being, then, is a hyperbolic endeavor to throw beyond itself, which is never completed, never 
arrives. 
 
216 Suzanne Guerlac, The Impersonal Sublime:  Hugo, Baudelaire, Lautreamont (Stanford:  
Stanford University Press, 1990), 67. 
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assert the impossible to arrive at the possible while knowing full well the impossible is 
not possible, but the possible must always strive towards and move through the 
impossible.  Postmodern theorists often make these hyper-qualified hyperbolic statements 
without actually exploring hyperbole explicitly.  They prefer, instead, to pursue 
explications of irony and catachresis.  On the other hand, Romantic writers as well as 
contemporary discussions about Romantic writers, offer explorations of hyperbole that 
are more abundant, e.g., “vertige de l’hyperbole” of Victor Hugo. 
In this section, I will briefly note the interaction between hyperbole and the 
sublime within Romanticism, and I will explore conceptions of hyperbole in 
contemporary rhetorical theory.  I will not explore these time periods extensively because 
I will explicate their theoretical insights into excess and hyperbole in the next chapter. 
 ROMANTIC HYPERBOLE 
 
In the late eighteenth century a reaction to Enlightenment philosophies comes in 
the form of Romanticism.  Wordsworth and Coleridge are noted to be the founders of 
Romanticism, and hyperbole is often employed within their writing.  There is no 
specificly extended theory of hyperbole that develops during Romanticism, but the uses 
of hyperbole during this time cluster around the sublime, which is also popular during the 
Renaissance, through the writing of Longinus.  On the Sublime was translated into 
French by Nicolas Boileau-Despreaux in 1674 along with Boileau’s essays on the 
sublime.  From discussions of the sublime and the aesthetics of the Renaissance, an 
aesthetic theory of Romanticism developed, largely influenced by the writing of Edmund 
Burke217 and his discussion of the sublime in terms of terror.218 
                                                
217 Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, 264-5. 
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 The sublime itself has a contentious history, and it is beyond the scope of this 
study to note all of the possible influences of hyperbole during Romanticism since the 
sublime (via hyperbole) affected art, literature, musical composition, poetry, and 
architecture.  Suffice it to say, the hyperbolic pursuit of the sublime, the ideal, and the 
absolute are similar to the sacred rhetorics in their search for divine transcendence.  If 
language is the outward expression of an inward devotion to and reflection on God in 
Christian humanist rhetoric, then the same is true for the Romantics.  The difference is 
that instead of seeking “God,” the Romantics seek the authentic expression of inner 
individuality, sense perception, and the imagination through their own interior sacred 
power.219   
The clear distinction between the sacred rhetorics, really all of rhetoric, and 
Romanticism is not just its object of study.  Whereas the sacred rhetorics are concerned 
with communicating their experiences to an audience they seek to move towards 
conversion and/or persuasion, the Romantics are focused wholly inward and are little 
concerned with planned discourse and moving others’ will through reason and passion.220  
“The supersensible becomes the [inner, individual] medium for the supernatural.”221  
                                                                                                                                            
 
218 Theologically, this connection can be viewed in the writings of those like Karl Barth and 
Rudolph Otto, e.g., mysterium tremendum et fascinans. 
 
219 The Romantics pursued the “proliferating cross-sensory or intersensory metaphors in an 
attempt to express the sublimity of a perception that transcends the limits of rational thought.”  See Webb, 
Divine Voice, 234.  Holderlin, for example, contains a theme of excess that erupts from an inner fullness 
and transgresses one’s own limits.  See Paul de Man, The Rhetoric of Romanticism (Columbia:  Columbia 
University Press, 1984), 61. 
 
220 For further discussion of the excessive interiority in Romanticism, see Joshua Wilner, Feeding 
on Infinity:  Readings in the Romantic Rhetoric of Internalization (Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2000). 
 
221 Webb, Divine Voice, 234. 
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Interiority, one’s sense perceptions, is the medium – not oratory.222  Although many 
Romantics often ignore the rhetorical aspect of the sublime, those in the Renaissance are 
fascinated with its rhetorical function, e.g., the “Hyperbolic Sublime” of Prideaux in 
Christian preaching and theology.   
Despite all of the disagreements regarding the sublime and Longinus’s intentions 
about the sublime during Romanticism,223 what is important here is the rhetorical 
function of hyperbole and its interaction with the sublime.  A theory of hyperbole is 
rarely developed at length in relation to the sublime, the two terms are often conflated, 
and rhetoric, in fact, is not viewed positively by Romantic writers.  What does occur is a 
link between hyperbole and discussions of “dream,” “astonishment,” “terror,” and the 
                                                
222 Theologically speaking, Romanticism fostered an eschatological vision that privileged emotion, 
enthusiasms, and other-worldly visions of heaven, i.e., the sublime and/as the ideal, rather than the bodily 
expression of the gospel, which is evidenced in America during the Awakenings of the nineteenth century 
as well as the character of conservative and fundamentalist, evangelical rhetoric and worship in the 
twentieth century.  However, Romanticism would also displace apocalyptic millennial discourse somewhat 
by moving the focus of its teleology from the drama of history to the interiority of the individual self – 
“faith in an apocalypse by imagination and cognition.”  See Wilner, Feeding on Infinity, 15. 
On a different note, it is extremely fascinating that the Awakenings of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries as well as conservative and fundamentalist, evangelical rhetoric in the twentieth century 
purported to privilege the Word over all else while actually seeking to move the audience’s emotions 
regardless of the content of the sermon.  As long as shared beliefs, e.g., doctrines or Christian 
“fundamentals,” are implied in the contractual agreement between speaker and audience, it matters very 
little what the preacher actually offers in terms of content or substantive argument.  What the audiences 
wanted, and want, was a feeling of emotional transport, perhaps the “entrancement” described by Longinus.  
Just as many interpret Longinus as abandoning logos for pathos, so did many of the sermons of the 
Awakenings as well as the evangelical rhetoric of the twentieth century.  Many sermons in both movements 
also relied heavily upon hyperbolic claims rather than logical argumentation in order to achieve their 
oratorical, emotive goals. 
 For further discussion of doctrinal agreement between speaker and audience, see Roderick P. Hart, 
“The Rhetoric of the True Believer,” Speech Monographs 38, no. 4 (1971) :  249-262; though Hart comes 
to different conclusions as to how doctrinal rhetoric is utilized. 
 
223 Some like Samuel Monk, Matthew Arnold, and Benedetto Croce insist that the sublime is 
actually beyond definition.  Interpretations of Longinus are also highly disputed.  Some thought Longinus’s 
hupsous (literally “height”) referred only to a heightened rhetorical style that was a practical concern for 
rhetoricians proper in order to, as Longinus says, reveal a speaker’s power and gain fame – a political 
consideration rather than an aesthetic one.  Others, like Wordsworth, thought Longinus’s theory 
foreshadowed Romanticism in its belief that emotional intensity and irrational appeal were the definitive 
indicators of great literature.  For further discussion, see Louis Wirth Marvick, Mallarme and the Sublime 
(Albany:  State University of New York Press, 1986). 
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Romantic sublime, including the religious sublime.224  The use and defense of hyperbole 
is pervasive, e.g., in Baudelaire and Hugo.225  Hyperbole is the vehicle, both 
ontologically and epistemologically, for the sublime.  In this sense, hyperbole is a 
redemptive figure for Romantic writers.226  Hyperbole is “the trace of a movement 
towards the ideal.”227  Whether this ideal can ever be communicated is a heated debate 
for Romantic theorists like Samuel Johnson, but certainly the most obvious trope for this 
task is hyperbole in its attempt to make the incredible seem credible, i.e., to translate the 
ineffable into language. 
 Through a defense of hyperbole, one of the predominant characteristics of 
Romantic writers is the connection and conflation of hyperbole with the sublime.  Louis 
Wirth Marvick, like Longinus, fears this blending of hyperbole with the sublime, and he 
suggests that hyperbole must be regulated by irony so the hearer is able to recognize 
hyperbole as hyperbolic.  Marvick asserts that Romantic writers tend to forget that the 
hyperbole is not the ideal, and carried away by emotions, they take the hyperbole literally 
                                                
224 For example, Jean-Pierre Mileur writes, “Dream is for the nineteenth century that 
representation of literary hyperbole which, in our own time, has been taken over by difficulty.”  See Mileur, 
The Critical Romance, 33. 
 
225 For example, see Guerlac, Impersonal Sublime. 
 
226 Hans Kellner writes about romanticism, particularly in France, “Hyperbole became the 
redemptive figure.  Its gestures of excess indicate that the explanatory structures of analogy are challenged, 
that compromises will not hold, and that incommensurability marks the broken relations of individual and 
history.”  See Ewa Domanska and Hans Kellner, eds., Re-Figuring Hayden White (Stanford University 
Press, 2009), 218. 
 
227 Marvick, Mallarme, 56.  Marvick further asserts, “For unlike every other means of adding a 
formal significance to discourse, the use of hyperbole is intended to take us, not just away from the literal, 
but to the ideal.  It is not merely a gesture but a displacement” (57). 
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rather than figuratively.  Rather than noting the distance between the ideal and the real, 
many Romantics cannot distinguish hyperbole from truth.228   
Other Romantic theorists like Harold Bloom also view hyperbole in terms of 
sublime representation, and he sees hyperbole as an emptying out of metonymy.229  
Suzanne Guerlac notes hyperbole’s connection to the sublime as well, but not in such 
negative or overt terms as Marvick.  She even suggests that criticism is praise (panegyric) 
through exaggeration (hyperbole) of the critical term, which Jean-Pierre Mileur also 
suggests when he says that difficulty arises as a kind of hyperbole that is the medium of 
the critic’s existence.230  Discussing the sublime in Hugo’s writing, Guerlac asserts, 
“Hyperbole speaks a double language…It overstates…Hyperbole is intensive…it 
operates as a figure through its intensification of the literal, its maximization of it,” but 
she continues, “The maximum is nonliteral, nondemonstrable, at the limit.”231  As noted 
previously of theological discourse, hyperbolic assertions comprise discussions of the 
ideal.  In a similar though distinct move from both Marvick and Guerlac, Paul de Man 
suggests that irony actually tends towards hyperbole.  Discussing Baudelaire, he posits 
that irony often begins as litotes and moves towards the absolute through and beyond 
                                                
228 Marvick, Mallarme, 52. 
 
229 Peter de Bolla, Harold Bloom:  Towards Historical Rhetorics (New York:  Routledge, 1988), 
29. 
 
230 Mileur, The Critical Romance, 11.  Mileur is, in fact, one Romantic theorist who attempts to 
develop a theory of hyperbole on its own terms (discussed further in chapter three). 
 
231 Guerlac, Impersonal Sublime, 65-66.  In this sense, her observation is similar to Perelman and 
Tyteca’s view of hyperbole as operating in an argument of unlimited development (discussed below).  
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hyperbole, and he suggests that irony is the “unrelieved vertige” of “vertige de 
l’hyperbole” (Baudelaire’s phrase).232   
From Romanticism, it is again evident that hyperbole has a contentious history.  
Viewed to possess a significantly positive function in Romantic writing through its 
connection to the sublime, hyperbole is still misconstrued and conflated with the sublime.  
Romantic writers and theorists both delimit and explore the ambiguity and paradox of 
hyperbole as a critical trope.  As Mileur notes of this complexity, “Hyperbole challenges 
its own identity as a trope – at times, it seems to harden into a characteristic of language; 
at other times, it seems to describe a movement of consciousness, to constitute a 
subject.”233  This protean and amorphous quality of hyperbole is tentatively explored in 
contemporary theory, and it is to contemporary rhetorical theory that I now turn. 
HYPERBOLE IN CONTEMPORARY RHETORICAL THEORY 
 
 I will finish this chapter by examining the few discussions of hyperbole in 
twentieth and twenty-first century rhetorical theory.  Although many philosophers, 
philologists, theologians, and theoreticians outside the field of rhetorical theory briefly 
examine or utilize excess in their arguments – Mikhail Bakhtin, Søren Kierkegaard, Karl 
Barth, Rudolf Otto, Mark C. Taylor, Willard R. Espy,234 Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul 
                                                
232 Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight:  Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, vol. 7 
of Theory and History of Literature, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 215.  See 
also Jean-Pierre Mileur, “Allegory and Irony:  ‘The Rhetoric of Temporality’ Re-Examined,” Comparative 
Literature 38, no. 4 (1986) :  329-336.  
 
233 Mileur, The Critical Romance, 74. 
 
234 Espy even writes a poem to hyperbole:  “Hyperbole speaks not amiss. / Though she may seem 
to overstate, / It’s just her way of emphasis. / She signs, ‘I perish for your kiss.’ / That’s not exactly so – but 
wait; / Hyperbole speaks not amiss,” and proceeding to the end of the poem, “Yet she speaks not in artifice; 
/ Her words do not dissimulate. / Hyperbole speaks not amiss - / It’s just her way of emphasis.”  See 
Willard R. Espy, The Garden of Eloquence:  A Rhetorical Bestiary (New York:  Harper & Row, Publishers, 
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Ricoeur, Christopher D. Johnson, Jacques Derrida, Slavoj Zizek, Jean-Luc Marion, Paul 
de Man, among many others who I will discuss further in following chapters – the focus 
here is on hyperbole within rhetorical theory.235  Despite hyperbole’s common use – 
“Hyperbole is so steadily droned into our ears that most of us have ceased to think of it as 
a figure of speech”236 – few rhetorical theorists and critics endeavor to explore the form 
and function of hyperbole on its own terms.  Instead, they opt simply to dismiss it as 
unimportant, a lie, of little value, or an aspect of metaphor and irony.237  Marvick writes 
of hyperbole’s low standing, “If twentieth century critics have not appreciated the full 
meaning of hyperbole, it is doubtless because they have clung too tenaciously to their 
ability to see through it.”238  With a few exceptions, the rhetorical critics and theorists 
who examine hyperbole do not develop a theory of hyperbole, view it negatively and 
with reservations, or so benign as not to warrant attention, which again highlights the 
contentious history of hyperbole. 
For example, Edward P. J. Corbett cautions the use of hyperbole with restraint, 
but he also posits that inventing new hyperboles can “produce the right note of 
                                                                                                                                            
1983), 98.  He defines hyperbole as “the boldest figure of rhetoric,” and it “enables us to describe what 
otherwise would be beyond description” (98). 
 
235 A discussion of hyperbole in this wider disciplinary sense will be addressed in chapter three. 
 
236 See Corbett, Classical Rhetoric, 452.  Noting hyperbole’s prevalence in our society, Corbett, 
like Aristotle and others, links it to adolescence, which is another way of dismissing it.  Likewise, in 
communication studies, advertisers are often distrusted, and connecting hyperbole to advertisers is a way of 
showing distrust for hyperbole as well. 
 
237 For example, in the Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, Hienrich F. Plett defines hyperbole:  “It is 
mostly a kind of metaphor or allegory that raises the referential object beyond probability.”  See Hienrich 
F. Plett, “Hyperbole,” in Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, ed. Thomas O. Sloane (Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 364.  Surprisingly, Arthur Quinn leaves hyperbole and even amplification completely out of 
his popular book, Figures of Speech:  60 Ways to Turn a Phrase (New York:  Routledge, 2009). 
 
238 Marvick, Mallarme, 60. 
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emphasis…or humor.”239  Richard A. Lanham offers a pithy, though insightful, entry on 
hyperbole defining it as “exaggerated or extravagant terms used for emphasis and not 
intended to be understood literally; self-conscious exaggeration.”240  James Jasinski, in 
Sourcebook on Rhetoric, places the entry for hyperbole under the broad entry on style.  
He utilizes Robert J. Fogelin’s portrayal of hyperbole as “a moment of excessive 
exaggeration”241 and also links it to conspiracy theories.  The subtle shift here is from a 
trope to a “moment,” which places a greater importance on hyperbole because it indicates 
a significant moment within discourse rather than a passing rhetorical flourish for effect.  
Indeed, Fogelin’s entry on hyperbole in Argumentation portrays hyperbole in a positive 
way.  He writes of hyperbole, “Here I say something stronger than what I have a right to 
say with the intention of having it corrected away from the extreme, but still to something 
strong that preserves the same polarity.”242  Here is Seneca’s and Quintilian’s definition 
again.  Fogelin also considers hyperbole, as well as irony and meiosis, to be figurative 
modes of discourse with the intent of offering a corrective judgment non-literally and 
indirectly.243  Fogelin’s view of hyperbole is quite positive, and describing it as a 
figurative mode of discourse elevates hyperbole’s status from a tropical ornament. 
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240 Richard A. Lanham, A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms, 2nd ed. (Berkeley:  University of 
California Press, 1991), 86. 
 
241 James Jasinski, Sourcebook on Rhetoric:  Key Concepts in Contemporary Rhetorical Studies 
(Thousand Oaks:  Sage Publications, 2001), 549. 
 
242 Robert J. Fogelin, “Some Figures of Speech,” in Argumentation:  Across the Lines of 
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The authors of The New Rhetoric posit a more complex view of hyperbole and 
offer a longer though terse discussion of hyperbole.  Their brief but dense section on an 
argument of unlimited development includes hyperbole and litotes within it and requires 
some explication.  Unlimited development, quite literally, is an argument that proceeds in 
a direction without limit, an argument towards infinity, and it is structured hierarchically.  
An ideal term, or “god term,”244 is posited as unrealizable, and the terms below that ideal 
term are utilized to describe and push towards the ideal term in an excessive way.  
Unchecked, the argument goes beyond reason.  Paradoxically, the ultimate term is not the 
center of the argument and not the term the audience is interested in hearing.  It is those 
certain terms that fall short of the ultimate term that are actually being debated.245  
Hyperboles are the terms at the center of the argument. 
As a term of unlimited development, hyperbole serves an important function.  The 
indictment of the argument by unlimited development is that it is impossible to proceed 
indefinitely in the direction indicated because it dead-ends at an absolute thereby making 
any further progress untenable.246  Hyperbole serves to regulate this development.  It 
gives a direction to thought through a “shock” that is “fired with brutality,” which intends 
to give an indication of the ultimate term.247  Hyperbole exploits the weakness of the 
argument of unlimited development by offering a self-reflexive check on infinity.  It 
delimits the limitlessness of unlimited development.  Hyperbole aims at unlimited 
                                                
244 The authors do not use this term, but they are describing Burke’s and Weaver’s notions of “god 
terms.” 
 
245 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, 290. 
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development, and it always has a purpose, which is to point towards the ultimate term 
without going beyond it to the point of absurdity.  Hyperbole asserts the impossible to 
arrive at the possible.   
This is, in fact, one way theology operates.  If one were to make an unqualified 
statement that God is inscrutable, then theology would end with that statement.248  The 
incomprehensibility of God must be modified by the qualifier of hyperbole because the 
ultimate term can only be debated through the limiting effect of hyperbole, i.e., asserting 
the impossible (God) to arrive at the possible (statements about God).  Hence, in this 
view, theology is contingent upon hyperbole as a qualifier of theology’s intent.  For 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, hyperbole is the cautionary figure that inhibits the 
unlimited development of an argument thereby serving a positive function.249 
However, relegating hyperbole to an argument of unlimited development limits 
the scope of hyperbole.  Always equating hyperbole with the ideal also limits its critical 
range.  Marvick, Guerlac, and Perelman and Olbrects-Tyteca restrain hyperbole within 
the purview of unlimited development and the ideal because, outside of these limits, 
hyperbole may become “too wild and unrestrained.”250  Webb, another contemporary 
theorist of hyperbole as well as a theologian, offers a critique of this view by suggesting 
that limiting hyperbole also limits its potential.  Releasing hyperbole’s extreme 
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249 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca also note that the opposite of hyperbole is litotes, and they 
suggest that litotes can become irony.  Ibid., 291-2.  Combined with Marvick’s and de Man’s conclusions 
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possibilities, it need not “further an argument of unlimited development; instead it can 
serve to end all arguments, to freeze all developments.”251  This is an extreme position to 
take, and it oversteps the functions of hyperbole.  It is not that hyperbole ends all 
arguments but transforms them into other ways of perceiving the world.  As we saw in 
the Renaissance, it is a playful trope that expands meaning.  Freezing all developments is 
actually what occurs in the argument of unlimited development, i.e., the argument ends at 
the ultimate term.  Hyperbole is what prevents this from occurring.  While I agree that 
hyperbole need not be limited to the ideal, the conclusion Webb reaches also limits the 
function of hyperbole by forcing functions onto hyperbole it does not possess. 
Webb is an interesting author because of his work in rhetoric as well as theology, 
and he can be credited with offering the most extensive theory of hyperbole in 
contemporary theological and rhetorical discourse.  Although he is a theologian and not a 
rhetorician, his work merits attention.  He traces hyperbole through Karl Barth, Søren 
Kierkegaard, Georges Bataille, Friedrich Nietzsche, Flannery O’Conner, Emmanuel 
Levinas, and G. K. Chesterton.  Webb’s project is to connect hyperbole to theology and 
argue that theology relies on hyperbole to function effectively.  This is a commendable 
endeavor since (rhetorical) theologians, e.g., Paul Ricoeur and David Tracy, often discuss 
the excess of God, the excessive gift of grace, and the excessive sacrifice of Christ 
through metaphor and analogy without discussing the function of hyperbole within these 
arguments.  Webb’s insights into hyperbole, though often inaccurate or perhaps over-
zealous, are helpful for understanding how hyperbole might be utilized in contemporary 
rhetorical theory. 
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He defines hyperbole as “a trope that beckons but also warns; it accomplishes an 
intensification that does not result in a metaphorical synthesis but brazenly both invites 
and distances the audience from the height of an apparently unreasonable position.”252  
This definition provides a constructive view of hyperbole, and it also fits into the overall 
characterization of hyperbole up to this point.  Yet, Webb often forces hyperbole into 
precarious positions it may not be able to occupy.  For example, Webb also argues, 
“Hyperbole allows one to say more than is strictly appropriate to the expectations set by 
the subject matter, the speaker, and the situation.”253  Contrary to much of hyperbole’s 
rhetorical history, Webb asserts that hyperbole violates decorum, which is the same 
accusation theorists who view hyperbole negatively make.  The attempt to inhibit 
hyperbole historically occurs through decorum, but a decorum of excess is often utilized 
to allow for the productive use of hyperbole in thought and language.   
Webb also writes, “Hyperbole vertiginously suspends the logic of language, and 
therein lies the origin of its danger and power.” 254  Hyperbole simply does not suspend 
the logic of language, nor is this the origin of its power.  As shown in this chapter, 
hyperbole pushes the limitations of language and logical reasoning to a breaking point 
through its own critical illogical function in order to reveal the ineptitude of language and 
undermine logical argumentation, similar to Derrida’s notion of différance.  Hyperbole 
does not suspend the logic of language but asserts impossibilities as possibilities and 
possibilities as impossibilities to push language beyond its own limitations.  It actually 
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heightens the logic of language in order to undermine it.  Thus, Webb’s contributions are 
numerous, but his conclusions about hyperbole are often tenuous in ways that deflate his 
overall argument. 
Outside of the realm of rhetorical theology, contemporary rhetorical theorists and 
critics often examine and utilize the form and function of hyperbole but do not discuss it 
explicitly or even acknowledge its existence.  For example, the “enthusiasms” of the 
Awakenings are analyzed by rhetorical critics, “purple prose” is treated rhetorically, and 
“god terms” and ideographs are important rhetorical contributions that have not delved 
into the ways hyperbole actually enables those terms to function effectively.  Fantasy 
theme analysis could benefit from a theory of hyperbole (perhaps renewing its 
usefulness), conspiracy theories are examined (sometimes noting hyperbole’s uses), and 
prophetic and apocalyptic discourse as well as Christian fundamentalist rhetoric is 
extensively explored without a mention of the obvious hyperbolic nature of those 
discourses through their tautology and eschatological teleology.  Even the brilliant 
analysis of Joe McCarthy’s “fantastic moment” is discussed in hyperbolic terms without 
addressing hyperbole at all.  Additionally, the hyperbolic assertions of postmodern and 
poststructuralist discourse regarding language, subjectivity, alterity, hospitality, and 
sacrifice are adopted for rhetorical purposes without noting their most significant 
rhetorical function, i.e., exaggeration.255  Most confounding of all, epideictic discourse is 
                                                
255 Allan Megill is one current writer to note the significance of exaggeration in postmodern and 
structuralist/poststructuralist discourse.  His extensive analysis of Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger, and 
Derrida offers a much needed alternative reading of these writers.  See Allan Megill, Prophets of 
Extremity:  Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1985).  
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Mileur, The Critical Romance, esp. 73-126.  Additionally, De Bolla states, “Derrida’s keenest insight, in 
my judgment, is that ‘writing is unthinkable without repression,’ which is to identify writing-as-such with 
the daemonizing trope of hyperbole.”  See De Bolla, Harold Bloom, 51. 
  128       
extensively explored without ever mentioning its most vital and historically foundational 
trope.   
There are also numerous expressions of hyperbole in popular culture and 
language, but these expressions are not examined rhetorically from a hyperbolic 
perspective.256  Noted above, one could interpret the Awakenings as hyperbolic 
expressions of “enthusiasms.”  One might even suggest that Jonathan Edwards’s “Sinners 
in the Hand of an Angry God” is an example of an intentionally hyperbolic sermon.  
Other examples of hyperbole in popular culture might include the “tall tales” of the 
American West, the political commentary of Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert, the 
comedy of Brian Regan, the exaggerated tactics of advertisements, certain elements in 
science fiction literature/film, the heavy metal music genre where everything is 
exaggerated, the comic book genre that often relies solely on hyperbole, and “end times” 
or apocalyptic discourse, which is almost entirely hyperbolic.  These and other examples 
of hyperbole’s absence in rhetorical theory and criticism serve to highlight the lack of 
hyperbolic analyses in contemporary rhetorical theory and criticism thereby revealing the 
inherent distrust or off hand dismissal of hyperbole as an unimportant trope that is 
unworthy of attention.  Of course, the very tradition of rhetoric largely distrusts and 
dismisses hyperbole, and it is not considered one of the “master tropes” originally posited 
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by Vico.  Contemporary theorists and critics can hardly be blamed for the centuries-old 
ambiguous and paradoxical perception of hyperbole, but it is time to begin exploring 
hyperbole in new ways that offers productive insights into rhetorical “texts” and theories.   
CONCLUSION 
 
 In this historical overview, the rich and contentious history of hyperbole is 
evident.  Throughout much of its history, hyperbole is distrusted and/or dismissed as an 
insignificant trope that serves no critical tropological function within language and 
discourse.  There are numerous times when hyperbole is viewed in a positive way, but 
even then, caution is suggested when using the trope.  Overall, the form and function of 
hyperbole assigned to it by Greco-Roman rhetorical theorists, especially Quintilian, is 
simply repeated by later rhetorical theorists, and the protean form of hyperbole as an 
embodied excessive vice is warned against for its deviation from the ideal of moderation.  
The synecdochal connection between language and being is an important concern of 
rhetorical theorists and rhetorical theologians, but this important ontological function of 
hyperbole is typically not discussed positively, e.g., embodied hyperbole as sin or vice.  
The epistemological fluidity and playfulness of hyperbole is utilized more predominantly, 
but it is still resisted or inhibited in favor of a more stable system of meaning and being.  
In sum, hyperbole has never shed the tone of suspicion derived from its de-stabilizing 
effects. 
 From this historical overview, one gets a sense of the typical characteristics of 
hyperbole even if attitudes about it differ.  It is regarded with caution because of its 
excess, but this aspect of hyperbole is often viewed as useful.  It is accused of violating 
decorum, and it is also used to constitute its own decorum of excess, which often places it 
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into the categories of epideictic discourse and the grand style.  To establish a decorum of 
excess, hyperbolic excess is often divided into a binary of excess where one type of 
excess – extravagant hyperbole, sin, or sophistic eloquence – is negative and the other 
type of excess – elegant hyperbole, divine excess, or Christian ornament and sacred 
eloquence – is positive.  Hyperbole is also sometimes confused with the impossible or the 
ideal, which places hyperbole in the precarious position of a term that is easily conflated 
with other terms.  In addition, hyperbole is typically understood to be a lie on the side of 
truth, though it is also considered simply a lie by some. 
Perhaps the most important and misunderstood function of hyperbole, it is also its 
most re-interpreted function.  For Seneca and Quintilian, hyperbole’s deceit is figural, but 
its effects are literal and hermeneutically advantageous.  For many other theorists and 
theologians, hyperbole’s deceit is moral, and its effect is corruption.  Yet, the figural 
deceit is simply the function of all tropes to offer alternative ways of perceiving the 
world.  Hyperbole, however, heightens this function, which makes it a tenuous and 
distrusted trope for its audacious assertions.  Significantly, hyperbole is most vehemently 
resisted when it is literally half-understood.  Hyperbole is often rejected as a lie, which is 
only partly true, because it is a lie on the side of truth.  It is not a falsehood intended to 
deceive but a pretense intended to reveal a larger truth, an alternative truth, and in this 
sense, hyperbole is a redemptive figure.  Misunderstanding this aspect of hyperbole leads 
one to mis-perceive it as only a lie, but understanding its overall redemptive function 
allows one to (mis)recognize that the lie is intended to reveal other truths as well as 
correctives in judgment.  Overall, the most consistent claims made of hyperbole are that it 
should be regarded with fear (the implicit claim) and suspicion (the explicit claim). 
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In order to offer a counterbalance to this fear and suspicion, I will explore the 
specific functions of hyperbole largely derived from its history in the following chapters.  
In chapter three I will examine the impossibility/possibility and truth/lie functions of 
hyperbole.  In chapter four I will explicate a disorientation/re-orientation meta-function 
of hyperbole.  I will argue that these are the three main functions of hyperbole that make 
it a critical trope for current theoretical discussion, and I will use the epideictic and 
grotesque genres to exemplify these claims. 
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CHAPTER 3:  THE IMPOSSIBLE LIE OF HYPERBOLE 
 
The historicity proper to philosophy is located and constituted in the transition, the 
dialogue between hyperbole and the finite structure, between that which exceeds the 
totality and the closed totality, in the difference between history and historicity, that is, in 
the place where, or rather at the moment when, the Cogito and all that it symbolizes here 
(madness, derangement, hyperbole, etc.) pronounce and reassure themselves then to fall, 
necessarily forgetting themselves until their reactivation, their reawakening in another 
statement of the excess which also later will become another decline and another crisis. 
Jacques Derrida 
 
When fascism comes to America, it will be wrapped in the flag and carrying the cross. 
Sinclair Lewis 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter I offered an exploration of the rich and contentious history 
of hyperbole, and from this survey, it is evident that hyperbole has clearly defined 
functions but is a highly contested trope that is sometimes celebrated as well as 
misapprehended and marginalized.  In contemporary rhetorical theory it receives neither 
the critical exploration nor the attention that other tropes like irony and metaphor are 
given, but it remains important for rhetorical discussion because of its theoretical 
contributions.  As Christopher D. Johnson writes, “The hyperbolist perceives an 
extraordinary, outrageous, ridiculous, or ineffable res (thing, event, feeling, idea), while 
his or her verba (words, speech, language) strain discursive limits, analogical 
frameworks, and literary and rhetorical conventions, to represent that res.”1  Here, 
Johnson highlights the importance for exploring hyperbole from its attempt to express the 
ineffable and extraordinary to its effect of stretching the limits of conventions and reason.  
All the while, this attempt is made despite the inadequacies of language and speech to 
                                                
1 Christopher D. Johnson, Hyperboles:  The Rhetoric of Excess in Baroque Literature and Thought 
(Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 2010), 2. 
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communicate such an incommunicable and incomprehensible res.  Thus, I will parse out 
the complexities and functions of hyperbole derived from its history in this chapter and 
the next and suggest various characteristics of this “master trope,” the “trope of tropes,”2 
in order to revive its importance as a critical tropological contribution to rhetorical theory 
and criticism. 
Gerard Genette poses a crucial question for hyperbole in his essay, “Hyperboles.”  
He asks, “Does not this hyperbolic mode of thought (wit) have its reasons, which 
commonsense ignores and which reason wishes to know?”3  The answer to this question 
may come in Genette’s own definition of hyperbole:  “One may call hyperboles the 
effects by which language…draws closer through contrast and discontinuity, as if by 
burglary, realities naturally far-removed.”4  Hyperbole holds extremities in tension.  It 
represents the extraordinary and attempts to force the audience beyond the literal into the 
realm of the figural.  It stretches the literal and maximizes it so that literal and figurative 
signification overlaps.5  The “reason” of hyperbole is to force one beyond the normality 
of conventional thought by bringing that which is contradictory into view.  “The same 
and the other are held together, ‘complicated,’ by hyperbole” because “Hyperbole speaks 
a double language…It overstates.”6  This complicated double language of contradiction, 
i.e., vertige de l’hyperbole, fosters transition.  More precisely, and aligned with Genette’s 
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assertion, hyperbole is a double-dealing gesture of “duplicity.”7  Driven to teach and to 
move, hyperbole is a double-cross for the purpose of transition, and this motive behind 
hyperbole occurs via three main functions. 
 The three tropological and figural functions of hyperbole I will explore in this and 
the following chapter are:  1) the relationship between impossibility and possibility, 2) a 
lie expressed on the side of truth, and 3) a disorientation leading to a re-orientation.  The 
first two are explicit functions given to hyperbole during its history, and I will explore 
these two functions in this chapter, which I will use as a structuring guide.  This will also 
illuminate the basic structure of hyperbole.   
The first function is derived from Demetrius’s, Quintilian’s, and Seneca’s 
discussions of hyperbole where the purpose of hyperbole is to move through the 
difficulty of impossibility and transition towards other as yet unrealized possibilities.  It is 
a play with epistemological and ontological assumptions that disrupts conventions and 
norms.  The second function comes largely from Quintilian’s complex theory of 
hyperbole where he argues that hyperbole is a lie but not one intended to deceive.  
Paradoxically, he portrays a hyperbolic lie that leads towards truth(s), and he offers 
hyperbole as a rich tool for epistemological inquiry.  In a sense, hyperbole is a self-
reflexive conceit, a mask, which unmasks the lie of the truth that only masquerades as the 
truth.  In each case, I will use the epideictic and grotesque genres as examples that 
highlight these functions of hyperbole.  I will use these genres to exemplify the functions 
                                                
7 “’Duplicity,’ which derives from the Latin duplicitas and is related to duplex, means doubleness, 
i.e., the state or quality of being numerically double or twofold…’Duplicity’ also means deceitful, 
deceptive, and double-dealing.  Like every outlaw, the floating signifier invariably double-crosses.”  See 
Mark C. Taylor, Erring:  A Postmodern A/Theology (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 
174. 
 
  135       
of hyperbole, and I will mainly use epideictic in this chapter and the grotesque in the next 
chapter, though there is definite overlap. 
 Epideictic is historically linked to hyperbole, and it is continually suggested by 
rhetorical theorists that this genre is where hyperbole belongs.  The grotesque is a 
conceptual realm where excess and exaggeration are repeatedly used without mention of 
hyperbole.  For each function of hyperbole, these two genres will serve to highlight the 
various functions of hyperbole.  The two genres each exemplify in their own way some 
critical aspect of hyperbole, and they share two persistent themes of hyperbole – 
contradiction and transition; the energeia of hyperbole.  That is, each function of 
hyperbole offers a contradictory position that operates as a critical transitional principle 
of epistemological and/or ontological importance.8  These genres emphasize these two 
themes that pervade the three functions of hyperbole, but before exploring these themes 
and functions, I briefly return to Quintilian. 
 Quintilian’s often uncertain theory of hyperbole is the defining moment for 
hyperbole within the history of rhetorical theory.  As discussed in the last chapter, it is 
mainly Quintilian who sees the significant potential of hyperbole, and it is his theory of 
hyperbole that remains influential for rhetorical theorists and critics throughout 
hyperbole’s contentious history.  In contemporary rhetorical theory his insights are all but 
lost, and hyperbole is typically viewed as a lie that serves no critical rhetorical function.   
As his theory of hyperbole is the most influential but is now occluded from view, 
it is only by going back to Quintilian that I can construct a foundation for a meaningful 
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theory of hyperbole.  I will use his insights as a foundation on which to build a theory of 
hyperbole, and from this foundation, I will re-explore and expand upon the functions of 
hyperbole.  I will clarify Quintilian’s insights throughout the chapter and offer a detailed 
analysis of different aspects of his theoretical contributions, but this first section will 
serve as a general overview of Quintilian’s theory to prepare for the following analysis of 
hyperbole. 
QUINTILIAN REDUX 
 
 It is Quintilian’s ambivalent theory of hyperbole, and his rhetorical theory in 
general, that is significantly influential for rhetorical theorists throughout history.  Indeed, 
it leads to Erasmus’s theory of copia as eloquence that became so important for Christian 
humanists of the Renaissance, and Quintilian’s theory of hyperbole is pervasive 
throughout the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Baroque, and Romanticism.  One 
might further argue that it is not Aristotle’s but Quintilian’s summarizing clarification of 
rhetorical theory and its connection to philosophy that is so influential today.  However, 
Quintilian’s views regarding hyperbole are largely disconnected from hyperbole at 
present.  Thus, it is Quintilian that I now briefly re-visit to elucidate some important 
aspects and issues of hyperbole such as decorum, ethos, pathos, kakozelia, and kairos, 
which will guide the overall discussion of hyperbole’s functions.   
To begin, hyperbole often requires the use of amplification (auxesis).  Quintilian 
suggests that auxesis (Gk. αυχέ-σις:  the process, state, or condition of increasing; Lat. 
amplificatio:  amplification) is a species of hyperbole,9 and the four species of auxesis 
                                                
9 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.4.29, trans. Lee Honeycutt, 
<http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/quintilian/8/chapter4.html> (12 April 2010).  See also Johnson, 
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Quintilian offers are incrementum (augmentation), comparatio (comparison), ratiocinatio 
(reasoning), and congeries (accumulation).  He also adds ratio minunendi (attenuation) 
under congeries.10   
Incrementum may slowly build step by step towards or proceed all at once to the 
highest point or beyond it – “Every particular is an advance on that which precedes”11:   
To vomit from excessive drinking would have been of itself disgusting, even if 
not before a public assembly; it would have been disgusting before a public 
assembly, even if not of a whole people; before a whole people, even if not the 
people of Rome; even if he had held no office, or not a public office, or not that of 
master of the horse.12 
 
Through a series of “even if” clauses, Quintilian’s example builds numerically and 
spatially step by step to amplify the “disgusting” in an extraordinary situation.   
Comparatio “seeks to raise itself on something lower”13:   
Cicero, in his speech for Cluentius, having related that a woman of Miletus had 
received a bribe from the heirs in reversion to cause abortion in her own person, 
exclaims, of how much greater punishment is Oppianicus deserving for a crime of 
a similar nature?  The woman of Miletus, in doing violence to her own body, 
tortured only herself; Oppianicus effected a like object by violence and torture to 
the body of another.14 
 
Oppianicus is compared to a woman who gave herself an abortion for a bribe.  By 
comparing Oppianicus to a woman and highlighting the violence done was only to 
herself, the rhetor amplifies the offensive violence of Oppianicus done to others.   
                                                                                                                                            
Hyperboles, 48-52.  “More than just being another way of increasing or diminishing the value of a res, 
hyperbole may encompass or control…various kinds of amplification” (52). 
 
10 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.4.1-8.4.28, trans. Lee Honeycutt, 
<http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/quintilian/8/chapter4.html> (12 April 2010). 
 
11 Ibid., 8.4.3-8.4.9. 
 
12 Ibid., 8.4.8. 
 
13 Ibid., 8.4.9. 
 
14 Ibid., 8.4.11. 
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Ratiocinatio introduces “in one place and produces its effect in another; so that 
one thing is magnified in order that another may be corroborated; and thence we arrive by 
reasoning at that which is the object of our amplification”15:   
This is done by Cicero, when he said, These are but trifling charges against such a 
criminal.  The captain of a vessel, from a most honorable city, purchased 
exemption from the terror of scourging with a sum of money; to allow him to do 
so was humanity in Verres.  Another, that he might not be beheaded, sacrificed 
also a sum of money; this was but an ordinary occurrence.16 
 
Here, a captain from a most honorable city purchasing the safety of a vessel is heralded 
as virtuous and highly praised.  This magnification in one context then strengthens the 
assertion that the crime under discussion is both trifling and ordinary.  
Congeries is the “accumulation of a number of words or thoughts having the same 
signification; for though they do not ascend by steps, yet they are heaped up, as it were, 
by coacervation”17:   
What did your sword do, Tubero, that was drawn in the field of Pharsalia?  At 
whose body was the point of it aimed?  What was the object of your appearance in 
arms?  To what were your thoughts, your eyes, your hands, directed?  What ardor 
inspired your breast?  What did you wish or desire?18 
 
Determining Tubero’s intent when using his sword is amplified by heaping sentence upon 
sentence and accumulating a mass of interrelated questions clustering around the main 
question of Tubero’s motives.  Quintilian also suggests that ratio minunendi is similar to 
congeries “for there are as many steps when we go up as when we go down.”19  
                                                
15 Ibid., 8.4.15. 
 
16 Ibid., 8.4.19. 
 
17 Ibid., 8.4.26. 
 
18 Ibid., 8.4.27. 
 
19 Ibid., 8.4.28. 
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Hyperbole can and does operate in these ways, but Quintilian also distinguishes 
amplification from hyperbole as trope suggesting that amplification is a species of 
hyperbole as well as placing hyperbole in his discussion of tropes.  
Christopher D. Johnson interprets Quintilian’s theory of hyperbole suggesting that 
there are three characteristics of hyperbole:  creating pathos where it is expected, using 
nature as an objective basis for exaggeration, and pointing to the conceptual and 
allegorical promise of hyperbole.20  Rather than offering these three characteristics, it is 
sufficient simply to say that hyperbole is a linguistic vehicle of transcendence.  
Hyperbole creates pathos in order to transcend the bounds of a given context, e.g., 
“nature” or language, by comparatively employing exaggeration to offer a new insight.  
This is perhaps the main reason the Romantics offer hyperbole as a vehicle for/towards 
the sublime.  Hyperbole is that which attempts to transcend the ordinary and express the 
inexpressible. 
In addition, Quintilian offers five types of hyperbole, which Johnson divides into 
two categories.21  The first three are tropological – hyperbole by simile,22 comparison,23 
and metaphor.  The last two are figures of thought – hyperbole by exaggerating the facts, 
i.e., saying more than the truth,24 and by “certain signs.”25  Quintilian also suggests that 
                                                
20 Johnson, Hyperboles, 42. 
 
21 Ibid. 
 
22 “You would have thought the Cyclades uptorn were floating on the deep.”  See Quintilian, 
Institutes of Oratory, 8.6.68, trans. Lee Honeycutt, 
<http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/quintilian/8/chapter6.html#68Quintilian> (26 April 2010). 
 
23 “Swifter than the wings of lightning.”  Ibid., 8.6.69. 
 
24 “Vomiting, he filled his lap and the whole tribunal with fragments of undigested food.”  Or, 
more loftily, “Two rocks rise threateningly towards the sky.”  Ibid., 8.6.68. 
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“one hyperbole is increased by the addition of another”26 (later theoretically extended by 
the copia of Erasmus)27 noting that each type of hyperbole can be used in combination 
with other types as well as other tropes, which suggests both the contextual flexibility and 
adaptability of hyperbole.  For my purposes, each of these “species” of hyperbole may be 
considered topoi from which I will draw when discussing each form and function of 
hyperbole in this chapter.  In all of the functions I will discuss, I am assuming, as does 
Quintilian, that hyperbole is not excess beyond all measure but a purposeful measure of 
excess for effect/affect.   
 For Quintilian, hyperbole is both objective and subjective.  It is an objective 
exaggeration of quantity or quality, and it is subjective in how it is received, which 
depends largely on the disposition of the audience toward hyperbole.  Johnson suggests 
that one might view hyperbole in Quintilian’s theory as the linguistic means to achieve 
excess corresponding to affectus.28  Unlike Isocrates and Aristotle who assign only the 
role of exaggeration to hyperbole somewhat distancing it from excess, though the 
excessive deviation from moderation is still a vital concern, Quintilian maintains the 
connection between objective exaggeration and subjective excess within the scope of 
hyperbole.  Excess is the order, and hyperbole is the genus.  This view, as shown in the 
last chapter, is quite significant for those like the Church Fathers who are obsessed with 
                                                                                                                                            
25 “She o’er the rising tops of untouch’d corn would fly, nor in her course the tender ears would 
hurt.”  Ibid., 8.6.69. 
 
26 Ibid., 8.6.70. 
 
27 “In brief, copia produces eloquence as well as understanding.  Sometimes it is synonymous with 
ornament itself, but it is also described…as a faculty of mind, a now logical, now imaginative way of 
thinking about the world.”  See Johnson, Hyperboles, 78. 
 
28 Ibid., 8. 
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the effects of excess, i.e., vices, on the individual.  Thus, born out of Quintilian’s theory, 
hyperbole’s structure is twofold:  the objective linguistic exaggeration of hyperbole is 
subjectively received and internalized as excessive affectus, e.g., perhaps as embodied 
hyperbole.  The two are not separate but interrelated.  Quintilian’s radical move thereby 
gives hyperbole both an epistemological and an ontological justification for its use.  
Rather than dismissing hyperbole, Quintilian offers it as a critical rhetorical trope that 
engages and/or exploits significant rhetorical issues such as ethos and pathos.   
 Hyperbole’s effectiveness, more than other tropes, is based on the audience’s 
predisposition for exaggeration and excess, its very tropological function.  Because 
hyperbole is a particularly risky trope, this means that ethos and pathos are important for 
hyperbole’s reception more than other tropes.  In Quintilian’s framework, hyperbole as 
trope and as “sophisticated, discursive figure of thought”29 interacts with, extends, and 
alters other tropes and perspectives by carefully maintaining an appropriate ethos with the 
audience so that pathos might be employed effectively.  As Johnson says, “The 
hyperbolist constantly puts his ethos at risk, as he depends on the reader’s good will and 
ability to decide how his inventions are received.”30  Hyperbole relies on ethos and 
pathos more than other tropes and figures because of the common accusation of 
kakozelia:  “Cacozelia…encompasses every fault of excess caused by insincerity, 
pretence, ambition, or faulty judgment.  It signals a distortion of the relation between 
subject and style, between things and words.”31  The very nature of hyperbole as a 
                                                
29 Ibid., 44. 
 
30 Ibid. 
 
31 Ibid., 34. 
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tropological representation of excess as well as hyperbole’s penchant for privileging 
affectus over ratio places it in an equivocal relationship with decorum and the 
hyperbolist’s ethos and use of pathos.  This puts hyperbole precariously at the mercy of 
the audience’s predisposition for both hyperbole and the hyperbolist.   
As one tactic against hyperbole’s failure, Quintilian suggests that hyperbole’s 
daring may require the “proleptic blame of remedium.”32  As Quintilian quotes “a very 
elegant Greek saying,” one should be “the first to blame [one’s] own hyperbole.”33  Not 
simply blame however, remedia, as remedies or cures, are meant to be employed as pre-
cautionary and/or recovery tactics when using hyperbole in order to prevent its failure 
and dismissal, and Quintilian’s caution against debasing one’s ethos through “exorbitant 
affectation”34 (kakozelia) is vital when hyperbole is used.  As this anticipatory tactic 
indicates, the risk of hyperbole heightens the need for its justification.  
Confirming my observations in the previous chapter, Johnson argues that for 
Quintilian there are two main justifications for hyperbole:  1) a speaker is moved in some 
extraordinary manner and 2) some incredible subject calls for expression.35  The first is 
psychological, and the second is phenomenological, and both “motives depend upon the 
existence of an outrageous or extraordinary res.”36  Either psychologically or 
                                                
32 Ibid. 
 
33 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.3.37, trans. Lee Honeycutt, 
<http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/quintilian/8/chapter3.html> (12 April 2010). 
 
34 Ibid., 8.6.74. 
 
35 See also [Longinus], On the Sublime, 283 and Brian Vickers, “The ‘Songs and Sonnets’ and the 
Rhetoric of Hyperbole,” in John Donne:  Essays in Celebration, ed. A. J. Smith (London:  Methuen and 
Co., Ltd., 1972), 140.  Both argue that the incident as well as the intensity of emotion justifies the use of 
hyperbole just as Cicero, the author of Ad Herennium, Tertullian, Augustine, the Christian humanists, and 
others also contend. 
 
36 Johnson, Hyperboles, 44. 
  143       
phenomenologically, these justifications are premised on hyperbole’s response to an 
extraordinary exigence.  An unusual psychological or phenomenological exigence can 
justify the use of hyperbole, but only if it remains decorous.  Hyperbole risks violating 
decorum even as it pushes common notions of decorum to the limit.  The extraordinary 
exigence demands an appropriately disproportionate response, which is negotiated 
through one’s ethos as well as one’s use of pathos.  While Aristotle says that hyperbole is 
“too risky” in relation to decorum, Quintilian posits that hyperbole necessitates risking 
decorum.  Establishing a binary of excess, a decorous hyperbole is an “elegant” 
hyperbole while an indecorous hyperbole is “extravagant,” i.e., an “exorbitant 
affectation,”37 and this extravagance leads to accusations of kakozelia. 
To be hyperbolic is to risk, e.g., pathos, and to be at risk, e.g., ethos.  The 
“incredible” risks violating decorum even as it attempts to stay within its bounds.  
Whether a stylistic or ethical risk, hyperbole exists in the space between the decorous and 
indecorous.  Residing within a certain liminal decorum of excess, hyperbole can be 
justified, or “pardoned,”38 when the subject matter demands an exceptional response, i.e., 
“when the res ‘surpasses the ordinary limits of nature,’”39 or language.  To clarify, one 
might say that the exigence (res) as well as the end (the re-presentation of a res), justifies 
the means (verba) within the precarious space of a decorum of excess, and this decorum 
is maintained through ethos and pathos.   
                                                                                                                                            
 
37 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.6.73-8.6.74.  
 
38 Ibid., 8.6.75. 
 
39 Johnson, Hyperboles, 47. 
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The hyperbolist creates a considerable tension between the ideal and the real, the 
word and the world, the figurative and the literal, and this means “strong demands are 
made on judgment as well as taste.”40  These strong demands require the use of hyperbole 
to seem appropriate, justified, and necessary, which places a significant burden on the 
hyperbolist.  The deft use of both pathos and ethos is thus crucial when hyperbole is 
employed.  Whether hyperbole as trope or figure of thought, each is governed by ethos as 
well as pathos, which, shown in the previous chapter, those like Longinus and Augustine 
posit.  Discussing the sublime or the things of God, respectively, the need to invoke 
subjective intensity outweighs the objective limits of language, even decorous language, 
which creates a playfulness with meaning. 
 For Quintilian, hyperbole engenders a certain playfulness with extremes, and in 
this play with extremity, hyperbole expands the range of what is considered “truth” and 
decorous.  For Quintilian, truth is fluid.  It is not absolute or fixed,41 and this is important 
for the functions he ascribes to hyperbole.  He writes, “It is an elegant surpassing of the 
truth [superiectio] and is used equally for exaggerating and extenuating.”42  Hyperbole 
can reveal by surpassing the truth, but it must remain appropriately disproportionate to do 
so.  It must not venture “beyond belief,”43 or beyond all reason, but it may go “beyond 
reality”44 and “say more than the facts” since “no one is contented with the exact truth.”45  
                                                
40 Ibid., 5. 
 
41 Ibid., 47. 
 
42 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.6.67. 
 
43 Ibid., 8.6.73. 
 
44 Ibid., 8.6.76. 
 
45 Ibid., 8.6.75. 
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Indeed, Quintilian suggests that departure from the truth may be “pardoned” if the 
departure does not affirm the false.46  That is, a hyperbole may be pardoned if it is elegant 
and believable, but if hyperbole goes too far or affirms what is false, then it is 
extravagant.  This hyperbolic binary aids in governing the excessive impetus of 
hyperbole and gives it effective/affective rhetorical direction and force, which decorously 
maintains its epistemological playfulness without devolving into “absurdities,” i.e., 
kakozelia. 
Highlighting this playfulness, Quintilian offers one of his most complex and 
paradoxical assertions:  “It is sufficient to remark that the hyperbole lies, but not so as to 
intend to deceive by lying, and we therefore ought to consider more carefully how far it 
becomes us to exaggerate that which is not believed.”47  Just as Seneca suggests, “The 
purpose of all exaggeration is to arrive at the truth by falsehood” and that through 
hyperbole “what could not possibly be in order that they might be thought to be as much 
so as possible,”48 Quintilian makes the same claim.  The lie of hyperbole is not a deceit 
but a falsehood intended to reveal because the exact truth is never enough.  
Compensating for this lack, hyperbole offers a different type of lie – a hyperbolic lie that 
brings epistemological abundance rather than lack. 
Paradoxical in the extreme, Quintilian and Seneca imply that hyperbole operates 
through a different kind of logic that is not bound to linguistic or epistemological norms.  
It marks the disproportionality between the word and the world.  Hyperbole is described 
                                                                                                                                            
 
46 Ibid. 
 
47 Ibid., 8.6.74. 
 
48 Seneca, On Benefits, trans. Aubrey Stewart (London:  George Bell and Sons, 1905), 7.23. 
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as more than exaggerated or even decorative language, which might be partitioned off 
into the grand style or dismissed as bombast.  It offers a different kind of speech where a 
lie that is not a deception can be employed on the side of a truth that necessitates the use 
of excess “because [reminiscent of Gorgias of Leontini’s maxim] the exact truth cannot 
be said, and language is more efficient when it goes beyond reality than when it stops 
short of it.”49  This hyperbolic lie allows for a copious play with meaning via extremity 
that ventures, not beyond belief, but beyond the strict limitations of language, knowledge, 
or facts.  Thus, the purpose of hyperbole for Quintilian, as for Seneca, is to reveal more 
than is stated, accepted, or commonly believed.  There is a stylistic and epistemological 
playfulness created by hyperbole that not only stretches conventions, decorum, and the 
value of truth claims but also, perhaps especially, that which cannot be believed without 
the use of the extraordinary. 
Quintilian suggests that the excessiveness of reality itself requires the use of 
hyperboles on a regular basis and that humans have a “natural propensity” to 
exaggerate.50  He notes that when one speaks of something that transcends the normal 
limits of nature, it is better to go too far and risk saying too much than not enough since, 
as noted above, “no one is contented with the exact truth.”51  Paradoxically, he posits that 
hyperbole is risky while also implying that the audience is already predisposed to 
hyperbole because it is in common use.  Even if it not well received, it may be pardoned 
or recovered through remedia.  One begins to wonder, then, what might cause hyperbole 
                                                
49 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.6.76. 
 
50 “There is in all men a natural propensity to magnify or extenuate what comes before them, and 
no one is contented with the exact truth.”  See Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.6.74. 
 
51 Ibid. 
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to be so risky.  The answer is that, in as much as Quintilian’s discussion is a remedium 
itself, the use of elegant hyperbole all hinges on its response that is demanded or 
necessitated by a specific contextual situation, and this response must force one beyond 
the literal into the figural.  Despite hyperbole’s common use, which may or may not be 
recognized as hyperbole, it must seem appropriate and not be interpreted literally.  Thus, 
the risk of hyperbole is the accusation of kakozelia. 
A particular phenomenological exigence requires a psychological response that 
cannot be offered in any other way except through hyperbole:  “Hyperbole is a beauty 
when the thing of which we speak is extraordinary in nature.  For we are then allowed to 
say a little more than the truth.”52  The psychological or phenomenological justifications 
of hyperbole, then, both fall under the purview of kairos, which is implied by Quintilian 
when he suggests that “wit” may easily turn to “folly.”53  The decorous use of hyperbole 
requires the hyperbolist to make the forceful assertion at an opportune moment.  Justified 
by exigence or not, if the hyperbole is not offered at the right moment, it will easily be 
accused of folly.  Indeed, a kairotic moment (psychological justification) that is tied to a 
particular exigence (phenomenological justification) is the overall justification for 
hyperbole.  One’s verba must seem timely and appropriate when describing and moving 
one towards the believability of a res. 
 From this discussion, what is important to highlight is that the objective use of 
hyperbole facilitates a subjective response.  This means that one’s ethos as well as pathos 
are significant considerations when employing hyperbole, which may easily be accused 
                                                
52 Ibid., 8.6.76. 
 
53 Ibid., 8.6.74. 
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of kakozelia.  Whether hyperbole as trope or figure of thought, ethos and pathos govern 
hyperbole’s departure from conventions and the “truth.”  In Quintilian’s case, the elegant, 
decorous use of hyperbole is effective while the extravagant hyperbole is of little use.  
When hyperbole is a “beauty” it becomes a linguistic vehicle of epistemological and 
ontological transcendence that may come in various forms, and these forms paradoxically 
reach beyond reality, but not beyond belief, in order to effect perceptual and emotional 
change.  The change fostered through hyperbole is justified phenomenologically and 
psychologically, and this justification is the crux of hyperbole’s success or failure.  To 
facilitate the justification of hyperbole, a decorum of excess is required where the 
appropriate response is a disproportionate response only hyperbole can offer. 
Quintilian negotiates a more fluid conception of decorum for hyperbole at every 
turn.  The binary of excess between elegant, i.e., beyond reality, and extravagant, i.e., 
beyond belief, hyperbole is perhaps his most overt attempt at accommodating decorum 
for hyperbole, and implying that a hyperbolic lie is distinct from a conventional lie is 
another attempt.  He also suggests that hyperbole maintains its decorousness through its 
justification.  Objectively justified by an extraordinary exigence or subject matter and 
subjectively justified by the need for extreme pathos, a fluid decorum of excess provides 
the hyperbolist with the necessary means to exert hyperbole’s full force upon the 
audience at a particular kairotic moment.  In a decorum of excess where excess, 
hyperbolic lies, and exaggeration are the norms, hyperbole seems entirely appropriate and 
may be offered forcefully at the opportune moment.   
In sum, hyperbole is a trope and figure of thought that facilitates transition 
through the mode of contradiction, e.g., a lie that is not a lie.  The motive of hyperbole is 
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change or transformation, and its function is to serve as the axis of transition upon which 
contradiction is balanced, which is only fully effective within a decorum of excess. 
 By re-visiting Quintilian’s theory of hyperbole these important observations 
constitute the foundation upon which I will construct a theory of hyperbole.  These are 
also the central issues hyperbole must face and the ones, which, paradoxically, make it so 
effective.  Hyperbole pushes all boundaries of notions of rhetorical decorum, and it risks 
extraordinary heights to accomplish its goals.  Avoiding kakozelia, of which it is so 
readily accused, is the burden the hyperbolist and hyperbole must bear above all tropes, 
and Quintilian offers these strategies to negotiate the tension between elegance and 
kakozelia.  As I will show, these tactics offered by Quintilian are what can save 
hyperbole from its own excessive nature. 
 I will now proceed to an explication of hyperbole’s functions, and I will begin 
with impossibility and possibility. 
THROUGH IMPOSSIBILITY, TOWARDS POSSIBILITY 
 
 The contradictory, dialogical assertion that impossibility transitions towards 
epistemological and ontological possibilities is one function of hyperbole that is offered 
by those such as Seneca, Quintilian, and many rhetorical theorists in the Renaissance.  
This connection of hyperbole to impossibility and possibility, so important for earlier 
rhetorical theorists, is now disconnected from hyperbole in contemporary rhetorical 
theory.  In the current context of postmodern and poststructuralist thought with its 
pension for deconstructive criticism and abandonment of moderation and aesthetic 
proportionality, this is an important function of hyperbole that should not be dismissed.  
Indeed, the possibility of impossibility and the impossibility of possibility are oft used 
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phrases within current poststructuralist discourse in the areas of, for example, theology, 
literary criticism, and philosophy, which shows that hyperbole can be a useful critical 
trope for current theoretical discussions.  This function is particularly highlighted within 
epideictic, which I will discuss after explicating the impossibility/possibility function of 
hyperbole.  Unfortunately, some theories of hyperbole overemphasize impossibility to the 
detriment of its transitional movement towards possibility. 
THE IMPOSSIBLE IMPOSSIBILITY OF HYPERBOLE 
 
 I begin with Demetrius because he offers a concise view of the relation between 
impossibility (adynaton) and hyperbole.  Although one can easily view Demetrius’s 
discussion of hyperbole negatively, as I did in the last chapter, his insights do offer 
important demarcations for impossibility that broaden hyperbole’s scope.  Demetrius 
describes hyperbole as “frigid,” i.e., indecorous, but he insists, as Johnson notes, that 
“hyperbole is essential in the task of expressing the impossible.”54  For my purposes, 
Demetrius’s demarcation of impossibility is a helpful heuristic for parsing out 
hyperbole’s connection to the impossible.  Demetrius writes of hyperbole: 
The most frigid of all figures is hyperbole, which is of three kinds.  It is expressed 
either in the form of a likeness, for example “like the winds in speed”; or of 
superiority, for example “whiter than snow”; or of impossibility, for example 
“with her head she reached the sky.”  Admittedly every hyperbole is an 
impossibility.  There could be nothing “whiter than snow,” nothing “like the 
winds in speed.”  But this last kind is especially called impossible.  And so the 
reason why every hyperbole seems particularly frigid is that it suggests something 
impossible.55 
 
                                                
54 Johnson, Hyperboles, 349. 
 
55 Demetrius, On Style, trans. Doreen C. Innes, The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge:  Harvard 
University Press, 1995), 427. 
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For Demetrius, hyperbole is always connected to impossibility.  Whether through 
likeness (hyperbolic simile), superiority (hyperbolic metaphor), or impossibility 
(hyperbolic allegory), they all suggest impossibility, which makes hyperbole the chief 
trope of excess since an impossible assertion is always excessive or in excess.56  
Demetrius goes on to suggest that hyperbole is chiefly used by comic poets to create 
laughter, and given that hyperbole attempts to surprise, to shock, and to seek out the 
novel, this is not an unwarranted connection.  Despite Demetrius’s failure to make the 
bridge from impossibility to possibility, he does show how hyperbole can be employed in 
different contexts, i.e., epic, lyric, and comic drama, and use various other tropes, i.e., 
simile, metaphor, and allegory, for its surprising effect/affect.   
In a more contemporary example of hyperbolic impossibility, Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, as discussed in the previous chapter, place hyperbole within an 
argument of unlimited development, which gives hyperbole an argumentative form but 
severely limits its use since this is seemingly the only instance where it might be 
employed.  An argument of unlimited development posits an ideal term that is always 
impossible and unrealizable.  Assertions about the ideal come close to the ideal, but it 
remains inaccessible:57  an “always receding…term in a given direction.”58  The role 
hyperbole plays in this argument is to promote “a certain behavior.”59  It gives “direction 
to thought, to guide it toward a favorable evaluation of this direction, and only by a return 
                                                
56 Johnson, Hyperboles, 539, fn 94. 
 
57 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 289. 
 
58 Ibid., 290. 
 
59 Ibid., 288. 
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shock is it intended to give an indication of the significant term.”60  The risk of unlimited 
development is that it can be refuted by the accusation of absolutism or incompatibility,61 
which is somewhat mitigated by the direction hyperbole gives to the argument. 
Hyperbole “draws the mind in a certain direction” and then descends back 
towards the “extreme limit of what seems…possible.”62  However, while hyperbole may 
bring one in proximity to possibility, its purpose in this type of argument is always to 
buttress the unlimited development of the impossible term.  It does not lead to possibility 
through impossibility.  Rather, it leads to impossibility through descriptive and 
exaggerated possibilities, i.e., “stepping-stones.”  The argument insists on the “possibility 
of always going further in a certain direction” and “continuing…passing beyond, in the 
direction indicated by two or three stepping-stones,”63 e.g., incrementum and/or 
congeries.  The goal is always impossibility.  Thus, hyperbole is given only the function 
of moving towards impossibility by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca.  These authors argue 
that hyperbole always supports an impossibility, which effectively occludes hyperbole’s 
transitional movement back towards other epistemological and ontological possibilities. 
Richard M. Weaver and Kenneth Burke call these impossible ideals “god terms.”  
Weaver’s conception of these terms is that the structure of the argument is a “hierarchy 
leading up to the ultimate good…links in a chain stretching up to some master link which 
transmits its influence down through the linkages.”64  In Perelman and Olbrechts-
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62 Ibid., 291. 
 
63 Ibid., 287, 288. 
 
64 Richard M. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Davis:  Hermagoras Press, 1985), 23. 
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Tyteca’s view, hyperboles are these “links,” or stepping-stones, stretching up to the ideal 
term, which Frances N. Teague suggests puts hyperbole “at the service of existing 
hierarchies.”65  On the other hand, Burke allows for the possibility that a reverse direction 
is possible in which these links are viewed as “emanating” or “radiating” from the ideal, 
which he calls the “spiritual source.”66  In this view, the ideal term is emptying itself out 
rather than filling itself up through the so called “links.”  There is a move back towards 
possibility.  Burke argues that in the drive towards god terms, words, which are to things 
as spirit is to matter, stretch and expand language and meaning only by moving back 
towards possibility from impossibility.   
In contradistinction to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Burke sees how an 
impossible ideal might lead to other possibilities of meaning and being.  Although Burke 
does not reference hyperbole, his logological argument about god terms offers one a view 
as to how a movement through impossibility might “emanate” or lead one towards other 
possibilities.  One might even suggest that Burke’s logological project is an extended 
hyperbolic figure of thought moving towards perspectival possibilities of meaning and 
being through excessive incongruity.  That is, he reveals how the contradiction between 
impossibility and possibility can produce transitional epistemological and ontological 
possibilities, which is precisely the function of hyperbole.  Thus, whereas Weaver’s view 
of god terms moves only in the direction of impossibility, Burke’s framework offers the 
unintentional insight that the shocking impossibility of hyperbole can lead towards 
                                                                                                                                            
 
65 Frances N. Teague, ed., Acting Funny:  Comic Theory and Practice in Shakespeare’s Plays 
(Fairleigh Dickinson University, 1994), 135. 
 
66 Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion:  Studies in Logology (Boston:  Beacon Press, 1961), 
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possibility via excess, but this is only implied.  It is also uncertain as to whether Burke 
sees the movement towards or away from god terms as more important 
As I will show below, the transition towards possibility is vital for hyperbole.  In 
the epideictic genre, for example, one might say that “this person was like no other 
person who ever lived,” and one hyperbole may be built upon another.67  It is not that the 
one being praised is literally the greatest person who ever lived, but what is being 
communicated is the possibility that this person was truly exceptional.  Or, in the 
grotesque, one might bring two disparate and impossible things or concepts together 
through hyperbole as do the novels of Flannery O’Connor68 and H.P. Lovecraft, the 
music of Richard Wagner, David Alfaro Sequeiros’s Echo of a Scream (1937) or 
Hieronymus Bosch’s The Garden of Earthly Delights (1510).69  In each instance a 
grotesque impossibility is asserted, but the impossibility always has the purpose of 
revealing some truth, some other possibility, through different hyperbolic expressions of 
impossibility.   
                                                
67 Quintilian offers this example:  “As Cicero, in speaking against Antony, says, ‘What Charybdis 
was ever so voracious?  What Charybdis, do I say?  If such a monster ever existed, it was but one animal, 
but the whole ocean, by Hercules, would scarcely have been able, as it seems to me, to have swallowed up 
so many things, so widely dispersed, and lying in places so distant, in so short a space of time!’  But I have 
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In Echo of a Scream, one can see the wretched scream shrieking from the 
distorted and disproportionately large head of an infant that is melded to rubble and metal 
on a battlefield.  Emerging from the infant’s mouth as a tongue is the same infant in 
smaller bodily form, and this other/same child is also screaming.  Sitting atop the 
dismantled battle scene, this juxtaposed impossibility is a shockingly grotesque 
hyperbolic metaphor.  Immediately disorienting, this image portrays a variety of 
dialogical interpretations, e.g., the effects of war on innocent life or the distorted sense of 
reality war creates, and this occurs hyperbolically by moving through the impossible 
image towards other perspectival possibilities. 
In the opening lines of At the Mountains of Madness, Lovecraft writes, “Doubt of 
the real facts, as I must reveal them, is inevitable; yet if I suppressed what will seem 
extravagant and incredible there would be nothing left.”70  Lovecraft relies on incredible 
and impossible grotesqueries of hybridity in his novels, and here, he reveals how 
important this grotesque exaggeration is for Madness.  Without hyperbolic impossibility, 
there is nothing to write and no story to tell.  Grotesquely aligning doubt with facts and 
suppression with extravagance, the impossible for Lovecraft is the impossibility of facts 
and language itself to express what can only be expressed through the incredible and 
grotesque excessiveness.  For him, the truth itself is a hyperbole, and it always leads 
towards an infinite array of possibilities. 
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HYPERBOLE AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF IMPOSSIBILITY 
 
 It is Seneca who completes the circuit from impossibility to possibility.  In On 
Benefits, Seneca writes, “Exaggeration never hopes all its daring flights to be believed, 
but affirms what is incredible, that thereby it may convey what is credible.”71  Through 
exaggeration one asserts “what could not possibly be in order that they might be thought 
to be as much so as possible.”72  Seneca posits that hyperbole is well suited to express the 
inexpressible, which leads to a realization of what is possible.  Seneca, like Quintilian, 
asserts that hyperbole must affirm what could not possibly be, i.e., that which is beyond 
reality but not beyond belief.  Pushing the bounds of belief for the purpose of transition, 
Johnson suggests that, for Seneca, “In the larger pursuit of ‘truth,’ hyperbole’s 
provisional violence against belief and reason becomes necessary and fitting,” and the 
extraordinary becomes a “driving cognitive force.”73  Through a momentarily violent 
teleological suspension of belief and reason, one is able to convey and even alter what 
seems credible and possible, and the brutal contradiction between reality and ideality 
fosters an epistemological and ontological change or transition from one perspective to 
another. 
The danger of hyperbolic impossibility is the intense, contradictory strain it places 
on normative conventions and accepted truths.  It “both invites and distances the audience 
from the height of an apparently unreasonable position.”74  Hyperbole maintains, even as 
it frustrates, the tension between the ideal and the real, and the movement through 
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impossibility towards possibility is the hyperbolic disruption of conventional belief and 
reason.  Noel Malcolm writes, “It [hyperbole] makes reference to impossible things not 
because it is trying to describe an impossible world…but as a rhetorical figure, to 
emphasize and dramatize impossibility itself.”75  For Malcolm and Seneca, extraordinary 
impossibility is a driving cognitive force dismantling normative assumptions about reality 
through its inconceivable idealized heights.  The unattainable ideal is not an absurdity but 
an epistemological tool that fosters real phenomenological and psychological transition.  
Malcolm stresses that the importance of hyperbole is not to offer an “impossible world” 
but, as a heuristic device, to (re)present a world re-imagined through impossibility.  
Impossibility both undermines and reveals the limits of possibility in order to disclose 
other possibilities.   
Through the contradictory double-dealing of hyperbole, a revealing transition 
occurs, and this transition, noted by Goran Stanivukovic in the previous chapter, is the 
place where “an incredible, exaggerated utterance interrupts the language and logic of the 
existing argument,” by shifting “one level of meaning to another, re-invented meaning.”76  
Hyperbole reveals the implications that impossibility may have for meaning itself by 
disrupting reality and offering other possible (re)interpretations of that reality.  As Katrin 
Ettenhuber asserts of Peacham’s insight into hyperbole, “By highlighting the limits of 
figuration and productively destabilising [sic] the reader’s views of linguistic norms and 
conventions, it encourages active reflection on the different ways in which meaning is 
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constructed and communicated.”77  Disrupting the “normal,” hyperbolic impossibility 
shocks and disturbs, and this achieves “the conceptual effect of suggesting the 
insufficiency or inexhaustibility of meaning.”78  The epistemological play of hyperbole 
can foster transformations of both meaning and being by transcending the meaning of a 
given context while still remaining bound to it.  Hyperbole offers, sometimes subtly and 
sometimes forcefully, what could be.  It presents the possible through the difficult 
challenge of the impossible.   
In a simple example, if one says, “It’s hotter than hell,” then, assuming hell exists 
and that it is in fact hot beyond the bounds of reality, this impossible assertion as 
hyperbolic allegory forces one to conclude that it is extremely hot, which is not beyond 
the realm of the credible.  In popular culture, nothing is hotter than hell.  It is an 
impossibility used to convey the given hotness of a particular context.  Or, if one says, 
“Obama is Hitler,” then this impossibility is a departure from the normative view of the 
President that leads to the possibility that Obama possesses certain characteristics or 
tendencies of Hitler.  In each case, an epistemological, even enthymematic, leap is made 
from impossibility to possibility.  Without moving back towards possibility, these 
impossible assertions cease their productive figural work and end in absolutism whereby 
one may simply refute the statements by pointing out their literal impossibility.   
A significant risk of hyperbolic impossibility, and hyperbole in general, is that the 
sign might be taken for the thing itself.  However, the extraordinary as a driving cognitive 
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force attempts to counter this impulse by interrupting the logic of literality long enough 
to, if only partially, disrupt one’s literal interpretation of the hyperbole and figurally 
move from one level of meaning to another.  Hyperbole, as Ettenhuber says, encourages 
active reflection on meaning, and this active reflection is premised upon hyperbole’s 
reception. 
For example, Jacques Derrida is sometimes interpreted literally and dismissed out 
of hand, or his language is mocked for its impossible obscurity.  Derrida’s hyperbolic 
language is not literally true, but if taken in this way, then his insights may cease to be 
effective.  However, his hyperbolic disruption of reason and the logic of language 
attempts to force one into a moment of interruption where belief is violently suspended 
through the (il)logic of the extraordinary.  Even producing disturbing affectus through 
vertige de l’hyperbole, Derrida’s hyperbolic heights take one away from the ordinary 
world of rationality, reason, and language.  Though it may only be momentary, Derrida’s 
hyperboles resist the closure of impossibility as he risks obscurity in order to generate 
epistemological insight, even clarity. 
When he paradoxically asserts that the “supplement” is both abundance and fills a 
lack or when he posits the impossibility of possibility and/or the possibility of 
impossibility, these hyperboles forcefully depart from epistemological norms and the 
convention of “writing.”  He shifts one level of meaning to another.  “The hyperbolic 
situation, according to Derrida, creates the necessity of interpretation – a necessity which 
different people respond to in different and (equally) contingent ways.”79  Out of his 
hyperbolic language of contradictions that offers provisional violence against 
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interpretation, belief, and reason, come other epistemological and ontological 
possibilities.  Derrida’s impossible hyperboles also reveal the complexity of impossibility 
itself, i.e., that the impossible holds possibilities in its grasp and that the possible is at the 
same time a purveyor of impossibilities.  He risks being misunderstood in order to 
communicate his complex ideas.  Derrida’s conceptual insights, as well as his language, 
are equally hyperbolic, and for this reason, his contradictory hyperbolic language is often 
resisted and accused of kakozelia.  This resistance is lessened within Derrida’s decorum 
of excess where both language and thought are excessive and all is disproportionate, one 
might even say grotesque, but if the force of hyperbole still fails to move one beyond the 
literal into the figural, then remedia may become necessary to guard against accusations 
of absurdity. 
For Derrida, he seems not to offer any remedia, and the magnitude of his 
hyperbole is thus often lost on his audience; yet, his “writing” within a decorum of excess 
is what can save the hyperbole.  In other cases where a decorum of excess is not 
established, remedia are necessary.  In defense against accusations of kakozelia, one 
might say, for example, “Of course Obama isn’t Hitler.  That’s impossible.”  
Preemptively, one might say, “Obama is Hitler, so to speak.”  The force of the hyperbole 
is mitigated by specifically pointing out that the assertion is impossible and is not literally 
true and that the hyperbolist did not intend it to be taken so.  If one’s audience does not 
take the hyperbole figuratively, then its excess may need to be pardoned through the 
tactic of remedia.  The risk of hyperbole, however, becomes more tenuous when it exerts 
a more forceful disruption of beliefs, and the offering of remedia must be more 
discursively complex. 
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Inasmuch as all theology is a type of apologetic, it is also a copia of remedia.  
One might even say that all theologians are highly skilled hyperbolists making their 
theological arguments within a decorum of excess.  Through a series of “is” statements, 
e.g., “Salvation is…,” “God is…,” or “Christ is…,” theologians attempt to describe 
something that is presumably indescribable.  The “is” makes an impossible assertion that 
must somehow move towards other possibilities of thought, but the figurative nature of 
theology is often obscured by the veil of the literal.  A decorum of excess aids in 
squelching hyperbole’s mis-interpretation, but despite theology’s reliance on hyperbole, 
and figurative language in general, the literal often prevails.  Even though theology’s 
extraordinary subject and copious language offers what is beyond reality in order to 
communicate multi-perspectival truths, it is often perceived as beyond belief.  This leads 
to accusations of kakozelia.   
As such, there is an implied “but” at the end of theological assertions – “God is 
omnipotent, but…” – and this “but” is the anticipation of objections and the prelude to a 
remedium.  The idealizations theology posits are impossible hyperbolic figures of thought 
that must be qualified in order to move towards other (re)interpretive possibilities.  They 
are impossible possibilities, which even “literal believers” realize, though perhaps 
unwittingly.  Christian literalists, for example, typically accept that it is impossible to 
describe God, but they then proceed to do so.  The impossible assertion is not enough.  
There must be possible descriptions and interpretations about God’s indescribability, 
which is also the acceptance that assertions about God are figurative in nature.  
Interpreting a hyperbole too literally is also a form of excess, i.e., absolutism, but failing 
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to recognize a hyperbole qua hyperbole is its failure since hyperbole cannot exist in the 
literal realm.   
The literal can and does end in impossibility and absolutism, which signifies the 
failed reception of hyperbole.  However, the project of theology, even fundamentalist 
theology, is thoroughly dependent on the tropological and figural functions of hyperbole 
in order to operate at all because hyperbole (literally?) offers theology the possibility to 
figurally conceptualize “God” as extraordinary and beyond reality, which it does 
voluminously.  If this hyperbolic movement is not received or perceived by the audience, 
then the assertion ceases its figural movement, and this effectively ends the task of 
theology to persuade through its unending array of verba pointing to an extraordinary, re-
imagined res, i.e., “God.”  The “but” of hyperbole is the disruption of the “is” of the 
literal, and the movement beyond reality is a resistance to positions that are beyond 
belief.  Thus, wittingly or unwittingly, most theological discussions are remedia in 
defense against accusations of kakozelia, and this tactic is used to ensure the positive 
reception of one’s position.  By moving through impossibility towards theological 
possibilities, the work of hyperbole is a necessary theological trope and figure of thought, 
but it is still a fragile rhetorical move necessitating careful employment by the 
hyperbolist. 
For example, one might assert that “God is omnipotent” (a hyperbolic metaphor).  
This hyperbolic impossibility is extremely risky and is indefensible if taken literally.  It 
can result in the absolutism of unlimited development and be dismissed as impossible.  
Indeed, this risk is explicitly acknowledged by theologians, and “God is omnipotent” is 
extensively qualified because it brings up problematic issues such as theodicy, salvation, 
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and free will.  In reference to theodicy, for example, one might say “God can stop evil but 
allows it to happen, and it is not up to us to judge the ways of God because no one can 
know the mind of God.”  Implicitly an argument for the figural, the problematic assertion 
that “God is omnipotent” is thereby somewhat alleviated in the minds of the audience, 
and the impossible assertion “God is omnipotent” then becomes a possibility for 
conceiving of theodicy in different ways.  This is just one remedium offered in defense of 
“God is omnipotent,” but there are certainly other capacious and unending arguments 
offered.  Various remedia from differing theological positions are necessary to ensure 
this hyperbole’s positive reception. 
Hyperbole’s effectiveness is based on the disposition of the audience, and it is 
thus extremely contextual, which is why there are a surfeit of theological positions.  
Johnson writes, “Hyperbole acquires immense dramaturgical subtlety from the context in 
which it is spoken, from the ethos of those who speak it, and from the way it is heard by 
others.”80  The hyperbolist must choose carefully when hyperbole’s force will be most 
suasive, especially since hyperbole is such a surprising and disturbing trope.  This, 
however, places the burden on the hyperbolist to employ the hyperbole effectively, 
appropriately, and at the opportune moment.  The overall motive of the hyperbolist is 
transforming one’s perspective or emotional state, and the main impetus of hyperbole is 
to serve as a transitional axis upon which contradiction balances.  The hyperbolist is in a 
precarious, duplicitous position and must maintain the tension between impossibility and 
possibility without seeming ridiculous. 
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Hyperbole marks a fine line between wit and folly, wisdom and absurdity, and the 
hyperbolist must artfully negotiate this tight rope with his or her audience.  Hyperbole, 
above all other tropes, can quickly fall prey to accusations of kakozelia, but through its 
figurative force and its decorous excessiveness, its impossible heights can lead to 
transformative possibilities.  This is particularly evident in epideictic where the 
impossibility of hyperbole is employed to offer transformation or renewal to a 
community or individual based on re-invented or re-invigorated creations of reality. 
HYPERBOLE EXEMPLIFIED IN THE EPIDEICTIC GENRE 
 
Historically, hyperbole is placed within the epideictic genre.  From Quintilian to 
Puttenham, the “elegant” and “discrete” use of hyperbole when epideictically praising or 
blaming is hesitantly viewed as a “beauty,” or at least tolerated.  Puttenham places 
hyperbole, the lowd lyer, within epideictic even as he cautions against its liability to 
sabotage what is being praised.81  Ben Witherington III asserts, “Dramatic hyperbole…is 
customary in epideictic rhetoric,”82 and he also notes in another work, “Epideictic 
rhetoric is…the rhetoric of hyperbole and the ongoing appeal to the deeper, more visceral 
emotions like love and hate, fear and faith/trustworthiness.”83  Of the Middle Ages, Ernst 
Robert Curtius asserts, “[The panegyric’s] chief trope is the hyperbole,”84 and Simon 
Gaunt also asserts that in medieval rhetorical manuals where the panegyric is given 
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utmost importance, “Hyperbole was thought to be particularly appropriate to 
panegyric.”85  Despite this historical connection between hyperbole and epideictic, it is 
currently not mentioned in epideictic literature,86 but epideictic is a representative 
example of how hyperbole functions through impossibility and possibility. 
Current epideictic theory in general tends to focus on a contextualized communal 
function based on the referencing of shared values and the offering of an alternative or re-
formulation of those values with the purpose of renewing and/or transforming communal 
identity, though some suggest that all epideictic is mainly for the purpose of 
transformation.87  In order to “increase the intensity of adherence to certain values,”88 
these re-formulated values are posited in contrast to the current situation and positioned 
in relation to a new version of reality.  Shared values are referenced (as virtuous), altered 
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or re-formulated, and put into conflict with present contextual values that are excessively 
blamed (as vices), which (re)constitutes communal identity.89  Robert Danisch writes, 
“Practicing epideictic rhetoric…involves telling the history of the present so that one can 
understand how subjects are constituted in a given historical moment and so that one can 
begin the project of self-creation.”90  Beginning the project of self-creation occurs by re-
positioning the re-formulated values in relation to an impossibility through auxesis as 
“any kind of amplification of the context.”91 
Noted above, Quintilian suggests that auxesis is a species of hyperbole, and 
Erasmus writes in his development of copia, “Speech is varied by auxesis, i.e., by 
amplification, when in order to render something more effectively we put in place of an 
appropriate word a stronger one [comparatio].”92  In epideictic, the auxesis of an ideal 
occurs chiefly through incrementum, comparatio, and congeries.  Incrementum may 
proceed by one step, by several, or at once.  Comparatio increases a lesser thing’s 
importance by implying a logical connection with a greater thing, and congeries heaps 
one word or sentence atop another in order to produce copia.  These species of auxesis 
magnify “the importance or gravity of something by referring to it with a 
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disproportionate name.”93  In response to an extraordinary exigence and in order to 
highlight the importance of a transformed or renewed sense of reality, an impossibility is 
offered within a decorum of excess at an opportune moment in order to transition towards 
this new or revivified creation of reality by heightening and amplifying its significance as 
well as the critique of a given context.   
In epideictic, impossibility is most notably expressed through auxesis as some 
idealization of thought intended to heighten the critique of a given context.  This 
disproportionate assertion occurs after shared values are referenced and then re-
formulated.  In light of the re-formulation, a new or renewed version of reality is offered 
as an “invented great,”94 or a “greater beauty” as Aristotle says,95 which is then praised to 
promote adherence to these altered values.  Just as in an argument of unlimited 
development, “The ideals it [epideictic] describes are rarely actually attained…a speaker 
confidently praises values in hopes that the audience will work to implement them.”96  
The praise of re-invented or re-invigorated values through auxesis amplifies the 
importance of the “invented great” as well as a critique of the present moment with the 
purpose of implementing a transition.  As Cindy Koenig Richards argues, “[Epideictic 
promotes] identification with a new or different vision of community through the 
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veneration of an ‘invented great,’”97 and she continues, “By venerating a figure that 
integrates known history, established beliefs, and imagined possibilities, epideictic can 
subvert some elements of the existing social order while affirming others.”98  The re-
assessment and re-formulation of values is thus also the positing of another 
disproportionately idealized version of reality for the purpose of communal or individual 
transformation and/or renewal.   
Although auxesis is now largely disconnected from epideictic theory, it is the 
operative function of hyperbole within epideictic discourse, though it is not limited solely 
to epideictic.  Timothy Long states that auxesis is “a major technique of ancient 
epideictic oratory,” and it “calls upon the orator to conjure an imaginary object or state, 
desirable or abhorrent, for detrimental comparison with an opponent’s proposal.”99  
Within epideictic, idealized conceptions of language, thought, community, or even 
critical terms are buttressed by hyperboles through auxesis that “conjure” an imaginary 
invented great in order to compare it to an opposing version of reality.  Furthermore, the 
epideictic genre is structured around hyperbolic gestures of “amplification and 
enhancement,”100 as “activities that lend themselves to heightening and tend to draw the 
speaker into excesses.”101  In other words, hyperbole offers an imaginary, 
disproportionate name meant to emphasize or exaggerate its importance within epideictic 
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rhetoric, and overall, its effect is intended to lead to transformations of meaning and 
being. 
HYPERBOLIC IMPOSSIBILITY IN EPIDEICTIC FORM 
 
When Anselm suggests that God is that than which nothing greater can be 
conceived in identical language to Quintilian – incrementum may “proceed at once to 
something than which nothing greater can be named”102 – Anselm is using hyperbole in 
his epideictic argument for the ontological proof of God’s existence to refute the non-
existence of God.  Using shared theological values, re-formulating them, and using 
auxesis to posit an impossible ideal, Anselm uses hyperbolic logic to assert his 
impossibility that nevertheless leads to other theological possibilities.  Aquinas is doing 
the same when he argues that there is no excess in the worship of God, i.e., there is 
nothing but excess in worship.  Zizek makes the same move when he posits the theo-
philosophical statement that in Christ’s appearance, “It becomes clear that God is 
NOTHING BUT the excess of man, the ‘too much’ of life which cannot be contained in 
any life-form, which violates the shape (morphe) of anthropomorphism.”103  In each case, 
hyperbole is forcefully employed to make an epideictic argument for alternative 
possibilities of perceiving reality, which is arrived at by moving immediately to and 
through impossible idealizations. 
In these cases incrementum is used to proceed at once to a hyperbolic position.  In 
a more gradual example, Lincoln builds his hyperbolic argument incrementally in “The 
Gettysburg Address,” but the effect of his epideictic speech is the same: 
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It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us – that 
from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they 
gave the last full measure of devotion – that we here highly resolve that these 
dead shall not have died in vain – that this nation, under God, shall have a new 
birth of freedom – and that government of the people, by the people, for the 
people, shall not perish from the earth.104 
 
Lincoln uses hyperbole to heighten the gravity of the situation and offer a vision for the 
future.  Using incrementum, Lincoln suggests that there is a “great task remaining before 
us,” and “we take increased devotion” from those who “gave the last full measure of 
devotion.”  Culminating, Lincoln concludes that this government has “a new birth of 
freedom,” which “shall not perish from the earth.”  As he epideictically creates his vision 
of the future to stir the audience’s pathos, he invokes the past battle, connects it to the 
present, and increases the importance of the situation as well as his “greater beauty” for 
the future.  His speech, in fact, hinges upon his use of hyperbole.  Without it, he may not 
quite make the transition from a nation being tested by war, which might not endure (the 
opposing view), to a nation that will not perish from the earth.  An impossible 
responsibility, leading to an impossible vision, only hyperbole is equal to the task of 
epideictically moving through impossibility towards a possibility for the future. 
 As discussed, hyperbole is justified by a phenomenological or psychological 
situation, and this justification is achieved largely based on exigence, pathos, and ethos.  
In these examples, it is the exigence that justifies the means.  Proving God exists is 
certainly a monumental task, and hyperbole is perhaps the only trope adequate for 
Aquinas’s defense of worship as well as Zizek’s disruption of the signified “God.”  
Certainly the exigence of the Civil War calls for an extraordinary response, and Lincoln 
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cannot move his audience through impossibility towards possibility without the pathos of 
hyperbole, i.e., affectus as/in excess.  Each example is also dependent upon ethos for the 
positive reception of hyperbole.  Anselm’s and Aquinas’s status as venerated theologians, 
Zizek’s theoretical prowess, and Lincoln’s position of president contribute to the 
audience’s reception of hyperbole.  Extraordinary situations and subject matter require an 
extraordinary response, which is delivered through hyperbole. 
 Another example of hyperbole used within epideictic is that of Derrida.  In a type 
of epideictic form105 within a decorum of excess, Derrida writes: 
By escaping it [the project of thinking]:  that is to say, by exceeding the totality, 
which – within existence – is possible only in the direction of infinity or 
nothingness; for even if the totality of what I think is imbued with falsehood or 
madness, even if the totality of the world does not exist, even if nonmeaning has 
invaded the totality of the world, up to and including the very moments of my 
thought, I still think, I am while I think.  Even if I do not in fact grasp the totality, 
if I neither understand nor embrace it, I still formulate the project of doing 
so…This is why, by virtue of this margin of the possible, the principled, and the 
meaningful, which exceeds all that is real, factual, and existent, this project is 
mad, and acknowledges madness as its liberty and its very possibility.  This is 
why it [the project of thinking] is not human…but is rather metaphysical and 
demonic.106 
 
In epideictic terms, the project, or exigence, is (re)thinking the “self,” the Cogito or “I,” 
which necessitates an epistemological and ontological transition.  These positions, which 
are possible “only in the direction of infinity [incrementum and/or congeries] or 
nothingness [ratio minunendi and/or litotes],” are the impossibilities Derrida attempts to 
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move through towards other possibilities.  Philosophically, this is the history, or “myth,” 
of the “self” from Descartes to the present, and by referencing these shared myths, 
Derrida establishes a type of ethos with his readers allowing for a believable critique he 
soon offers.  The “margin of the possible,” i.e., the project of exceeding this totalization, 
is a duplicitous impossible possibility.  It is a moment of undecidability that is also a 
hyperbole, which serves to heighten the critique of one’s interpretive conception of the 
historical “self” or “I” as the “real, factual, and existent.”  This hyperbole and/as a 
critique of the present philosophical moment leads to a (re)interpretive stance regarding a 
future, though absent, possibility.   
The lie, i.e., “falsehood or madness,” is the “opening” for a moment of 
(re)formulating the “truth” of the project of exceeding, and the repetition of “still 
formulat[ing] the project of doing so” is the work of errant hyperbole.  Through auxesis, 
Derrida builds one hyperbolic statement upon another with “even if” clauses:  “Even if 
the totality of what I think…even if the totality of the world…even if nonmeaning…Even 
if I do not in fact grasp the totality.”  Each “even if” statement builds on the previous one 
until finally culminating in madness and the demonic, which are positive terms of 
possible impossibility for Derrida.   
Derrida considers demonic hyperboles to be “marvelous transcendence,” which he 
translates from “daimonias hyperboles,” and he describes his project as the “attempt-to-
say-the-demonic-hyperbole from whose heights thought is announced to itself, frightens 
itself, and reassures itself against being annihilated or wretched in madness or in 
death.”107  One may be annihilated in the impossibility of madness, i.e., an excess of 
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affectus, but it is madness that is the impossible possibility within his project of possible 
impossibilities.  Derrida writes of demonic hyperbole:  
This demonic hyperbole goes further than the passion of hybris [and]…Assuming 
that it is deranged and excessive, it implies the fundamental derangement and 
excessiveness of the hyperbolic which opens and founds the world as such by 
exceeding it.  Hybris is excessive and exceeds only within the space opened by 
the demonic hyperbole.108 
 
The demonic hyperbole is hyperbole functioning to open and found the world by 
exceeding it.  Opening and founding the world by exceeding it is the impossible task 
Derrida must move through in order to move towards madness that is the “very 
possibility” of the project of thinking.  Out of the undecidability, the “doing so,” i.e., the 
decision to begin that is madness and “always hyperbolical,”109 is the repetitive auxesis of 
hyperbolic impossibility.  To attempt this project of madness is an impossible possibility 
facilitated through the hybris of “demonic hyperbole.” 
 In sum, moving through impossibility towards possibility is one contradictory 
transitional function of hyperbole.  Demetrius and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca focus 
on the impossibility of hyperbole while Seneca and others focus on its use of 
impossibility to transition towards possibility.  Through this transition, the 
epistemological and ontological importance of hyperbole is highlighted for its play and 
expansion of meaning and being.  Moving through the difficulty of impossibility, 
hyperbole disrupts and reveals the limits of possibility so that other avenues of meaning 
and being may arise.  In the example of epideictic, hyperbole operates through auxesis in 
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order to accomplish the task of moving from impossibility to possibility.  An impossible 
future or revivified ideal is asserted in order to critique the present and move one’s 
audience towards a possible transformation and/or renewal.  Through hyperbole, a 
contradictory transition from impossibility to possibility occurs.  This transition is also 
the case in the next function of hyperbole, which is a lie on the side of truth(s). 
A LINGUISTIC LIE ON THE SIDE OF HERMENEUTICAL TRUTH(S) 
 
Hyperbole is often accused of being simply a lie, kakozelia, or a lowd lyer, but its 
history often reveals another relationship between lie and truth.  As Johnson states, “To 
hyperbolize is to tell and not to tell enormous truths in one eloquent breath.”110  
Unfortunately, this link between truth and lie within hyperbole’s overall function is now 
replaced by only one side of its function – to lie.  Hyperbole is not to be trusted or 
believed.  Easily open for attack of being only a lie for its seeming insincerity and 
violation of decorum and moderation, hyperbole is often lambasted for its bombastic and 
artificial ornamentation, but there is another side to hyperbole repeatedly overlooked – a 
lie on the side of truth(s).   
Hyperbole offers one a lie that paradoxically does not intend to deceive but to 
productively de-stabilize and surpass a particular truth, a given interpretation of a truth, in 
order to offer the possibility of re-interpreting one’s perception of that truth.  Without 
negotiating and moving through the tension between truth and lie, however, hyperbole’s 
power is diminished or even undone.  That is, hyperbole forcefully attempts to radically 
disrupt one’s given interpretation of reality through the shocking and de-stabilizing effect 
of a heuristic conceit.  Hyperbole is duplicitous and offers a lie that is a double-cross.  A 
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hyperbolic lie both is and is not a lie, and this duplicity is the attempt to compel one to 
see beyond the lie that is offered not to deceive but to create a moment when assumed 
truth(s) might be re-interpreted and foster a transition from one meaning to another.  If 
this process is mis-apprehended or resisted, if the hyperbolic lie is not recognized as such 
in order to heighten the suspicion that more is being communicated than what is actually 
stated, then the re-interpretive work of hyperbole fails, which is why the positive 
reception of hyperbole is so vital for its effectiveness. 
Related to but also distinct from hyperbole’s impossibility/possibility function, 
e.g., a lie need not be an impossibility, the truth/lie function is more specifically designed 
to intentionally create epistemological playfulness.  Hyperbole’s truth/lie function self-
consciously and brazenly exaggerates a falsehood, which may not be an impossibility, in 
order to force one to self-reflexively re-evaluate one’s perspective in regard to meaning.  
A hyperbolic lie presents one with such a radical contradiction, e.g., Obama is Hitler, that 
one’s attention is arrested and not allowed to resolve the conflict immediately or easily.  
The suspicion that something more is being said is heightened, but one may not instantly 
see any particular truth(s) in the lie or even apprehend what is occurring perceptually.  In 
the face of such a shocking or surprising contradiction, one is forced to look beyond the 
deceit for other truth(s) or perspectives that might be indicated by the hyperbolic lie. 
It is the purpose of this section to explore the productive contradictory connection 
between truth and lie as a hyperbolic function, which one might view as an objective, 
linguistic lie transitioning towards subjective, hermeneutical truth(s).  In a 
poststructuralist context, truth is shown to be subjective and perspectival rather than 
objective and enduring.  Nietzsche’s essay, “On Truth and Lie,” which influences much 
  176       
poststructuralist thought, is one example of this occurrence.  He argues that objective 
truth is actually a metaphorical construction that is forgotten to be a subjective 
convention, which means that what one holds to be a truth is a lie in that there is no 
absolute truth.  Conversely, a lie is also the truth.  More precisely, a lie masquerades as 
the truth.  Truth is a figural expression, not a literal reality. 
 Despite hyperbole’s attempt to force one to see beyond its literal assertion to other 
figural revelations, this endeavor can and does fail.  Rather than seeing some other 
truth(s) or insights through hyperbole’s falsehood, one may simply see the lie as a lie.  In 
this sense, hyperbole is a heuristic device inviting one to explore the possibilities for 
expanding one’s conception of truth(s) beyond its conventional bounds.  It is a heuristic 
that produces real, contextual change by leading to an epistemological insight.  A 
blindness to this insight robs hyperbole of its power.  Just as one might “forget,” as 
Nietzsche says, that a particular truth is premised upon one’s (re)interpretation and 
perception of that truth, one might also mis-perceive that a hyperbolic lie always points 
beyond itself.  Hyperbole attempts to guide one through the lie in order to allow for a 
(re)interpretation of a given perception of reality or assumed truth. 
For example, many Christians today privilege interpreting scripture literally rather 
than figuratively.  Despite a centuries old tradition at least beginning with Origen and 
moving through Augustine, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance, the figurative 
exploration of scripture is often abandoned by those like Fundamentalist Christians who 
prefer an inerrant and literal view of scripture.  Here, the (re)interpretation of truth is 
devalued in two ways.  First, it is interpreted literally, which denies its rich 
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transformative, even transcendent, power.  Second, the ways that Christians might 
perceive truths within scripture as revealed through rhetorical means is all but lost. 
 On the first count, those like the Fundamentalists might benefit from the 
corrective of Nietzsche’s insights.  On the second count, they might also benefit from the 
insight of hyperbole.  It is not that hyperbole, or rhetoric in general, is an outright lie.  
Rather, the epistemological double-cross precludes a revealing observation, which is a 
subjective hermeneutical revelation.  Through this duplicitous paradox, a destabilizing 
transition occurs from one given to another, which must then be repeated in order to 
foster further (re)interpretive development.  Hyperbole is the “maximization” of the 
literal, which is non-literal, at the limit.  “It marks the literal (in excess) as figure through 
a certain impersonality.  It suggests a kind of figure without a face, a mask that is one 
with the masked.”111  Hyperbole unmasks the truth by putting on a mask-as-lie in order to 
merge with the truth-as-masked and move beyond it.  The linguistic deceit of hyperbole 
is forceful and shocking but only temporary, and it is employed in the service of a 
disruptive hermeneutical transition from one way of perceiving the world to another.   
For example, when Demetrius says something is “whiter than snow,” which he 
considers an impossibility, this is not actually true.  What this hyperbole signifies is that 
something is extremely white.  It is not a true statement, but it is one that offers the truth 
of the “whiteness” of something, which alters one’s perceptual field on two levels.  It 
forces the hearer to recall their given perception of snow, and it then requires the hearer 
to apply that perception to the present context.  On these subjective and objective levels, 
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hyperbolic metaphor surprises the hearer with its deceit thereby forcing one beyond the 
literal statement into a figural hermeneutic realm.   
Taking this simple observation to a more theoretical level, the lie of hyperbole is 
not a falsehood intended to deceive but a concerted effort to destabilize perceptions of 
meaning in order to reveal alternative conceptions of truth and knowledge.  Hyperbole is 
not simply a lie, but an excessive figural distortion on the side of truth.  For those like 
Quintilian, it is an exaggerated mis-recognition that leads to recognition and a theoretical 
method of epistemological inquiry that highlights the fragility of meaning through excess.  
In this theory of excess, affirming a falsehood through exaggeration in the pursuit of 
knowledge is necessary because the known is not capable of expressing the as yet 
unknown, the as yet unrealized within knowledge itself. 
QUINTILIAN’S ELEGANT SURPASSING OF THE TRUTH 
 
Quintilian offers a detailed and profound explication of this function of hyperbole.  
Implied in Seneca’s discussion of the impossibility/possibility of hyperbole, Quintilian 
explicitly suggests that hyperbole is an “elegant [i.e., decorous] surpassing of the truth”112 
(superiectio).  Or, as Longinus says, hyperbole is a “strain on the facts.”113  On an 
epistemological level, Quintilian defines hyperbole stating, “It is sufficient to remark that 
the hyperbole lies, but not so as to intend to deceive by lying, and we therefore ought to 
consider more carefully how far it becomes us to exaggerate that which is not 
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believed.”114  Quite plainly, Quintilian makes his claim:  hyperbole lies but not to 
deceive.  On its face, this claim is a complete non sequitur because a lie is by definition 
always intended to deceive.  Paradoxically, this statement reveals two levels of 
Quintilian’s epistemological theory:  1) epistemological enquiry cannot survive on truth 
alone and 2) a hyperbolic lie is different from a lie in its general sense of the term.   
In order to explore questions regarding the truth, a rhetorical deception is 
necessary to push the truth beyond normal ways of perceiving it, and hyperbole is 
particularly effective at engaging in this task.  Within the realm of hyperbole, a lie is not 
necessarily a lie, which is true of all tropes and figures.  Yet, Quintilian gives the 
hyperbolic lie a pride of place above other tropes and figures because hyperbole is 
specifically given the paradoxical role of a lie that does not deceive.  Duplicitous 
hyperbole must surpass the truth through a deceit in order to reveal other truths about and 
beyond conventional truth claims, a double-cross, but this tactic must be used with 
caution.   
After suggesting that hyperbole might elegantly surpass the truth, Quintilian then 
goes on to suggest that one must consider its use – “We therefore ought to consider more 
carefully how far it becomes us to exaggerate that which is not believed” – and this 
statement can be interpreted in two ways.  It does become a rhetor to exaggerate what is 
not believed.  Or, it does not become a rhetor to exaggerate what is not believed.  In the 
context of his overall treatment of hyperbole, both interpretations are correct.  Avoiding 
kakozelia is of utmost importance, but moving the audience beyond their given reality is 
often necessary based upon subject matter defined by the exigence.   
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Hyperbole is already in excess, so it is already prone to kakozelia, which is why 
he advises caution and moderation against “extravagant” hyperbole.115  The “wit” of 
hyperbole may easily become “folly,”116 and hyperbole’s triumphant reception may 
easily turn to dismissal.  On the other hand: 
Hyperbole is a beauty when the thing of which we speak is extraordinary in 
nature.  For we are then allowed to say a little more than the truth, because the 
exact truth cannot be said, and language is more efficient when it goes beyond 
reality than when it stops short of it.117   
 
An extraordinary subject matter that defies ordinary description demands a response 
worthy of it, which makes hyperbole such an important trope because of its excessive 
epistemological nature, as well as the affectus it invokes.  It is hyperbole that 
purposefully pushes the bounds of prosaic, ordinary language and decorum in order to 
risk the force of excess and exaggeration that can describe the abnormal, the unusual, and 
the marvelous.118  Within a decorum of excess, hyperbole moves along the margins of 
language and attempts to describe what cannot be articulated through normal linguistic 
and psychological means, which is worth the risk of kakozelia.  The abnormal and 
unusual demand a different use of language and heightened speech. 
In Quintilian’s example, “Vomiting, he filled his lap and the whole tribunal with 
fragments of undigested food.”119  Here, the astonishing nature of this scene requires the 
lie of hyperbole to describe the indescribable amount of vomit ejected from one’s body 
                                                
115 Ibid., 8.6.73. 
 
116 Ibid., 8.6.74. 
  
117 Ibid., 8.6.76. 
 
118 Peter William Shoemaker, Powerful Connections:  The Poetics of Patronage in the Age of 
Louis XIII (University of Delaware Press, 2007), 84. 
 
119 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.6.68. 
 
  181       
and to evoke the pathos associated with it.  The deceit is necessary to achieve one’s 
subjective means, which is objectively justified by the exigence.  Beyond belief, without 
hyperbole, normal means of description are inadequate.  If one does not risk hyperbole, 
then the assertion may fail.  If one does risk hyperbole, then the assertion may also fail, 
but its success is worth the risk.  One must risk being misunderstood in order to 
communicate an extraordinary res.  Thus, an extraordinary response must be employed, 
and it is better for this hyperbolic response to go beyond reality than fall short of it.  
While caution may be advised by Quintilian, he lands firmly on the side of risking 
accusations of kakozelia to makes one’s point.   
Further explicating the lie of hyperbole, Quintilian writes: 
It is in common use, as much among the unlearned as among the learned, because 
there is in all men a natural propensity to magnify or extenuate what comes before 
them, and no one is contented with the exact truth.  But such departure from the 
truth is pardoned because we do not affirm what is false.120   
 
Not only is hyperbole given the task of lying on the side of truth, hyperbole is privileged 
over the truth itself.  It is the universal nature of both “unlearned” and “learned” 
humanity to hyperbolize because the exact truth is not enough.  One must use a 
hyperbolic, decorous lie to move beyond a particular assumed truth towards other 
hermeneutical truths, which are also not enough – alleged “truth” is infinitely deferred 
and disrupted.  To risk hyperbole is to risk epistemological boundaries in the pursuit of 
knowledge.  All the more reason to risk hyperbole is that if it does fail, then it may be 
“pardoned,” e.g., through remedia or the pathos it creates, for its appropriate 
disproportionality. 
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The linguistic lie is thus worth the risk in order to communicate more profound 
hermeneutical truth(s) as well as the truth that the “truth” is an unsatisfying deceit.  A 
given truth is not enough, and one must employ hyperbole to throw beyond this truth and 
reality through the paradoxical task of offering a deceit that is not deceitful in order to 
arrive at a more expanded conception of a particular truth.  There is a significant tension 
operating in Quintilian’s argument between falsehood and truth, and this tension, he 
asserts rather explicitly, can only be maintained through the duplicity of hyperbole, which 
forces the hearer beyond their epistemological limits.   
Going back to the example of Nietzsche for a moment, his Overman 
(Ubermensch) or his assertion of the death of God, which are both beyond the reality of 
good and evil, can be interpreted as hyperbolic lies on the side of other (re)interpreted 
truth(s).  The Overman is not an actual being but a surpassing of the truth of humanity.  
The death of “God” is also not the actual death of “God” but a hyperbolic lie intended to 
excessively disrupt normative, i.e., classical theistic, conceptions of “God” and put them 
to rest.  These lies are hyperbolic figures of thought with the purpose of dismantling 
conventions of meaning and being.  Nietzsche writes, “Facts are precisely what there is 
not, only interpretations.”121  He puts a strain on the facts, and just as for Quintilian, the 
truth is never enough.  Language, in fact, is more efficient when it goes beyond reality 
rather than stopping short of it. 
Nietzsche “re-mystifies” the truth through his hyperbolic lies.  As Allan Megill 
writes: 
[Nietzsche] wants to say that there is no such thing as a thing – that every “thing” 
is only a mask for some other “thing,” which in its turn will be seen to be only a 
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mask as well…the process of interpretation itself [is] a process infinite in its 
unfolding, for the ground is never reaching, the “original” or “transcendental” 
signified never uncovered.122 
 
Nietzsche offers linguistic lies in order to present alternative hermeneutical truth(s).  He 
does not offer hyperbole as beyond belief but beyond the reality of deeply held beliefs.  
The affectus this causes in the audience is often extreme, and he is often misinterpreted 
and accused of kakozelia.  Indeed, until Walter Kaufmann’s rather recent re-interpretation 
of Nietzsche, this accusation was commonplace.  Yet, through Nietzsche’s use of a 
decorum of excess, those like Kaufmann eventually see the truth in the lies of Nietzsche’s 
hyperbolic logic – what Nietzsche might call “the magic of the extreme.”123 
 Webb notes two rather obvious hyperboles in Nietzsche’s discourse that are worth 
quoting.  In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche writes, “No one has ever had more of the new, the 
unheard-of, the really new-created in artistic means to squander…before me one did not 
know what can be done with the German language” (EH, 74-5).  He later writes, “I am 
not a man I am dynamite…I am by far the most terrible human being there has ever 
been” (EH, 127).124  In these statements, Nietzsche presents his audience with objective 
lies in order to reveal subjective truth(s) about himself and his Overman.  Out of a 
“fragmented individuality” that he sees as a crisis of representation, he (re)presents his 
audience with a “mythos of the future,”125 which he often does through affectus rather 
than ratio. 
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Nietzsche’s objective justification for his hyperbole is the crisis of representation, 
and as Webb suggests, “Nietzsche’s hyperbole is intended because he thought he was 
responding to a crisis, which could only be overcome in the most extreme terms.”126  
Nietzsche thought he must excessively disrupt the normative values of society and 
philosophy to force subjective transition of meaning and being.  The crisis for Nietzsche 
is the common belief in rigidified Apollonian ideal illusions as transcendent knowledge, 
and in response, he risks a hyperbolic Dionysian interruption as critique.127   
Responding to the crisis of representation at a kairotic moment, Nietzsche 
engages in a type of epideictic form by referencing common values, e.g., good and evil, 
as “myths that will be useful in the present,” which are propagated by “history.”128  He 
then re-formulates or transvalues those values in light of an impossible hyperbolic lie, 
e.g., the disproportionate Overman, described through auxesis, which heightens the 
critique of his present (philosophical) situation.  The hermeneutical truth(s) his linguistic 
lies create within a decorum of excess offer errant insights of transformation in the 
present as well as into the future.   
In sum, hyperbole can elegantly surpass the truth because:  1) no one is content 
with the exact truth, 2) the exact truth can never be stated, 3) language is more efficient 
when it goes beyond reality, and 4) it is better to say too much than not enough.  
Hyperbole radically resists the closure of presumed absolute truths and disrupts through 
its duplicity to both lie and not lie.  It is these observations by Quintilian that play out 
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time and again within the history of rhetoric and, as shown in Derrida’s and Nietzsche’s 
discourse, within the history of philosophy as well. 
THE INFLUENCE OF QUINTILIAN’S THEORY OF HYPERBOLE 
 
Much ado is made during the Renaissance about appearance and reality.  New 
hermeneutical theories are developed and the relation between truth and artifice as well 
as impossibility and possibility are produced.  Regarding hyperbole, however, most 
discussions are redundant and even exact copies of Quintilian’s views of hyperbole.  John 
Hoskyns, for example, suggests that hyperbole’s articulation “beyond the truth” will 
descend to the truth, or that the “flat impossibility” of hyperbole may highlight “the 
unspeakableness than the untruth of the relation.”129  As for Quintilian, Hoskyns posits 
that hyperbole’s moving beyond the truth does not lead to a deceit but to another yet 
unrealized truth through the paradox of contradiction.  Bernard Lamy also practically 
plagiarizes Quintilian in his The Art of Speaking.130  On the other hand, Baroque writers 
do extend, and even diverge from, some of the typical suggestions made about hyperbole.  
Baltasar Gracian, for example, makes a distinction between “witty exaggeration” and 
rhetorical hyperbole,131 but these excursions do not affect my overall argument.  The 
main functions of hyperbole remain intact. 
One summary statement of Renaissance hyperbole, confirming my own 
assertions, is offered by Stanivukovic who writes, “A lie, expressed in linguistic terms, 
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becomes truth on a hermeneutical level.  Hyperbole thus acts as a generator of 
meaning,”132 and he continues: 
The significance of hyperbole here lies in the particular use of the referential 
meaning it contains.  The writer draws on a concrete reference from a familiar 
myth, evoking particular expectations, which are betrayed by relating the mythical 
story to a new literary reality.  The hyperbolic form suggests this deviation from 
the expected to the newly created reality.133 
 
These statements about Renaissance hyperbole are a concise summary of Quintilian’s 
theory of hyperbolic truth and lie as well as my observations about hyperbole within that 
framework.  Offering a copia of meaning, hyperbole betrays the conventional and the 
normative in order to deviate from accepted truths and perceptions of reality.  
Reminiscent of an epideictic form, the hyperbolic form references familiar truths and 
shared values, re-formulates them, and offers new (re)interpretive possibilities through a 
linguistic deceit.  For Stanivukovic’s interpretation of hyperbole in the Renaissance as 
well as for Quintilian’s theory, hyperbole offers a deceit that is not a falsehood, which 
generates meaning by moving beyond the reality of accepted truth(s). 
In a more contemporary context, similar assertions as Quintilian’s about excess 
and hyperbole are offered, but the bounds of the hyperbolic are also expanded.  Suzanne 
Guerlac, for example, writes of hyperbole: 
The expression exceeds the thing expressed.  The signifier outreaches the 
signified, remarking the enunciation within the utterance, keeping alive its force.  
The excess of the signifier marks a redundancy that renders the signified a 
signifier in its turn – a signifier of excess.  It renders the signified a kind of proper 
name that designates excess – itself in excess.134 
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Her statement is evocative of Quintilian’s descriptions of hyperbole as a necessary 
surpassing of the truth, though she translates it into a poststructuralist context.  Guerlac’s 
assertion highlights the epistemological playfulness Quintilian ascribes to hyperbole.  
Hyperbole’s figural expression exceeds the literal thing expressed.  She also pushes 
Quintilian’s theory forward by explicitly suggesting that hyperbole throws beyond the 
signified “truth” but also renders the signified a signifier, which signifies excess itself.   
Combining Guerlac’s and Quintilian’s insights, no one is content with the exact 
truth, and more than that, the truth is a hyperbolic lie that comes to signify excess itself.  
Not only does hyperbole carry a signifier beyond the signified, but the signified also 
relies upon hyperbole because the exact truth is not enough:  “It [hyperbole]…both 
oversteps the limit of the signified and constitutes the signified through the limit.”135  The 
signified must be thrown beyond the limit even as it always already transgresses the limit 
through the deceit of impossibility.  As Weiss states, “All signifieds are…figures and 
tropes,”136 and this is the promise of hyperbole:  that it will bludgeon with hammer blows 
the literal into figurality and move one beyond the literal in order to force a deeper 
(re)interpretation.  It resists, disrupts, transgresses, double-crosses, and undermines truth 
through errant137 repetition in order to keep open the fluctuating gap between the signifier 
and the signified. 
                                                
135 Ibid. 
 
136 Allen S. Weiss, The Aesthetics of Excess (Albany:  State University of New York Press, 1989), 
63. 
 
137 Mileur writes of Paul de Man, “In the final analysis, the relationship between statement and 
meaning, blindness and insight, has the structure of error without being an error; it might be called errancy 
or, tropologically, hyperbole.”  This “errancy” is an infinitely and paradoxically purposeful wandering.  See 
Mileur, The Critical Romance, 113.  See also Taylor, Erring. 
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 Guerlac’s observations are premised upon much of Derrida’s thought, and his 
views about hyperbole are equally illuminating in light of Quintilian’s discussion on the 
hyperbolic tension between truth and lie.  In a significantly similar manner to Quintilian, 
Derrida writes, “The economy of this writing is a regulated relationship between that 
which exceeds and the exceeded totality:  the différance of the absolute excess.”138  
Although Quintilian and Derrida are operating from considerably different 
epistemological assumptions, their insights are nevertheless related, or at least parallel.  
For Quintilian, a hyperbolic lie is that which exceeds beyond reality through the 
efficiency of exaggerated language.  The process of this exceeding is never complete 
because the truth never satisfies, and hyperbole must repetitively move elegantly beyond 
reality (already in excess) but never extravagantly beyond belief.  For Derrida, différance 
as repetitive hyperbole is the regulating position of deconstruction that exceeds the 
always already exceeded totality, which is and is in absolute excess.  Again, the truth 
never satisfies. 
 Derrida’s connection to Quintilian becomes more apparent when he offers his 
most extended and explicit observation about hyperbole: 
At its height hyperbole, the absolute opening, the uneconomic expenditure, is 
always reembraced by an economy and is overcome by economy.  The 
relationship between reason, madness, and death is an economy, a structure of 
deferral whose irreducible originality must be respected.  This attempt-to-say-the-
demonic-hyperbole is not an attempt among others; it is not an attempt which 
would occasionally and eventually be completed by the saying of it, or by its 
object, the direct object of a willful subjectivity.  This attempt to say, which is 
not, moreover, the antagonism of silence, but rather the condition for it, is the 
original profundity of will in general.139 
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He also asserts, “I maintain [that hyperbole] cannot be enclosed in a factual and 
determined historical structure, for it is the project of exceeding every finite and 
determined totality.”140  This is a dense definition of hyperbole, which needs explication, 
and there are many similarities to Quintilian’s thoughts about hyperbole.  First, Derrida 
uses hyperbole to make his argument.  Through incrementum, he builds his praise of 
hyperbole through two “it is not” statements and one “This attempt to say” statement.  
This incrementum culminates in suggesting that hyperbole is the “original profundity of 
will in general.”  Thus, using hyperbole tropologically, at a linguistic level, already 
shows Derrida’s inclination towards hyperbole. 
 Second, as a figure of thought, Derrida invokes the “attempt-to-say-the-demonic-
hyperbole” as the overall project of uneconomic expenditure and “exceeding every finite 
and determined totality.”  Although hyperbole is always re-economized even “at its 
heights,” it attempts to surpass the “truth” in its duplicitous movement towards “original 
profundity,” which it will never attain within an economy of reason, madness, and death.  
The heights of hyperbole always descend back into re-economization.  This highlights 
two characteristics of “demonic hyperbole” for Derrida:  1) its infinite deferral within a 
system it attempts to exceed and 2) its necessary force of repetition.   
The double-dealing demonic hyperbole ceaselessly attempts to exceed that which 
it can never exceed.  Derrida is not content with the truth, and he speaks the lie of 
exceeding economy in order to emphasize the repetitive necessity of making the attempt, 
i.e., to push the “truth” beyond is limits, “because the exact truth cannot be said.”141  
                                                
140 Ibid., 60. 
 
141 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.6.76. 
 
  190       
Through this repetition, the signifier exceeds the signified and, as Guerlac states above, 
“Marks a redundancy that renders the signified a signifier in its turn,” which reveals that 
the signified is already in excess.  “Language is more efficient when it goes beyond 
reality.”142  By attempting-to-say-the-demonic-hyperbole, a type of cleaving occurs that 
binds and keeps separate, a “holding open the differential interval of the between”143 
through hyperbole’s errant, duplicitous repetition that will never be completed but is 
always necessary and always in excess.  Thus, Derrida’s overall assessment of hyperbole 
is positive as both trope and figure of thought.  Like Quintilian, it is a deceit that leads to 
other truths; a duplicity that leads towards epistemological transition. 
Re-interpreting the Hegelian dialectical process, Slavoj Zizek contends, “The 
excess of ‘exaggeration’ is the truth which undermines the falsity of the balanced 
totality.”144  Like Quintilian, what Zizek’s (hyperbolic) assertion suggests is that 
hyperbole’s deceit leads to another view of truth by surpassing it in a “paradox of truth-
in-exaggeration.”145  Zizek argues that the alleged “balanced totality” is the actual 
falsehood and the hyperbolic lie as the excess of exaggeration, the excess of reality 
within a fantasmatic narrative of/as a spectral event, is the truth:  “‘Truth’ resides in the 
excess of exaggeration as such.”146  That is, hyperbole can reveal the epistemological 
insight that every attempt at a fixity of meaning is excessively disrupted or (re)interrupted 
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through forceful exaggeration, and this truth about symbolization is the undermining of 
radically contingent symbolic fictions posing as a totality.   
The truth never satisfies, e.g., the anxiety of desire, and hyperbole must move 
beyond this reality.  Every “truth” offered is a hyperbolic deceit that is the truth about a 
balanced totality masquerading as the truth.  The truth(s) revealed through the lie of 
hyperbole is that the signified is always already in excess as an empty signifier, and this 
duplicity exposes the fact that, as Taylor says, “The floating signifier invariably double-
crosses.”147  The “excessive fixation” on an empty signifier is double-crossed by the 
exaggeration of symbolization that resists the closure of the balanced totality through this 
“disruptive ‘exaggeration’ which disturbs its [the balanced totality’s] poise”148 and allows 
for adaptation and a radical change in self-perception.149 
The indeterminacy of such empty signifiers – indicating the plasticity and 
contingency of meaning and symbolization – can, therefore, only emerge through the 
violence of interpretation and/as the efficiency of exaggerated language:  “a violent act of 
disfiguring the interpreted text.”150  In short, the excess of exaggeration is what allows for 
a perspectival shift/mobility where limits, norms, order, and conventions are battered 
with hammer blows through a disfiguring (re)interpretation that is (re)constituted through 
thought and language itself.  As Weiss states, “Overdetermination is…the basis for all 
interpretation and exegesis, including philosophy.”151  The excess of exaggeration, the 
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hyperbolic lie on the side of truth, is the objective expression that forces one into the 
violence of subjective (re)interpretation.  As Zizek states when combining Badiou and 
Hegel, “The subject emerges in the event of ‘exaggeration’, when a part exceeds its 
limited place and explodes the constraints of balanced totality.”152  Through its duplicity, 
hyperbole disfigures, destabilizes, and unmasks a given truth through the force of its 
deceitful assertion, which pushes hermeneutical limits to the breaking point in order to 
foster epistemological and ontological transition and insight. 
Another example of this function of hyperbole to speak a lie on the side of truth as 
the excess of exaggeration occurs through the hyperbole embedded within the epideictic 
form of Michael Moore’s films.  Moore relies on a nostalgic American past in order to 
gain ethos with his audience and re-formulate shared values like individualism, active 
citizenship, and patriotism.  He then critiques the present moment based on these re-
formulated values.  Much as the “Spanish hyperbolists” did, Moore implements 
hyperbole as an ethical response to the exigence of greed (codicia), despondency 
(desaliento), and a precipitous descent leading to disastrous collapse (despenamiento),153 
and this ethical response is embedded within his epideictic form.  Through auxesis, he 
offers a “greater beauty” of what America might once more become when the greed of a 
corrupt government is squelched.   
For Moore, a corrupt government is his exigence that demands an extraordinary 
response, which is the objective (phenomenological) justification for using hyperbole.  
His ethos is established through his persona of being a regular, though intelligent, 
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individual who is passionate about defending America from corruption.  From his dress 
to the “dumpy” way he presents himself, he plays on a “Joe the plumber” persona that is 
often respected by his audience, e.g., in his movie “Slacker Uprising.”  This aids in his 
task of implementing forceful pathos that is the subjective (psychological) justification 
for the use of hyperbole.  His hyperbole is certainly not well received by all in his 
audience, and he is often accused of kakozelia whereby his “wit” seemingly turns to 
“folly.”  Yet, as Quintilian notes, it is better to attempt too much than not enough.  
Moore’s attempts can always be “pardoned” when the falsehood is not affirmed but the 
insight expands perspectival limits. 
Here, the success or failure of hyperbole is shown again to be contingent upon its 
reception.  Some may accuse him of kakozelia, but others will readily accept his 
hyperbole as pushing the truth to its limits, though it is uncertain as to whether his 
hyperbole is intentional.  One might suggest that a hyperbole cannot be a hyperbole if it 
is unintended; however, the function of hyperbole and its effects are still operative 
whether it is intended or not.  The structure of the argument remains hyperbolic, and the 
emotional effects it produces are quite real as hyperbole moves the audience primarily 
through affectus rather than ratio.  The possible reception of hyperbole as revealing 
alternative interpretations about the truth also occurs whether the hyperbole is intended or 
not. 
In his most recent film, “Capitalism:  A Love Story,” as well as in his previous 
films, “Sicko” and “Fahrenheit 9/11,” he builds his argument from beginning to end 
incrementally through affectus rather than ratio.  In each film he stacks one hyperbole 
upon the next, i.e., one “strain on the facts” to the next.  Each time, the emotions of the 
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audience are stirred until they presumably move into outrage.  As Moore says about 
“Capitalism,” “The film will blow their minds,”154 which implies both a transition in 
thinking as well as heightened emotion when these new realizations are subjectively 
(re)interpreted and integrated into one’s worldview.  Stirring the audience through pathos 
and strengthening his ethos, he strains the facts in order to surpass the truth.  His 
hyperbolic heights always move in a descent back towards a political reality where his 
falsehoods are intended to duplicitously transition towards other revealed truths. 
In a statement about the health care bill that is related to the issues he raises in 
“Sicko,” he says, “To My Fellow Citizens, the Republicans:  Thanks to last night's vote, 
that child of yours who has had asthma since birth will now be covered after suffering for 
her first nine years as an American child with a pre-existing condition.”155  This type of 
exaggeration (hyperbolic metaphor) is intended to reveal what he believes to be hidden 
truths about American corruption:  “They [the viewers of “Capitalism”] will see things 
and learn things about the economic calamity we are in that have not been shown to them 
on the evening news.”156  In Zizek’s terms, the excess of Moore’s exaggeration is the 
truth undermining the appearance of a balanced American economic totality.  The empty 
signifier becomes greed itself, and Moore can violently (re)interpret that greed filling it 
                                                
154 See Michael Moore, “‘Capitalism:  A Love Story’ House Parties this Weekend – 1,000 to be 
Held across the Nation!,” MichaelMoore.Com, <http://www.michaelmoore.com/words/mikes-
letter/capitalism-love-story-house-parties-weekend-1000-be-held-across-nation> (16 April 2010). 
 
155 See Michael Moore, “The Great thing about the Health Care Bill that has Passed?  It will Save 
Republican Lives, Too (An Open Letter to Republicans from Michael Moore),” MichaleMoore.Com, 
<http://www.michaelmoore.com/words/mikes-letter/great-thing-about-health-care-law-has-passed-it-will-
save-republican-lives-too-open-letter-republicans-michael-moore> (16 April 2010). 
 
156 Moore, “House Parties.” 
 
  195       
with whatever signified he deems appropriate, e.g., governmental and corporate 
corruption. 
One scene in “Capitalism” has him standing before the New York Stock 
Exchange holding a moneybag asking for America’s money back.  His objective gesture 
is a hyperbolic lie, and the conceit reveals Moore’s subjective truth that America has 
been robbed by the government in league with corporations.  This hyperbolic sign 
signifies the entirety of the film’s message (as well as the message of his other films):  
corporate and governmental greed has exploited and taken the common American 
citizen’s money and freedom.  As Moore says, “Track the crime of the century from Wall 
Street to your street.”157  Whether capitalism is the crime of the century or not 
(comparatio), his objective exaggeration leads his audience to their own subjective 
conclusions about capitalism, which, for Moore, is that the government has sold out to 
Wall Street.  This statement in itself is a hyperbolic figure of thought transcending both 
films, and it is parallel to Derrida’s discussion of demonic hyperbole. 
These two individual’s contexts are quite different, but the impetus is the same.  
In Derrida’s case, the truth-as-totality is what must be repeatedly exceeded through 
hyperbolic différance because hyperbole will always be re-economized into the system of 
totality it attempts to disrupt and transgress.  This exigence requires the response of 
demonic hyperbole in order to crack the walls of the tower of truth-as-totality and reveal 
the project of madness that lies beneath.  In Moore’s case, the alleged truth about the 
American government and capitalism as totality is a lie, which can only be revealed 
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through various hyperbolic deceits that will lead to the possibility of de-stabilizing this 
perception.   
For both Derrida and Moore, the project of thinking the demonic hyperbole is a 
repetitive necessity in order to disrupt conventional assumptions.  Moore’s films are 
always re-economized, literally within a market economy where he makes large 
quantities of money, but his films attempt to move beyond the accepted truth of 
capitalism to reveal other truths about this economic system.  By making multiple films, 
and repeating the gesture of madness, he is repetitively chipping away at the façade of 
conventional norms.  One film is not enough.  The attempt to hyperbolically reveal must 
always be (re)attempted. 
In sum, the contradiction between truth and lie leads to an epistemological 
transition through the work of hyperbole as trope and as figure of thought.  The 
epistemological heights of hyperbole transform thought in its descent back towards 
reality, and the truth that is the lie is double-crossed by the lie that reveals other truths.  
Hyperbole can elegantly surpass the truth because:  1) no one is content with the exact 
truth, 2) the exact truth can never be stated, 3) language is more efficient when it goes 
beyond reality, 4) it is better to say too much than not enough, 5) the project of thinking 
must attempt to exceed its bounds for epistemological transformation to occur, 6) the 
excess of exaggeration is the truth that disrupts the presumed balanced totality, and 7) the 
signified is already in excess and must be pushed beyond itself through the destabilizing 
hyperbolic signifier.  Through objective and subjective use, objective and subjective 
justification, exigence and ethos, auxesis, and duplicitous transition, hyperbole is seen as 
a complex and important rhetorical device.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The two functions of hyperbole discussed in this chapter are important for 
constructing and understanding an overall theory of hyperbole.  They are the functions 
historically ascribed to hyperbole, and they also enrich one’s understanding of hyperbole.  
Simply viewing hyperbole as an impossibility or a lie is a deficient interpretation of 
hyperbole.  For those like Seneca and Derrida, it is moving through the difficulty of 
impossibility towards possibility that signifies the significance of hyperbole.  For those 
like Quintilian and Nietzsche, it is viewing hyperbole as a deceit on the side of other 
truths, and the undermining of the “truth” itself, that allows its epistemological and 
ontological force to be perceived.  Transgressing and constituting signifieds at the limits 
of signification, hyperbole reveals the excess of meaning and being contained within the 
abundance of the signifier that signifies and constitutes excess itself.  Indeed, the 
economy of signification itself operates within a decorum of excess that reveals both the 
insufficiency and inexhaustibility of language and meaning. 
 Within a decorum of excess, hyperbole is shown to operate appropriately and 
effectively.  Hyperbole balances on the edge of kakozelia more than other tropes, and its 
reception is paramount.  Offering a hyperbole risks misunderstanding, and its subjective 
and objective justification is the responsibility of the hyperbolist.  Providing 
phenomenological and psychological transition out of contradictory epistemological and 
ontological positions places a strain on language and perspectives, and the burden a 
hyperbolist bears requires a complex feat of rhetorical dexterity.  Negotiating ethos and 
pathos at every figurative turn, the hyperbolist must both prepare and astonish the 
audience at an opportune moment in order to move them beyond the literal and into the 
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figural, which can move the audience into a position of transition.  The contradiction of 
hyperbole is easily viewed as folly rather than wit, and an effective transition can only be 
maintained within a decorum of excess where the excess of exaggeration is the norm and 
disproportionality is entirely appropriate and timely. 
 Through auxesis, hyperbole duplicitously resides within a realm of copious verba 
and stylistic excess that guides one towards the re-presentation of a res through 
contrariety and paradox, but the interpretation of the hyperbole is left entirely in the 
hands of the audience.  The double-dealing hyperbole risks its position of elegance for 
the sake of the audience who is seemingly eager to dismiss it, but the astonishing res 
hyperbole can re-present is worth the risk.  Its risk is worth it because the alleged truth is 
never enough.  The “truth” can only be meaningfully explored and disrupted by moving 
beyond its own presumed reality-as-totality, and hyperbole shatters the absolute closure 
of assumed truth thereby allowing for shocking and forceful epistemological and 
ontological transition.  The surprising and baffling errant logic of hyperbole disrupts and 
dismantles normative epistemological frameworks with hammer blows.   
Exemplified in the epideictic and grotesque genres, hyperbole moves within an 
alternate reality of logic and reason where an impossibility can but might not lead to 
other possibilities and a lie can but might not lead to other hermeneutical truths.  Used 
intentionally or unintentionally, hyperbole bludgeons the literal and forges it into the 
figural, and this ambitious project can only be accomplished through an excess of affectus 
and the exaggeration of reality.  Paradoxically moving between one extreme and the 
other, hyperbole both tells and does not tell.  It both reveals and re-veils.  It both 
disorients and re-orients in one eloquent breath.
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CHAPTER 4:  THE DISORIENTING RE-ORIENTATION OF HYPERBOLE 
 
All visions of what is not are hyperbolic and therefore, from within the “economy” which 
they transgress, appear in the aspect of monstrosity (or madness) – some actually are. 
Jean-Pierre Mileur 
 
The road to excess leads to the palace of wisdom. 
William Blake 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In the last chapter I explored the impossibility/possibility and truth/lie functions 
of hyperbole that serve to facilitate phenomenological and psychological transition 
through epistemological and ontological disruption.  These two fundamental functions of 
hyperbole are mainly established by Quintilian and are carried forward in the historical 
discussion.  The two functions together constitute a third meta-function, which I derive 
from two unelaborated statements by Paul Ricoeur.  In this chapter I will explicate the 
meta-function of hyperbole to re-orient perspectives and interpretations of a given 
context or reality through disorientation.  That is, it is now clearer that each function of 
hyperbole re-orients through disorientation.  Furthermore, while the first two functions 
have a clear historical grounding in rhetorical theory, this meta-function has no explicit 
ties to previous theories of hyperbole.  Thus, this chapter aids in reviving and revivifying 
hyperbole as a critical trope by offering a new contribution to the theory of hyperbole. 
The disorientation/re-orientation meta-function comes from two somewhat 
problematic rhetorico-theological statements made by Ricoeur, which I will significantly 
expand upon since they are left unexplored by him in any meaningful way.  His 
statements suggest what I suspected all along about hyperbole, but I was unable to 
articulate it succinctly.  As such, Ricoeur’s insight is the inspiration for this function, and 
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the main statement I will focus on is offered by Ricoeur regarding parables in the New 
Testament.  He writes, “[Hyperbole] reorients by first disorienting [the law of paradox 
and hyperbole]…[and] makes the extraordinary break forth in the ordinary [the law of 
extravagance].”1  Specifically indicating the paradoxical extravagance of hyperbole, 
Ricoeur unintentionally highlights the overall function, or “law,” of hyperbole.  This 
disorientation/re-orientation function Ricoeur posits is crucial for hyperbole because it 
operates at a meta-theoretical level guiding the first two functions.  The overall purpose 
of hyperbole as trope or figure of thought is to disorient through contradiction and re-
orient towards a transition in meaning and being.  Hyperbole can teach and move its 
audience and offer them what they already desire – epistemological and ontological 
expansion – and this is exemplified in the grotesque genre. 
As in the previous chapter I will use the epideictic and grotesque genres as 
examples that reveal this forceful demand of hyperbole.  I will focus mainly on the 
grotesque genre, but epideictic will sometimes come into play.  The disorienting function 
of hyperbole as a double-dealing gesture of duplicity that creates vertige de l’hyperbole 
coupled with the re-orientation hyperbole facilitates is pervasive and typified in the 
grotesque.   
The grotesque is certainly a disorienting genre, and it achieves this disorientation 
by bringing disparate elements together in paradoxical and contradictory combinations 
through hyperbole’s impossible deceits.  Using hyperbole, the grotesque also re-orients 
the audience towards other perspectival and (re)interpretive possibilities.  The grotesque 
specifically highlights Gerard Genette’s statement about hyperbole I quoted in the 
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previous chapter:  “One may call hyperboles the effects by which language…draws 
closer through contrast and discontinuity, as if by burglary, realities naturally far-
removed.”2  This is, in fact, an excellent summary statement about a main characteristic 
of the grotesque genre to fuse contrarieties into hybridities of thought and language.  As 
is already evident from the last chapter, precariously holding discontinuities in tension is 
a significant function of hyperbole, and this errancy fosters as yet unrealized 
epistemological and ontological possibilities. 
I will begin with a discussion of Ricoeur’s insight into hyperbole’s 
disorientation/re-orientation function, and I will also note some difficulties with his 
observations.  I will then proceed to offer a more detailed discussion than in the last 
chapter regarding a decorum of excess where kairos and decorum work in tandem to re-
orient through disorientation.  Next, I will use the grotesque to highlight this aspect, or 
operation, of hyperbole, and I will specifically show a decorum of excess operating 
within the grotesque genre.  Finally, I will offer two variations on the theme of hyperbole 
in a grotesque key:  1) paradoxical verba and the insight of res and 2) transgressive de-
formation and errant transformation.  These variations serve the same function, but they 
each reveal different ways of conceptualizing the meta-function of hyperbole to re-orient 
through disorientation.  This is how I will construct the final meta-function of hyperbole, 
which is epitomized in the grotesque genre, and further reveal hyperbole’s critical 
contributions to rhetorical theory and criticism. 
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HYPERBOLIC DISORIENTATION AND RE-ORIENTATION 
 RICOEUR’S HYPERBOLE 
 
The operative impetus of hyperbole to re-orient through disorientation is, as I 
said, not one historically ascribed to it.  It is implied but never fully articulated.  Ricoeur, 
then, offers a keen insight into hyperbole, but he does not elucidate his statements in any 
detail.  As noted above, Ricoeur posits that hyperbole paradoxically “reorients by first 
disorienting [the law of paradox and hyperbole]…[and] makes the extraordinary break 
forth in the ordinary [the law of extravagance].”3  Ricoeur also suggests, “Hyperbole, like 
paradox, leads us back to the heart of existence.”4  In these two statements, a world of 
possibilities is opened for hyperbole.  To this end, I will explore these statements in order 
to establish disorientation and re-orientation as a meta-function of hyperbole, and I will 
examine kairos and decorum to reveal their importance for this function, as they are 
imperative for all functions of hyperbole.  I will then show how the grotesque exemplifies 
this “law” of hyperbole. 
 The first observation to re-iterate is that disorientation/re-orientation is an 
umbrella function of hyperbole that also buttresses the previous two functions of 
hyperbole.  It is not overt but causes overt emotional responses and consequences.  It is 
always operating within hyperbole, and it pervades every aspect of this trope’s functions.  
When one asserts a hyperbolic impossibility or a hyperbolic lie, the intention is to 
disorient one’s audience by shocking them and disrupting previously held assumptions 
                                                
3 Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred, 229. 
 
4 Ibid., 59. 
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about reality.  Once this disorientation occurs, the audience is ready for a re-orientation; a 
paradoxical movement leading towards transition.   
Almost as sensory deprivation (attenuation) or overload (accumulation or 
incrementum) prepares one for indoctrination or brainwashing, hyperbole disorients the 
hearer in order to de-stabilize their thoughts and perspectives.  Only when this 
disorientation is invoked is the hearer then ready to be re-oriented to another way of 
thinking or being.  To be clear, I am not suggesting that hyperbole brainwashes, but the 
momentary shock of hyperbole can induce a similar psychological effect or experience, 
e.g., when Longinus uses hyperbole to “transport” the audience into the realm of the 
sublime. 
The second observation to highlight is Ricoeur’s subtle detour from Quintilian’s 
theory of hyperbole.  Ricoeur’s departure is also distinct from every other rhetorical 
theorist examined thus far.  For Ricoeur, hyperbole forces the extraordinary to break into 
the ordinary – a transcendent movement into immanence.  For other theorists, hyperbole 
is an extraordinary break from the ordinary – a movement from immanence towards 
transcendence or a transcendent movement across immanental boundaries.  This is, in 
fact, the novelty of Ricoeur’s claim, and it is an important distinction to make.  In the 
latter instance, hyperbole is simply a deviation from the conventional and normative, a 
rhetorical hyperbole.  In Ricoeur’s case, hyperbole ushers the extraordinary into the 
ordinary as if from some other realm, a theological hyperbole.  It appears as a type of 
onto-theological metaphysics of presence where one receives a pre-packaged hyperbole 
from some extraordinary realm, but this is antithetical to rhetorical hyperbole because the 
purpose of rhetorical hyperbole is to use as well as to respond to the extraordinary.  
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However, Ricoeur’s theological hyperbole that leads one back to the heart of existence 
nevertheless highlights the transitional effect of hyperbole, which still reveals interesting 
hyperbolic movements within discourse.  
For example, Flannery O’Connor’s grotesque novels engage hyperbole from a 
rhetorico-theological perspective.  Theorists of the grotesque often reference O’Connor 
as exemplifying the “literary grotesque,” and their characterizations accentuate Ricoeur’s 
understanding of hyperbole as a disorientation leading one back to a re-orientation that 
reveals the essence of existence.  James Goodwin suggests that to convey matters of faith 
O’Connor uses “exaggerated and overdetermined methods,” and he quotes O’Connor in 
Mystery and Manners, “You have to make your vision apparent by shock – to the hard of 
hearing you shout, and for the almost-blind you draw large and startling figures.”5  The 
prevalence of hyperbole is perhaps obvious in these statements.  Exaggeration, 
overdetermination, and shocking visions are all evident references to hyperbole, and the 
shocking, shouting, and startling figures in O’Connor’s novels disorient through 
hyperbole.  Her use of hyperbole is a disorienting break from the ordinary, but the re-
orientation also occurs from a vision that breaks into the ordinary revealing “the heart of 
existence.”   
Goodwin suggests that O’Connor’s literary grotesque discloses “intrinsic truths,” 
and again quoting O’Connor, “Reveals what we are essentially.”6  Through hyperbole, 
these intrinsic truths and what we are essentially are seemingly extraordinary insights that 
break into the ordinary.  O’Connor employs hyperbole as a deviation from the ordinary, 
                                                
5 James Goodwin, Modern American Grotesque:  Literature and Photography (Columbus:  The 
Ohio State University Press, 2009), 97. 
 
6 Ibid., 98. 
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but it then rebounds back allowing the extraordinary to break into the ordinary.  The 
insight this brings is the “truth,” one’s essential nature, or the heart of existence.  In this 
sense, Ricoeur’s claims are not completely different from other rhetorical theories of 
hyperbole, which suggest that the heights of hyperbole always descend back into a 
contextual reality revealing a transitional insight regarding meaning and being.  Yet, his 
metaphysical assumptions remain distinct from rhetorical hyperbole.  Operating within a 
Christian context, O’Connor and Ricoeur share the same presuppositions about reality 
that perhaps guide their perceptions about hyperbole, but despite Ricoeur’s superb insight 
into hyperbole’s disorienting/re-orienting function, his claims remain somewhat 
rhetorically problematic.   
 Out of his Christian context, Ricoeur’s definition of hyperbole is inexorably tied 
to kairos, or a kairotic moment, as Paul Tillich puts it.  Kairos, theologically speaking, is 
interpreted as “the time of God” or the “fullness of time” when the in-breaking of the 
kingdom of God can occur and reveal or bring one to the “heart of existence.”  It is a 
moment where chronos time is radically disrupted and transcendence and immanence 
coalesce.  Rhetorically, kairos is the “timely” or “opportune” moment when the most 
suasive force might be implemented in order to affect some type of change.  Ricoeur’s 
claim is thus premised upon a metaphysics of presence whereas rhetorical kairos is 
premised upon a more socio-political context.  Theological kairos assumes a revelation of 
some essence of being, while rhetorical kairos makes no such presupposition.  These 
difficulties with Ricoeur’s understanding of hyperbole aside, his statements about 
disorientation and re-orientation reveal two important aspects of hyperbole I wish to 
explicate:  kairos and decorum. 
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 Kairos is an important part of rhetorical theory in general, and it is particularly 
crucial for hyperbole.  Kairos is implied throughout each function of hyperbole discussed 
thus far.  Whether advising the caution of timely moderation or the encouragement of 
timely exaggeration, kairos surges as an undercurrent guiding the uses and abuses of 
hyperbole.  Most significantly, kairos largely determines the effectiveness of hyperbole 
since the reception of hyperbole is almost entirely dependent upon its timely use by the 
hyperbolist.  While Ricoeur’s statement about hyperbole emphasizes kairos, most other 
theories of hyperbole discussed thus far stress decorum, but these are interrelated 
conceptions.  Concisely, Ricoeur makes kairos explicit and decorum implicit while other 
rhetorical theorists of hyperbole make decorum explicit and kairos implicit. 
 The issues of decorum and kairos have emerged throughout this overall project, 
and it is now time to explore these issues.  I save this discussion for the final section for 
two reasons.  First, these rhetorical concepts operate at a meta-hyperbolic level, and 
hyperbole’s disorientation/re-orientation function does as well, which means that this 
function exemplifies the use of kairos and decorum.  They are always present and always 
crucial, but they are never quite overt, though the effects they create will hopefully 
become obvious and tangible.   
Second, I posit that, within a decorum of excess, kairos facilitates hyperbole’s 
disorienting function and decorum facilitates hyperbole’s re-orienting function.  As a type 
of dialogical counter-balance, the initial shock of hyperbole is forced onto the audience at 
a kairotic moment through kairotic speech, and the ensuing disorientation is mitigated by 
a decorous re-orientation.  Kairos and decorum are the churning inner conflict of 
hyperbole.  Derrida’s characterization of hyperbole in terms of the “demonic” thus seems 
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appropriate.  Hyperbole has hidden depths that are in constant turmoil and are not 
revealed all at once, but it is this turmoil that makes hyperbole so effective at disturbing 
one’s audience enough to make them re-consider their initial positions.   
A hyperbolic assertion may seem shocking and “all at once,” but the forceful 
implications of hyperbole are often unrealized until after the initial encounter.  A 
seemingly distasteful violation of decorum, one may not be initially prepared for the 
kairotic moment of hyperbole’s force.  This is one reason why hyperbole and decorum 
appear to have a love-hate relationship.  To take the personification further, hyperbole 
and decorum are at once intimately wedded as well as bitter enemies.  Hyperbole is 
always pushing, de-stabilizing, and risking decorum, fighting for its chance to shock and 
disrupt, and decorum is always attempting to contain and tame hyperbole even as it 
damns hyperbole’s nature to exceed every boundary. 
A DECORUM OF EXCESS:  KAIROTIC DISORIENTATION AND 
DECOROUS RE-ORIENTATION 
 
Decorum, as a balance or propriety that “becomes the measure for assessing the 
rhetorical quality for expression,”7 is an important issue to address in terms of hyperbole 
because hyperbole may easily fall victim to accusations of kakozelia.  It is, in fact, 
through decorum that hyperbole is often condemned as unnatural, disorderly, and 
tasteless.  This indictment is offered despite the fact that even in nature harmony and 
balance are often disrupted through the brutal force of “natural” disasters such as 
earthquakes and typhoons, which, like hyperbole, often strike without warning.  As 
evidenced by Quintilian’s difficult, though dexterous, negotiation between hyperbole and 
                                                
 7 Michael Leff, “The Habitation of Rhetoric,” in Argument & Critical Practices Proceeding from 
the Fifth SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation, ed. Joseph Wenzel (Annandale:  SCA, 1987), 6. 
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decorum, maintaining a decorous approach to extraordinary subject matter is risky and 
uncertain.  As Johnson writes, “Hyperbolic amplification proves a means of exhausting or 
mocking received ideas, including the idea(l) of decorum.”8  Hyperbole is often more 
effective when it pushes decorum to its limits and offers the audience the unexpected, 
even the impossibility of moderation itself. 
Historically, rhetorical theorists arbitrate this issue of violating moderation and 
decorum by offering a more fluid conception of decorum regarding hyperbole.  For 
example, Quintilian separates a more decorous elegant hyperbole from extravagant 
hyperbole, and Erasmus largely rejects the strictures of decorum within his system of 
copia.  Or, rhetorical theorists accommodate hyperbole by re-constituting a separate type 
of decorum where hyperbole might operate, e.g., Tertullian’s “Christian ornamentation,” 
Longinus’s elevated or sublime style, and Renaissance rhetorician’s conception of 
“sacred rhetoric.”  The issue of violation is also mitigated through one’s ethos, e.g., in 
Augustine’s framework as well as Quintilian’s.  As discussed in the previous chapter, 
ethos is critical for the reception of hyperbole, and it, combined with pathos, becomes a 
subjective justification for the use of hyperbole.  Decorum, defined by its exigence, offers 
both an objective and subjective justification for hyperbole.  Adjusting decorum for 
hyperbole is thus one strategy that is beneficial for its justification and its eventual 
reception, which is why it is a common move for theorists of hyperbole, and it seems that 
decorum is as flexible as hyperbole is unaccommodating.  
Michael Leff suggests that decorum is adaptive and adjusts the structure of a 
given discourse in relation to its specific context.  It is a “flexible standard for assessing 
                                                
8 Johnson, Hyperboles, 12. 
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the intrinsic merit of a rhetorical product,”9 and Robert Hariman argues, “Failure to adapt 
indicates to observers that either the actor or the code is too rigid to warrant continued 
respect [i.e., one’s ethos] in a changing world.”10  Conceiving of decorum as flexible 
based on its context as well as influencing one’s ethos directly based on this flexibility 
allows for the (re)constitution of a type of decorum of excess,11 which heightens 
hyperbole’s effectiveness and is not contradictory to the notion of decorum overall.  
Decorum is contingent, and it alters over time and among styles of oratory.12  Johnson 
                                                
9 Leff, “The Habitation of Rhetoric,” 7. 
 
10 Robert Hariman, “Decorum, Power, and the Courtly Style,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 78, no. 
2 (1992) :  164. 
 
11 Charles W. Mignon makes a similar argument regarding Edward Taylor and what he sees as a 
decorum of imperfection.  See Charles W. Mignon, “Edward Taylor’s ‘Preparatory Meditations’:  A 
Decorum of Imperfection,” PMLA 83, no. 5 (1968) :  1423-1428.  See also Annick Paternoster, “Decorum 
and Indecorum in the ‘Seconda redazione’ of Baldassare Castiglione’s ‘Libro del Cortegiano,” The Modern 
Language Review 99, no. 3 (2004) :  622-634; Paul Achter, “Comedy in Unfunny Times:  News Parody 
and Carnival after 9/11,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 25, no. 3 (2008) :  274-303; and 
Patricia Roberts-Miller, “John Quincy Adams’s Amistad Argument:  The Problem of Outrage; or, the 
Constraints of Decorum,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 33, no. 2 (2002) :  5-25.  Roberts-Miller suggests that 
a typical conception of decorum as moderation leaves little space for “principled dissent” and “sincere 
outrage,” and Achter posits that expressing anger and rage are often viewed as a violation of decorum, 
which I would categorize, with Plato, as hyperbolic expressions.  Plato suggests that “when desire without 
reason drags us toward pleasures and rules in us, the name wanton outrage is applied to the rule.”  He 
contrasts this with a certain decorum of moderation and suggests that the excessive desirous soul lacks 
reason and pursues only pleasure.  “Sincere outrage” has no place, then, within the purview of his praised 
moderation.  See Plato, Phaedrus, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1998), 
237d-238a.  Plato’s view is then carried through Aristotle’s “vehemence” and Cicero’s “intemperance” up 
into the Renaissance.  Yet, if decorum is adaptive and flexible as Leff suggest, then a decorum of excess 
that incorporates sincere outrage and anger into its response are appropriate expressions premised upon its 
given context.   
Paul Goring also offers an interesting historical moment when decorum is allegedly violated but is 
significantly effective, and this effectiveness can be understood in terms of a decorum of excess.  Methodist 
preachers of the 18th century were often accused of “enthusiasms,” i.e., an “excess of religious zeal,” that 
were distasteful, “frantic,” and “extravagant.”  While the effectiveness of such extravagance may seem 
puzzling, I posit that this instance of alleged violation is actually a re-negotiation of decorum where 
extravagance is precisely appropriate within a decorum of excess or “enthusiasm.”  That is, the Methodist 
preachers condemned as mad and socially depraved by anti-Methodists were operating within an 
appropriate decorum of excess for others.  Viewing “enthusiasms” from this perspective of decorum 
alleviates the question of effectiveness because the extravagant sermon was entirely decorous for the 
audience thereby rendering it effective and persuasive.  See Paul Goring, The Rhetoric of Sensibility in 
Eighteenth Century Culture (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2005), 70-72. 
 
12 See Joy Connolly, The State of Speech:  Rhetoric and Political Thought in Ancient Rome 
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2007), 171.  This is derived from a Ciceronian conception of 
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even suggests that “decorum is best illustrated by the juxtaposition of the most ingenious 
and atrocious examples.  To arrive at a notion of decorum (or taste), the negative and the 
extreme are necessary starting points.”13  In this view, hyperbole is a necessary element 
of decorum in general. 
A decorum of excess is here conceived as a type of errant decorum that 
emphasizes the poetic within the oratorical; a style of plus ultra.  It is a decorum where 
exaggeration is an appropriate disproportionate expression regarding that which exceeds.  
Within this errant decorum, the vividly disproportionate response to an extraordinary 
exigence or subject matter is the appropriate “right action” that achieves suasive effect.14  
This decorum highlights the justification for hyperbole.  “Hyperbole does not merely say 
the ‘something more’; it does so for a purpose.”15  Where exaggeration is demanded, only 
a decorum of excess – where the economy of the decorum is excessive and the risk of 
heightened speech is appropriate (to prepon) – will suffice.  In this decorum, the pathos 
used, the exigence, the magnitude of subject matter, and the result of hyperbole’s force 
                                                                                                                                            
decorum premised upon “natural laws” that Cicero viewed as both contingent and necessary.  See also 
Stephen J. McKenna, Adam Smith:  The Rhetoric of Propriety (Carbondale:  Southern Illinois University 
Press, 2005). 
As Craig R. Smith writes of Cicero’s conception of decorum, “He extends the notion of propriety 
to questions of ethical conduct, thereby specifically linking it to ethos…Cicero is so taken with this linkage 
that he develops four divisions by which a public orator can organize his life with propriety.  Style also 
helps to convey the truth and leads Cicero to develop elaboration, illumination {illustrare), paradox 
(admirable), and expansion.  Because of their relationship with spoken truth, these devices became part of 
invention as well as style. This vastly expanded the less detailed notions of ‘appropriateness’ and ‘fitness of 
function’ developed by the Greek Sophists.”  See Craig R. Smith, “Roman Decorum as a New Praxis for 
Existential Communication,” Western Journal of Communication 56, no. 1 (1992) :  76. 
 
13 Johnson, Hyperboles, 26. 
 
14 Robert Hariman, “Decorum,” in Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, ed. Thomas O. Sloane (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2001), 200. 
 
15 Webb, Re-Figuring Theology, 88. 
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can function as remedia that pardon and/or justify the extraordinary means employed, but 
the possibility for the accusation of kakozelia remains acute.   
The allegation of kakozelia is perhaps the most significant reason hyperbole is 
dismissed as a critical trope, which is why a decorum of excess is vital for hyperbole to 
function effectively.  Psychologically and phenomenologically disrupting appeals to 
harmony and proportion, e.g., aesthetically and ethically, is a perilous rhetorical move, 
and the vice of excess is often resisted and rejected.  A decorum of excess is thus 
characterized overall as risky even as its risks can bring variety, vividness, and clarity of 
insight to the rhetorical situation. 
One contemporary example of using a decorum of excess is offered by Joshua 
Gunn in his article “ShitText:  Toward a New Coprophilic Style.”  Using a decorum of 
excess while arguing for his excessive new style is his goal, though he does so 
unintentionally and without reference to hyperbole.  He argues that this style links the 
biological (“shit”) to the rhetorical (“speech”).  He writes, “This style of public address 
must be akin to street shitting!  This style must truly be risky and creative…The new 
style must counter the strategies of the anti-diarrheal with the diarrheic.”16  Unwittingly 
resuscitating the Cynic practice of defecating in the middle of the street before 
declaiming, i.e., “street shitting,” “prideful overproduction” is the risk of this style, which 
is also its justification.  Within a decorum of excess, shitting and countering the anti-
diarrheal must be disproportionately appropriate and occur at an opportune moment.  
This shocking gesture is the risk of hyperbole in Gunn’s argument where all is 
exaggerated for a disorienting effect/affect. 
                                                
16 Joshua Gunn, “ShitText:  Toward a New Coprophilic Style,” Text & Performance Quarterly 26, 
no. 1 (2006) :  93-94. 
 
  212       
Gunn’s decorum of excess helps him create effective exaggeration within a 
disorienting economy of affectus.  A coprophilic style hyperbolically posits shitting as 
both biological and rhetorical excess, and in doing so, it comes dangerously close to 
kakozelia.  From the root kakos meaning “bad” and related to kakke (Lt. cacare) meaning 
“excrement” or “feces,” perhaps a kakozeliac style is a more appropriate name for his 
essay.  Yet, Gunn’s shockingly hyperbolic argument is mitigated within a decorum of 
excess where his excess is “pardoned,” i.e., it is published in a scholarly journal.  He even 
offers a remedium at the beginning of his essay in the form of a letter written to the 
editors of the journal explaining the shocking nature of his article.  
His argument is a hyperbolic lie intended to reveal other truths about rhetoric in 
general thereby re-orienting one’s perspective towards what rhetoric might mean through 
the (re)interpretive lens he presents.  Much as those in the “second sophistic” might do, 
Gunn argues for kakozelia even as he largely avoids accusations of kakozelia by 
maintaining a decorum of excess. 
Overall, a decorum of excess is a decorum that is in excess, i.e., in copia, and 
engenders a style of plus ultra.  It adapts to the unexpected risk of exaggeration – to the 
point of violation – required to facilitate transformation within a given context.  It is an 
expansion of decorum that risks and pushes decorum to its fluid limits in order to 
accommodate excess and/as exaggeration.  In a sense, hyperbole feigns violating 
decorum for rhetorical effect while remaining within the bounds of decorum.  Like the 
grotesque, hyperbole “forcibly joins the decorous with the unexpected,” and this joining 
occurs in the ambiguous space between virtuous form and rebellious content, which 
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becomes a “scene of transformation.”17  A decorum of excess offers a nebulous, tenuous 
space where appropriate form is melded with disproportionate content for the purpose of 
a transition in thought and emotion, which relies on pathos and/or ethos to insure its 
transitional effects.  In the end, this decorum contains or manifests a suitable, though 
often unexpected, response to the magnitude of the subject/situation under discussion, 
and its effect is the shattering insight of hyperbole that must be offered at the opportune 
moment.  That is, kairos is an important element of a decorum of excess. 
Appropriating a hyperbolic risk within a decorum of excess is marked by a certain 
kairos as a moment of timeliness able to be infused with potent rhetorical power.18  John 
Poulakos suggests that kairotic speech is necessary “to create an impression of timeliness 
in the audience,”19 and Scott Consigny defines kairos as “momentary ‘openings’ or 
opportunities to which the skilled artisan must respond accurately and forcefully.”20  
These “openings” for hyperbole in particular are the narrow gaps within discourse when 
                                                
17 Kathryn Hume, “Robert Coover:  The Metaphysics of Bondage,” The Modern Language 
Review 98, no. 4 (2003) :  827-828.  Or, as Geoffrey Galt Harpham writes, “The grotesque often arises in 
the clash between the ‘virtuous’ limitations of form and a rebellious content that refuses to be constrained.”  
See Harpham, On the Grotesque, 7. 
 
18 See Dale L. Sullivan, “Kairos and the Rhetoric of Belief,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 78 
(1992) :  317-332.  For an interesting argument that is often contradictory to Sullivan’s presentation of 
kairos regarding Plato and Aristotle see James L. Kinneavy, “Kairos in Classical and Modern Rhetorical 
Theory,” in Rhetoric and Kairos:  Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis, eds. Phillip Sipriora and James S. 
Baumlin (Albany:  State University of New York Press, 2002) and James L. Kinneavy and Catherine R. 
Eskin, “Kairos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” Written Communication 2 (1994) :  131-142.  Isocrates also 
emphasized kairic thought and action within his system of rhetorical paideia.  See Phillip Sipiora, 
“Introduction:  The Ancient Concept of Kairos,” in Rhetoric and Kairos:  Essays in History, Theory, and 
Praxis, eds. Phillip Sipriora and James S. Baumlin (Albany:  State University of New York Press, 2002). 
 
19 John Poulakos, “Kairos in Gorgias’ Rhetorical Compositions,” in Rhetoric and Karios:  Essays 
in History, Theory, and Praxis, eds. Phillip Sipriora and James S. Baumlin (Albany:  State University of 
New York Press, 2002), 90. 
 
20 Scott Consigny, “Gorgias’s Use of the Epideictic,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 25, no. 3 (1992) :  
284.  Consigny also quotes Eric Charles White as stating that kairos denotes “a passing instant when an 
opening appears, which must be driven through with force if success is to be achieved” (285). 
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hyperbole can exert its full potential.  If the opening is missed, then hyperbole is likely to 
fail miserably.  As a response to a particular exigence, the use of kairos aids in creating a 
forceful pathos deemed necessary by the hyperbolist.  If kairotic speech fails to appear 
timely, then pathos will seem unnecessarily extravagant and artificial, and hyperbole will 
fall flat as “folly” and be misunderstood as kakozelia.  As Longinus says, hyperbole can 
overshoot its mark:  “Overdo the strain and the thing sags, and often produces the 
opposite effect to that intended.”21  A decorum of excess attempts to regulate this 
overshooting and harnesses the force of kairos to insure that disproportionate hyperbolic 
power appears appropriate and occurs at the opportune moment.  Kairos disorients, and 
the elegant use of hyperbole moves the audience decorously towards re-orientation by 
highlighting and justifying the appropriateness and necessity of the assertion. 
The gravity of extraordinary situations requires extraordinary risks, and this risk 
only functions effectively within a decorum of excess where hyperbole and kairos work 
in tandem.  As Poulakos argues about kairos, “Extraordinary circumstances and 
unprecedented conditions compel one to resort to kairotic speech, that is, speech that 
risks violating established norms of propriety and decorum,”22 and Longinus argues that 
hyperbole is also most effective when it is employed at a time of crisis.23  In this sense, 
hyperbolic speech is kairotic speech that risks violating norms and decorum in order to 
respond appropriately to a particular exigence defined by extraordinary circumstances.  
The crisis may be such an “overwhelming threat” and an “intensity” that “achieves 
                                                
21 [Longinus], On the Sublime, 281. 
 
22 Poulakos, “Kairos in Gorgias,” 92. 
 
23 [Longinus], On the Sublime, 283. 
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psychotic proportions”24 that only a disproportionate hyperbolic response is appropriate.  
The pre-Socratic ethic, especially in the Pythagorean school and Gorgias’s thought, of 
“Know the opportunity” (kairon gnothi) is thus vital for the functioning of hyperbolic 
risk.25   
In order to accomplish this risky task, Poulakos argues (via Gorgias) that one 
must use kairotic speech to “avoid employing what is normatively typical because the 
typical in the form of the expected is the exact opposite of the unique in the form of the 
timely”26 in order to “dislodge a generally held view by means of new and surprising 
arguments,” which recasts “common belief in a new light.”27  Within rhetorical theory, 
there is nothing more capable of casting beyond reality or more unexpected or atypical 
than a hyperbolic shock “fired with brutality,”28 and this disorienting disruption must rely 
on the audience’s perception of timeliness and decorousness if it is to be received as wit 
instead of folly.  The risk of hyperbole is the risk of kairotic speech operating within and 
as a part of a decorum of excess, and the risk effects a re-orientation of thought or reality 
that results in perspectival transition.  This is often seen when hyperbole is used within 
epideictic. 
Expanding on Poulakas’s conception of kairos, Dale L. Sullivan argues that 
epideictic rhetoric itself is kairotic in nature,29 and with Rosenberg, posits that epideictic 
                                                
24 Darsey, Prophetic Tradition, 23. 
 
25 Kinneavy, “Kairos in Classical and Modern Rhetorical Theory,” 59. 
 
26 Poulakos, “Kairos in Gorgias,” 91. 
 
27 Ibid., 94. 
 
28 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, 290.  
 
29 Sullivan, “Kairos and the Rhetoric of Belief,” 325-326. 
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operates as a “suprarational rhetoric that goes beyond the rational capacity to confront an 
individual’s being with the radiance of Being.”30  Within epideictic discourse, the 
epistemological and ontological disruptiveness of hyperbole functions as a response to an 
exigence by forcefully throwing beyond one’s perception of a rational economy, i.e., a 
given interpretation of reality, and highlighting circumstantial contingency.  This 
disorienting ambiguity is only momentary, but employed at the right moment, it dislodges 
one’s interpretive lens long enough to re-orient a given perspective and effect 
transformation/renewal.  In tandem with kairos, embedded within a decorum of excess, 
and grounded in pathos and/or one’s epideictic ethos,31 hyperbole functions effectively in 
all of its paradoxical and excessive ambiguity within epideictic.   
FOUCAULT’S HYPERBOLE 
 
A philosophical example of a decorum of excess used in epideictic is offered 
through Allan Megill’s analysis, in Prophets of Extremity, of Foucault’s discourse.  
Although Megill never references hyperbole, his argument is based entirely on analyzing 
the use of hyperbole within Foucault’s discourse.  I will not trace the intricacies of 
Megill’s analysis of Foucault’s “discursive formations,” “subversive discourses,” and 
“discourse as praxis.”  I will simply draw attention to Megill’s unwitting insight into 
Foucault’s use of hyperbole.  Additionally, and without knowing it, Megill also argues 
that Foucault’s work takes the form of epideictic, which Robert Danisch asserts as well.32   
                                                                                                                                            
 
30 Ibid., 329.  Sullivan is here quoting Rosenberg. 
 
31 Sullivan, “The Ethos of Epideictic Encounter,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 26 (1993) :  113-133. 
 
32 Danisch, “Power and the Celebration of the Self,” 291-307.   
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Commenting on Foucault’s use of epideictic, Danisch argues that Foucault’s 
discourse “does not seek to get the past right, nor does it seek to establish policy 
proposals for future courses of action…it seeks to reveal and transform the present, and 
this is precisely what makes his rhetoric epideictic.”33  Danisch asserts that Foucault 
attempts to “uncover what lies hidden” and “play on the dominant values of his audience 
and show what makes various communities cohere.”34  Danisch makes a convincing case 
that Foucault’s work is epideictic, but what he misses, and what Megill unintentionally 
emphasizes, is that Foucault also uses hyperbole throughout his arguments asserted at 
opportune openings within discourse and philosophical thought.  As Mileur asserts, 
“Foucault locates hyperbole at the heart of philosophical language,”35 which is to say that 
hyperbole is necessarily at the heart of his critiques.  Foucault uses a decorum of excess 
within epideictic to errantly assert hyperbolic impossibilities that are duplicitous in order 
to arrive at other possibilities. 
Megill argues that the impossible task of attempting to say too much in order to 
say what must be said but is never fully articulated is precisely what Foucault is pushing 
the exploration of “truth” towards, of “changing the way things are.”36  Disrupting literal 
sense through hyperbole “to communicate what could not have been otherwise 
communicated,” Foucault, as a hyperbolist, wants the audience to believe an 
                                                
33 Ibid., 299. 
 
34 Ibid., 293. 
 
35 Mileur, The Critical Romance, 92. 
 
36 Megill, Prophets of Extremity, 245.   
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“extraordinary ‘idée,’”37 a re-imagined res.  In this sense, the very basis of Foucault’s 
writing is premised upon hyperbole.   
In particular, Megill writes, “It can be argued that Foucault is engaging in a 
legitimate rhetorical tactic, telling us lies about the past in order to open our eyes to the 
reality of the present,” and he continues, “Despite its inadequacies or even its outright 
falsehoods, such an account is justified insofar as it enables us to see more clearly the 
reality of this disciplinary society.”38  As if re-appropriating Quintilian’s theory of 
hyperbole for a Foucauldian context, Megill emphasizes Foucault’s tactical, i.e., 
opportune, use of hyperbolic lies, which are “pardoned” because of the purpose they 
serve to elegantly surpass the truth.  The justification Megill offers for Foucault’s use of 
excess is the exigence of the present extraordinary political/historical reality, Foucault’s 
“crisis orientation.”39  Objectively and subjectively justifying Foucault’s hyperbole, 
Megill offers his reader the (re)interpretation of Foucault’s discourse as disorienting and 
disproportionate.  His “fictioning” of the past and present results in a decorous surpassing 
of the truth, which re-orients one’s perspective “to see more clearly the reality of this 
disciplinary society.”   
In Megill’s understanding of Foucault’s “fictioning,” he notes that there is an 
“odd interplay between truth and lie:  a lying history is legitimized by the existence of a 
‘true’ political reality; a lying politics is legitimized by the existence of a ‘true’ 
                                                
37 Johnson, Hyperboles, 11. 
 
38 Megill, Prophets of Extremity, 244.   
 
39 Ibid., 222. 
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history.”40  With Quintilian, Megill sees a distinction in his analysis of Foucault’s writing 
between a lie intended to deceive and a hyperbolic lie intended to push epistemological 
and ontological limits.  For Megill, Foucault’s “‘fictioning’ of the past is at the same time 
a fictioning, and a mystifying, of the present”41 in a disorienting display of hyperbolic 
force that pushes truth beyond its bounds.  That is, he fictions the past and uses a given 
interpretation of the present that is a “useful tool” intended to mystify and “disorder 
order.”42  Foucault “seizes upon an interpretation already in place, ‘which it must upset, 
overturn, shatter with hammer blows.’”43  The truth is the hyperbolic lie, i.e., the excess 
of exaggeration, on the side of truth(s) that disorients and disorders order with hammer 
blows at a kairotic moment, which then leads to a re-ordering or re-orientation that is a 
revelation of what lay hidden.   
Foucault’s kairotic speech (what he might call the fearless speech of parrhesia)44 
is shocking, disproportionate, and risky, but it is necessary to alter given interpretations 
of reality, which Foucault sees as extraordinarily oppressive and skewed.  He risks being 
mis-apprehended in order to create moments of apprehension.  Historical scholars note 
the inaccuracy of Foucault’s work suggesting it is folly, but in doing so, they miss the wit 
of his hyperbolic (re)interpretations made within a decorum of excess. 
                                                
40 Ibid.  As Foucault says, “One ‘fictions’ history on the basis of a political reality that makes it 
true, one ‘fictions’ a politics not yet in existence on the basis of a historical truth” (235). 
 
41 Ibid., 246. 
 
42 Ibid., 235. 
 
43 Ibid., 223. 
 
44 Michel Foucault, Fearless Speech, ed. Joseph Pearson (Semiotext(e), 2001). 
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What Megill suggests these scholars miss, for example, is that The Archaeology 
of Knowledge is a parody.  Parody and hyperbole are distinct from each, but they share 
similar functions and characteristics, e.g., they each exaggerate and position oppositional 
impossibilities against each other as falsehoods, which might lead to other possible 
alternative truths.45  In this hyperbolic parody, Megill suggests that Foucault is attacking 
Cartesianism as “the whole subjectivist emphasis that allegedly underlies modern science 
and technology.”46  Foucault accomplishes this goal by offering The Archaeology of 
Knowledge as a parodied response to the Discourse on Method that posits the 
impossibility of Descartes’s “method” against Foucault’s own elusive anti-method.47  The 
hyperbolic parody results in disorientation that is meant to lead to a perspectival re-
orientation.  
In contrast to Descartes, Foucault attempts the Dionysian project of “smashing 
science altogether” by the “grotesque parodying of an Apollonian scientific formalism.”48  
In this sense, Foucault is “engaged in undermining a whole structure of thinking, a whole 
approach toward ‘reality’ that he sees as oppressively uncreative.”49  If this is indeed 
Foucault’s risk in Archaeology, then he is using hyperbolic lies within a disorienting/re-
orienting decorum of excess to make his hyperbolic argument of smashing science 
altogether.  With the hammer blows of hyperbole, Foucault offers Archaeology as a 
                                                
45 For example, see Simon Dentith, Parody (Routledge, 2000) and Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and 
His World, trans. Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington:  Indiana University Press, 1984). 
 
46 Megill, Prophets of Extremity, 228. 
 
47 Ibid., 229. 
 
48 Ibid., 231. 
 
49 Ibid., my emphasis. 
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hyperbolic lie intended to reveal the impossibility of Descartes’s method as well as the 
truth that his subjectivist views underlie all of science and technology.  Although 
Foucault’s Archaeology may be misunderstood as folly, the disorienting and “grotesque” 
force of his kairotic speech is managed within a decorum of excess where his witty 
hyperbole may be successfully employed. 
What this discussion reveals is that a decorum of excess is necessary for the 
effective implementation of hyperbole.  A disorienting hyperbolic assertion, i.e., vertige 
de l’hyperbole, is made at a kairotic moment within a decorum of excess where a 
disproportionate response to an extraordinary situation is the appropriate one, which 
facilitates a re-orientation towards meaning and being.  Operating as a meta-function, the 
disorientation/re-orientation function of hyperbole exerted at the opportune moment is 
when a hyperbolic lie can be a beauty and an impossibility can lead to other possibilities.  
This is particularly evident in the grotesque genre. 
HYPERBOLE EPITOMIZED IN THE GROTESQUE 
 
Jean-Pierre Mileur and Christopher D. Johnson both suggest that there is 
something monstrous about hyperbole, and Johnson posits that hyperbole can go in either 
of two directions:  the grotesque or the sublime.  Obviously, monstrosities immediately 
leap to the mind when the grotesque is mentioned, but this is perhaps not true of 
hyperbole.  From the Latin monstrare – meaning to indicate itself, or something beyond 
itself, so that it is a sign of things to come50 – both the grotesque and hyperbole indicate 
something beyond reality and are phenomena at the limits of philosophical articulation 
                                                
50 David Summers, “The Archaeology of the Modern Grotesque,” in Modern Art and the 
Grotesque, ed. Frances S. Connelly (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2003), 29. 
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always pushing epistemological and ontological limits.51  As trope or figure of thought, 
hyperbole is always present in the grotesque – “the monstrous is one of the hyperbolist’s 
most characteristic subjects”52 – and this genre exemplifies the disorientation/re-
orientation function of hyperbole.   
First, I will offer an initial look at hyperbole’s absent presence in theoretical 
grotesque literature, which will reveal hyperbole’s prevalent but unacknowledged 
presence in the grotesque.  It will also show hyperbole’s disorientation/re-orientation 
function operating within the grotesque.  Next, I will examine specifically how the 
grotesque operates through a decorum of excess of disorientation and re-orientation.  I 
will then offer two variations of disorientation and re-orientation on the theme of 
hyperbole in a grotesque key:  1) paradoxical verba and the insight of res and 2) 
transgressive de-formation and errant transformation.  These variations serve the same 
function, but they each reveal different ways of conceptualizing the hyperbolic function 
of disorientation and re-orientation in discourse. 
It is important to emphasize at this point that hyperbole does re-orient through 
disorientation, but the re-orientation is not necessarily a synthesis or resolution.  As 
Mileur says, “The curve of hyperbole appears as the path of desire,”53 and this desire as 
errant re-orientation is never satisfied and always unfinished.  Hyperbole offers a 
transition that reveals some other way of thinking or being in the world, which is never 
fixed or stable.  It leads towards other possibilities and other perspectival truths, and the 
                                                
51 Mileur, The Critical Romance, 92. 
 
52 Johnson, Hyperboles, 43. 
 
53 Mileur, The Critical Romance, 81. 
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re-orientation out of disorientation may, in fact, be a res that is disorienting.  This is 
particularly evident within the grotesque where all is uncertain and may feel like 
“walking on the edge of a precipice from which one might fall at any moment.”54 
When discussing the grotesque and using it to show hyperbole’s function, one 
difficulty that arises is its definition, which is quite stupefying itself.  As Wolfgang 
Kayser states, “The creator of grotesques…must not and cannot suggest a meaning.”55  It 
is difficult to give form to an expression of ambivalent meaning and formlessness.  In a 
particularly well crafted grotesque passage of hyperbolic eloquence, Kristen A. Hoving 
writes:   
The grotesque is a slippery idea.  Like slime mold, it is difficult to grasp, sliding 
first one way, then another, only to ooze through clutching hands and splatter to 
the ground…It undoes form, picking away at beauty, rationality, harmony, and 
shape like fingernails worrying a scab.  By means of parasitic prefixes it sucks its 
life from what it is not, becoming misshapen, deformed, unfocused, indistinct, 
disintegrated, and antithetical.56 
 
A quite disorienting contiguous amalgam of congeries, Hoving reveals the problematic, 
elusive notion of the grotesque while also offering some of its tentatively agreed upon 
characteristics such as being elusive, undermining form, and operating through 
contradiction.  Even conceiving of the grotesque as a genre is a slippery theoretical move 
because it oozes across linguistic, formal, and generic boundaries and categories.  This is 
                                                
54 James J. Troiano, “The Grotesque Tradition and the Interplay of Fantasy and Reality in the 
Plays of Roberto Arlt,” Latin American Literary Review 4, no. 8 (1976) :  8. 
 
55 Wolfgang Johannes Kayser, The Grotesque in Art and Literature (Bloomington:  Indiana 
University Press, 1963), 186. 
 
56 Kristen A. Hoving, “Convulsive Bodies:  The Grotesque Anatomies of Surrealist Photography,” 
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2003), 220. 
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why the examples I offer in this section may not seem immediately “grotesque” but are, 
in fact, grotesque expressions.   
For this reason, some suggest the grotesque might be a particular style, an 
aesthetic category, a form, an operation, or an incongruous image.  Others simply create 
their own thematic, generic, or historical category for the grotesque, e.g., the mystical 
grotesque, the science-fictional grotesque, grotesque realism, the literary grotesque, the 
grotesque-absurd, the satiric grotesque, the tragicomic grotesque, the carnivalesque 
grotesque, the romantic grotesque, or the modern grotesque.  Referential inferences are 
made, but no theorist succeeds in definitively naming the grotesque.  The grotesque, each 
theorist asserts, suggests no particular form or meaning, but although theorists of the 
grotesque often avoid the project of formal definition, they do offer “characteristics” or 
“operations” of the grotesque. 
One concisely culminating attempt at summarizing the characteristics and 
operations of the grotesque is offered by Dieter Meindl:   
The grotesque emerges as a tense combination of attractive and repulsive 
elements, of comic and tragic aspects, of ludicrous and horrifying features.  
Emphasis can be placed on either the bright or the dark side (or pole) of the 
grotesque.  But without a certain collision or complicity between playfulness and 
seriousness, fun and dread, the grotesque does not appear to exist.57   
 
A contradictory creature, the grotesque brings contrarieties together and makes the 
familiar strange.  It is a “semi-exotic” space where the strange and the familiar meet,58 
                                                
57 Dieter Meindl, American Fiction and the Metaphysics of the Grotesque (Columbia:  University 
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e.g., in Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Masque of the Red Death.”59  No matter the differing 
characteristics enumerated across the literature of the grotesque, the one unifying concept 
is that of disorienting contradiction, paradox, or incongruity,60 e.g., Kenneth Burke offers 
                                                
59 Perhaps one of the best characterizations of the grotesque, Kayser maintains, is offered by Poe 
when he writes in “The Masque,” “There were much of the beautiful, much of the wanton, much of the 
bizarre, something of the terrible, and not a little of that which might have excited disgust.”  See Meindl, 
American Fiction, 45. 
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Photography (Columbus:  The Ohio State University Press, 2009); Joan Gordon, “Hybridity, Heterotopia, 
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476; Geoffrey Harpham, “The Grotesque:  First Principles,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
34, no. 4 (1976) :  461-468; Lee Byron Jennings, The Ludicrous Demon:  Aspects of the Grotesque in 
German Post-Romantic Prose (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1963); Farrell Lee, “Grotesque 
and the Demonism of Silence:  Beckett’s ‘Endgame,’” Notre Dame English Journal 14, no. 1 (1981) :  59-
70; James Naremore, “Stanley Kubrick and the Aesthetics of the Grotesque,” Film Quarterly 60, no. 1 
(2006) :  4-14; Elsa Nettels, “The Grotesque in Conrad’s Fiction,” Nineteenth-Century Fiction 29, no. 2 
(1974) :  144-163; Ashton Nichols, “‘Will Sprawl’ in the ‘Ugly Actual’:  The Positive Grotesque in 
Browning,” Victorian Poetry 21, no. 2 (1983) :  157-170; William Van O’Connor, “The Grotesque in 
Modern American Fiction,” College English 20, no. 7 (1959) :  342-346; Christina Ferreira-Pinto, “The 
Fantastic, the Gothic, and the Grotesque in Contemporary Brazilian Women’s Novels,” Chasqui 25, no. 2 
(1996) :  71-80; Peter L. Podol, “The Grotesque Mode in Contemporary Spanish Theater and Film,” 
Modern Language Studies 15, no. 4 (1985) :  194-207; Delma Eugene Presley, “The Moral Function of 
Distortion in Southern Grotesque,” South Atlantic Bulletin 37, no. 2 (1972) :  37-46; Victor I. Scherb, 
“Blasphemy and the Grotesque in the Digby ‘Mary Magdalene,’” Studies in Philology 96, no. 3 (1999) :  
225-240; Paulette Singley, “Devouring Architecture:  Ruskin’s Insatiable Grotesque,” Assemblage 32 
(1997) :  108-125; Michael Steig, “Defining the Grotesque:  An Attempt at Synthesis,” The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 29, no. 2 (1970) :  253-260; James J. Troiano, “The Grotesque Tradition and 
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the grotesque as a perspective by incongruity.61  Olga Muller Cooke writes, “It is in that 
admixture of extremely heterogeneous elements, embracing such polarities as the horrific 
and the humorous, the ludicrous and the absurd, that the grotesque resides.”62  The main 
hyperbolic function represented by the grotesque, then, is its disorienting contradictory 
nature, which always leads towards some transition of thought, emotion, experience, 
insight, or psychological state.  Its excessive verba inevitably leads to the re-presentation 
of an extraordinary res.  The subversive force of the grotesque is to excessively 
(re)present contradiction, and this occurs through the disorientation and re-orientation 
function of hyperbole.    
Geoffrey Galt Harpham asserts that the grotesque is a fusion and co-presence of 
something that is “illegitimately in something else,” which creates a “distinct feeling of 
repulsion.”63  This uneasiness, whether extreme or mild, can be stirred by overtly 
hyperbolic combinations of bodily distortion.  In the Renaissance grotesque, for example, 
this fusion occurs by blending animal and vegetable together in an impossible grotesque 
amalgam of illegitimate and deceitful hybridity that creates a feeling of repulsion, a 
repulsion that nevertheless fascinates and exploits curiosity.64  Yet, the disquietude of the 
grotesque may also be a disorienting hyperbolic figure of thought such as when two 
conflicting philosophical and/or theological combinations are melded together, e.g., 
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Thomas J. J. Altizer’s “Christian atheism,” which can cause an equally unsettling 
reaction as two opposing worldviews are violently blended together, and “the deepest 
foundations of our being are interfered with.”65   
In either instance, a fusion of contrarieties creates pathos of excessive discomfort, 
and fascination, through hyperbolic disorientation.  As Webb writes of hyperbole, 
“Decentering the ordinary in a horizon of limitless possibilities can draw together 
disparate standpoints onto an open plane of a passionate and inclusive imagination.”66  
Drawing together contradictory standpoints is the work of hyperbole in the grotesque, 
which creates an affectus in the audience of excessive, errant psychological states.  
Through impossibility, disorientation, and the lie of hyperbole, the grotesque brings 
together incongruous elements that intend paradoxically to shock, disturb, re-orient, and 
transform.  As Johnson says of hyperbole in general, “Extremes converge to precipitate a 
state bordering on madness and catastrophe,” and this convergence allows hyperbole to 
“interrogate the immanence of superfluity and monstrosity.”67  Balanced on the edge of 
madness, the grotesque offers one a (re)interpretation of reality through hyperbole.  The 
transition this creates may lead to the realization of disorientation itself, other 
disorienting possibilities, but the transition is always an imaginative epistemological and 
ontological expansion, which is facilitated by hyperbole’s phenomenological and 
psychological disruptiveness.  
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For example, hyperbole in the grotesque disorients by assembling a strange 
conflation of disparate elements indicating something beyond itself, but these elements 
need not constitute an actual monster or even something like a gargoyle, which many 
grotesque theorists consider Gothic rather than grotesque.  Noel Carroll, for instance, 
suggests that the Left Behind series as well as clowns are grotesque.68  A grotesquerie 
need only to be some disorienting amalgam of contradictory thoughts or elements, e.g., a 
confusion of the real and the ideal,69 creating excessive affectus in the audience that is 
disconcerting, disruptive, discomforting, and discombobulating.70  Not typically 
considered grotesque, Hercules, or his modern counterpart Superman, is an example of 
the contradictory fusion between mortal (the real) and immortal (the ideal) that creates a 
feeling of wonderment and also fear in the audience.  Hyperbolically overreaching the 
bounds of mortality, Hercules’s immortality expresses itself through impossible feats of 
strength within a body that is a conceit.  He is not quite human or inhuman but a 
“subversion of our common expectations of the natural and ontological order.”71  He is an 
amalgam of the two thrown together in a mythological hyperbole.  In this sense, Christ 
may also be considered a hyperbolic grotesquerie.   
Despite the grotesque’s reliance upon disproportionate and incongruent 
exaggeration and excess to facilitate its perspectival re-orientation, the functions of 
hyperbole that make the grotesque possible are often ignored by theorists of the 
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grotesque.  Most theorists limit the grotesque to the realm of metaphor and myth without 
mention of hyperbole, but exaggerated mythic allusions and metaphoric amplifications 
are ineffective, perhaps even impossible, without hyperbole.  Webb even contends that 
the grotesque actually operates in opposition to metaphor and in line with hyperbole.  He 
argues that bringing incongruent realities together is the work of hyperbole because 
grotesque incongruence does not lead to the synthesis of metaphor72:  “Hyperbole is a 
trope that beckons but also warns; it accomplishes an intensification that does not result 
in a metaphorical synthesis.”73  Webb’s assertion, however, is a bit excessive and actually 
delimits the use of hyperbole while attempting to refuse metaphor access to the 
grotesque.  Certainly, metaphor is used extensively in the grotesque and is vital for its 
expression, but grotesque theorists limit the possibilities of the grotesque, and even 
metaphor in the grotesque, by ignoring the functions of hyperbole. 
  Hyperbole, in fact, is frequently dismissed in the grotesque as “mere” and 
“extravagant exaggeration.”74  Two notable exceptions are Suzanne Guerlac and Mikhail 
Bakhtin.  Guerlac’s “impersonal sublime” relies on both hyperbole and the grotesque.  
She suggests that the logic of excess, a “hyperbologic,”75 is what guides the grotesque 
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and that the grotesque’s rhetorical figure is “accumulation, exaggeration, or hyperbole.”76  
Within the grotesque, “The same and the other are held together, ‘complicated,’ by 
hyperbole.”77  This is the paradoxical disorientation that is the promise of hyperbole, but 
it is incomplete.  Guerlac does not highlight hyperbole’s transition towards re-orientation. 
On the other hand, Bakhtin argues that hyperbole is a positive figure for grotesque 
realism that fosters liberation and transformation, but he downplays the disorientating 
effect of hyperbole opting instead to highlight bewilderment as caused by other concepts 
such as parody.  Each theorist gives hyperbole an important role in the grotesque, but 
their theoretical insights are deficient without using the complete function of hyperbole to 
re-orient through disorientation, which is so demonstrable within the grotesque genre.  In 
addition, these two theorists’ acknowledgement of hyperbole operating within the 
grotesque is hardly a significant contribution to the breadth and depth of grotesque 
theoretical literature.  However, by combining Guerlac’s and Bakhtin’s insights, the 
grotesque illuminates the disorientation and re-orientation function of hyperbole.  
For example, Georges Bataille’s complex and grotesque scatological project uses 
hyperbole to achieve its effect.  Relying on the functions of hyperbole, he explores the 
grotesque world of surrealism with all of its admixtures, “heterogeneous matter,” and 
amalgams of imagery that are perpetually out of joint with reality.  Bataille’s hyperbolic 
body imagery, much like Mikhail Bakhtin’s discussion of bodily exaggeration within 
grotesque realism, emphasizes orifices and openings from which ejaculate, vomit, and 
defecation spew forth.  Bodily functions are exaggerated (hyperbole as trope) and 
                                                
76 Ibid., 47. 
 
77 Ibid., 64. 
 
  231       
celebrated as “sacred” animality (hyperbole as figure of thought) with the intent of 
confounding, overturning, and transgressing typical distinctions between what is sacred 
and profane.   
Notions such as the “festival,” similar to Bakhtin’s notion of the carnivalesque, 
intrigue Bataille for its transgressively paradoxical and seemingly disparate elements of 
death, abhorrence, liberation, desire, sacrifice, and eroticism, which hyperbolically 
disrupt psychological states and foster heightened emotions and “sacred” experiences.78  
For Bataille, the grotesque festival corresponds to the object of horror that is a “fetid, 
sticky object without boundaries, which teems with life and yet is the sign of death…it is 
death gorging life with decomposed substance.”79  Here, the sacred, rather than the 
profane, is paradoxically aligned with the horrific, and this shocking hyperbolic sacred 
that pushes boundaries and gorges life with death (hyperbolic personification) leads 
inexorably to a perspectival reinterpretation through bewildering transgression.   
In a telling passage that highlights his use of hyperbole in the grotesque, Bataille 
writes: 
The movement of the festival liberates these animal forces, but now their 
explosive liberation interrupts the course of an existence subordinated to ordinary 
ends.  There is a breakdown – an interruption – of the rules; the regular course of 
things ceases; what originally had the meaning of the limit has that of shattering 
limits.  Thus, the sacred announces a new possibility; it is a leap into the 
unknown, with animality as its impetus.80   
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Through auxesis, the “sacred” is itself described as a type of hyperbole that interrupts the 
ordinary and shatters limits through the impossibility of the unknown, which leads to new 
possibilities.  The addling “leap into the unknown” transitions to re-orientation through 
the extraordinary nature of the sacred, and homogenous impossibility leads to 
heterogeneous possibilities such as the hyperbolic contrariety of the profane being sacred 
and the sacred being profane.  The festival is a hyperbolic lie that casts the world upside 
down, and it is a moment of transgressive transition where the ordinary is made 
extraordinary in order to conceive of reality differently.  “Everything that ‘justifies’ our 
behaviour needs to be re-examined and overturned.”81  Transposition for Bataille relies 
on a hyperbolic logic operating within the grotesque, which skews the world enough to 
view it awry and push epistemological and ontological boundaries towards other 
grotesque possibilities, and he offers exaggerated transgressive inversions and orifices 
within a decorum of excess.   
The grotesque, then, highlights the disorientation/re-orientation function of 
hyperbole well.  The exaggeration of the grotesque is confusing and leads to an errant re-
orientation of thought and being.  Perplexing and frightening impossibilities are offered 
that disrupt order and normalcy – “the norms of common life are replaced by an ‘anti-
norm’”82 – and only the errant wandering that occurs after this disorientation will take 
one along the path towards a possible re-orientation.  This function of hyperbole 
elucidated by the grotesque also reveals how a decorum of excess might function within a 
particular genre. 
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KAIROTIC DISSONANCE AND DECOROUS RESONANCE 
 
Discussed throughout this chapter, the reception of hyperbole is crucial, and the 
same is true of the grotesque.83  Theorists of hyperbole are at pains to accommodate 
hyperbole, especially through the fluidity of decorum, to insure its positive reception, but 
the notion of decorum in the grotesque is often befuddling while the importance of its 
reception is quite clear.  Buried within the theories of the grotesque, however, is a notion 
of decorum that is a decorum of excess.  Inadvertently, grotesque theorists offer an 
important example of how a decorum of excess operates within discourse even as they 
fail to see its use.   
As I argued above, kairos and/as kairotic speech as an “opening” in thought 
and/or discourse is a key factor for a decorum of excess, and it serves the function of 
creating dissonance within the audience by relying heavily on pathos.  The 
disproportionate expression of hyperbole asserted at a kairotic moment is then mitigated 
and re-directed towards a more decorous, resonant perspective that is intended to be well 
received.  “The hyperbolist constructs his readers as much as he awaits them,”84 and the 
purpose of a decorum of excess is to aid the hyperbolist in preparing the audience for a 
positive perception and reception of hyperbole, i.e., that hyperbole resonates with the 
audience.  Relying more on pathos than ethos, the grotesque demonstrates the operation 
of a decorum of excess well.   
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John R. Clark writes, “The grotesque was always understood to be excessive, 
requiring boundaries and regulation lest it burgeon, ‘break out,’ or get out of hand,”85 
which is precisely the problematic relation between hyperbole and decorum.  Indeed, 
replacing “the grotesque” in Clark’s statement with “hyperbole” still renders the 
statement equally true.  Quoting Victor Hugo, Guerlac notes that the grotesque is an 
“irruption, an overflow, like that of a torrent that has burst its banks,”86 and Leesa 
Fanning writes, “The disruptive force of the grotesque threatens to exceed containment 
and rupture discrete figural form.”87  The excessive dissonance of the grotesque and its 
penchant for seemingly exceeding and de-forming decorum is reiterated throughout the 
literature.  This apparent violation of decorum is often celebrated in grotesque literature, 
but so is the resonant insight the grotesque creates in the individual.  It is also 
consistently implied that the grotesque does operate within its own type of decorum, 
which I suggest typifies a decorum of excess.   
It is the risk of hyperbole to push the boundaries of decorum that aids the 
grotesque in its flight from the ordinary and the appropriate and then back towards a 
certain resonance with the audience:  hyperbole offers a “‘temporary, transitory’ 
disruption between expression and communication.”88  Without a decorum of excess, the 
grotesque might always be dismissed as kakozelia thereby deflating its transitional power.  
Insightful theorists of the grotesque such as Clark and Harpham do see the importance of 
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decorum for the grotesque, which aids in creating an errant resonance with the audience.  
Harpham writes, “The grotesque implies discovery, and disorder is the price one always 
pays for the enlargement of the mind.”89  The grotesque necessitates a certain decorum to 
achieve its effects in the minds of the audience, but this process must first pass through a 
juxtaposing amalgam of kairotic incongruity.   
John Ruskin suggests separating the noble grotesque from the ignoble grotesque.90  
Whereas the noble grotesque evokes meaningful insight and emotion and is a highly 
poetic means of expression, the ignoble grotesque is a ridiculous absurdity, a superfluous 
decoration.  A noble grotesque reveals truth(s), but an ignoble grotesque is simply a 
falsehood.  Ruskin is here trading in hyperboles and negotiating decorum.  Just as 
Quintilian separates elegant hyperbole from extravagant hyperbole in order to constitute a 
more fluid sense of decorum, Ruskin does so within the grotesque.   
In a different move, Michel Chaouli suggests, “The disgusting has its own 
peculiar spatial logic,” and he posits that “the disgusting” is out of place and that its 
effects cannot be “contained in a delimited area.”91  Yet, he then suggests that an 
appropriate space for the disgusting is the abject space discussed by Julia Kristeva.92  
Ascribing the disgusting its own “spatial logic” and offering abject space as a scene of 
appropriateness for the grotesque, Chaouli inadvertently implies the importance of giving 
the grotesque a certain space where it might operate effectively.  This is the space of 
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decorous excessiveness where kairotic dissonance and decorous resonance are cleaved 
together in a hyperbolic logic of contrariety. 
In yet another attempt at discussing decorum and the grotesque without the insight 
of hyperbole, Harpham suggests that the grotesque does not violate decorum because the 
system of decorum the grotesque operates within has “indeterminacy or ambivalence as 
the norm.”93  Or, as Lee Byron Jennings puts it, there is an “alien chaos principle at work” 
in the grotesque,94 and Bernard McElroy suggests that the grotesque can only exist in a 
grotesque world.95  In each statement, these authors unintentionally describe a decorum 
of excess where the principle and norm of this economy is excess itself.96  In fact, 
Harpham’s description coupled with his earlier assertion that the grotesque leads to 
discovery through disorder, suggests that a positive reception of the grotesque relies on a 
kairotic moment when the grotesque’s insight may be revealed through decorous 
indeterminacy and ambivalence. 
According to Harpham, the grotesque is predominantly dependent upon its 
reception and perception by the audience – “It is our interpretation of the form that 
matters, the degree to which we perceive the principle of unity that binds together the 
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antagonistic parts.”97  A positive perception is dependent upon the ability to eventually 
interpret the grotesque, which depends on a decorous re-orientation.  Harpham continues, 
“The more naïve and intense our belief, the more violently will be the transition from one 
interpretation to another, and the stronger our experience of the grotesque.”98  The more 
intense the magnitude of a belief in a given context, the more dissonant will be the errant 
transition to resonance.  Exemplified in the grotesque, hyperbole discordantly and 
disproportionately dislodges belief(s) and moves from one interpretation to the next 
based on the contingent interpretation of the hyperbole itself.  One must be receptive to 
the grotesque image or discourse in order for it to be effective, and a decorous 
excessiveness that gives the grotesque its power errantly re-directs the audience towards a 
(re)interpretive transition.  Hyperbole responds with appropriate disproportionality to the 
exigence of a perceived incorrect or incomplete interpretation, and the interpretation must 
be, as Foucault says, shattered with hammer blows.  This hyperbolic bludgeoning must 
occur at the opportune moment or opening for its full effect to be felt.   
The resonance achieved through hyperbole, however, is never a firm or constant 
moment but is always contingent.  Likewise, “The perception of the grotesque is never a 
fixed or stable thing, but always a process, a progression.”99  The objective content of the 
grotesque and one’s perception of it evolves, or transitions, through time.100  The 
hyperbole of the grotesque image or discourse is perpetually in transition, and the 
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mutability of a decorum of excess allows for the perceptual fluidity of the grotesque, 
based on contextual constraints and the changing nature of those constraints,101 to move 
one errantly towards transition.  From one historical context to the next, the grotesque is 
always changing, taking on new meanings and shedding old ones, and no matter what the 
grotesque might “mean” for one context, it always remains “occluded and imperfectly 
perceived.”102  It is for this reason that the grotesque often appears as kakozelia and 
thereby necessitates the use of kairos in a decorum of excess.  The grotesque is a vehicle 
of disproportionate hybridity that shocks through a tragicomic suddenness that arrests 
thought and attention at a particular moment for the purpose of transition, not 
dismissal.103   
In the gap of perception, which is a perpetual interval, the grotesque erupts into 
errant apprehension.104  Gilles Deleuze writes of thought in general, “Ideas swarm in the 
fracture, constantly emerging on its edges, ceaselessly coming out and going back, being 
composed in a thousand different manners.”105  In the grotesque fracture where an 
amalgam of ideas swarm in differential composition, this gap of perception is the jarring 
kairotic moment when the grotesque can exert its full hyperbolic and 
emotional/psychological force.  As Mileur writes, “Between the ‘madness’ of decision 
and the normalcy of an articulation which can never comprehend its own origins, there is 
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a gap, the space of fiction or fantasy, which only hyperbole can traverse.”106  Within the 
grotesque, hyperbole is implemented in this space of fiction or fantasy.  This gap is a 
kairotic “space between,” e.g., an abject space, and “this mid-region is dynamic and 
unpredictable, a scene of transformation or metamorphosis.”107  The excess of the 
grotesque is always in transition from one interpretation to another, and it is facilitated by 
the hyperbolic “act of transition” or “act of transformation” from seemingly meaningless 
dissonance to meaningful resonance.108   
These gaps are where the grotesque hyperbolically explodes at a kairotic moment 
when all hope of resonance is lost.  It is at these moments when disharmonious 
grotesqueries, as form(less) and impossible representations viewed awry, are offered, 
which “impales us on the present moment, emptying the past and forestalling the 
future.”109  Out of the perpetual gaps between interpretation and comprehension the 
“prodigious hyperbole” of grotesque ornament causes the eye to wander110 towards a 
reverberating image of perception, and the duplicity of hyperbole resists absolute closure, 
i.e., resonance itself is always in transition.   
The subject remains in the repetition of errant hyperbolic transition that is 
nevertheless an attempt to re-orient one’s perspective out of disorientation, and this 
process of confusion generates new insight.111  As Mark C. Taylor posits, “Repetition 
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ruptures the closed circle in which beginning and end, Alpha and Omega are one.  By 
holding open the time of space and the space of time, ‘repetition,’ in Lacan’s words, 
‘demands the new.’”112  The repetition of hyperbole is not infinite deferral but infinite 
(re)interpretation.  It is in this process of repetition that the subject errantly wanders 
towards a resonance of apprehension that, without hyperbole, will forever recede from 
view and elusively defer both interpretation and comprehension.113 
 For example, when Zizek argues that an empty signifier can repetitively signify 
contradictory impossibilities as alleged signifieds, he is positing a discursive hyperbolic 
figure of thought in a grotesque frame, which can disrupt belief through the disorienting 
recurrence of the violence of (re)interpretation.  His hyperbole causes affectus as 
interpretive and psychological disruption, and his hyperbolic logic relies on 
disproportionality and excess as normative expressions within the economy of his 
discourse.  Through auxesis, Zizek uses the empty signifier as a discursive hyperbole that 
is a kairotic gap of perception within discourse (the curve of hyperbole) that serves to re-
orient one to other subjective (re)interpretive possibilities (the path of desire).  His 
dissonant verba stretches discursive limits in order to reveal an always unfinished 
errantly resonant res.   
Zizek suggests in On Belief that a signified might be that “Alien Thing” of 
science-fiction horror movies where the monstrous Thing is either wholly other – the 
radical transcendental Otherness of “God” – or exactly the same with a barely noticeable 
difference – the radical immanence of “Christ” that is the excessive “too much” of 
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humanity that is never fully human.114  In the grotesque juxtaposition of the signifieds 
“God” and “Christ,” the empty signifier holds both signifieds in a dissonant, kairotic gap 
of disproportionality that can lead to a decorous resonance out of the turmoil, which may 
be a re-imagined res of infinite dissonance that nevertheless leads errantly to 
(re)interpretive possibilities.   
The coalescence of transcendence and immanence in Zizek’s example is kairotic 
in a theological sense, and the ambivalent convergence of these seemingly opposed 
notions is grotesque in a hyperbolic sense of incongruity.  The grotesque wholly other 
“God” and wholly same “Christ” signify the excess of signification that dislodges the 
presumed signified status of “God” by amalgamating “the horrific or alien with the desire 
to shock by exposing repressed truths,” which “can also be aligned with Freud’s concept 
of the uncanny and abjection.”115  Through auxesis in a grotesque frame, Zizek offers a 
dissonant hyperbolic lie intended to disrupt epistemological and ontological 
presuppositions within a resonant decorum of disproportionate (re)interpretation.  
Kairotic speech in Zizek’s grotesquerie distorts the expected and makes the familiar 
unfamiliar, and hyperbole channels this disillusion into an appropriate disproportionate 
expression of contradiction moving towards other resonant possibilities.   
The empty signifier offers a jarring tension of disequilibrium, and as in the 
grotesque, “There is a recombining of the elements of experienced reality to form 
something alien to it.”116  This alienating opening in Zizek’s discourse when two 
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disparate theological positions, or beliefs, are placed in discord is the kairotic space when 
a (re)interpretive moment occurs that might augment one’s perspective enough to err 
towards resonance.  The hyperbole might be rejected as kakozelia, but within Zizek’s 
decorum of excess, the hyperbolic logic of his argument evokes the force of pathos to 
move his audience that is predisposed to excess repetitively towards the realization that 
absolute signifieds are necessarily empty signifiers within a playful and unsettling 
economy of imaginative (re)interpretation.  
The Icelandic musicians Sigur Ros also express the (re)interpretive dissonance 
and resonance of hyperbole in a grotesque frame.  Their album entitled “(  )” offers a rich 
expression of hyperbolic grotesquerie through their tracks that are all “untitled.”  Without 
words and in the perpetual interval of the space between, they express their music 
through repetitively dramatic vocalizations that swirl in an amalgamation of grotesque 
dissonance, imaginative tonality, and various forms of instrumentation.  Even the 
instruments they choose such as strings, brass, electric guitar, and drums are distorted in 
intentional misuse and alteration to exploit the conventionality of typical musical 
progression, which is the resonant insight of their music. 
Playing on the postmodern notion of absent presence and present absence, they 
crescendo incrementally towards impossible heights of disproportional dissonance that 
seemingly violate all notions of musical decorum, but at the opportune moment, they 
descend once again into the resonant depths of insight, even if that insight is inexorable 
dissonance.  Attenuation and litotes increase the ambivalence of the exaggeration, and the 
pathos induced through kairotic discord resolves itself, if only partially, within a decorum 
of excess where new interpretive perspectives are errantly opened to the audience. 
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In their newer album, “Takk…,” they again play on the theme of hyperbolic copia 
that repetitively exploits the perpetual interval between.  Through the rich effervescent 
Icelandic language, the thematic progression of the overall album is one of contradictory 
and impossible heights and depths.  Progressing slowly by augmenting and building one 
voice upon the other, one instrument upon another, and blending their phraseology in a 
grotesque cacophony of sound, they then move suddenly and shockingly to a hyperbolic 
apogee only to alter their course abruptly and unexpectedly in a radical diminuendo.  
Evoking pathos at every turn, they assert their forcefully excessive indulgences through 
opportune openings in rhythm, time, and meter. 
Moving along the margins of vast and monstrous vocal and instrumental 
landscapes, they present tonal disharmony leading inevitably to timbre, in thought if not 
in sound.  In doing so, they both disrupt and prepare the audience for the positive 
reception and interpretation of their hyperbolic grotesquerie, where dissonance is the 
norm even as their variations on that dissonance are always shockingly unexpected.  They 
push and bend the boundaries of decorum by posing oppositional movements, 
instruments, and vocals against one another in impossible grotesqueries of sound that 
offer (re)interpretation and resist closure, and their juxtaposed phrases and themes evoke 
dissonant feelings of uncanniness and fascination that lead errantly towards resolution out 
of the aural gaps they exploit. 
Through a decorum of excess, the grotesque moves towards an altered resonance 
through the dissonance of oppositions in a decorous movement of transition.  Repetitively 
pushing the limits of decorum through radical disequilibrium within the perpetual interval 
of the space between, hyperbole expands epistemological and ontological boundaries 
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within the grotesque that leads to a resounding insight, even if that resonance is the 
inevitability of dissonance.  Thoroughly hyperbolic, the grotesque exemplifies the errant 
movement of resonant dissonance and dissonant resonance out of which a partial insight 
may be revealed.  
TWO VARIATIONS ON THE THEME OF HYPERBOLE IN A GROTESQUE KEY 
 
Shown thus far, the disorientation/re-orientation function of hyperbole, and thus 
all functions of hyperbole, relies on a decorum of excess to operate effectively.  Drawing 
from the example of the grotesque, this can be viewed as a type of dissonance moving 
towards resonance.  Furthermore, under the function of disorientation and re-orientation I 
offer two brief conceptual variations on the theme of hyperbole that are revealed by the 
grotesque genre.  The first variation expresses itself through paradox and insight, and the 
second variation arises out of the movement from de-formation to transformation.  The 
first operates on a more objective level.  The second operates on a more subjective level, 
but they each use hyperbole as trope and figure of thought to foster a transition towards 
re-orientation within a decorum of excess.  Each one is a hyperbolic movement of 
contradiction that offers one the opportunity for epistemological and ontological 
transitions, and they are both present in the grotesque.  The variations are subtle 
perspectival alterations of this function of hyperbole, but I offer these two perspectives in 
order to elaborate upon and to show the flexibility and complexity of the 
disorientation/re-orientation function of hyperbole. 
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PARADOXICAL VERBA AND THE INSIGHT OF A RE-PRESENTED RES 
 
Sometimes considered a species of hyperbole, especially by Baroque writers like 
Gracian, paradox and hyperbole “often share the same methods and subject matter,”117 
and Ricoeur posits that hyperbole is “like paradox” and even operates through the “law of 
paradox and hyperbole.”  Indeed, exaggeration is fundamental to both, and paradox 
“represents another method of conceptualizing the impossible and the extraordinary.”118  
Johnson, interpreting Gracian, says that hyperbole is haunted by the “specter of paradox,” 
and Guerlac posits, re-appropriating Lacoue-Labarthe, “‘The paradox states a law of im-
propriety as an infinite exchange or identity of opposites’ operated through hyperbole.”119  
Out of the incomprehension of paradoxical verba, hyperbole leads one towards the partial 
apprehension of a re-presented res – a “paradox of truth-in-exaggeration.”120  Particularly 
manifested in the grotesque genre, discombobulating juxtaposition is a hyperbolic 
paradox leading to a new, yet unrealized, insight. 
Paul de Man argues in Blindness and Insight, that criticism engages in a type of 
paradoxical blindness that results in insight.121  Through disorienting blindness, one 
moves paradoxically towards insight within the overall scope of criticism itself.  In the 
same sense, hyperbole also requires a certain blindness regarding its insight in order to 
function effectively.  As Katrin Ettenhuber’s analysis of Peacham concludes, “Hyperbole 
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asserts the importance of partial blindness and functional ignorance; the notion of 
complete comprehension devalues the thought or feeling that hyperbole evokes.”122  
Conceptualizing the baffling heights and incongruities asserted through hyperbole are 
only partially comprehended because it is only in the hazy space of “para” that one is 
disoriented enough to release presuppositions about thought and reality thereby preparing 
the way for a newly re-imagined res.  Hyperbole’s repetitive resistance to closure is 
particularly evident in the grotesque. 
The grotesque, as Harpham suggests, places one into the “para” of paradox, which 
is a “preludial condition that dissolves in the act of comprehension;”123 however, 
Harpham later writes, “Interpretation always falls between the poles of absolute certainty 
and absolute indeterminacy, but…an interpretation accompanies every act of perception 
whether we want it to or not.”124  Harpham highlights the paradoxicality of the grotesque 
that dissolves in the act of comprehension, but he also asserts that the comprehension it 
leads towards is never complete but always in the process of (re)interpretation.   
Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. posits that the grotesque “obstructs the mind from 
completing its effort of quick understanding, arresting it when it wishes to get on with its 
routine of knowing, and forces it to learn something it is not sure it wants to know.”125  
Some transition towards the re-presentation of an extraordinary res will occur out of the 
confounding paradox of hyperbole, but it will never be complete and remains in ceaseless 
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repetitive gestures of (re)interpretation.  The obstruction of the mind in the grotesque is 
the partial blindness of hyperbole functioning in that discourse.  Hyperbole paradoxically 
stretches the imagination, emotions, and one’s grasp of/on reality, which expands 
epistemological and ontological horizons through partial blindness and ambiguous 
apprehension, and this is acutely evident in Mark C. Taylor’s grotesque, hyperbolic 
discourse. 
Taylor’s grotesque copia of a/theological discourse demonstrates the use of 
hyperbolic paradox well.  Constructing his grotesque a/theological concepts, he moves 
one errantly towards tentative apprehension, not comprehension, within his discursive 
hyperbolic arguments.  Juxtaposing incongruous concepts, Taylor offers one a world of 
heteroglossia “compossibilities” where “altar-ity” and nonabsent absences (re-
appropriated from Blanchot) reign within a decorum of excess.  His a/theological project 
itself is a paradoxical notion.  This disparate and opposing concept radically 
(de)constructs a hybridity of theology and an un-theology of “nots.”  The “not” un-
theology of unthought he presents is nevertheless a theological project, a postmodern 
theology he has pioneered, that offers insight from the re-presentation of a theological res 
through hyperbole.   
Using hyperbole as trope and figure of thought, Taylor violently pulls verba apart 
and re-assembles it in a disorienting amalgam of radical theo-philosophical ideas.  
Speaking of Heidegger, for example, Taylor writes,  “Riddles.  Riddles that riddle the 
Heidegarrian text.  First Greek.  Then Christian.  Then ‘neither Greek nor Christian.’  But 
first, a further delay – a supplementary deferral in which Der-rid-a again tells us what he 
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is not telling us or is telling us by not telling us.”126  Undermining and riddling theology 
at every turn, Taylor forcefully pushes language to its limits in his decorum of excess in 
order to take one suddenly and shockingly into paradoxical heights that descend again 
into the realm of insight. 
Out of the radical theological tradition of Thomas J. J. Altizer and the crisis of the 
“the death of God,” Taylor develops Altizer’s hyperbolic paradox of Christian atheism.  
Pushing this notion beyond itself, transgressing itself, Taylor’s copious and contradictory 
verba inevitably, though hesitantly, leads to a re-presented and transformed 
understanding of a res.  He argues that the anxiety of a/theology fosters bewilderment 
that “creates seminal openings – openings that make it possible to re-examine and 
reformulate established assumptions and presuppositions.”127  The labyrinthine errancy of 
his discourse exploits kairotic openings that beget vertige de l’hyperbole in the reader, 
i.e., an excess of affectus, which is necessary in order to disrupt conventions but 
eventually re-orient one towards a new apprehension of a res.   
Taylor’s intent overall is to push theology and philosophy paradoxically beyond 
itself.  He accomplishes this feat through the unintentional use of hyperbole in the 
framework of the grotesque.  Within the hyperbolic grotesquerie of deconstructive 
writing that is “always paradoxical, double, duplicitous, excentric, improper…errant”128 – 
“Writing that attempts to trace the border and retrace the margin can…be described as 
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erring”129 – Taylor employs hyperbole as trope and figure of thought at every 
a/theological turn. 
In Erring, Taylor writes of the postmodern “closure of the book” by pointing 
specifically to the paradoxical binaries from which he operates and also disrupts.  In one 
representative passage, he writes: 
Along the margin of the book, opposites that Western thought traditionally 
separates and holds apart appear to be confused:  inside/out-side, 
identity/difference, remedy/infection, purity/pollution, propriety/impropriety, 
good/evil…The paradoxes that result from this interplay of opposites mark the 
closure of the book and point toward erring scripture.130 
 
These paradoxes mark the conceit of the closure of the book, but they are also the 
impetus from which he (re)formulates the transition towards the re-presentation of an 
unexpected res, i.e., “toward erring scripture.”  The paradoxes trace both closure and 
errancy, and this is the impossible grotesque space in/from which his writing is amplified.  
Using paradox as a guide, Taylor explores the impossible possibility and the possible 
impossibility of paradox through hyperbole.   
Writing in “para” – in/through the “parapraxical imagination” that “does not seek 
to heal the wound of words but keeps the mind open by refusing to mend its tear”131 – 
Taylor traces these oppositional concepts along the margins of (un)thought that “mark” 
the openings within discourse where an astonishing (re)apprehension of a res may be 
gleaned.  He does not abandon these contrarieties but fuses them together in hyperbolic 
grotesqueries of thought such as the “not”:  “Not is…a strange, irregular ruler that creates 
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irresolvable paradoxes.  Perhaps the most puzzling paradox of the not is its necessary 
incomprehensibility.”132  This hyperbolic “not” emerges in Taylor’s discourse as he 
“cleaves” incongruities in order to push towards the apprehension that theology and 
a/theology are equally and inevitably impossible.  Forging another hyperbolic 
grotesquerie to aid in this paradoxical task, he develops the concept of “alarity.” 
Altarity is both distinct from and similar to alterity.  It is a tertium quid, a 
grotesque “impossible third,” which cleaves impossibilities in a transgressive space of 
disruption:  “To cleave…is both to separate, divide, or split, and to adhere, cling, or 
stick…This separation that joins and joining that separates transforms the tear of cleaving 
into the tear of pain.”133  The hyperbolic cleaving of the tear of grotesque altarity is a 
hyperbolic figure of thought that creates pathos in the audience through the anxiety 
caused by the tear of cleaving – “The strife of the tear captures the duplicity of 
cleaving”134 – and these tears are the “seminal openings” where the transition towards 
partial insight can begin.  At the “altar” itself, this hyperbole as trope is in “para” at the 
rift, or Riss of Heidegger, where contradictions are bound together and also split apart.  
The altar is the objective representation of hyperbole that is the impossible space of 
paradoxical verba, and altarity is its subjective manifestation as a hyperbolic figure of 
thought that moves towards a certain re-formulated res.  The paradoxical maneuvering of 
Taylor’s “nonsynthetic imagination”135 both uses and is in excess. 
In a particularly disorienting passage from Tears, Taylor writes: 
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The trace of the fugitive gods is the nonabsent absence of the Holy.  This trace is 
a different trace, the trace of difference itself, which can never be expressed 
directly, revealed totally, or known completely.  It is ever elusive, evasive, 
excessive.  Irreducibly ex-orbitant, the Holy eternally returns to interrupt the 
circulation of knowledge and to disrupt every form of reciprocal exchange.  To 
hear the “inhuman,” “anonymous,” “uncanny” murmur of the Holy is to become 
open to that which cannot be conceived, grasped, mastered, or controlled.  To be 
“released” or “drawn” into the un-dis-closable openness of this rending difference 
is to overcome nihilism by no longer “giving a negative reading to that which is.”  
Released from the need to assert self by negating other and incorporating 
difference, one is free “to read the word ‘death’ without negation.”136 
 
Amidst this teeming sea of philosophical complexities and amalgamations, Taylor’s use 
of hyperbolic copia and congeries reveals a decorum of excess at work as he navigates 
across an ambiguous theo-philosophical topography.  Incrementally augmenting, 
accumulating, and building towards the climax of death without negation, he erects one 
hyperbole on top of the other in grotesque combinations, and radical verba leads one to 
partial insight from an unexpected res.  “To walk in the shadow of this death is to linger 
in the Night.  Night…an other Night…Night of the Other…Other of the Night…Holy 
Night…Night beyond Night…White Night…Vigil Night…Waking Night…Night of the 
Wake.”137  Certainly a disorienting goop of verba, the re-orientation towards thinking the 
nonabsent absence of the Holy, which “always implies a certain excess…that is 
unmasterable,”138 is achieved through a decorum of excess where his pathos of confusion 
pushes one into the realm of insight.   
The insight is never comprehended completely, and his stretching of language is 
also a stretching of the self.  Straining the facts and surpassing the truth, Taylor’s verba 
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brings epistemological and onto-theological presuppositions to the margins of possibility.  
His hyperbolic paradoxes remain in suspended apprehension, and his drive towards the 
re-presentation of a res occurs through repetitive, errant hyperbole.  In Erring, his 
immense hyperbolic project builds as one massive demonstration of incrementum and 
congeries driving towards the insight of a “Divine Milieu,” and this extraordinarily 
grotesque concept swims in the uncanny realm of repetitive, marginal disruption.   
In the Divine Milieu, “Eternal recurrence is a paradoxical movement of repetition 
that itself neither begins nor ends.”139  The milieu is the impossible space “between 
extremes.”  It “marks a middle way that is thoroughly liminal.  At this threshold, 
opposites cross” in a spatical miasma of hyperbolic disproportionality.  “The margin 
itself, however, is not reducible to the extremes whose mean it forms.”140  Offering the 
grotesque milieu as a mean between two extremes, Taylor nevertheless constitutes this 
space as hyperbolic where the grotesque impossible third resides and “can never be 
contained, captured, or caught by any fixed pair of terms.”141  Within the Divine Milieu, 
impossible and disparate concepts are cleaved together in a grotesque monstrosity of 
hyperbolic paradox where the mean itself is exploited as impossibility, and this is his 
theological re-presentation of the astonishing res that theology and a/theology each 
inhabit the space of impossible possibility and possible impossibility.   
Taylor’s insight is that theology itself is an a/theological project that is 
incomprehensible – that theology itself is, in fact, a grotesquerie expressed as a 
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hyperbole.  “To write beyond the end of theology is to write the lack of language…[and] 
this lack of language is inscribed in and as the failure of words.”142  Revealing the 
deficiency and limitlessness of language, Taylor uses hyperbole to offer the tear, which 
“eludes the economy of representation,” as a lack of language through the excess of 
writing.  Indeed, theology and a/theology both rely on hyperbole to express the 
inexpressible and the mystical.  Theology is a contradictory impossibility arriving at 
other incomprehensibilities through grotesque deceits that are not lies.  It is a gargantuan 
copia of verba that is unending.  Infinitely differing and deferring, theology is a 
hyperbole that cleaves and transgresses itself, which, as Bakhtin says, is “the very nature 
of exaggeration,”143 and this transgression suggests both the insufficiency and 
inexhaustibility of meaning.144  Not always well received by his audience and often 
accused of kakozelia, Taylor’s decorum of linguistic excess still evokes a res of errant 
transformative “compossibilities,” even if it is only partially apprehended by those who 
are predisposed to receive it.  
TRANSGRESSIVE DE-FORMATION AND ERRANT TRANSFORMATION 
 
More subjective than objective, this variation of hyperbole shown in the grotesque 
relies heavily on pathos to move its audience.  In the errant movement towards subjective 
transformation, transgressive exaggeration is uncontained while always already being re-
contained.  As Derrida says, hyperbole is beyond all totalizing structures but also always 
re-economized.  More precisely, hyperbole does not move beyond belief but beyond 
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reality in order to de-stabilize beliefs.  It forces the center to the boundaries in order to 
expand or annihilate one’s conception of the center.  Mileur defines transgression 
specifically as a hyperbolic movement:  “A hyperbolical reduction of hyperbole to a point 
or moment of crossing, which constitutes the limit it profanes as well as its origin and 
end.”145  He sees the moment/movement of transgression as entirely hyperbolic.  At the 
moment of an impossible crossing that is an a/teleological teleology, a hyperbolic 
suspension of the teleological, hyperbole does not destroy boundaries but repetitively 
transgresses them.  Transgression is both possible and impossible, and it is sustainable 
only through errant hyperbolic repetition, which must be perpetually attempted, though it 
is never complete.  Transgressive de-formation is a hyperbolic impossibility errantly 
wandering towards the possibility of transformation.  It is a hyperbolic conceit on the side 
of hermeneutical truth(s), and it is ever moving towards and away from these subjective 
insights. 
In this vein, Mileur writes, “The subject is…an errant hyperbole,”146 and the work 
of hyperbole is the “extremely hyperbolic representations of the subjectivity that remains 
unaccommodated in language.”147  The subject, as Peter de Bolla states is “the excess or 
overplus of discourse itself.”148  Uncontained and infinitely transgressing itself as well as 
epistemological and ontological boundaries, the residual, de-formed subjectivity as 
excess left unaccommodated can only express itself through the excess of exaggeration, 
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but it is also always errantly wandering towards and away from the margins of 
subjectivity, i.e., transformative moments within thought and discourse.  “The subject 
becomes aware of himself as the hyperbolic, transgressive element in his language; he is 
the point of disorder, the wrinkle, the fold, the source of the disquietude that he tries in 
vain to eliminate from the otherwise placid surface of language.”149  Itself the hyperbolic 
figure of thought for Mileur, the subject moves through the de-formation of transgression 
and errantly, tentatively hopes for a glimpse of transformative possibilities.  Continually 
in the act of becoming, the self is transformed through repetitive hyperbolic 
transgression.  Bakhtin’s and Kayser’s understandings of the grotesque exemplify this 
movement of hyperbole from transgressive de-formation towards errant transformation.  
It is Bakhtin’s notion of grotesque realism, which is constituted through the 
carnivalesque, that highlights this variation of hyperbole well.  In a time of transition that 
is his exigence, Bakhtin views the grotesque (in Rabelais) in entirely liberating terms.  
Through the excessive transgressive de-formation of the carnivalesque, he sees the 
grotesque as the “contradictory and double-faced fullness of life”150 that offers a 
significant act of subjective regeneration and renewal.  In much the same way as Bataille 
views the festival as a transgression leading to transformation,151 the grotesque body is 
the act of becoming and growth within the exaggerated carnivalesque narrative of turning 
hierarchies upside down and inside out.   
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In grotesque realism, all is exaggerated, de-formed, and parodied.  Bodies are 
gigantic and monstrous.  A fusion of body parts and food are distorted and 
disproportionate, and bodily functions are over-emphasized.  Bakhtin writes, 
“Exaggeration, hyperbolism, excessiveness are generally considered fundamental 
attributes of the grotesque style,”152 and he continues, “The exaggeration of the 
inappropriate to incredible and monstrous dimensions is…the basic nature of the 
grotesque.”153  These disproportionate fundamental attributes that are the basic nature of 
the grotesque offer one a decorum where the hyperbolic is the most appropriate 
expression – exaggerating the inappropriate is the appropriate thing to do.  Out of this 
exaggeration comes errant transformation.   
In a theological context, Wilson Yates writes of Bakhtin’s eschatological view of 
the grotesque, “The grotesque can participate in human life in a transformative fashion, 
even though the nature of transformation may vary markedly in extent and insight.”154   
Out of the de-formation of death, struggle, and suffering, the grotesque can foster re-
birth, liberation, and grace.155  Using hyperbole as both trope and figure of thought, the 
grotesque “discloses the potentiality of an entirely different world, of another order, 
another way of life.”156  In Bakhtin’s decorum of excess of grotesque realism where 
exaggerated potentiality, i.e., the “logic of contradiction,” is the norm, the transgressive 
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de-formation of the carnivalesque is performed at an opportune moment of transition that 
leads to the errant transformation of the grotesque.  This kairotic moment is the opening 
where laughter erupts, and laughter as the “unaccommodated” facilitates subjective 
liberation and errant transformation through an excess of affectus.   
Out of this laughter, the residual grotesque body is always in the “act of 
becoming,” which is never finished or completed.  The body is transgressed and then 
subject to “positive exaggeration, to hyperbolization,”157 i.e., the subject as an errant 
hyperbole.  This positive exaggeration leads to images of bodily life such as “fertility, 
growth, and a brimming-over abundance”158 where bowels, genital organs, and anus are 
the “convexities and orifices” that overcome the confines between the world and the body 
through an “interchange and an interorientation.”159  The decorum of excess of grotesque 
realism where the pathos of exaggeration, disproportionality, de-formation, and distortion 
are the norms facilitates the “act of becoming” through a transgression of convention, and 
transgressing its own limits is “the very nature of exaggeration.”160  Out of this repetitive, 
hyperbolic transgression, the self outgrows itself and becomes a new, other self. 
 In contradistinction to Bakhtin, Kayser views the grotesque in more tragic terms.  
Kayser suggests that the grotesque is still contextual and perspectival but that grotesque 
realism is no longer operative.161  Instead, he sees the Romantic grotesque as a tragicomic 
fusion of disparate elements that are “unnatural” combinations, which shatters coherence 
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and highlights a fragmentation of historical order.162  Kayser explicates the grotesque in 
terms of the tragicomic163 – what Frances K. Barasch calls a “grotesquerie”164 – but, 
unlike Bakhtin, he places a heavier emphasis on the tragic.  Laughter is on the fringe of 
the grotesque and is bitter, cynical, and “satanic.”  Rather than (hyperbolic) parody, 
Kayser emphasizes (hyperbolic) satire and the fantastic, which become predominant 
characteristics of the modern grotesque and are focused more on transgression and 
disorder than transformation.165 
Kayser suggests that the grotesque is a structure that is constituted by the 
estranged and de-formed world, a play with the absurd, and an attempt to invoke and 
subdue the demonic aspects of the world, which arises in times of confusion and 
insecurity.166  “The ambiguous way in which we are affected by it results from our 
awareness that the familiar and apparently harmonious world is alienated under the 
impact of abyssal forces, which break it up and shatter its coherence.”167  From the 
grotesque realism of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance grotesque to the Romantic and 
modern grotesque, there is a shift from comic transformation to tragic and inward horror, 
but this subjective dread and terror nevertheless seeks a transition in its attempt to subdue 
the aw(e)ful de-formation of the demonic. 
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Meindl suggests that this shift of liberation to horror and anxiety in the romantic 
grotesque is the “consequence of the confrontation between a subjective and 
individualistic outlook – as cultivated by the romantic hero and artist.”168  “The horror-
oriented grotesque, which plays the decisive part in bringing about the reorientation [of a 
romantic epistemology], is promoted by dark or negative romanticism, which discards the 
Enlightenment construct.”169  Meindl suggests, as does Bakhtin, that laughter can 
liberate; however, the laughter of the romantic grotesque is filtered through fear, “an 
existential, demonic sphere” that functions as a defense against and a threat to the 
individual.170  For Kayser and Meindl, the kairotic moment of the grotesque is still 
laughter, but it is a more threatening laughter that can both subdue the demonic and 
threaten the annihilation of the individual. 
 Combining these two perspectives, hyperbole serves to exaggerate, de-form, 
distort, fragment, transgress, and estrange.  Bakhtin emphasizes folly, which is actually 
wit, and bodily as well as phenomenological distortion, which leads to psychological 
transformation.  Kayser highlights the tragic and psychological estrangement, which 
leads to phenomenological alteration.  In each instance, disorienting impossibilities and 
hyperbolic lies are ever present within the grotesque.  The de-forming impossibilities and 
deceits of hyperbole – the gargantuan, the monstrous, the absurd, and the ludicrous – all 
foster transgression and estrangement from the normative and conventional, but this 
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fragmentation and distortion can lead towards a subjective transformation in thought and 
emotion.   
Returning to the example of Lovecraft’s At the Mountains of Madness, the 
hyperbolic, phenomenological de-formation of Bakhtin’s grotesque is particularly 
evident.  In Madness, Lovecraft joins animal and vegetable together in a tragicomic 
display of force where his hybrid monstrosities stretch epistemological and ontological 
limits.  In Lovecraft’s novel all is stupendous, nightmarish, frightful, ultra-dimensional, 
exaggerated, disproportionate, de-formed, and in the process of potential revelation.171  
Describing the monstrosities discovered at the mountains, he writes, “All guesses about 
its external members had been correct, and on the evidence of these one could hardly 
hesitate to call the thing animal; but internal inspection brought up so many vegetable 
evidences that Lake was hopelessly at sea,”172 and “It was partly vegetable, but had three-
forths of the essentials of animal structure.”173  The grotesqueness of these creatures is 
further emphasized through hyperbolic paradox when he describes them as both 
“excessively primitive and archaic” and “the very extremes of specialized 
development.”174  Using hyperbole, Lovecraft’s de-formed monsters overturn and 
transgress the “natural” and/as subjectivity, but his phenomenological distortions also 
offer one the transforming psychological insight that all that is normative is disfigured. 
Bakhtin’s carnivalesque also suggests that conventional norms must be 
thoroughly disfigured, which necessitates the grotesque process of always becoming.  
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This is also true of Lovecraft.  Through hyperbolic grotesqueries he creates an unsettling 
affectus by resolutely undermining all conventions of “nature” and classical decorum by 
crafting “hideously amplified worlds of lurking horrors which nothing can erase from our 
emotions, and which we would refrain from sharing with mankind in general if we 
could.”175  The “natural” is disrupted and de-formed in his imaginative descriptions of 
Cyclopean cities “embodying monstrous perversions of geometrical laws and attaining 
the most grotesque extremes of sinister bizarrerie.”176  His lurking horrors of 
transgressive de-formation lead one through labyrinthine copia to the insight that all is 
not right with the world.   
The “natural” is not, in fact, natural and always in the act of becoming.  The 
“truth” exists in a hyperbolic realm where all is amplified, exaggerated, and frightful, but 
out of his deformities, an errantly perspectival transformation emerges that can be 
psychologically liberating.  Relying on a decorum of excess where de-formed 
disproportionality is the appropriate and the shocking is the timely, Lovecraft offers 
phenomenological transgression as the conduit for psychologically transformative 
errancy. 
For Rudolf Otto, on the other hand, it is not anthropomorphic or naturalistic de-
formation that transforms, but a de-formation/re-formation of the wholly other as a 
(re)conceptualization of “God,” i.e., mysterium tremendum, which often creates a feeling 
of psychological estrangement and the “demonic,” a diabolic disordering.  Operating 
from the Kantian notion of the sublime, Otto nevertheless responds within Kayser’s 
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grotesque frame to the rupture between the rational and the non-rational, and his 
discussion of the wholly other de-forms/transforms one’s ontological state and 
phenomenological worldview by grotesquely transgressing psychological limits and 
expectations.  In doing so, he presents the audience with an unsettling melding of 
rationality and non-rationality effectively blurring the conventional boundaries between 
two presumed rigidly oppositional extremities.  Steeped in incongruity, mysterium 
tremendum for Otto may be hyperbolically beyond reality, i.e., the non-rational, but it is 
not beyond belief, i.e., the rational. 
In a quagmire of interrelated though distinct terms, Otto argues that mysterium 
tremendum evokes a horrific feeling of dread and can be summarized in two words – 
“absolute unapproachability.”177  In a grotesque frame, he hyperbolically asserts, “The 
‘wholly other’…[is] that which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the intelligible, 
and the familiar, which therefore falls quite outside the limits of the ‘canny’, and is 
contrasted with it, filling the mind with blank wonder and astonishment.”178  Initially 
revealing the ominous savagery of mysterium tremendum, Otto begins to build a 
description of the wholly other as that which transcends, transgresses, estranges, and 
exceeds boundaries as a de-formed, demonic figure of thought.  He also makes the 
assertion that mysterium tremendum is fascinating (et fascinans), a fascination with 
“awefulness” and “wonderfulness”179:  “At its highest point of stress the fascinating 
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becomes the ‘overabounding.’”180  Not only is the grotesque, “monstrous” wholly other 
something beyond the usual and familiar that stirs wonder, fear, and astonishment, it is 
also intensely psychologically fascinating from which one cannot quite break one’s 
“numinous” gaze. 
The numinous is the state of consciousness that is directed towards mysterium 
tremendum,181 which contains the contradictory elements of “awefulness” and 
“majesty.”182  By gazing into the impossible abyss of mysterium tremendum one’s 
affectus is directed towards a “numinous experience.”183  A “‘creature-feeling’ or 
creature-consciousness”184 is a response to and a result of the numinous experience 
occurring at a precise moment.  At this “‘mystical’ moment,” the wholly other is an 
expression of a transcendent “beyond” where numinous consciousness is transgressed 
and errantly transformed through a “‘Dionysiac’ element of transport and fervour” that is 
“stressed to excess.”185  Through hyperbole, Otto re-conceptualizes the possibility of the 
impossible, and the impossible itself, within the numinous experience.   
The numinous cannot be strictly defined, but it is connected to “the holy,” which 
contains a “moment” that is inexpressible, “ineffabile [sic],” and “completely eludes 
apprehension in terms of concepts.”186  The “holy,” as grotesquely sublime (shadows of 
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each other)187 and resisting complete comprehension, includes a feeling of “overplus,” 
which equivalent words in Latin, Greek, and Semitic languages designate “only this 
overplus,” and this “‘extra’ in the meaning of the ‘holy’ above and beyond the meaning 
of goodness” is identified by the numinous.188  Out of the kairotic moment of the 
overabounding “holy,” the closure of which is disrupted and subverted through the 
grotesque and hyperbole, the numinous re-directs one’s thoughts towards an errant re-
formulation of the wholly other, an infinite perspectival re-orientation. 
Subjectively and objectively justified, Otto constructs his hyperbolic argument 
through auxesis.  He also uses subjective hyperbole, creating pathos and causing affectus, 
when describing that “demonic” feeling of mysterium that is filtered through the 
numinous towards a new experience of “creature-consciousness,” and this affectus 
exceeds all boundaries and categories within a decorum of excess.  An ineffable 
impossibility, hyperbole builds towards the grotesque “sublimity” of the “holy” – “The 
grotesque…confounds the very distinction between grotesque and sublime through its 
own duplicity [i.e., a subtraction that is also an addition]”189 – which is the kairotic 
moment when this sublimity is revealed as the de-formed whereby the now dissonant 
numinous is then re-channeled through one’s consciousness towards errant transition.  
The hyperbole builds slowly or arrives all at once in the mind of the individual at 
an apex of experience that is a horrific mystery, a “daemonic dread,” of mysterium 
tremendum: 
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The feeling of it may at times come sweeping like a gentle tide, pervading the 
mind with a tranquil mood of deepest worship.  It may pass over into a more set 
and lasting attitude of the soul, continuing, as it were, thrillingly vibrant and 
resonant, until at last it dies away and the soul resumes its ‘profane’, non-religious 
mood of everyday experience.  It may burst in sudden eruption up from the depths 
of the soul with spasms and convulsions, or lead to the strangest excitements, to 
intoxicated frenzy, to transport, and to ecstasy.  It has its wild and demonic forms 
and can sink to an almost grisly horror and shuddering…[but] it may be 
developed into something beautiful and pure and glorious.190 
 
Here, Otto uses auxesis, which is consistently associated with the grotesque,191 that builds 
towards the horrific and the glorious.  Breaking from ordinary “profane” experience at a 
kairotic moment, the grotesqueness of mysterium tremendum is errantly grasped by and 
also creates hyperbolic effects.  In impossible heights and depths of hyperbole that strains 
and moves beyond “truth,” mysterium tremendum comes “like a gentle tide” (hyperbolic 
simile) or a “sudden eruption up from the depths of the soul” (hyperbolic metaphor), 
which both de-forms numinous consciousness and transforms creature-consciousness out 
of its hyperbolic hideousness.   
Through a violent movement of disrupting spasms and convulsions, one is 
transported into the realm of the demonic or the realm of the beautiful, depending on how 
mysterium tremendum is received and integrated into one’s numinous experience.  
Juxtaposed by its “boundless awe[fullness]” and “boundless wonder,”192 mysterium 
tremendum is a grotesquery of thought and a deceit where coherence is shattered and 
impossible oppositions are held in tension in what Taylor calls the space of the 
impossible third, i.e., a tertium quid.  In this space of unnameable excess, mysterium 
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tremendum evokes the affectus of a de-formed numinous monstrosity, which prepares one 
for transition.  Mysterium tremendum may arrive suddenly or slowly, and the 
transformation it causes does so as well. 
The numinous experience is an ontological, psychological movement where “I 
pass over or make the transition from one feeling to another as my circumstances change, 
by the gradual decrease [attenuation] of the one and the increase [accumulation] of the 
other.193  Through the auxesis of hyperbole, one transitions through pathos from a de-
formed sense of mysterium tremendum towards a transformed conception of wholly other 
that is excess and in excess.  After achieving the height of hyperbole, “This process [of 
psychological movement] is one of steady ‘descent’ into the interiors, into the ‘grottoes’ 
of being, in the hope of finding a core, but always finding more transformation.”  
“Awareness is turned inward toward…contingency and change, with the added problem 
that this may actually change the thing being observed [i.e., that ‘Alien Thing’ that may 
be perceived as wholly other],”194 which for Otto is the inner self as object of subjective 
observation.  Without unity or synthesis, the wholly other is and creates a metamorphic 
flux within the individual that is errant, perceptual transition in a world that is radically 
mutable. 
Within a Kantian framework, Otto posits that the extraordinary “sacred” 
experience breaks from the ordinary “profane” experience, which issues from intuition 
and towards “cognitive apprehension” whereby one’s perceptual field is altered, 
supplemented, or transcended by “peculiar interpretations and valuations,” e.g. judgments 
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about ethics or aesthetics.195  Beyond sense-perception, however, religious ideas and 
feelings reside in the mind independently of sense-experience, and hyperbole 
“precipitates a heuristic experience in which imaginative and cognitive limits are tested,” 
which may cultivate “lasting ambiguity.”196  Attempting to synthesize opposites – the 
rational profane with the non-rational sacred (though these reverse and bleed into each 
other) – through Kantian “imagination,” Otto nevertheless presents an ambiguous 
contrariety causing cognitive dissonance, creating astonishment rather than admiration, 
and evading complete comprehension.197  
The wholly other does not break into the ordinary, but religious ideas and feelings 
break from ordinary perception creating a psychological and ontological de-
formation/transformation even as complete comprehension is never attained.  Within a 
decorum of excess, the magnitude of mysterium tremendum, which is most effectively 
described through disproportionality and diabolical disruption, breaks from, or 
transgresses, the ordinary at a “moment” when one’s attention is shockingly arrested and 
prepared for an errant transformation of thought and emotion.  The non-rational, a priori 
elements of “holiness” converge to reveal “the hidden depths of the spirit itself.”198  In a 
grotesque key, Otto’s mysterium tremendum can only be conceptualized through 
hyperbolic force within a decorum of excess where all is monstrous, overstated, and an 
overplus.  Out of this transgressively de-forming experience of psychological 
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estrangement, epistemological and ontological transformation emerges as a perpetual 
phenomenological act of hyperbolic becoming. 
The transgressive de-formation transitioning towards errant transformation is 
hyperbole functioning in the grotesque to disorient and re-orient one’s given perception 
and interpretation of reality.  Bakhtin’s and Kayser’s conceptualizations of the grotesque 
highlight this movement well.  Whether a phenomenological disruption moving towards a 
psychological change or a psychological de-stabilization moving towards a 
phenomenological re-orientation, the de-forming/transforming theme of hyperbole’s 
disorienting/re-orienting function is pervasive within the grotesque.  The insight of the 
grotesque reveals the function of hyperbole. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The disorientation/re-orientation function of hyperbole is a complex one.  Implied 
in the two foundational functions of hyperbole, this meta-function operates at a meta-
theoretical level encompassing both of those foundational functions.  Even the intricacies 
of hyperbole such as a decorum of excess are governed by disorientation and re-
orientation, which is why this is also the most important function of hyperbole.  
Revealing the underlying impetus for hyperbole to re-orient through disorientation, this 
function is the foundation upon which hyperbole succeeds or fails. 
 Various tactics such as remedia are employed to prevent hyperbole’s failure, but 
if one cannot see beyond the literal, then the insights hyperbole can offer are forfeit.  The 
pathos used to move the audience, the dissonant kairotic moment and/or speech achieved, 
and a decorous re-orienting within a decorum of excess are all for naught if hyperbole 
suffers rejection and the condemnation of kakozelia.  Impossibility and hyperbolic lies 
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may achieve vertige de l’hyperbole, but if it is not well received and re-directed towards 
some transition of meaning or being, then hyperbole is rendered useless and even 
detrimental to one’s overall argument.  In every instance, however, the primary purpose 
of hyperbole is disruptive, errant transition, i.e., to teach and to move. 
 Exemplified in the grotesque as well as epideictic, the risk of hyperbole is the risk 
of disorienting/re-orienting change or transformation.  A grotesque body or a Foucauldian 
panegyric, hyperbole offers the promise of transition, but its price is the movement 
through disorder, contradiction, and deceit.  This movement heightens the risk of being 
misunderstood, and risking misapprehension in order to alter one’s perspective or 
interpretation of reality makes hyperbole a particularly precarious trope.  More than any 
other trope, hyperbole’s shocking, surprising force is radically paradoxical and 
confounding.  It does not synthesize or gently compare.  It does not make tentative 
connections or subtly undermine.  It bludgeons and befuddles.  It emphatically disrupts, 
rends veils, dismantles, de-forms, transgresses, and deconstructs.  It brings blunt force 
trauma and power (energeia), and its intent is brutality.   
Re-presenting an extraordinary res, insight, transformation, and decorous re-
orientation is the hyperbolist’s goal, but the hyperbolist attempts this persuasive feat by 
violently stretching and bending verba and decorum to its limits.  The promise of 
hyperbole is also its most profound danger.  The hyperbolist moves the audience into the 
uncertain, slippery tertium quid of “beyond reality” where hyperbole may seem “beyond 
belief,” and only the audience can accept the invitation back towards a (re)interpreted 
reality where norms are actively being violated and truth is surpassed in the name of new 
epistemological and ontological insights.  
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 Yet, even the errant res hyperbole offers may be disorienting itself, as it is with 
Taylor and Sigur Ros.  Resisting the confines of synthesis, hyperbole moves dialogically, 
paradoxically, and discursively in between and at the margins of thought and language as 
it exploits and explodes perceptual gaps where disorientation and the possibility of re-
orientation occurs.  The insights apprehended may be disturbing and frightening, as in 
Lovecraft and Otto, and it is for this reason that disorienting impossibilities and 
hyperbolic lies are resisted.  Not all are receptive to hyperbole’s heights, but those who 
venture into the unknown of the nonabsent absence will undoubtedly return with a 
transformed and more resonant apprehension of an extraordinary res.  Hyperbole can 
offer important phenomenological and psychological purpose to its audience, and this 
purpose is the desire for transformation that is achieved through and is always already in 
excess. 
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CONCLUSION:  THE GREATEST TROPE IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSE 
 
The language of mystical unknowing thus circles around its God in a hyperbolic naming 
which speaks the radical anonymity that sustains the soul’s insatiable desire. 
Thomas Carlson 
 
When we try to follow virtues to their extremes, vices appear from everywhere which 
mingle imperceptibly with them…And vices are there in crowds at the other end.  The 
result is that we get lost in the vices and no longer see the virtues. 
Blaise Pascal 
 
DISRUPTING THE LIMITS OF LANGUAGE AND KNOWLEDGE 
 
The function of hyperbole, from its attempt to express the ineffable and 
extraordinary to its effect of stretching the limits of conventions and reason, makes it an 
important and vital trope and figure of thought.  These attempts at description and 
disruption are made despite the inadequacies of language and speech to communicate 
what may be perceived as an incommunicable and incomprehensible res balanced on the 
edge of madness and monstrosity.  Regardless of these insufficiencies, hyperbole 
(re)presents the extraordinary by operating, or “throwing,” beyond reality but not beyond 
belief.  It joins the decorous with the unexpected and makes the unbelievable believable, 
and it can strengthen pistis and point the way “beyond” as it defies the laws of ratio and 
probability through its forceful use of pathos to move the audience.  
One might hesitate or recoil at the use of hyperbole because our relation with 
hyperbole is a difficult and strained one, but it is the chief way the inexpressible is 
communicated.  Hyperbole is often used to describe indescribable events in order to 
communicate a departure from the ordinary that seems beyond reality.  From 9/11 to 
Katrina, these events can only be described through the force and contrariety of 
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hyperbole.  Impossible events in the mind of Americans, they are perceived as beyond 
reality and almost beyond belief.  Through the descriptions of these events, an infinite 
array of verba, the use of hyperbole leads one to a re-imagined res within a decorum of 
excess where most are receptive to hyperbole because of the magnitude of these events, 
which only hyperbole can figurally push the imagination towards through a descriptive 
and emotional surplus of reality.  Offering impossible descriptions of psychological and 
phenomenological contradictions as hyperbolic lies on the side of expanding conceptions 
of truth(s), the possibilities such as altering the American consciousness from a 
perception of invulnerability to vulnerability, i.e., 9/11, or bringing the cohesion of a 
newly created sense of American identity, i.e., Katrina, can be constructed.  
Presenting the American audience with the wounding and healing of hyperbole, 
hyperbole offers a salve in response to extraordinarily traumatic events, which it also 
excessively describes.  Hyperbole forces one to gaze into the face of exaggerated 
contradiction and intense anxiety so that one may come out on the other side of horrific 
experiences.  9/11 and Katrina are literal events, but these events are duplicitously 
assuaged within the festering wound of hyperbole.  As a type of poison that is also 
antidote, hyperbole both exploits and delimits our fear of excess.  
Hyperbole is a different type of language operating within its own (il)logic of 
excess.  It offers a different kind of speech where a lie that is not a deception can be 
employed on the side of a particular conception of truth(s), which is always lacking, that 
hyperbole thoroughly disrupts through the abundance of excess.  Hyperbole stirs one’s 
emotions through the convergence of power and luminosity in a grandiose display of 
insight that transcends or throws beyond the purview of logic and reason thereby creating 
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the intensity of vertige de l’hyperbole, which threatens to dismantle the conventions of 
reason and rationality.  Revealing that reason is madness and madness is reason through 
its “mad audacity,” this vertigo is precisely the disorienting crux of hyperbole’s function 
to momentarily suspend presuppositions before they are re-oriented towards audacious 
phenomenological and psychological re-formulations, though full comprehension is 
effaced from view. 
In an age of excess when we are struggling with the transcendent and immanent 
and are emerging out of the dizzying stupor of existentialism (the impossibility of 
possibility) and the disorienting promises of romanticism (the possibility of 
impossibility), we are grasping errantly for something more, and it is hyperbole that aids 
in this task.  From the litigious discussions of impossibility and difficulty to the 
conceptual (re)articulation of transgression, the unconscious, subjectivity, and the de-
stabilization of systems of knowledge and economy, hyperbole is the most effective, 
duplicitous, and (in)appropriate attempt at expressing  these often confounding and 
inexpressible positions.   
Often accused of tastelessness and insincerity, a new aesthetic understanding of 
hyperbole for an age of excess that is itself re-formulating what it means for some thing, 
thought, or idea to hold aesthetic value can be significant.  The grotesque and the sublime 
are obvious expressions of this ambiguity as they are sometimes regarded with disdain 
and sometimes revered as aesthetic vehicles par excellence.  Balancing upon a precarious 
marginality, the aesthetic (re)assessment of these concepts resides tenuously within the 
perceptual gaps riddling notions of transcendence and immanence. 
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Between one’s perception of transcendence and the residual 
materiality/corporality of immanence, hyperbole resides in the perpetual interval cleaving 
these two spatio-temporal (im)possibilities together by disturbing, disrupting, and 
transgressing norms and conventions while hinting at new and re-imagined realities.  
Signifying lack as well as abundance, hyperbole forcefully beckons the hearer to “throw 
beyond” convention and risk a de-stabilizing epistemological and ontological shock of 
transformation where immanence and transcendence grotesquely coalesce.  
Hyperbole is a tenuous bridge between transcendence and immanence.  The 
immanent often fails to describe the extraordinary adequately, and it is at this moment 
that hyperbole becomes vital and necessary.  When language or thought must transcend 
epistemological and ontological boundaries in order to describe the magnitude of a given 
situation, hyperbole is the tropological formation and figure of thought that can reveal the 
transcendent power to re-imagine immanence.  Unlike any other trope, hyperbole 
traumatically and forcefully pushes and strains meaning and being to the margins of 
thought whereby one might surpass a given perspective or worldview and re-envisage the 
world differently.  Through paradox and obscurity, hyperbole reveals the wondrous and 
the marvelous about a given context.  Beyond “ordinary” language and a “given” reality, 
hyperbole may be viewed with fear and suspicion, but it is the most appropriate vehicle to 
think and to express the inexpressible. 
The madness of demonic hyperbole, the-attempt-to-think-demonic-hyperbole, 
offers “marvelous transcendence” (daimonias hyperboles) and is a redemptive figure of 
turmoil revealing other truth(s) and possibilities, which are as yet unrealized 
potentialities.  The hyperbolist acknowledges that hyperbole’s attempts at audacity are 
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never enough, but hyperbole errantly repeats itself anyway in order to shatter with 
hammer blows the ossification of the literal – where not enough is too much – and move 
one into the figural – where too much is not enough.  Transcending temporal and spatial 
perspectival realities, daimonias hyperboles exorbitantly attempt to re-present what might 
be beyond one’s epistemological and ontological realities. 
Hyperbole holds the real and the ideal in irresolvable tension.  It reveals the 
impossible distance between the ineptitude and the infinite multiplicity of language to 
describe that which is indescribable.  Hyperbole is a trope of and for use in the present 
moment, making the distant seem immediate, even as it always points beyond itself to 
something more, making the disparate seem possible.  One may not fully comprehend 
what that more might be, but a glimpse, a glimmer of apprehension, is offered through 
hyperbole.  It bridges the gap between what is spoken and what is meant and can translate 
figurative language into emotional meaning.  Hyperbole is the possibility of always 
(re)imagining something more and other that is just beyond one’s grasp.  At the far 
reaches of the imagination when seeing through a glass darkly is not enough, hyperbole 
shatters the glass and strains one’s perceptions to a breaking point in order to exceed 
one’s given reality. 
Creating significant moments of inventio as well as elocutio, the hyperbolist self-
consciously uses hyperbole knowing that it may be misunderstood or mis-apprehended.  
The enormity of a particular exigence is so severe that the only trope capable of 
communicating the extraordinary is the one that so adamantly risks miscommunication.  
Impudent in the extreme, hyperbole prefers too much over not enough, and the 
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affirmation of hyperbole is its impossible lie that must be re-directed towards and through 
errant, alternate ways of perceiving meaning and being.   
Hyperbole dramatizes the impossible itself and is, as Puttenham suggests, a “lowd 
lyer.”  The extremity of hyperbolic speech and/as kairotic speech offers disrupting 
contradictions to force some type of transition onto the hearer, even if that transition is to 
a place of disturbing ambiguity.  Out of this ambiguity, change occurs.  Slowly or all at 
once, feigning subtlety or wielding brutality, the hyperbolist risks hyperbole’s own mis-
apprehension for the benefit of the audience to see beyond itself towards as yet unrealized 
horizons of (re)imagination.  However, it is fear and suspicion of exaggeration and excess 
that problematizes our relation with hyperbole.  We are not quite certain what to do with 
it or how to contain and control it, and we are often afraid of the radical disruption it 
offers even as we seek psychological and phenomenological transformation that can only 
occur through tenacious inordinateness. 
EXCESSIVE MODERATION AND MODERATING EXCESS 
 
The difficulty with embracing this trope of excess arises out of our problematic 
relation with excess itself.  Ingrained into the very fabric of our social order is an 
uncertain and conflicting view of excess.  To be “in excess” is to delve into the realm of 
sin and vice, and we are taught from an early age to resist this excess.  One must not 
embody excess because one must not sin or live in vice, which violates the moderation 
that is seemingly held in such high regard.  The accusation of “too much” is a phrase as 
profane as any curse one might utter.  That one has too much money is an accusation of 
greed.  That one eats too much is the condemnation of gluttony.  That one thinks about 
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sex too much is the deplorable vileness of lust, and the list of sins and vices goes on.  
Excess is not to be trusted.   
Many say that America overindulges, lives in excess, and gorges itself on 
consuming everything it can.  For this, it is viewed as evil by some and the Promised 
Land by others, though the latter deny America’s excessiveness even as they relish in it.  
This is the paradox of our relation to excess.  It is feared and suspect, but it is also desired 
and embraced.  It is this confusing relationship with excess and exaggeration that causes 
our enigmatic relation to hyperbole to exist, and the contradiction within hyperbole itself 
is a contradiction that both satiates and fuels the desire for excess.   
On the one hand, we have embraced the golden mean as the golden rule from our 
Greco-Roman and Puritan ancestors.  On the other hand, the golden rule of our society is 
to consume voraciously without reserve whether this is commodities, knowledge, or 
religious experience.  We search after prosperity and living life to its fullest while also 
restraining ourselves.  When one buys something “on sale,” for example, does this not 
express the paradox of excess perfectly?  Yes, one might have spent a lot of money, but 
think of all the money saved!   
Confounding in the extreme, those who live moderately are praised but also 
viewed as economically, experientially, and socially poor.  Those who live in excess 
and/or possess a disproportionate amount of wealth are praised but also vilified and 
envied (yet another excess).  Embedded within the American psyche, it is said that if we 
live right, in moderation, then we will be blessed.  If we work hard and keep our noses to 
the grindstone, then one day we will be rewarded.  Karma happens, and when it does, 
sacrifices made will be replaced with abundance.  The relation to excess is equivocal and 
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pervades every aspect of our lives.  Both poison and remedy, hyperbole-as-pharmakon 
evades complete comprehension.  
The Puritan mindset of prudence, for example, is thoroughly entrenched within 
the American consciousness, but this alleged attitude of radical moderation has its own 
excesses.  Puritans literally expunged excess from their midst, though this occurred 
paradoxically through excessive acts such as witch-hunts, and justifications for this 
excess were offered as a defense of moderation.  Many even said that we did not 
excessively conquer other civilizations because it was our manifest destiny, i.e., an 
abundant blessing bestowed by God for our moderate, Christian living and restrictive 
obedience.  One might even suggest that the exaggerated restraint of prohibition is the 
excessive resistance to excessive debauchery.  It seems that appearance is what matters.  
One’s outward self must seem prudent even as a surfeit of desires swirl within the inner 
self, but as Tertullian and Augustine remind us, the inner erupts into the outer.  Even as 
we embody hyperbole, we also attempt to smother it beneath a façade of prudence.  The 
apparent self we project is the literal lie exceeding the hermeneutical truth(s) of our inner 
self.  Excess cleaves our outside to our inside and our inside to our outside. 
Just as Greco-Roman rhetorical theorists and the “Church Fathers” wrote about 
excess, those who espouse a prosperity gospel today paradoxically encourage living in 
moderation in order to gain abundant blessings, e.g., wealth.  For the Greco-Romans and 
“Church Fathers” the blessings of state, democracy, citizenship, or God were the reward.  
In this view, one is not to live excessively in vice, which leads to intemperate living or 
even the gates of hell, but one is to exude austerity while at the same time spending, 
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consuming, and even thinking lavishly about God, politics, or philosophy – with a nod to 
moderation – which leads to success and enlightenment.   
One must live moderately and “above reproach” as Paul says and not be a “leaky 
jar” as Plato says, but theologically and philosophically the “good news” must be heard 
and lived to the extreme.  One must seize every opportunity but not appear to be an 
opportunist.  It is no wonder that a trope which embodies excess is resisted, enveloped in 
paradox, and viewed as such a contradictory expression.  It is no wonder that hyperbolists 
are demonized and considered deceivers.  Is not “Satan” the very embodiment and 
scapegoat of what we view as all that is excessive, as the ultimate hyperbolist? 
Excess is our insatiable desire never to be fulfilled but always sought, and we 
have paradoxical (mis)understandings of how to deal with it or what to do with it.  
Religious institutions, e.g., Christianity, presumably act as vanguards against excess, but 
their stipulations and doctrinal declarations and our obedience to them are also excessive.  
The “not” to one kind of excess is the “yes” to another kind.  Yet, the Christian message 
is itself excessive.  God gives a surplus of love without remainder through Christ who 
exceeds normative human boundaries.  Grace and salvation are excessive concepts and 
are offered excessively to forgive an excess of sin.  As Paul says, “Where sin abounds, 
grace much more abounds.”  Christ’s sacrifice to ensure this grace and salvation is an 
excessive gesture, but this excess is controlled and contained by those who espouse it.  If 
God as an impossible possibility actually existed, would that not be more monstrously 
terrifying than our impossible conceptions of God? 
Rather than operating within a type of decorum of excess, the Christian message 
is tamed and toned down within a highly regulated restricted economy of religion.  Grace 
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and salvation are offered only to those who accept it in a particular form and a particular 
way, e.g., only through baptism, only through the Eucharist, or only through the Church.  
In Catholicism, access to this excess is restricted even further through the confessional 
and the priesthood.  Most intriguing of all, those who are “saved” often cannot accept the 
grace they are promised, and they turn to an excess of shame and guilt.  They suffer 
inwardly for their sin because they cannot integrate excess positively into their lives.  It 
seems that the excessive exaggeration of “original sin” is too much and far outweighs the 
promise of and the desire for infinite grace.  Psychologically, the complexities of excess 
are confusing, and we are confused by it.  The same is true of exaggeration.   
“I thought you were just exaggerating.”  “That’s a mere exaggeration.”  “Come 
now, don’t exaggerate.  Tell the truth.”  These are the phrases one hears time and again, 
and yet, we enjoy exaggeration, or we are at least fascinated by it.  The exaggerated 
grotesqueries of disasters, violence, and even terrorist acts where, say, the overabounding 
incongruity of a plane flying into a building or a student assassinating fellow students 
holds our attention.  We cannot look away.  We must see it again and again.  It is 
repeated on every news station at our disposal.  We are psychologically bound to 
exaggeration and excess as we are to its opposite. 
Even in academic “disciplines,” we are to be modest in our claims and are not to 
exaggerate our conclusions – because that is a lie – but what if the magnitude of our 
conclusions deserves or even demands to be exaggerated?  What if too much is exactly 
the right amount?  Or, we are taught not to deviate from our restricted economy of 
writing, but what if what we need to communicate is precisely an unrestricted economy, 
an excess of verba to arrive at the re-presentation of an extraordinary res?  We must write 
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conservatively but publish excessively.  We indulge in philosophical excesses and praise 
them as heralds of a new paradigm or era, but we contain them in theoretical constructs 
while also explicating them incessantly.  We attempt to disorder order through 
epistemological and ontological excess and exaggeration – “in theory” – but we loathe 
giving up our order of disorder.   
Even if the exorbitant theories of academics might result in physically violent 
consequences, we continue to embrace and to contain them within our conventional 
modes of communication since they are only figures of thought.  We argue for 
exaggerated reform and even excessive revolution despite the fact that we do not actually 
live out and express these thoughts in our everyday lives because we might be perceived 
as an extremist.  Even if we did, would it be as intense as our writings signify?  Are not 
revolutionaries often put to death, the ultimate excessive cessation of life?  Social 
movements as the excessive representations of thoughts and ideas are squelched or tamed 
down into manageable, moderate, academically demarcated “moments” in history.  
Academics speak of excessive “transgression,” “anarchy,” “heterology,” or “alterity,” but 
we do not always act out or integrate these concepts into our lives because they are too 
much.  They become traumatic, and so we cover them with excessive fantasies, which are 
displaced by other “theoretical” fantasies and replaced with yet other, “safer,” fantasies. 
The scientific paradigm exemplifies the tenuous relation we have with excess.  
Exploring and discovering, ever expanding the horizon of knowledge, are concepts 
already prone to excess, and we have a seemingly insatiable desire to push them even 
further.  Moving along the curve of hyperbole/hyperbola science flirts with transgressing 
the limits of human knowledge even as it moderates this process by categorizing and 
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compartmentalizing its discoveries into constricted modes of examination.  In highly 
controlled experiments, the unknown and uncontrollable are harnessed by placing them 
into knowable parts.  Excessively capturing, violently tearing apart, and dissecting our 
world, scientists paradoxically attempt to counteract and unify all that is unknowable and 
mysterious while also theorizing about the inexplicable, e.g., in quantum theory and 
quantum mechanics, which is also an attempt to explicate the unknown.  A battle rages 
within the scientific paradigm between excess and moderation. 
Teetering on the fragile edge of excess, science inhibits excess with excessive 
control.  The physical sciences scrutinize the outer world, and neurophysiology and 
neuropsychology delve into the inner world of the brain and the human psyche.  Probing 
and searching, the amorphous realm of the unconscious is dismantled and put together 
again.  The impetus to investigate is always excessive, but the impulse to restrain this 
force, e.g., through bioethics and the scientific method, is equally as strong.  Explaining 
the literal with hyperbolic conceptual models, i.e., lies on the side of perceptual truth(s), 
scientific hyperbolists move through disorienting impossibilities towards other 
possibilities of thought and knowledge. 
Radical in the extreme, the epistemological and ontological promises of hyperbole 
are both fascinating and viewed as dangerous, and our relation to hyperbole and our 
relationship with hyperbolists are dubious at best.  Academics both embrace Derrida’s 
scandalous re-interpretation of a res and resist his verba as “errant texts [that] graph an 
infinite course at the edge of the abyss, of madness and of silence.”1  We hesitantly 
meander around Heidegger’s verba seeking his re-imagined res about Being, worlding, 
                                                
1 Taylor, Tears, 103. 
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and reveiling/unconcealing difference between Being and beings as a surplus and an 
excess.  We both praise and fear Taylor’s a/theology because it threatens the clearly 
demarcated systematics of theology.  We revel in the theoretically transgressive de-
formation of the carnivalesque, but we balk at its transformation when it is our bodies 
that might be transgressively exaggerated.  Praising and resisting hyperbolists like 
Rabelais, Zizek, Bataille, and Foucault, disordering societal norms and conventions is 
both exciting and terrifying.   
Societies seek spiritual resonance, but they do not want to pass through 
disorienting dissonance to achieve it.  They seek societal transformation but cling to the 
accepted order.  The hyperbolists they praise, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., are also the 
ones they destroy.  Moving through impossibilities towards other possibilities is simply 
too impossible, and transformation through hyperbole is stifled and dismissed.  The jump 
into contradiction is too inconvenient, which is another way of saying too much than one 
can handle.   
Religions praise impossibilities and mysteries, but it seems that only saints, 
mystics, and ascetics are willing to embody hyperbole and move through this unknown 
terrain to arrive at other possibilities of meaning and being in the world.  One is not even 
quite sure what to do with these extremists.  They are excommunicated or venerated and 
sometimes both.  Surprising and disturbing, those who live a life of embodied hyperbole 
are often excommunicated in life, which is quite an excessive gesture, but venerated after 
the excessive finality of death. 
A monastic life or the life of a nun is an exaggerated one, though highly admired.  
We allegedly value obedience, but the very lives of hyper-obedience they lead are 
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recondite.  For this, they must be physically and spatially compartmentalized into 
monasteries and nunneries and placed at the psychological and geographical margins of 
societal and religious life.  Those such as the Quakers are also both revered and placed at 
the fringes of society.  Amish communities are misunderstood, and their radical 
separation from normative society is viewed as an excessive lifestyle.  As we learn from 
Otto, it is easier to accept the rational and distance ourselves from the non-rational, and 
even Otto’s psychological mysterium tremendum is a defense against irrationality since 
he constructs and dissects it within a rational framework.   
Whatever else hyperbole may be, it is the attempt to contain our fear of excess 
within a tropological expression because it exposes the inadequacy and inexhaustibility 
of language and reality.  Out of fear and suspicion, those who view moderation as the 
golden mean of rhetorical decorum approach the excess of hyperbole as too much.  Even 
those who view hyperbole more positively still tend to emphasize a certain moderation 
and caution its use.  Stretching the limits of language, thought, and decorum, those who 
see the epistemological and ontological benefits of hyperbole attempt to accommodate its 
forceful onslaught of tropological force, but the risk of this hospitable view of hyperbole 
is the risk of misapprehension.  Perhaps no other trope creates as much anxiety or is as 
psychologically disturbing for rhetors and audiences as hyperbole.  
IMPLICATIONS 
RHETORICAL THEORY AND CRITICISM 
 
Rhetorically negotiating the psychological struggle with excess is a daunting task 
because hyperbole is not simply psychologically frustrating but is also problematic 
rhetorically.  Hyperbole is a lie.  It is just a deceit.  It is ridiculous and foolish.  It serves 
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no productive rhetorical purpose.  These are the typical accusations (as defense 
mechanisms?) made of hyperbole.  Indeed, the history and exploration of hyperbole is a 
venture into contradiction, ambiguity, extremity, and paradox.  Though it may be 
similarly defined throughout its rhetorical history, the attitudes held regarding this 
tropological representation of excess are widely divergent and even oppositional.   
 Largely forgotten or neglected as a critical trope in current rhetorical theory, I 
explored the two functions and one meta-function of hyperbole in order to offer a 
different view of hyperbole than current rhetorical scholars are used to, and it presents 
hyperbole in a new light.  Through my analysis of hyperbole, for example, I was able to 
produce fresh insights into the epideictic and grotesque genres, tropological theory, 
kairos and decorum, sophistic rhetoric, and the relation between hyperbolist and 
audience.  Examining the epideictic and grotesque genres, I showed that hyperbole 
expresses itself in a variety of forms, and these forms reveal much about hyperbole as 
well as the hyperbolist.   
It seems that overall, rhetoric has a love-hate relationship with hyperbole born out 
of fear, confusion, and suspicion, and the prejudices against hyperbolists can be severe.  
Using a variety of remedia and relying more on affectus than ratio, the hyperbolist 
negotiates the tension between unsettling transformation and the audience’s affinity for 
stability, order, and normativity.  Just as a prophet, the hyperbolist stands at a distance 
from the audience and offers a radical message of transition.  The hyperbolist stands 
alone and can be judged harshly unless ethos and pathos are used effectively.  Interpreted 
literally, the hyperbole fails, but the instances of hyperbole’s failure are equally as 
interesting as its successes.  Understanding the complexities of hyperbole’s functions and 
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its operations within a decorum of excess can help rhetorical critics and theorists 
recognize, explore, and even re-evaluate these successes and failures.  Thus, one 
implication hyperbole offers for rhetorical theory and criticism concerns the question of 
judgment. 
 For example, certain judgments made about hyperbole’s use within discourse and 
who might be considered a hyperbolist can be re-considered.  Are the apocalyptic 
sermons of John Hagee any less eloquent than the eschatological speeches of Martin 
Luther King, Jr.?  Is the political hyperbolic satire of John Stewart any less sophisticated 
than traditional political discourse?  Is the rhetorical “street shitting” of Gunn’s essay any 
less decorous than a papal encyclical or a presidential inauguration?  Are the hyperbolic 
lies within Foucault’s discourse to be dismissed for their historical inaccuracies?  Does 
not the apocalyptic message of the Left Behind series offer kairotic speech in the same 
way as political activists or radical environmentalists?  Should fear and suspicion truly 
dictate what rhetorical theorists and critics consider eloquent or stylistically acceptable?  
We are too bound to historical presuppositions about rhetoric that we often miss the art of 
hyperbolic persuasion with its radically altered epistemological and ontological 
perspectives, its alternative forms of inquiry, and our judgments about hyperbolic “texts” 
or theoretical concepts may thus be skewed. 
 Considering rhetoric’s exploration of the sublime, for example, judging how the 
sublime is either communicated and/or imagined successfully or unsuccessfully can be 
reconsidered by more fully apprehending hyperbole’s functions and the hyperbolist’s role 
in a rhetorical situation.  That the sublime is buttressed by hyperbole can aid in 
significantly pushing rhetorical theory’s interest in the sublime forward.  As the vehicle 
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for expressing the ineffable, hyperbole gives further insight into how the sublime 
functions and operates effectively or ineffectively within discourse and aesthetics.  
Actually constructing an aesthetic theory using hyperbole could radically alter 
impressions and conclusions regarding the sublime and the beautiful.   
Perhaps exploring certain aesthetic issues and transcending presumed aesthetic 
categories through a grotesque hyperbolic framework or combining the sublime and the 
grotesque, as Victor Hugo suggests, through hyperbole, since hyperbole tends to go in 
either direction towards the sublime or the grotesque, might reveal new insights into 
hyperbole, aesthetics, and our perceptions about aesthetic judgment.  Or, rhetorically 
constructing a theory of the Longinian sublime combined with his understanding of 
hyperbole and then applying it to Kantian notions of the infinite and sublime, erupting at 
the limits of human consciousness in the irreducible excess of the infinite, and the 
beautiful is certainly worthy of consideration.  Perhaps, as Johnson asserts, despite Kant’s 
alleged aversion to rhetoric, he uses hyperbole to structure many of his arguments.  This 
perspective could radically alter certain judgments made about Kant’s overall discourse.  
Disrupting commonly held assumptions regarding these issues, hyperbole, and the 
hyperbolist is one way rhetorical critics and theorists might re-evaluate their observations 
concerning various aesthetic theories.  
 As already suggested in the previous chapters, exploring other tropes in relation to 
hyperbole is a task rhetorical theorists must examine and re-formulate.  Considered by 
several theorists of hyperbole to be a trope-producing trope and the master trope, an 
understanding of tropological theory in general must be re-visited.  The four master 
tropes, so named by Vico and solidified by Burke, are now put into question and are 
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effectively destabilized from their venerated pedestal.  If hyperbole is indeed a trope-
producing trope and the most effective way to express the inexpressible, then it is not 
simply the four master tropes that need theoretical expansion but a new conceptualization 
of how tropes operate within discourse through hyperbole.  Judging how these tropes 
work in tandem must also be re-examined. 
 Re-conceptualizing hyperbolic metaphor or hyperbolic simile or hyperbolic 
parody, or satire, or irony are all productive ways hyperbole might be employed within 
rhetorical theory, which can foster re-interpretations of these tropes and genres.  How 
does a metaphor operate differently from a hyperbolic metaphor?  What does it mean that 
irony might function through hyperbole and produce vertige de l’hyperbole, e.g., as Hugo 
and de Man suggest?  In what ways does hyperbole produce and facilitate the use of these 
tropes and genres?  I have already shown how the epideictic and grotesque genres 
exemplify hyperbole and can be re-interpreted through hyperbole.  Certainly, this affects 
one’s understanding of genre criticism and how it might be approached.  Our judgments 
about eloquence, style, kairos, and decorum must also be re-configured. 
Understanding Zizek’s or Derrida’s oeuvres as using a hyperbolic style and 
kairotic speech within a decorum of excess to make their arguments changes the 
accusations of kakozelia, with which they are often lambasted, to praise of intricately 
woven hyperbolic arguments.  That is, they might be praised as adept and skillful 
hyperbolists who fully embrace hyperbole’s functions.  Using hyperbole to critique and 
deconstruct others’ hyperboles can shed new light on various “texts” using this excessive 
style as well as hyperbole itself.  Already entrenched within the infinite differing and 
deferring movement of signification, hyperbole seems an appropriate expression of this 
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type of writing-in-excess that is already in excess and signifies excess.  Always pointing 
beyond itself, the differing and deferring signification of language requires a surpassing 
of alleged truth(s) that is the work of hyperbole.  How one approaches language itself 
might be re-considered.   
The excessive re-duplication of writing effaces the author/self, and the hoped for 
but never attained hyperbolic transgression of writing is the process of becoming-as-
repetition that embraces and also displaces transgression with transformation as errant 
hyperbole.  The impossibility of transgression is asserted in order to arrive at the 
possibility of the author/self that can only erupt from the excessive fissures within writing 
as moving beyond truth and reality itself, and the impossibility of desire doubles back 
upon itself in order to perpetuate the possibility of the work of writing as a hoped for, 
even eschatological, vision of what writing-the-self might one day become but never is.   
Rhetorical critics might even re-explore criticism, as performance, itself as a 
hyperbolic endeavor.  For example, Guerlac notes, “If exaggeration was a term of 
criticism, criticism is transvalued into praise through exaggeration of the critical term.”2  
Or, as Mileur says, “The work is a hyperbole, the intersection of other hyperboles, and 
the subject is, insofar as he can be written about at all, another hyperbole.”3  Viewing a 
critical term as hyperbolic and even approaching a piece of criticism itself as a hyperbole, 
one might consider this critical work as a flow of verba that stretches discursive limits 
and leads one towards the re-presentation of a res; or, as an impossible lie errantly 
wandering towards other truth(s).  In particular, Guerlac’s statement implies that criticism 
                                                
2 Guerlac, The Impersonal Sublime, 64. 
 
3 Mileur, The Critical Romance, 86. 
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might even use hyperbole in epideictic form whereby it references the shared values or 
terms of criticism, it re-formulates them, and offers a new literary reality as an invented 
great through the work of auxesis within a decorum of excess.  As de Man says, “The 
work must become a project aimed toward an unreachable goal,”4 and this unreachable 
goal is the invented great that promises attainment while at the same time defers its 
presence in endless repetition.   
The analysis and critical term(s) of the critic are then judged to be valid or invalid 
based on the coherence of the argument, the employment of the term(s), and the critic’s 
epideictic ethos.  In this view, offering a profusion of praise or exaggeration of the 
critical term, “text,” the critic’s conclusions, or even the critic’s brilliance itself in order 
to reveal a unique insight at an appropriate and opportune moment is the purpose of 
criticism.  Often, impossible uses and disproportionate, daring heights are imbued upon 
the critical term so that the criticism itself, the critical position maintained, may arrive at 
other possible conclusions.  The act of criticism itself may be judged to be a significant, 
though unrealized, expression of hyperbole.   
RHETORIC AND RELIGION 
 
The second major implication hyperbole offers rhetorical studies is related to the 
relationship between rhetoric and religion.  The entire rhetorical approach to and 
connection with religion and theology becomes more complicated through the lens of 
hyperbole.  If theologians are adept hyperbolists, then rhetoricians can both learn from 
and explicate their theoretical constructs of remedia and affectus in inventive new ways.  
                                                
4 De Man, Blindness and Insight, 43. 
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Viewing apologetics or heresies from a hyperbolic perspective, even placing them into 
the same category of hyperbolic discourse, is certainly an imaginative way to (re)examine 
these divergent theological positions.  Exploring cataphatic and apophatic rhetoric 
through hyperbole is another worthwhile endeavor since via positiva and via negativa are 
replete with disorienting hyperbolic lies and impossibilities and flourish within a 
decorum of excess.   
Viewing specific rhetorical theologians such as Tertullian, Augustine, Anselm, 
Aquinas, Erasmus, and even Luther and Calvin through the lens of hyperbole 
significantly alters our presuppositions about these theologians as well as how their 
theologies are constructed and interpreted.  A staunch dialectical Scholastic, Aquinas’s 
use of hyperbole can reveal the necessity of hyperbole for rhetorical theological 
discourse.  Or, re-interpreting Augustine’s blending of rhetoric and Christianity through 
the lens of embodied hyperbole can affect the perceptions of his inward psychological 
turn and his theory of preaching within a decorum of excess.   
A radical theo-philosophical re-interpretation of Jonathan Edwards is currently 
underway, and a new apprehension of hyperbole certainly casts the significant disconnect 
between his theology and many of his sermons in new light.  Indeed, approaching 
“Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God” from a hyperbolic perspective completely 
modifies our typical interpretations of that sermon.  As Edwards was fascinated with the 
psychology of “enthusiasms,” perhaps this sermon offers a heuristic through the 
impossible lie of hyperbole in order to move towards other possible truths about 
Christianity or the psychology of the Awakening since this sermon is highly divergent 
from his theology and philosophy.  One could even approach his sermon from the 
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standpoint of an Augustinian psychology within a decorum of excess of worship through 
preaching.  Are not the sermons and revivals of George Whitefield, which induced 
psychological and physical “enthusiasms,” also hyperbolically employed?  Perhaps all of 
the Awakenings erupted out of a decorum of religious excess where exaggerated 
falsehoods were preached on the side of re-conceptualizing given truth(s).   
From Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God to current 
Fundamentalist rhetoric, political rhetoric, and theoretical theo-philosophical discourse, 
hyperbole and its decorum of excess re-maps the theoretical field of rhetoric and religion.  
Even apocalyptic discourse, with its literally figural and figurally literal expressions, that 
is already widely explored in the field of rhetoric might be re-interpreted through 
hyperbole since this trope has a pension to exacerbate the tension between the literal and 
the figural, which is always a difficulty when examining apocalyptic rhetoric. 
Hyperbole, theology, and religion all reveal the interesting interaction between the 
literal and the figural.  Rhetorico-theologically, one might conceive of beliefs as literal 
manifestations of metaphysical absoluteness and faith as a figural disruption of onto-
theological claims.  Literal statements of belief may be rescued by remedia, but if not, 
theological work ceases at belief before it can move into figural faith statements of more 
theoretical complexity.  Beyond theology, but just as “religious,” beliefs in political 
ideologies can be just as powerful.  Nationalism is one such ideology that holds 
significant sway over humanity, and free market, neo-conservative ideology is a form of 
corporate, economic power relying almost entirely on the literal.  Literally believing in 
and unquestioning state power is undoubtedly a failed hyperbole.  Or is it? 
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Beliefs certainly offer lies on side of someone’s truth, and they are impossible 
conceptions that lead to other possible ways of conceiving meaning and being in the 
world.  These possibilities may be disastrous, but they are possibilities nonetheless.  
Exaggerated speeches, propaganda, treatises, and pamphlets buttress these ideologies.  
However, as I argued in chapter three, literal belief statements are often qualified with 
remedia as “but” statements so they do not fail as hyperboles, and this is still true.  
Propaganda, for example, offers no “but” statements.  It reinforces the “is” of the literal 
through the figural, rather than disrupting this “is” and emphasizing the fluidity of figural 
hermeneutic truth(s) through the literal lie of hyperbole and, therefore, cannot be a 
hyperbole.  A movement away from the figural is a movement away from hyperbole 
since hyperbole can only exist in a figural realm where its (il)logic of extremity can be 
effectively employed.  Literalism leads to absolutism and not hyperbole.  To pursue the 
literal is to deny hyperbole, and when hyperbole is denied or mis-apprehended, 
epistemological and ontological imagination is stifled. 
The mythological/theological imagination, for example, becomes empty and 
meaningless when bereft of hyperbole and the figural because within mythic thought 
everything is meaningfully figural and governed by the mediation of oppositions, e.g., 
Mircea Eliade’s “hierophany” as a “mysterious act” manifesting something of a different 
order and reality.5  This movement through impossibility towards transformational 
possibilities simply cannot occur in the realm of the literal.  As Roland Barthes suggests, 
“Myth is speech justified in excess,”6 which “aims at an ultra-signification…and stretches 
                                                
5 Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane:  The Nature of Religion, trans. Willard R. Trask 
(New York:  Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1959), 11. 
 
6 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers (New York:  Hill and Wang, 1972), 130. 
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to the limit the link between signifier and signified.”7  For Barthes, language itself is a 
mythological system of signification, and this system is justified in/by excess itself.   
The literal does not stretch the limit between the signifier and signified but 
attempts to make a direct connection between a signifier and a particular signified.  When 
the hyperbolic movement of disrupting this connection fails, then so do new imaginative 
possibilities and the act of “perpetual metamorphosis.”8  For many, it is perhaps easier to 
simply proceed along the path of the normative and the familiar rather than struggle with 
the difficulty of remembering that the literal is the figural.  When faced with destabilizing 
order and conventions, these movements may simply be too much for hyperbole to 
disrupt. 
Examining the mythological/theological imagination from the perspective of 
hyperbole, a rhetorical theorist or critic might take up questions of the self, subjectivity, 
desire, and transgression through a discussion of asceticism.  Rhetorico-theologically, 
asceticism can be viewed as the theological and rhetorical hyperbolic, hagiographic re-
inscribing of the self, i.e., a writing of the self in excess as both lack and abundance, and 
the self is the exigence of subjectivity guided by the curve of hyperbole that is the path of 
desire.  The subject is a literal embodiment of hyperbole that is the figural enactment of 
desire within a decorum of bodily and psychological excess, i.e., a theological or 
a/theological re-orientation.  The self becomes a spatio-temporal, phenomenological grid 
where intense pathos moves one psychologically towards epistemological and 
ontological transformation.   
                                                                                                                                            
 
7 Ibid., 133. 
 
8 Harpham, On the Grotesque, 77. 
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Asceticism is not withdrawal from the world but a hyperbolic engagement with a 
normative, reified perspective with which one is dissatisfied.  It is kairotic speech and a 
disorienting transforming of one’s subjectivity and symbolic universe through a 
hyperbolic mode of existence.  Thus, the ascetic can be viewed as a grotesque hyperbolic 
self-in-transition through transgression leading errantly towards an alternate way of life – 
a self watching itself transition towards an Other self.  This mode of existence is guided 
by desire-as-hyperbole, and its heterological intent is nothing less than absolute 
transgression, paradox, and contradictory hybridity.  Indeed, what I am offering in this 
paradoxical ascetic “work” as a hyperbolic expression of transgressive subjectivity 
traversing the errant path of desire is a hyperbole about hyperbole in epideictic, as well as 
grotesque, form. 
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